THE DYNAMICS OF SYSTEMS OF SECONDARY CITIES IN AFRICA:

URBANISATION, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Cities Alliance
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ABSTRACT

Secondary systems of cities in Africa (SSCA) have become the subject of renewed interest by scholars and international development organisations. This book explores the role played by secondary cities in the development of African countries and regions. It includes a review and discusses trends, influences, and challenges, including the forces of New Economic Geography, facing the development of secondary cities in Africa. Using a systems approach, it examines urban governance, economic, development, social, and environmental factors that have shaped the development of secondary cities. Eight country and city case studies illustrate how they have approached urbanisation, decentralisation, and other processes supporting secondary city development. Case studies include Cape Coast in Ghana, Dire Dawa in Ethiopia, Gabès in Tunisia, Huambo in Angola, Ibadan in Nigeria, Mombasa in Kenya, Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth) in South Africa, and Touba-Mbacké in Senegal. These case studies provide insights and knowledge about challenges facing the development of secondary cities within the selected countries. Learning outcomes are presented for each country case study, followed by an outline of opportunities open to secondary cities in Africa to become more competitive, dynamic, and liveable. The roles that international development assistance agencies and organisations can play to support the development of secondary systems of cities are discussed. The book concludes with a call for a new urban age agenda for the management and development of African secondary cities. This is focused on the need for improved urban governance, management, planning and economic development, and for enhancing connectivity and logistic systems to build collaborative partnerships between secondary cities and create a strong network of national systems of cities across the continent.

Key Words: Africa, systems of cities; secondary cities; urban systems; urban development; development policy; international development assistance

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAPG	Annual Average Population Growth
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AfDB	African Development Bank
ANICT	Agence National d'Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales (National Agency for Investment in Local Regions)
CBD	Central business district
CCM	Cape Coast Metropolis
CCMA	Cape Coast Municipal Assembly
CDS	City development strategy
CEDS	City economic development strategies
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COP26	2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019 (also known as novel coronavirus/2019-nCoV)
CUT	Coalition of Urban Transitions
DCP	Diaspora Community Projects – Kenya
DFLA	Development Fund for Local Authorities
DHS	Demographic and Health Surveys, Nigeria
DPAT	District Performance Assessment Tool
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
ECCAS/ CEEAC	Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDRI	Ethiopian Development Research Institute
EIU	Economic Intelligence Unit
EMR	Extended Metropolitan Region
EPZ	Economic Processing Zone
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FBO	Faith-Based Organisation
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FONIC	Fonds National d'Investissement Communal (National Fund for Local Investment)
GC	Gini coefficient
GCIF	Global City Indicators Facility
GDP	Gross domestic product
GGGI	Global Green Growth Institute
GIS	Geographic information system
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI	Gross National Income
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
GVA	Gross value added
HDI	Human Development Index (indicators)
ICT	Information and communications technology
IDMC	International Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Integrated development plan
IDPs	Internally displaced persons

IFAC	International Federation of Accountants
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estatística
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IWI	International Wealth Index
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JWP	Joint Work Programme (Cities Alliance)
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
LED	Local economic development
LGA	Local government area
LGTAS	Local Government Turnaround Strategy
LGU	Local government unit
LMIC	Low- and middle-income countries
LVC	Land Value Capture
MAs	Municipal Assemblies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MINUH	Ministério do Urbanismo e Habitação
MIS	Management information system
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MSE	Micro and small enterprise
MSMEs	Micro, small and medium enterprises
NCE	New Climate Economy
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
NMBM	Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality
NPDP	National Physical Development Plan
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OECD/ SWAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Library/Sahel West Africa Club
PEV	post-election violence
PNDAT	National Planning and Development Plan (Plan National d'Aménagement et de Développement du Territoire)
PNOTU	Política Nacional de Ordenamento do Território e Urbanismo
pp km^2	Population density (people per sq. km of land area)
PPP	Public-private partnership
RFGs	Responsiveness Factor Grants
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCSP	Secondary Cities Support Programme Project
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEZ	Special economic zones
SMEs	Small and medium enterprises
SNG-WOFI	World Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and Investment
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSCA	Secondary systems of cities in Africa
UCCLA	União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa
UCLGA	United Cities and Local Governments - Africa
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UESP	Urban Environmental Sanitation Project
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
UMDF	Urban and Municipal Development Fund
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2020)

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UN-Habitat & ESCAP	United Nations Human Settlement Program & Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

UNIDA	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	Value-added tax
WAMZ	West African Monetary Zone
WASH	Water, sanitation, and hygiene
WaSSIP	Water and Sanitation Service Improvement Project
WEF	World Economic Forum
WHO	World Health Organization

FOREWORD

The COVID-19 pandemic has presented a significant challenge to the future recovery and development of African cities. Africa's largest cities and metropolitan regions are expected to recover faster from the pandemic. Secondary and smaller cities are expected to recover much slower. Even before the pandemic struck, however, many of these cities struggled to gain an equitable share and benefit from national economic development, investment, and resource allocations. Subsequently, there have been growing disparities in the development of national systems of cities in Africa. These disparities are set to widen unless governments are prepared to take action to reverse this outcome.

Secondary cities play a vitally important role in supporting the livelihood of almost 80% of Africa's population that does not live in the large cities and metropolitan regions. They are centres of subnational government, logistics, employment and services. They range in size from 100,000 to 1,000,000 or more in some of the more populated countries of the continent. However, they have not been given prominence in the focus of national urban policy, capacity building and infrastructure investment. As a result, the national system and spatial pattern of development of cities in many countries have become distorted, with a single large metropolitan region dominating the economic, political and population structure in most African countries.

Africa cities are urbanising and developing rapidly. However, the current trends in the spatial pattern and development of national systems of cities are not sustainable. In many African countries, the very high concentration of urban populations in one sizeable metropolitan region poses a significant risk to the national economies, political stability, and resilience of those countries, should a disaster strike. Some of these metropolitan regions produce more than 40% of the national GDP. A more dispersed and equitable spatial pattern of urban and economic activities in African countries is needed to spread the risks of the high level of national wealth concentration in one city and create opportunities to realise the development potential of secondary city and regional economies. This potential needs to be recognised and realised if African countries are to grow and develop equitably and sustainably.

In recent years, the African Development Bank and Cities Alliance have supported various projects and programs for developing secondary cities across the continent. This common interest has brought the two organisations together on publishing this book. The book provide comprehensive insights into the dynamics of the system of secondary cities in Africa and how secondary cities are developing, performing and managing the challenges of urbanisation. It calls for a new urban age agenda for supporting the development of secondary cities and outlines how governments and international development agencies and organisations can play a role in this. Putting a greater focus on the development of secondary cities can help to improve their performance, while contributing to the fight against climate change and promoting sustainable development and post COVID-19 recovery. Above all, the many lessons and improvements outlined in the book can contribute to the maximisation of benefits of secondary cities in supporting the development of African countries and improving the lives of citizens that live in or benefit from them.

African Development Bank

Mike Salawou
Ag. Director,
Infrastructure and Urban Development Department

Cities Alliance

Greg Munro
Director
Cities Alliance Secretariat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The populations of African cities are expected to grow by more than 900 million by 2050. Many of these people will live in secondary cities. These cities are a sub-set of cities within national systems of cities. Secondary cities play a critical intermediary role in the operation and development of local and regional economies of national systems of cities and regions. They are a vital part of the fabric of the production, distribution, and logistics systems of national economies. Unfortunately, they have become a neglected area of policy and economic development in the post-independence era in Africa.

African cities are dynamic places full of life, vibrant business, and social activities and are growing and changing very rapidly. Approximately 44% of Africa's population lives in cities. This figure is likely to be much higher, given the definitional problems with the term 'urban.' *Africapolis*, supported by the OECD, argues that urbanisation has already exceeded 50%.

An estimated 180–200 million people live in secondary cities of 100,000 to 1 million or higher in the case of Ibadan in Nigeria. These cities comprise between 12.5% and 15% of the total urban population of Africa, depending on how 'urban areas' are defined. They mostly perform second-tier level government and business functions and play a critical intermediary role in regional value-adding, logistics supply chains and subnational levels of education, governance, community and social services delivery and economic development. Some, like Luxor (Egypt), Touba-Mbacké (Senegal), and Stone Town (Zanzibar), have significant international links to tourism.

Since the early 1960s, scholars and international development organisations have shown an intermittent interest in researching issues affecting the management and development of secondary cities in Africa. However, there have been relatively few in-depth primary research studies conducted on secondary cities in recent years. For several decades, secondary cities have not been at the forefront of urban policy development and research; good data and information are unavailable or difficult to obtain.

There is a growing interest and need for research on systems of secondary cities in the region to underpin improvements in the planning, development and management of these cities in order to enable them to become better governed and more competitive. South Africa, Rwanda, Ghana, Egypt and Uganda have shown a strong interest in raising the conversation on the importance of secondary cities to the development of nations.

This book investigates the dynamics of systems of secondary cities in Africa. It builds on the considerable research on systems of secondary cities undertaken by the Cities Alliance. The book's first six chapters introduce the concept of secondary cities and examine the general trends and patterns of their development, policy, challenges, population and financial management. Eight-chapter case studies by different authors provide more detailed assessment data, information, issues and opportunities about secondary cities in eight countries, which offer new insights that expand the current knowledge base. The final two chapters synthesise the learning outcomes from the research and outline opportunities, frameworks, and initiatives for a new-age urban agenda for African secondary cities and possible roles for official development assistance agency support.

DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY CITIES IN AFRICA

While a considerable effort was made to collect data and information that provide indicators for the development status of secondary cities, that data was difficult to obtain from census and other records and often does not exist.

State of African Cities

Currently, there are an estimated 1,765 cities in Africa with a population of more than 50,000. Around 143 of these have populations of more than 500,000 people, based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) estimates. This number is expected to increase to 245 by the year 2035. The most significant growth in the number of cities is expected in western Africa, a region with a population growth rate of 2.6% and an urbanisation growth rate of 4.1%. Most of this growth will occur in cities with populations between 500,000 and 1,000,000. It is expected that cities of 300,000 to 1,000,000 will absorb most urban population growth in eastern Africa.

The average densities of cities are around 4,070 persons per km^2 (pp km^2) but range from 6,265 pp km^2 in northern Africa to 2,454 pp km^2 in eastern Africa. Secondary cities tend to be higher and exceed 8,363 pp km^2 in northern Africa but fall as low as 2,571 pp km^2 in eastern Africa. The general level of services in secondary cities for water, sanitation, waste collection, roads and electricity is below that of metropolitan areas.

Policy Development

All but two African countries (Ethiopia and Liberia) experienced a significant period of colonial rule. As a result, the pattern of development in African secondary cities has been influenced strongly by colonial development policy, with that influence continuing to varying extents post-independence. Most African secondary cities are regional administrative centres of provincial governments. Most are small, except in South Africa and Nigeria, where several secondary cities have populations over 1 million.

Weakness in administration, e-government, education, health, and other online services effectively prevent many African secondary cities from having equal access to services, information and technologies available in large cities. Some countries, such as Rwanda and Kenya, seek to enhance connectivity along economic development corridors using the internet and other technology. However, secondary cities in these and most other African countries fall short of what is needed to support more competitive, inclusive and sustainable local economies.

Population and Migration

There are two primary sources of data used for the study: the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and Africapolis, a geospatial database for research and data visualisation supported through the OECD Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC). Africapolis contains data on over 9,000 urban agglomerations in Africa. There are significant variations in the two sets of data, however, because of the way each organisation classifies 'urban'. The OECD (Africapolis) data uses a geographic information system (GIS) to measure the population of urban agglomerations; UN DESA uses official country measures based on administrative area and populations thresholds set for cities. Africapolis data shows significant agglomeration levels, with secondary cities for Africa between of 100,000 to 500,000 inhabitants growing at over 4% per year. United Nations DESA shows cities between 1 million and 5 million growing fastest, at 3.7%. Large primary cities have growth rates of around 2.6%. Still, cities such as Lagos (Nigeria) have many clustered secondary cities from spill over growth. The actual level and rate of growth in the population remains confusing because of the urban definition problem.

FIGURE E.1 | Percentage Distribution of African urban populations by city size, 2015 (Africapolis)

Source: Africapolis Database (2020).

Most urban growth occurring in African cities (based on spatial imagery) appears to occur in urban centres with populations between 300,000 and 500,000.

Migration, both internal and external, is a significant driver of the population growth of secondary cities across the continent and is expected to remain so in the future. Migrants living in urban areas comprise around 30% of the total urban population, or 75% are rural-urban or inter-urban migrants. Secondary cities play a significant role in migrant pathways from rural to metropolitan regions. In secondary cities, migrants are generally better educated, have lower dependency rates, comprise a higher percentage of the population, and a pyramid population structure varies significantly to that of city-born residents.

Many refugees from conflict zones settle in secondary cities close to borders — and this place enormous pressures on places like Kakuma in north-west Kenya. Refugees are found to make a significant contribution to secondary host-city local economies.

Development Challenges

While most African cities are experiencing severe urban growth management problems, secondary cities are experiencing significant and unique problems. These cities generally have poor urban governance and management systems. Many lack basic infrastructure, good education, and community and health services and have unreliable urban and regional logistics systems. While many African secondary cities have dynamic local economies, they are primarily consumption-driven, with a sizeable informal employment sector. Their peri-urban areas tend to be highly dispersed, with inhabitants engaged in semi-subsistence activities. In these cities, the population and labour force also tend to be transitionary, with migrants frequently returning to rural areas or moving into metropolitan regions when employment is not available. Urban slum proliferation is one of the most significant existing challenges.

The development of secondary city local economies is dominated generally by the transport, government, agriculture and trading services sectors. Some secondary cities, such as Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana, Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth) in South Africa, and Mombasa in Kenya, have significant industrial and transportation-based economies. Except for South Africa, industrialisation has been slow to develop within sub-Saharan Africa countries. This is due to poor infrastructure, logistics, lack of capital, skills and governance systems. Skills loss through emigration has weakened the development of all sectors of African economies.

The inefficiencies of urban governance, management and logistics systems add substantially to business and government transaction costs in secondary cities distant from large metropolitan regions. Many are becoming heavily reliant on domestic and foreign remittances to supplement household income and support local economic activities. Urban financial management, revenue, land management and administration systems are weak. Land and housing markets are distorted, uncertain, lack transparency and are influenced heavily by expatriate investment. Property and land tax evasion are widespread. Secondary cities struggle to attract investment and find it challenging to build and retain educated and skilled human capital.

The COVID-19 pandemic, and more recently the economic fallout and disruption to global supply chains from the crisis in Ukraine, has set back Africa's development for many years. Covid-19 recovery will be one of the most difficult challenges for African secondary cities. The coronavirus initially impacted the continent's largest cities, but as cases rose, unemployment and economic activities declined, and many urban migrants were forced to move back to secondary and other regional cities and rural areas. This led to the spread of the virus. African secondary cities have weaker economies, governance structures and resources to support recovery efforts. As a result, the gap between recovery efforts in large metropolitan regions and secondary cities will widen. Secondary cities must not be left behind in the focus of recovery efforts, as they, in turn, are needed to support extensive rural communities, towns and cities.

National governments have not shown a solid commitment to implementing administrative and fiscal decentralisation policies to encourage greater local autonomy, responsibility, and effort to promote local economic development by secondary city governments. While the development of some secondary cities has been driven strongly by natural resource extraction, productivity improvements in the agriculture and more advanced services sectors are low, especially in education, information, and business services. Failure to invest in these has undermined the ability of secondary cities to compete.

Many African secondary cities do not have the capacity and know-how to develop competitive, export-orientated economies and industries. The possibility of advanced economies decoupling from the global economy and their moves to reclaim greater economic sovereignty and re-shore manufacturing may well change the neoliberal economic development model of free trade. Should this occur, prospects for African export industries will be impacted substantially, and African countries and cities will need to focus more on stimulating endogenous growth, national markets, and trade between cities. Regardless of developments in the global economy, strategic change is needed to national urbanisation and regional economic development policies that recognise the importance of secondary cities in countries' social and economic development.

The lack of reliable data and information on African secondary cities, especially sub-Saharan Africa, is a significant inhibitor to developing urban policy and knowledge about the dynamics of secondary cities. Some countries such as Kenya and Ghana have good statistical bureaus that provide detailed information and make census and other data readily available in electronic form. In Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and Ethiopia, data on secondary cities is poor, making analysis of trends and preparing evidence-based policies difficult. Africapolis, an OECD-supported database, offers comprehensive information on the spatial geography of more than 8,000 urban agglomerations in Africa; however, there are significant differences between its population estimates and United Nations data because definitions of 'urban', and the envelope areas used to collect data are different. Africapolis provides a more realistic perspective on urban agglomerations in Africa.

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Skills loss through emigration has weakened the development of all sectors of African economies.

CASE STUDIES

The case study cities show the diversity of approaches and efforts made to support the management and development of secondary cities in eight African countries. The case studies selected are as follows: Cape Coast in Ghana; Gabès in Tunisia; Huambo in Angola; Dire Dawa in Ethiopia; Mombasa in Kenya; Ibadan in Nigeria; Touba-Mbacké in Senegal, and Gqeberha in South Africa. Each case study includes a brief review of the history of national urbanisation and municipal government arrangements, demographics of primary and secondary city development, description of the economic geography of secondary cities, policies on urbanisation and secondary city development, decentralisation, problems and issues affecting secondary city development, and initiatives and policies necessary to support secondary city development.

The case studies provide valuable insight into the many challenges secondary cities face in developing and implementing a wide range of plans. The capacity to develop and the resources to implement plans is an issue raised in all case studies. The case study of Huambo illustrates the many challenges that secondary cities affected by conflict and civil war have in recovery. The case study of Touba-Mbacké is an excellent example of a secondary city facing development challenges from climate change and the impact of international tourism, being a significant Islamic religious centre.

Gabès is a significant port and industrial centre in Tunisia that is facing environmental problems, which are affecting investment attractiveness and human health and quality of life. Mombasa, another port city in Kenya, is facing significant development problems from population growth and social issues associated with employment. It is a city undergoing significant transformation as it redefines itself as one of Eastern Africa's major gateway ports. Gqeberha is a city experiencing transformation problems with the decline of heavy industries, especially businesses affected by automobile manufacturing closure.

Cape Coast is a secondary city that has not benefited significantly from the rapid economic growth in Ghana over recent decades. It struggles with urban management issues, especially the loss of forest lands and erosion of the coastal foreshore. It is a city with great potential and a good university but lacking the capacity to develop. Ibadan is a vast secondary city. Despite having a population of several million, it functions as a set of policy-centric networked secondary cities. This results in significant urban management challenges to metropolitan management planning and services delivery. It is a problem that many secondary cities will need to address as they expand in the future.

LESSONS

The challenges facing African secondary cities are of a different scale and magnitude to those experienced in the large metropolitan regions, and local context factors such as climate, culture and civil unrest often exacerbate problems. These differences call for national governments to develop policies and programs that are more specific and responsive to the needs of secondary cities within their countries. The following summarises some of the key lessons and learning outcomes of the research.

Colonial Government Legacies continue to Influence Urban Development Policies: Despite many former colonial countries reforming their planning systems, laws, and practices over recent years, many former colonies still rely on old systems to resolve issues, e.g., master plans and court systems. Some changes occur due to political reform; however, as an area of policy focus, secondary cities are not a policy priority for most African countries.

The Dominance of Primacy in Africa Cities: Africa's urbanisation is dominated by the high levels of primacy in its systems of cities. In 41 out of 51 countries, more than 15% of the urban population live in the largest city, while in 27 countries, more than 30% live in a metropolitan region. In Togo and Djibouti, more than half of the urban population lives in the country's largest city. The dominance of urban primacy has led to significant distortions and inequities in the development of cities and regions.

Economic Geography: Studies have shown that the economic geography of secondary cities has similar characteristics. Most secondary cities are driven by consumption and trading activities, with a significant proportion of the labour force engaged in informal sector employment. They are generally much poorer, less competitive, have weaker economic governance, and have lower value-adding industry activities.

Decentralisation and Devolution: None of the African countries studied adopted national decentralisation and devolution policies focusing on the planning and development of secondary cities. Decentralisation and devolution are necessary to empower secondary cities to be more autonomous, responsible and accountable in developing and delivering on localised approaches to policy, economic and financial management for dealing with urbanisation problems. Public sector management and governance processes in secondary cities need to be resourced, and people must be trained and given technical support and technology to do this.

Urban Governance: Governance is a challenge revealed in all the case study cities. The source of most of these challenges is the growing centralisation of political power and control of development finance at the expense of local autonomy. The centralisation of power has dire impacts on local governance because of the dependency on the political will and controls at the 'centre'. Many gains of decentralisation and devolution from earlier decades have been lost, especially because of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has seen central governments take back a lot of responsibilities and functions.

Financial Management: All secondary cities studied faced significant municipal finance and budgetary challenges. The failure to improve revenue generation; reform financial and budget management practices; and address financial mismanagement, wasteful expenditure, insolvency and corruption make countries unattractive – especially to international investments. The reliance on central government grants to pay wages and develop and maintain infrastructure and basic services results in insufficient monies being available to fund essential services adequately. Outlays on salaries often exceed 70% of budget outlays. There is a need for secondary cities to become more financially sustainable and self-sufficient.

Economic Development Policies: There are considerable variations in national/secondary city investment. While petroleum and resource-rich countries can generate the revenues for investment, such as in Angola, Botswana, Ghana, and Nigeria, most African countries struggle to attract foreign direct investment. Many still rely heavily on bi-lateral and multi-lateral assistance and remittances to support their development and wellbeing. Most countries are still applying an export growth development model to create an environment attractive to foreign investment in order to develop export markets. Only South Africa has a strong export manufacturing sector. Some countries, such as Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, and Senegal, are mobilising domestic investment through reform. However, most benefits occur in metropolitan/metropolitan regions with little flow-on to secondary cities and subnational regions.

Infrastructure: Without exception, all of the case study cities have old or obsolete infrastructure, large un-serviced urban areas, and insufficient capacity to accommodate high population growth rates. Very few secondary cities have integrated infrastructure plans, public investment plans or capital works plans linked to long-term funding and budgeting.

Land Administration and Management: Land is a complex issue in all secondary city case studies. All of the countries studied have gone through 'experiments' to try to solve the challenges. Land problems in all cities are multifaceted and multi-layered: examples include `nationalised' land in Nigeria and Ethiopia; millions of live landmines in Angola, which plague the development of regional towns and cities; and the tiered jurisdiction system, fraudulent land agents, and land disputes that make orderly development of land in expanding urban areas difficult.

Human Capital Development: Data on human capital and skills development indicators for African secondary cities is poor. Human Development Index data is seldom available at a state, provincial, or local government level. Within Africa, the case study countries and cities have low rankings in human capital development (where data is available), compared to the rest of the world. Where data is available, location quotient data at the region and city levels show low levels of educated and skilled human capital

development in the 25 to 45 age group. There is a significant hollowing out of skills in this age cohort. Many with an education or with professional or trade skills migrate to the larger cities to seek greater economic opportunities and higher salaries.

Quality of Urban Environment: While there are well-kept urban residential and parkland areas in the case study cities, the majority of secondary city environments are of poor quality due to the general lack of autonomy of local government arrangements, the poor economic base, rapid urbanisation, the lack of appropriate policies and funding, the lack or deterioration of infrastructure, complicated land transaction issues and the poor or complete lack of investment in municipal services. The result is poor street lighting, a prevalence of overcrowded, poorly built, high-density informal housing; overflowing solid and sanitary wastes; polluted waterway systems; a failure to control air pollution; a lack of access to clean water; and the prevalence of controllable human diseases. Few secondary cities are prepared for or have plans to manage climate change.

Social Development: Clear articulation in the case studies of social issues associated with education, health, housing, wellbeing, crime and security was difficult because of a lack of reliable data. The migration studies showed that secondary cities are often the first receiver for refugees, rural-urban and economic migrants. Unemployment is often high, particularly among the youth; informal employment exceeds 70% of working-age adults in many inland secondary cities; and the range of economic opportunities is limited. Secondary cities are less able than metropolitan regions to provide adequate social services due to poor governance (lack of outlets for inhabitants to participate in planning their futures), inaccessibility to land, the lack of or slow service delivery, unmet expectations, issues of social diseases (e.g., STD, HIV/AIDS), poor housing and lack of funding. These conditions often result in anti-social behaviour; racism, crime, vandalism, and drug-related crime is a significant problem in border and cross-border secondary cities.

Doing Business: Most secondary cities currently are not competitive enough to attract secondary city investment on their own accord. Gqeberha is one of a very few secondary cities globally to be a centre for the motor vehicle assembly industry. Some secondary cities have developed a competitive position in national education, such as the University of Cape Coast, Ghana, while Ibadan, Arusha (Tanzania), Marrakesh (Morocco) and Luxor have developed competitive advantages in tourism, although they have been drastically affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Weak Policies and Initiatives to Support Secondary City Development: Secondary cities' competitiveness and economic efficiency require the effective devolution of powers and responsibilities in order to manage their affairs, develop local economic development plans, and develop more robust networks of competitive and collaborative trading cities, where this is advantageous. Collaboration between secondary city governments, institutions, and businesses would help overcome economies of scale for small businesses and reduce business and services transaction costs. The case studies show very few attempts to improve collaboration and cooperation between secondary cities and adjacent local governments.

Lack of Planning Data and Information: One of the most significant impediments to planning development and services delivery is the lack of population, economic, social, land-use, and infrastructure data and information. Collection and records management to improve local planning, infrastructure management, and services delivery is poor. National statistical, census, and household income survey data and information are not sufficiently disaggregated or available in digital format to enable detailed studies, research and analysis at the secondary city level to support better planning, infrastructure, and services delivery.

A NEW AGENDA FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SECONDARY CITIES

A new era is dawning for the development of African cities. In 2016 the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat) launched the New Urban Agenda, which most countries signed. To date, slow progress has been made so far with its implementation. However, the document's focus was on large metropolitan regions, with minimal recognition of the critical role secondary cities can play in the development of national systems of cities. Much greater attention must be given to the development of policies and an agenda for secondary cities in Africa.

A new urban-age agenda and framework are essential to developing a dynamic and robust system of secondary cities in Africa. In urban policy planning and development, secondary cities must be given the same priority as metropolitan regions. While their contribution to economic development may be lower than metropolitan regions, secondary cities play a crucial role as the conduit for many goods and services to reach the large proportion of the national population living in smaller urban and rural areas. People living in those areas deserve more equitable access to the goods, services and employment opportunities of residents of metropolitan regions.

Moving from Sector to Systems Approach to Secondary City Urban Governance

The approach to African countries' national urban and regional economic development policies is mainly structurally administrated through vertical hierarchical governance systems. Horizontal integration between sectors is very weak. Infrastructure and services delivery at the secondary city/region level is overly dependent on the resources of line agencies at multiple levels of government. The current sectoral and siloed system of government agencies and departments both vertically and horizontally leads to poor planning and delivery of infrastructure and services.

This situation is exacerbated at the secondary city level, where local governments depend on the central government to provide many services. A convergence of the right delivery and mix of resources, infrastructure, personnel, and services are essential to efficiently functioning urban systems. A more coordinated and systems approach to urban management and governance is required in African secondary cities to make them more effective and sustainable.

A Framework for Urban Systems Policy and Development for Secondary Cities

TABLE E-1 | Functional elements of urban subsystems supporting the development of secondary cities

Systems/ functions	Governance	Economics and Finance	Built Environment	Social	Environmental	Connectivity
Organisation and Structure	• Collaborative governance • Teams based management	• Economic development policies • One-Stop Business Centre	• The integrated development approval system • Public participation	• Employment and poverty alleviation • Single social services centre	• Integrated environmental management	• Online information • Data exchange • E-governance • Focus groups
Policy and Strategy	• Integrated public policy management	• Urban financial management • Investment Incentives	• Integrated strategic planning • Public investment plans	• Public health and wellbeing	• Climate change adaptation • Emergency management plans	• Support for self-organising network partnerships • Suggestion boxes
Resource Management:	• Legal systems and regulation • Financial management	• Value-added business • Co-financing	• Building regulation enforcement	• Lifelong education and learning • Community colleges	• Pollution and congestion • Forest and land rehabilitation	• Public transport apps • Share-use ride and logistics apps

Systems/ functions	Governance	Economics and Finance	Built Environment	Social	Environmental	Connectivity
Planning and Development	• Corporate planning and management	• Productivity and competitiveness targets • Economic risk management assessment	• Housing and shelter strategies • PPP infrastructure delivery	• Community services	• Environmental health and safety	• Communications and information
Capacity Building	• Accountability and transparency • Human resources management	• Research and development • Technology and Innovation	• Development control • Citizen science groups	• Peace and security • Community crime watch • Community policing	• Cleaner production and industrial ecology • Recycling	• Communities of interest • Diaspora networks • Supply chains and dynamics
Resilience and Regeneration	• Participatory and inclusive governance • Social media networks for disaster recovery	• Industry diversification grants • City-city trade partnerships	• Asset maintenance • Heritage conservation • Local area energy networks	• Human resource development • Migrant integration programs	• Green economies and design • Risk and hazard management	• Community support networks • Local area support services • Community wardens

Source: Author.

The concept of 'urban systems' is a new way of thinking about the operations of cities, planning and operations, and approaches to management and development. This book sets out a framework for an urban systems approach to the sustainable development and management of secondary cities, classifying areas for support/intervention as governance, social, economic, environmental, built environment, and connectivity (flow/logistics) systems. These six urban systems functions are explained in the final chapter of the book. Urban plans and networks operate well when the opportunities for links/connections are strong and choices are available for alternatives and substitutions when the need arises. Well-developed urban systems for secondary cities need to be more self-organising and be able to adapt and adjust when supply chains fail, resources are constrained, or there are unexpected failures in parts of the networks.

A systems-approach framework to manage and support development opportunities for secondary cities in Africa is outlined in Table E.1. This approach can also be applied to analyse national urban systems. It is presented to conceptualise the various elements of managing the development and operation of secondary cities. In Table E.1, six urban systems (top In row across) and six functional (first column) groups of activities provide a decision-making framework for managing activities to support the operations and development of secondary cities. (These systems and functions can be changed or adapted if desired.) Many connections, flows, and combinations of activities occur across these various networks of urban systems and functions at different levels on a day-to-day and annual operations basis in secondary cities. The table shows a sample of initiatives that secondary cities and adjacent region governments could take to build capacity and support opportunities for development and regeneration.

Well-developed urban systems will enable the facilitation of multiple connections and mobilise resources, skills, and technologies in many different places, spaces, and times to enable things to be done quickly. Critical to the introduction and development of a systems-management approach to secondary cities is the need to carefully analyse the constraints preventing these systems from functioning efficiently. These constraints may be political, financial, or technological; related to skills, knowledge, or information, or a combination of all of these. The critical issue for secondary city local governments is to know the most significant constraints to the efficient operation of urban systems and remedy them as a matter of priority.

A New Spatial Economic Model for Development of Secondary Cities

The key to implementing a new urban agenda for supporting secondary cities is a new spatial economic development model. The research indicates the need for a decentralised and integrated, spatially networked system of cities. Three spatial strategies can be applied to support this model, as shown in Figure E-2. These are:

- A. Economic Development Corridors
- B. Regional Cluster of Cities and Towns
- C. Metropolitan Regional Clusters

FIGURE E-2 | Three broad spatial strategies for enhancing the development of secondary cities

The above involves building networks and clusters and enhancing connectivity for secondary cities surrounding metropolitan regions, economic development corridors, and subnational regions. The principles behind the development of all three strategies are similar. In most countries, a combination of each can be applied, depending on economic geography and population density.

These principles underpinning each of the three strategies involve building a framework to foster the development of the following:

- Networks of trading-city partnerships.
- Frameworks for enhancing connectivity.
- A focus on linking value-chains and industry clusters.
- Strengthened rural-urban linkages.
- The mix of exogenous and endogenous growth.
- The growth of competitive subnational corridors and regional markets.

The figure below shows a concept for using three spatial approaches for developing collaborative networks to support the development of secondary cities. The scale and development of these networks will vary within countries, depending on the nature and size of secondary and associated smaller cities and the willingness of cities to collaborate. There can be some overlap between the three spatial networks of secondary cities, especially

between the corridor and regional networks. The economic structures and connectivity arrangements for each spatial framework will be different. Regional networks of secondary cities are likely to develop where a denser network of secondary cities is distant from a large metropolitan region.

A ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Africa has received substantial international official development assistance to the urban sector from the United Nations system; international and regional development banks; pan-European, American, and Chinese institutions; and NGOs. Secondary cities receive less than an equitable share of official development assistance (ODA). Their role in supporting national and regional supply chains and value-adding to the nationwide delivery of products and services to rural and metropolitan areas is generally not reflected in development assistance programs. Official development assistance to secondary cities to improve functions and logistics systems could significantly enhance economic and employment multipliers in rural and urban sectors. This form of assistance to secondary cities has tended to be piecemeal, sectoral and poorly integrated. A more integrated, multi-sectoral and collaborative effort is required for managing secondary cities, that is tailored to a country's needs – rather than a 'one size fits all' approach. An integrated approach is crucial to support the development and management of secondary cities in the post-pandemic era of recovery. The final chapter in this book sets out a framework for improving ODA assistance to support the sustainable development of secondary cities.

"

A more integrated, multi-sectoral and collaborative effort is required for managing secondary cities, that is tailored to a country's needs – rather than a 'one size fits all' approach.

PRIORITISING AREAS OF ASSISTANCE FOR SECONDARY CITIES IN AFRICA

The development of secondary cities in Africa is falling well behind the rest of the world. While many are dynamic centres of commerce and trade, most are struggling to develop the advanced economies that will enable countries to become self–sufficient and prosperous. A conversation is needed at the higher national political and technical echelons, across all African countries, on the importance of secondary city development. Substantial investment is necessary for human capital development to support the development of cities and jobs, as Africa transitions to a post-agriculture economy. The regeneration of local governance capacity in finance, urban management, land and infrastructure development, markets, and logistics systems is needed urgently. This begins with the rehabilitation of existing urban systems in order to provide a basic minimum level of urban services to support the operation and maintenance of cities.

There is a need to identify how to transform local secondary city economies to support more endogenous economic growth and development to support the expansion of the domestic economy. Economic development policies focused on exogenous export growth involving growth poles and economic enterprise zones in secondary cities have not worked, except where they are linked to major ports and good highways, such as in Morocco. The transaction costs of operations are high, supply-chain support services and enabling environments are weak.

Developing local business networks, fostering collaboration, industry clusters, and specialisation will be essential to reduce common-user costs of providing infrastructure and services, leveraging resources and creating economies of scope and scale. Building a network of collaborative, competitive cities will be essential. Global, continental and local urbanisation `best practice' should be showcased and accessible to stakeholders.

A conversation is needed within African countries about a change in the direction of economic and urban development policies and how to integrate these. A more balanced approach to exogenous and endogenous growth and spatial development policy is needed if African countries are to address inequality and more sustainable development of cities. Such a conversation must recognise the importance of integrating spatial and sectoral policies and plans supporting the development of cities' national systems, especially secondary cities. It is important to foster home-grown solutions to development problems and open opportunities for development that benefit all parts of countries, not just large metropolitan regions. The conversation needs to address the following:

- Developing local capital markets to realise the potential for capitalising land and public assets in order to provide pool funding to supplement private and public-private partnership (PPP) investments.

- Focusing on urban land administration and management systems reform is necessary to underpin the development of and confidence in urban land and property markets.

- Addressing the immediate and long-term data and information deficiencies so that the planning, management and development of secondary cities will not be hampered. Modern cities rely on information and data to plan the physical, economic and social development and infrastructure and monitor environmental impacts and performance.

- Setting up existing African and international research infrastructure centres of excellence that will openly address cross-continental, regional, national, and local urbanisation issues and make them available to any stakeholder interested in the planning, management and development of cities in the region.

- Reviewing the impacts of international, national, and subnational policy agendas on their intended outcomes. Other and official development assistance (ODA) directed towards developing secondary cities in Africa are not well coordinated. Leveraging and stretching of ODA with institutional, NGO, and private sector resources is weak.

- Ascertaining why government institutions and public corporations continue to pursue detrimental and failed policies that do not deliver the planned results. This problem calls for a much more spatially integrated approach to development and financial planning and to operations and maintenance at the secondary systems of cities level.

Responding to these issues is crucial to advancing a new urban age agenda for reforming the planning, management, and development of more inclusive, equitable and sustainable secondary cities in Africa.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Secondary cities are not on the urban policy agenda for most African countries. However, as the book identifies, they are an important urban policy issue demanding significant attention from governments and ODA. They are important in building and maintaining a well-run national system of cities that can support a more equitable and efficient national economic and industrial development structure in African countries. Their critical roles in national economic, urbanisation and population policy need to be recognised and advocated for strongly by secondary city governments, businesses, and community leaders throughout Africa.

Secondary cities should be given priority in national urban and regional economic development policy. They need significant institutional capacity-building support, investment in hard and soft infrastructure and human capacity development to become more dynamic, creative, and welcoming places for investors and developers. Stronger enabling environments and economic, environmental, and social governance systems must be created and sustained to create new jobs and industries that will help build subnational wealth and prosperity in African countries.

African countries need to revise their national urban policies and strategies to recognise the crucial role secondary cities play in supporting countries' development, operation, and competitiveness and provide adequately for their needs through more equitable allocation of national resources and budgets. These are all part of a new urban-age agenda that recognises a greater role for secondary cities in Africa and their importance.

SECTION I.

Development Challenges
for Secondary Cities

BRIAN H ROBERTS AND
GODFREY O ANYUMBA

1

INTRODUCTION

> Currently, around 600 million or 43.4% of Africa's population live in urban areas. Most live in more than 1,765 urban centres with populations over 50,000 (OECD/SWAC, 2020). Around 200 million live in secondary and other intermediate-sized cities. Many of these cities are growing rapidly, yet they have not benefitted from development to the same extent as metropolitan regions.
>
> Urbanisation has been the primary driver of development in Africa for more than five decades. However, the development of cities and the benefits of urbanisation have not been uniform or equitable. The poverty gaps between secondary cities and national systems of cities are widening. The gross domestic product, income and wealth per capita in secondary cities are well below those of large metropolises. These gaps will not close unless there is a change in structural and spatial urbanisation and economic development policy for national systems of cities and regions, with a greater focus on the role of secondary cities (Satterthwaite et al., 2007).

The systems of urban settlements in Africa are trending towards a high level of primacy, with the proportion of people living in secondary and smaller intermediate size cities (40%) being lower than that of Europe (42%) or Asia (50%) (UCLG, 2015). Urbanisation rates exceed 1.1% per annum, but these are predicted to remain constant over the next few decades in Africa, unlike in other regions of the world. By 2030, an additional 250 million people are expected to live in urban areas, with 900 million by 2050. Many of these will live in secondary and intermediate cities. These cities are experiencing many urban development problems and have fast-growing populations, due to rural-urban migration and refugees.

PHOTO 1.1
Agona Swedru, Ghana

© Photo: Roberts (2018).

Secondary cities[1] play a crucial intermediary role in the development and operations of African economies. Most are subnational centres of government, manufacturing, recreation, education, and tourism. They play a crucial second tier-level role in the functioning of national supply chains and distribution and regional services. Their populations range from 100,000 to 1 million, or more in the case of Nigeria. Many struggle to compete with large metropolitan regions for jobs, trade and investment.

Many secondary cities are located inland, far from the coast or river ports or in land-locked countries such as Ethiopia, Zambia, and Mali, and are Africa's poorest and most disadvantaged secondary cities. Many have high levels of informal- and under-employment; large, sprawling slums with impoverished populations; weak local governance structures and urban management capacity; and poorly developed infrastructure, community, and public services. Climate change, land degradation, civil unrest, and the COVID-19 pandemic continue to impact secondary cities across Africa

The development of secondary/intermediary cities in Africa has suffered disproportionate public and private investment in large metropolitan regions. Many secondary cities, like Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) and Kisumu (Kenya), were once dynamic and prosperous places with good growth and development prospects, but state failure, corruption and weak local government, urbanisation, infrastructure, and economic development policies have held them back from realising their potential. Africa needs a strong, more balanced and equitable system of cities and regional development. The development of a dynamic and robust system of secondary cities will be crucial to achieving this goal.

For African secondary cities to play a more meaningful role in national development, there must be a significant shift in thinking on national urban and economic development policies on decentralisation, devolution and competitiveness. National and regional development and investment policies also need to focus on improving the management of urbanisation, population growth and migration, infrastructure, connectivity, productivity, human capital development and climate change to create more dynamic secondary and smaller-sized cities. To overcome secondary cities' many challenges, a greater focus is needed on adopting collaborative governance, regional endogenous growth, economic sovereignty and investment, increased sub-national region aggregate demand for goods and services, and diversified employment outside the large metropolitan regions. For this to occur, Africa needs a new age-urban agenda for secondary cities. These are the themes that are the focus of this book.

1.1 What are Secondary Cities?

There are many differing viewpoints about what constitutes a secondary city. Few African countries recognise secondary cities, also called intermediate or middle-sized cities as a category of cities or incorporate them into national urban policy plans and development strategies (Muawwad & Hassan, 2015; Kenawy, 2017). Some countries recognise secondary or second-level cities as part of political and administrative structures or capital of a region, province, state, or district. However, African governments have an emerging awareness and recognition (UNICEF and UN-Habitat, 2020) that secondary cities are important in terms of their administrative role and in supporting devolution, decentralisation, connectivity, functionality, logistics, value-adding, trade, and production within national systems of urban settlement (Roberts, 2014).

In countries with demographically low-level urbanisation and small national spatial territories such as Burundi, Djibouti, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Eretria, Lesotho and Somaliland, the ratio of the population of the capital city to the next largest city does not fit the traditional mould of secondary cities based on population size. In these smaller countries, functionality plays a more important role in defining secondary cities. At the other extreme, large cities such as Ibadan in Nigeria and Mombasa in Kenya (DCP Kenya, 2019), with populations over 1 million, are considered secondary, not metropolitan regions. In addition, there is variance in the nomenclature for secondary cities by different countries. Rwanda refers to them as `niche secondary cities' (Urban Gateway Organisation News, 2016), Kenya and South Africa refer to them as `secondary cities' (Otiso, 2005; South African Cities Network, 2012). Ethiopia refers to them as `intermediate cities' (OECD/PSI, 2020), Uganda refers to them as `regional' and `strategic' cities (Arup, 2016), and Egypt refers to them as 'new urban communities' (Ellahham, 2014).

Most countries have a hierarchical system of cities classified by population size. Secondary cities tend to be classified as having a range in population between 100,000 and 1 million. However, secondary cities are not defined exclusively by population size: function and economic status are more significant factors in defining their role within national urban systems (Roberts, 2019). Secondary cities play a crucial intermediary role as value-adding hubs in national supply-chain, production, logistics, distributions, and network systems for goods, services, information, and passengers between metropolitan regions and more dispersed and settled rural-regional development areas and smaller urban settlements. Most African countries have 5-10 secondary cities. In Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa, population size and functions of secondary cities need to be adjusted according to national population size.

1.2 Three Spatial Characteristics of Secondary Cities

There are three broad spatial characteristics associated with the development of secondary cities (Figure 1.1): regional, metropolitan cluster and corridor.

FIGURE 1.1 | Spatial Typologies of Secondary Cities

Source: Roberts (2014).

Regional: These are states or provincial centres of local secondary-level government or a new national capital city, such as Dodoma in Tanzania. These may focus on large industrial manufacturing, agriculture, or mineral extraction or processing, or be port-based economic-based cities. Others are major transportation, tourism, religious, education, or military-based centres. All play a crucial role in supporting well-functioning national economies and systems of cities. Regional secondary cities are often the hub of a network of smaller intermediate cities and towns. Examples of secondary-city regional hubs include Takoradi in Ghana, Bulawayo in Zimbabwe, and Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth) in South Africa.

Metropolitan cluster: These are peripheral cities that cluster around a large urban agglomeration. Most are fast-growing interdependent new industrial or satellite cities, growth poles, or rapidly expanding towns within a 100-km radius of large metropolitan regions or fast-growing regional secondary cities. Examples of this include Sagamu outside Lagos, Nigeria, and Kisumu in Kenya. On a smaller scale, some regional hub secondary cities have smaller clusters of satellite towns.

Corridor: These are a series of small towns and cities that have merged – or are emerging – that function as a linear urban agglomeration corridor along a highway, river, or coastline. These corridors include examples like Ceuta (the autonomous Spanish city) to Tetouan in Morocco, Freetown to Jamestown in Sierra Leone, and Bugembe-Jinja-Njeru in Uganda.

1.3 Growing Interest in African Secondary Cities

Secondary cities in Africa play a significant role in developing national economies, but they remain a neglected area of research and policy development, especially in improving governance, logistics, infrastructure, and job creation, and attracting investment. Most secondary cities lag well behind the development of larger metropolitan cities in the region. Catching up will be a significant challenge and will require a substantial shift in policies to avoid situations where one or two cities dominate an entire nation's economy.

A growing library of reports documents the development of secondary cities in Africa. The first studies, conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on these cities as extensions of the agriculture sector. Initially, the primary function was to act as secondary logistics and production hubs to support the flow of products and materials to larger cities and overseas markets. From the early 1990s until recently, except for some UN-Habitat studies, interest in secondary city development waned. In the mid-2000s, interest in secondary cities' development was renewed by international agencies and researchers.

The literature shows that challenges facing the development of secondary cities are also growing. The issues of weak urban governance, and the need for improved planning and urban management, basic infrastructure, environmental, health, education, and social development have been covered in this book.

Secondary, intermediate, and middle-sized cities are not well recognised in urban policy development in Africa. A few countries like Ghana, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda (Thompson, 2021) have developed policies to support secondary city development as part of national urbanisation policies. But in South Africa, where there is a well-developed system of secondary cities, bringing them into the focus of debate and discussion is still a challenge (Brand, 2021).

1.4 Outline of the Book

African secondary cities are home to around 15% of Africa's population. They perform essential functions as intermediary hubs and centres of production, governance, services, and logistics; however, many do not function effectively. Some have become dysfunctional and have areas of civil unrest. Government problems associated with corruption, poor staffing, and environmental and social issues are common with rapid, unplanned urban growth. Connectivity, especially transport and communications systems between secondary cities, is inadequate.

While COVID-19 has added to the problems of secondary cities in the region, these problems are not peculiar to secondary cities but are a global problem.

Despite poor planning and management, secondary cities in Africa are dynamic places. Government and international development agencies are beginning to recognise their importance. As a result, secondary cities are garnering growing policy interest from governments and international development agencies like the World Bank and UN-Habitat (Roberts, 2019; UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020). However, a policy paradigm shift is needed to recognise their potential and key role as the future frontiers of sustainable social, economic, and spatial growth and development in the national systems of cities in Africa (WEF, 2019).

The Cities Alliance has been researching for a decade on secondary cities (Roberts 2014; Roberts 2019). It has produced a series of knowledge products published in multiple languages on the management and connectivity within systems of secondary cities. Given the many urbanisation challenges facing African cities, Cities Alliance commissioned this book, and the African Development Bank has joined for its publication and dissemination. The underlying rationale for the book is to investigate how national urban and regional economic and spatial urban development policy and international development assistance could help national and local governments in Africa to support the sustainable development of secondary cities.

The book also explores the opportunities for urban and regional development policy changes that would enable secondary cities to play a more significant role in national, regional, and local area development. Finally, it identifies the possible role that central and local governments, institutions, businesses, international development agencies, and civil society interest groups can play in creating new opportunities for developing secondary cities across the continent.

This book seeks to extend previous research and policy development work on systems of secondary cities in Africa. It sets out to explore reasons why secondary cities have struggled to develop, attract investment, and manage urban growth. It uses literature and case studies to gather data and information and explain some of the underlying dynamics and challenges facing the development of secondary cities. Case studies are included from Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone, and Arabic-speaking countries in Africa. This is important because of the historical differences in the former colonies' legal and planning systems.

The book comprises 16 chapters and is divided into three sections. The first section includes six chapters that set the context and analyse the historical and current situation concerning development patterns, challenges, policies, population, economics, and financing of African secondary cities. This introductory chapter outlines the context, rationale, scope, and structure of the book. Chapter 2 examines urbanisation trends and patterns over recent decades. Chapter 3 explores challenges facing the development and management of secondary cities. Chapter 4 presents a historical perspective on urbanisation policy and the development of secondary cities. Chapter 5 addresses population growth and migration factors shaping the demographic makeup of African secondary cities. Chapter 6 examines issues facing the financial operations, investment, and economic development of secondary cities.

16 CHAPTERS

| 1 | 2 | 3 |

divided into three sections

Section 2 (Chapters 7.15) contain case studies of eight secondary cities, each in a different country:

- Cape Coast in Ghana (Chapter 7)
- Dire-Dawa in Ethiopia (Chapter 8)
- Gabès in Tunisia (Chapter 9)
- Huambo in Angola (Chapter 10)
- Ibadan in Nigeria (Chapter 11)
- Mombasa in Kenya (Chapter 12)
- Gqeberha in South Africa (Chapter 13)
- Touba-Mbacké in Senegal (Chapter 14)

The case studies were selected to provide both the national context as well as more detailed insights into development issues, opportunities and information availability at the level of a secondary city in each country. The authors of the case study chapters either live or have long work experience in the selected countries. Each chapter presents a national and local perspective of the economic geography, trends, policies, issues, and challenges affecting national systems of secondary city development . The secondary city case studies are structured to review and summarise the history of urbanisation and municipal government arrangements in the country of study. They include brief descriptions of the administrative arrangements, powers, and responsibilities between levels of government and the laws/constitutional arrangements.

Chapter 15 brings together the findings from the country and city case studies and to offers some strategic directions for governments, businesses, and international development assistance agencies to improve the development and management of secondary cities. In the final section of the book, Chapter 16 outlines opportunities to support the development of secondary cities and argues the need for a new-age urban agenda for secondary cities. It presents a framework with initiatives based on a systems approach that African countries could apply to support the development of secondary cities, including their recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. It addresses how secondary cities might respond to the trend towards the decoupling of economies and a focus on economic sovereignty.[2] These two issues will pose significant challenges to the development of African secondary cities in the immediate future.

1.5 Data Issues

Data and information on African cities are generally poor — which has made studies about secondary cities difficult. Information on metropolitan region cities is improving, but it remains poor for smaller urban centres below 500,000 in population. Outside the metropolises, data on urban areas is not often broken down in sufficient detail to separate rural from urban areas. Many administrative areas for towns and cities include large rural populations. This creates difficulties in a book spanning eight diverse African countries when comparing population densities and other types of ratio-analysis related to urban land area.

Part of the problem related to the above is the definition of 'urban areas'. National census organisations use more than 25 definitions of 'urban' in African countries (United Nations, 2005). The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) does not have a standard definition for urban areas, but uses definitions applied according to national statistical offices, census, and administrative boundaries. It also uses various methods to interpolate data to estimate urban population size when census data is unavailable (Moreno, 2017). Other organisations like the OECD use different definitions (Dijkstra et al., 2019; USCB, USAID & UNFPA, 2020).

The book uses UN DESA, OECD and other sources of data. However, the lack of a uniform definition of urban areas or agglomerations presents significant problems in analysing data from different sources and making spatial demographic comparisons between countries (OECD/SWAC, 2020). These problems are exacerbated at an aggregate level by a lack of consistency in countries included in geographic regions for data collected by various international agencies. The research for this book has highlighted the need for consistent definitions and classifications of urban and geographic areas to improve future analysis and reporting on urbanisation and development in Africa.

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ENDNOTES

(1)   For definition of secondary cities, see Roberts (2014).

(2)   The term economic sovereignty refers to the power of national governments to make decisions independently of those made by other governments (Jacques, 2020).

2

STATE OF AFRICAN SECONDARY CITIES

BRIAN H ROBERTS AND
GODFREY O ANYUMBA

PHOTO 2.1
Stone Town, Zanzibar

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Africa is the least urbanised but fastest urbanising continent on Earth. Many studies have examined trends, patterns and impacts of urbanisation and the urban development process (UN-Habitat, 2010a; World Bank, 2010; Saghir & Santoro, 2018; UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020), leading to a growing body of knowledge about African cities (OECD/SWAC, 2020). In recent years, information and data on larger African cities have improved due to improved census, surveys, studies, and satellite imagery (SWAC, 2020); however, information and data on secondary cities remain poor. Primary data on economic development, employment, poverty, public administration and finance, energy and water use in secondary cities is often unavailable, outdated in most countries, or is not in a digital format. More detailed data and information are needed on secondary and smaller medium-sized cities in Africa to understand trends, the role and importance of these cities in supporting sustainable national and local development, and how governments, businesses, institutions, and communities can support this development.

African secondary cities have been a neglected area of research and policy development, despite being home to approximately 15% of the continent's overall population and 28% of the urban population. However, recent studies (Zimmer et al., 2020; UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020b; World Economic Forum, 2019; Haysom & Fusieni, 2019) are beginning to highlight their growing importance in supporting the development of national and subnational economies. While secondary cities in Africa face many challenges of urbanisation and development, there is a vibrancy and sense of local entrepreneurship and optimism that thrive in these cities and smaller regional towns, which provide hope and can be harnessed to create jobs, improve living conditions and incomes.

African cities have shown they are good at self-organising and mobilising community efforts to improve living conditions and the built and natural environments, as well as managing development — provided local government and business are given the resources and freedoms to do so. Local governments are key to developing resilient, robust, and dynamic secondary cities.

This chapter presents an overview of the state of development of African secondary cities. It covers regional urbanisation and spatial trends, development patterns, urban developments, sustainability, and prospects for African and secondary cities.

2.1 Growth of African Cities

Table 2.1 shows the number of cities by population threshold size for Africa and the five sub-regions from 1990 projected to 2035. Currently, there are an estimated 1,765 cities in Africa with a population of more than 50,000. Around 143 of these have populations of more than 500,000 people, based on UN DESA estimates, and this number is expected to increase to 245 by 2035. The most significant growth in the number of cities is expected in western Africa, a region with growth rates of 2.6% in population and 4.1% in urbanisation. Most of this growth will occur in cities of between 500,000 and 1 million people. Cities with populations between 300,000 and 1 million are expected to absorb the most urban population growth in eastern Africa.

TABLE 2.1 | Number of cities classified by size class of urban settlement, 1990-2035

Africa	1990	2000	2010	2015	2020	2030	2035
10 million or more		1	2	3	3	5	5
5 to 10 million	1	2	2	3	6	13	19
1 to 5 million	24	37	42	51	59	81	93
500,000 to 1 million	29	35	56	60	75	111	128
300,000 to 500,000	43	48	65	90	92	117	121
100,000 to 300,000*	171	255	351	485	715		
50,000 to 100,000*	290	454	636	782	815		
Total	558	832	1 154	1 474	1 765		
Eastern Africa							
10 million or more	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
5 to 10 million	0	0	0	1	1	4	5
1 to 5 million	5	9	9	10	14	17	17
500,000 to 1 million	5	3	11	14	13	30	40
300,000 to 500,000	8	13	10	18	21	35	38
100,000 to 300,000*	25	37	60	107	157		
50,000 to 100,000*	35	81	128	162	182		
Total	78	143	218	312	388		
Middle Africa							
10 million or more	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
5 to 10 million	0	1	2	1	1	2	2
1 to 5 million	2	6	5	9	10	16	22
500,000 to 1 million	5	5	9	8	16	17	15
300,000 to 500,000	8	6	13	19	13	12	14
100,000 to 300,000*	18	36	39	53	82		
50,000 to 100,000*	32	36	60	87	95		
Total							

Africa	1990	2000	2010	2015	2020	2030	2035
Northern Africa							
10 million or more	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
5 to 10 million	1	0	0	1	2	2	2
1 to 5 million	6	7	8	7	8	12	12
500,000 to 1 million	4	7	10	13	14	17	21
300,000 to 500,000	13	14	18	21	21	224	25
100,000 to 300,000*	46	76	109	136	205		
50,000 to 100,000*	104	140	189	210	208		
Total							
Southern Africa							
10 million or more	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5 to 10 million	0	0	0	0	1	2	2
1 to 5 million	4	5	6	6	5	5	6
500,000 to 1 million	3	5	4	5	7	9	8
300,000 to 500,000	3	2	3	5	3	5	5
100,000 to 300,000*	15	23	36	42	48		
50,000 to 100,000*	26	54	57	61	71		
Total	7	10	14	19	22		
Western Africa							
10 million or more	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
5 to 10 million	0	1	0	0	1	3	8
1 to 5 million	7	10	14	19	22	31	36
500,000 to 1 million	12	15	22	20	25	38	44
300,000 to 500,000	11	13	21	27	34	41	39
100,000 to 300,000*	54	71	90	126	191		
50,000 to 100,000*	82	120	170	210	202		
Total	166	230	318	403	476		

Source: UN DESA (2020) *Africapolis (2020).

2.2 Spatial Nature of African Cities

The geographic primacy and dispersion of African cities vary significantly between countries and regions. Figure 2.1 shows a snapshot of the spatial pattern of urbanisation in Africa. Table 2.2 shows the high level of primacy for systems of cities in Africa. In 41 out of 51 countries, more than 15% of the urban population lives in the largest city. In 27 countries, it is more than 30%, while in Togo and Djibouti, more than half of the urban population lives in the country's largest city.

In 13 countries, more than 20% of the total population lives in the largest cities. Middle African countries such as Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé, and Príncipe, have more than 20% of their total population living in the largest city. The same occurs in northern African countries of Egypt, Tunisia, Western Sahara. Some countries, such as Ghana and South Africa, have a duopoly structure of primacy. In Ghana, close to 30% of the urban population lives in Accra and Kumasi metropolitan regions.

FIGURE 2.1 | Snapshot of the spatial pattern of urbanisation in Africa

Source: Mapbox Africapolis Database.

Figure 2.2 shows a Zipf's graph of population size and ranking log for the 10 largest cities in 9 African countries (Angola, Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia). A well-developed hierarchical system of cities plots typically as a straight line. The graph shows uniformity in the hierarchical structure of the systems of cities; however, in Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal, there is a relatively sharp drop off from the largest to the next levels of secondary cities. This indicates a distorted structure in the system of cities and the dominance or primacy of the country's largest city. In Nigeria and South Africa, the drop off is much smoother, due to a more dispersed geographic distribution of urban agglomerations by population, according to city size.

FIGURE 2.2 | Zipf's Law population size ranking of 10 largest cities for eight African countries

Source: (UN DESA 2019).

TABLE 2.2 | Number of cities classified by size class of urban settlement, 1990-2035

Region	Country	Urban (000)	Level of Urban %	Largest City	Largest City (000)	Primacy %	Total Population 2020 (000)	% of Total Population
Eastern	Burundi	1,637	13.0	Bujumbura	332	20.3	11,216	3.0%
	Djibouti	781	77.8	Djibouti	624	79.9	971	64.2
	Eritrea	2,246	40.1	Libreville	834	37.1	5,188	16.1
	Ethiopia	24,463	20.8	Addis Ababa	2,758	11.3	107,535	2.6
	Kenya	14,975	27.0	Nairobi	4,735	31.6	50,951	9.3
	Malawi	3,535	16.9		932	26.4	19,165	4.9
	Mozambique	11,978	36.0	Maputo	1,706	14.2	30,529	5.6
	Rwanda	2,281	17.2	Kigali	745	32.7	12,501	6.0
	Somalia	7,431	45.0	Mogadishu	2,587	34.8	15,182	17.0
	South Sudan	2,749	19.6	Juba	450	16.4	12,919	3.5
	Uganda	11,775	23.8	Kampala	3,298	28.0	44,271	7.5
	Tanzania	22,113	33.8	Dar es Salaam	6,702	30.3	59,091	11.3
	Zambia	8,336	43.5	Lusaka	2,774	33.3	17,609	15.8
	Zimbabwe	5,7	32.2	Harare	1,53	26.8	16,913	9.0
Middle	Angola	21,937	65.5	Luanda	8,33	38.0	30,774	27.1
	Cameroon	14,942	56.4	Douala	1,338	9.0	24,678	5.4
	Central African Republic	2,077	41.4	Bangui	889	42.8	4,737	18.8
	Chad	3,83	23.1	N'Djaména	1,423	37.1	15,353	9.3
	Congo	3,857	66.9	Brazzaville	1,285	33.3	5,400	23.8
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	40,848	44.5	Kinshasa	7,786	19.1	84,005	9.3

Region	Country	Urban (000)	Level of Urban %	Largest City	Largest City (000)	Primacy %	Total Population 2020 (000)	% of Total Population
	Equatorial Guinea	1,028	72.1	Bata	415	40.4	1,314	31.6
	Gabon	1,938	89.4	Libreville	578	29.8	2,068	28.0
	Sao Tome and Principe	162	72.8	Sao Tome	53	32.9	209	25.5
Northern	Algeria	31,951	72.6	Algiers	2,768	8.7	42,008	6.6
	Egypt	44,041	42.7	Al-Qahirah (Cairo)	20,901	47.5	99,376	21.0
	Libya	5,376	80.1	Tripoli	1,151	21.4	6,471	17.8
	Morocco	23,552	62.5	Casablanca	3,145	13.4	36,192	8.7
	Sudan	15,349	34.6	Khartoum	5,829	38.0	41,512	14.0
	Tunisia	8,281	68.9	Tunis	2,365	28.6	11,659	20.3
	Western Sahara	519	86.7	Laayoune	196	37.9	567	34.6
Southern	Botswana	1,712	69.4	Gaborone	208	12.2	2,333	8.9
	Lesotho	674	28.2	Maseru	118	17.6	2,263	5.2
	Namibia	1,403	50.0	Windhoek	268	19.1	2,588	10.4
	South Africa	39,551	66.4	Johannesburg	5,783	14.6	57,398	10.1
	Eswatini	348	23.8	Manzini	111	31.8	1,391	7.9
Western	Benin	5,869	47.3	Cotonou	80	13.3	11,486	6.8
	Burkina Faso	6,398	29.4	Ouagadougou	1,087	17.0	19,752	5.5
	Cabo Verde	378	65.7	Praia	113	30.0	553	20.5
	Côte d'Ivoire	13,532	50.8	Abidjan	3,677	27.2	24,906	14.8
	The Gambia	1,435	61.3	Banjul	451	31.4	2,164	20.8
	Ghana	17,626	56.1	Accra	2,514	14.3	29,464	8.5
	Guinea	5,071	36.1	Conakry	1,938	38.2	13,053	14.8
	Guinea-Bissau	884	43.4	Bissau	83	43.9	1,907	20.3
	Liberia	2,659	51.2	Monrovia	940	35.3	4,854	19.4
	Mali	8,907	42.4	Bamako	2,618	29.4	19,108	13.7
	Mauritania	2,647	53.7	Nouakchott	661	25.0	4,54	14.6
	Niger	4,003	16.4	Niamey	1,292	32.3	22,311	5.8
	Nigeria	107,113	50.3	Lagos	14,368	13.4	195,875	7.3
	Senegal	8,277	47.2	Dakar	3,14	37.9	16,294	19.3
	Sierra Leone	3,454	42.1	Freetown	1,202	34.8	7,72	15.6
	Togo	3,332	41.7	Lomé	1,828	54.9	7,991	22.9
Cites > 15% of Urban Pop = 41	Cities > 30% Urban Pop = 25			Cities > 50% of Urban Pop = 2	>20 % National Population = 13			

Source: UN DESA (2020).

The geographic pattern of urban settlements is becoming more concentrated in parts of some western and northern African countries. This is a product of climate and geographic constraints. Primacy is growing at the expense of secondary cities, especially in Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Angola. These shifts will significantly impact population distribution and economic activities in these and other African countries in the future.

2.2.1 Networked Systems of Cities

All cities form part of a network or an interconnected system and sub-system of cities within countries or across regions. Cities grow and develop as the result of trade between them; the rate at which populations grow naturally or through migration; the levels of investment in government services, business and infrastructure becoming more efficient in producing goods and services; and the extent to which hinterlands become more developed, productive, and accessible. These require a well-developed, organised network or system of communications, trade, investment, and the freedom of population movement between towns and cities.

FIGURE 2.3 | Development of urban network systems of cities

Random Network
- Nearly always homogenous.
- Most nodes have approximately the same number of links and flows between hubs and nodes.
- Lowly urbanized countries, Ethiopia.

Regular Network
- Mostly homogeneous.
- Links and separation of hubs and nodes tends to be uniform.
- More densely populated countries.
- India, Brazil, and Nigeria.

Hierarchical Networks
- Tend to mostly homogeneous, but some can be more heterogeneous.
- Hubs and nodes not uniform and function mainly through a primate city.
- Feature of many African, South American and some Asian countries.

Scale Free Networks
- Not homogeneous.
- Two or three strong links within systems of secondary cities.
- Numerous but varying strength of links to smaller nodes.
- North American, Europe and China.

Historical ⟶ Future

Source: Author.

There are evolutionary and sometimes cyclical stages in developing networks and systems of cities (Figure 2.3). Countries and regions transit through these development phases as they become more urbanised, industrialised and internationalised. Transition is driven through the development of trade, communications, industry, services and investment. In times of crisis, war, disaster, civil unrest or unpredictable political change, networked systems of cities can revert to a lower development stage, especially if nations are forced to become more self-sufficient. This reversion is occurring because of the COVID-19 crisis in some parts of the world.

African cities have undergone significant changes in network development over the centuries. Historically, smaller cities and towns in different geographic regions formed patterns of networks that were linked and defined mainly by tribal or empire boundaries. City size was determined, primarily, by the productivity and population-carrying capacity of hinterland food and resource production. Precolonial cities were relatively uniform and homogeneous in size and spatial distancing. Most were engaged in localised trade, but some engaged in limited coastal and river trade. The spread and development of broader trade across the northern and later the sub-Saharan regions of Africa led to a more regular system of cities developing in locations where soils, climate and resources were favourable (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2016). What emerged in Africa was a system of city-states, many of which formed parts of ancient empires. Not all were homogenous in terms of regular connections to smaller urban settlements. Some, like Carthage and Alexandria, became engaged in long-distance trade.

Arab and European colonial settlements led to the development of more regular networks of cities across the continent. Extensive trading began to occur across sub-Saharan Africa. Several large cities such as Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and Sokoto (Nigeria) grew prominent and influential in the nineteenth century, with large metropolitan regions at the time having populations around 100,000 (Kusimba et al., 2006). A well-developed, regular networked system of cities was important to colonial expansion. As a result, many secondary provincial cities have well-developed infrastructure, local governments, and services supporting agriculture or mining hinterland economies. This led to the building of railways in many parts of the continent. Many remain crucial to the export of raw materials and minerals from the continent.

By the end of the colonial era, a more hierarchical networked system of cities had emerged across the continent. Local governments and administrative territories were well developed, many with good basic infrastructure. In the post-colonial era, subnational local governments' power and responsibilities became weakened, often due to military coups. Policies aimed at nationalism and self-reliance gave way to foreign direct investment (FDI), industrialisation, and economic development focused on food, cash crops and minerals exports. This narrowed the base of local government economies and reinforced a strongly hierarchical and metropolitan-centric networked system of cities in Africa. The African systems of cities are increasingly hierarchical and metropolitan focused in politics, economic, social, and physical development.

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The development of a hierarchical system of cities and a focus on exogenous (export-driven) growth models of national economic development has led to little or no investment in city-to-city sub-networks of road, air and rail connecting cities and towns within countries. Competition between cities has given way to more structured hierarchical systems of regional feeder roads supporting metropolitan regions or metropolises. Many of these cities have become major river or coastal ports cities, such as Kinshasa (the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Lagos (Nigeria), Luanda (Angola), and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). Others such as Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Harare (Zimbabwe), Nairobi (Kenya), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) are now large metropolitan inland cities. As a result, secondary cities that are not significant transport hubs or border gateway cities, such as Mombasa (Kenya) or Lomé (Togo), have become locked into, or are increasingly dependent upon, a hierarchical metropolitan-region networked system of cities. Many are losing significant development, trade, and investment opportunities.

Consequently, many secondary cities have little political or economic choice but to focus on conducting national subsidiary public-administration functions, acting as distribution and logistics centres for goods and services supplied by metropolitan regions, and as exporters of mainly agriculture commodities and natural resources. Many have neither the capacity, the critical mass of skills and resources, nor the know-how to look for opportunities to develop trade and competition between themselves. Many, especially in Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, and Nigeria, have missed out on development opportunities because of how the systems of cities across the continent have become configured towards a dominant hierarchy. Reconfiguring the systems of cities to more regular or scale-free systems of cities will become extremely difficult and take a long time to achieve.

The more recent phenomenon of the hierarchical networked system of cities has occurred along development corridors, for example, in western, eastern, and north-western Africa (see section 2.2.6, Emerging Spatial Patterns of Urban Development).

In Morocco, and to a lesser extent Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, a new form of a scale-free network of cities is beginning to develop, driven mainly by more dispersed FDI in manufacturing and tourism. Firms in Casablanca, secondary and other smaller cities are becoming more integrated into global (especially European) value-adding industry supply chains and industry clusters (Amraoui et al., 2019). This integration of supply chains and clusters has led to collaborative partnerships between firms in the larger cities, producing and exporting agricultural produce (citrus fruits and market vegetables), semi-processed goods and consumer goods (including textiles) and phosphate products. These emerging scale-free networked systems of production, logistics and trade in value-adding between Morocco cities mimic many emerging European countries.

However, sub-Saharan African cities, except for South Africa, have not reached the stage of developing scale-free networked systems of cities. There is little evidence of inter-regional, solid city links, competitive trading cities and value-adding to production processes within development corridors or regional networks of cities. There is some potential for scale-free network development in Nigeria and Kenya involving clustered city development around Lagos and Nairobi, but this is limited (Musbau, 2019; Splinter and Van Leynseele, 2019).

Sub-Saharan economic development's focus is still very much on exogenous (export) growth and national supply chains servicing a hierarchical network of towns and cities. The trade flow system tends only to support the real growth of metropolitan regions and limited export industries. Secondary cities tend to gain only from the import flow of consumer goods and import services, with little localised value-added manufacturing. This situation is not sustainable and does little to create decent jobs, attract investment, or boost secondary cities' economic development. Sub-Saharan African national economic development policies must move to create a more free-scale networked system of cities and towns with a stronger focus on endogenous growth. Competition, co-production, innovation, trade and investment must be encouraged between cities along transport-orientated economic-development corridors and clustered secondary cities and towns forming a regional network of cities or surrounding large metropolitan regions.

2.2.2 Coastal and Inland Secondary Cities

Africa has 17 land-locked countries within which live 29% of the continent's population. More than 28% of the continent's population live within 100 km of the coastline, many in flood-prone or swampland areas. Table 2.3 estimates the percentage of urban agglomeration, total population, and urban populations living in urban coastal areas. Approximately 6% of all urban settlements in Africa with populations of less than 10,000 are located on coastlines. This figure rises to 29% for cities above 100,000 and 38% for metropolitan regions (OECD/SWAC, 2020). Inland metropolitan and secondary cities appear to be urbanising faster than coastal cities, but this varies across regions.

TABLE 2-3 | Coastal urbanisation of Africa's main regions

Region	Number of coastal agglomerations	Share of coastal agglomerations in total (%)	Coastal urban population (million)	Share of coastal urban population in total (%)	Coastline (km)
Central	15	2	4.7	8	1,998
Eastern	36	2	11.6	10	8,386
Northern	178	10	40.0	28	8,201
Southern	100	10	24.1	29	8,440
Western	96	4	40.7	25	6,065
Total	424	6	121.1	21	33,090

Source: OECD/SWAC Africapolis Database (2018).

Secondary cities located on coasts or large navigable river systems tend to perform better than inland cities with poor road or rail transport services. Border crossings add significantly to landlocked African countries' transaction costs (Arvis et al., 2007). River systems have not played as significant a part in developing African cities as they have in Europe and Asia, except along the lower reaches of the Congo, Niger, Nile, and Zambezi rivers. Road transport continues to be the dominant means of transporting goods and services in supporting the operations and development of national systems of cities. Coastal secondary port cities such as Calabar (Nigeria), Tangiers (Morocco) and Mombasa (DCP Kenya, 2019) have benefited from a long history of trade, which continues, but at a much-reduced scale, as containerisation becomes more centred on metropolitan region coastal ports.

Inland secondary cities in sub-Saharan Africa have much narrower based economies than coastal cities. The growth of these inland cities is being driven by migration from rural areas that have become increasingly prone to drought, desertification, land disputes, and overcrowding, conditions that are pushing more people into secondary cities and towns. These areas often have a large, low-density peri-urban settlement inhabited by residents involved in semi-subsistence farming, which supplements any income they may earn from casual/informal work in the city. Levels of informal sector employment in inland secondary cities tend to be much higher than in coastal cities, although this can vary from country to country.

2.2.3 Cross-Border Secondary (Twin) Cities

An emerging feature of secondary city growth is the growing number of cross-border agglomerations located on borders between two or more countries. More than 635 cross-border cities in Africa (see Figure 2.4) play a significant role in trade and logistics between countries. More than 42 million people live in these agglomerations or almost 8% of the continent's total urban population (Curiel, 2020). Africa has 10 national capitals that are located at a national border: Bangui (the Central African Republic), Brazzaville (the Congo), Bujumbura (Burundi), Gaborone (Botswana), Kinshasa (the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Lomé (Togo), Maseru (Lesotho), Mbabane (Eswatini), N'Djamena (Chad), Porto Novo (Benin). Seven of these are secondary cities, although being the largest cities in each country.

The highest concentrations of border cities are in West Africa, the Great Lakes region and South-Central Africa. More than half of all agglomerations are cross-border in Benin, Gambia, Lesotho, Eswatini, and Togo. Cross-border cities and towns are not a significant feature of North and Northeast Africa.

Many cross-border or twin cities developed as a product of the colonial era road transport network. In most cross-border cities local languages and customs are similar, and there are strong family connections and trading ties. Colonialism created an artificial boundary over tribal areas, preventing people's freedom of movement: foreign language, laws, and constraints on free trade necessitated official border crossing requirements and passes. Closures of borders at night and delays in border crossing created a demand for accommodation and restaurants, laying down the basis of other trade and economic development opportunities in towns on either side of the border.

Cross-border cities located on the transcontinental highways and rail corridors, such as in West Africa and the African Great Lakes region, have benefited from increased trade and passenger movement at a border crossing. Unfortunately, these border crossing points have also provided opportunities for

FIGURE 2.4 | Cross border cities Africa

Source: Africapolis (2018).

illegal contraband goods and people smuggling, due to corruption and rent seeking by corrupt border officials and crime syndicates. Cross-border cities have also witnessed high COVID-19 and HIV/AIDS transmission (Lone & Ahmad, 2020).

African cross-border secondary cities play a crucial role in trade, logistics and tourism; however, many have become chokepoints or constraints to the free and efficient flow of goods and services. Free trade across the border is crucial to the growth and development of secondary cities located on borders. Streamlining of customs and administrative procedures and the introduction of e-passes can help develop strong regional and corridor development for trade, tourism, and investment between secondary cities. The establishment of cross-border special economic free-trade and manufacturing zones will create new job opportunities.

2.2.4 Urban Population Density

There are significant differences in population density between the types and sizes of cities in Africa, and it is not easy to estimate the density. Census data is often not refined enough at the secondary and smaller cities level. Household and income surveys are infrequent. Transient or temporary population levels can be high, as can day visitors to cities from rural areas and smaller towns. Absolute density, therefore, varies not only during seasons but daily. his lack of data makes planning for infrastructure and services in smaller towns and secondary cities difficult.

Table 2.4 shows the population density per square kilometre for African cities and regions derived from Africapolis data. Average densities of cities are around 4,070 persons per km², but ranged from 6,265 persons per km² in northern Africa to 2,454 in eastern Africa. The two largest cities in Africa, Cairo (Egypt) and Lagos (Nigeria), are denser. There are significant differences in densities between the population threshold levels of cities and regions. However, cities with 1–10 million people have the most significant variations in densities by regions. Secondary cities (0.1–1 million) tend to be denser in population than cities with populations of 1–5 million in most parts of Africa, except southern Africa. Northern African secondary cities have high densities, especially for secondary cities with a population between 300,000 and 500,000. Water, arable land, and climate have a significant impact on settlement pattern in this region of Africa. The density of secondary cities in eastern Africa is significantly higher than in metropolitan regions, a product of rapid rural-urban migration, household size, and poor planning policies associated with regional cities' management.

TABLE 2.4 | Density of population per square kilometre for African cities and regions

Density (pp/km²)	Africa	Eastern Africa	Middle Africa	Northern Africa	Southern Africa	Western Africa
10 million or more	12,151			12,960		10,839
5–10 million	3,748	2,369	2,287	16,810	4,811	3,146
1–5 million	3,685	1,881	3,911	5,226	4,035	5,136
0.5–1 million	4,053	1,803	6,454	6,646	4,910	5,050
300,000–500,000	4,144	2,571	5,910	8,363	4,229	4,413
100,000–300,000	3,792	2,395	5,823	4,936	3,396	4,811
50,000–100,000	4,130	3,301	5,230	5,192	2,847	4,973
10,000–50,000	4,110	3,721	4,463	5,693	2,259	4,944
Less than 10,000	4,074	2,454	4,183	6,265	3,412	5,009

Source: Estimates derived from Africapolis Data (2015).

Average density, however, presents a misleading picture of the concentration of population in secondary cities. The continent's largest cities are characteristically dense at the inner core but become progressively less dense as the city spreads out and grows. Peri-urban areas feature a significant number of rapidly expanding villages and towns. In metropolitan regions of less than 5 million, the inner core areas have become denser, but there is still a steeper drop off in the density gradient as the city spreads. Over several decades, however, densities have increased away from the core with infilling, but have dropped off rapidly as peripheral development becomes more scattered with in-filling. Few secondary cities have developed dense inner cores; their density gradient curve is much flatter, with the population spreading outwards in a more dispersed manner (Figure 2.5) shows the aggregate pattern of density shift for the development of large (>5 million), medium (1–5 million) and small (<1 million) cities.

FIGURE 2.5 | The distance decline of the urban land density in concentric rings for three aggregated levels of cities in Africa

Source: Tables Replicated from Xu et al. (2019).

Population density has a significant impact on income in African cities. One study found that "there are large household income premiums from being in bigger and particularly denser cities over rural areas in Africa, indicating migration pull forces remain strong. Second, the marginal effects of increases in density on household income are large, with density elasticities close [to] 0.6" (Lall et al., 2017, p. 32). These and other findings (Linard, et al., 2013) show the need for secondary cities to increase the intensity and density of urban development if incomes and productivity are to rise.

2.2.5 Urban Footprints

The total built-up area of land used for African cities is difficult to assess, given the variation in population densities in built-up urban areas (Seto et al., 2011). Estimates derived from Africapolis data of urban agglomerations with populations greater than 10,000 suggest that more than 139,200 km² of the continent is urbanised – less than 0.5% of the landmass (see Table 2.5). However, it may be larger than this estimate, given the data and census information gaps.

Little information is known about the rates and amount of land converted to urban use annually in the region. Based on the estimates of one report (Tuholske et al., 2019), the continuation of the current land conversion to urban use would result in the land occupied by cities having 100,000 people or more increasing between 2010 and 2030 by a factor of 2.75. With densities falling (Mboup, 2019; Henderson & Kriticos, 2017), land demand may well exceed this estimate.

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Estimates derived from Africapolis data of urban agglomerations with populations greater than 10,000 suggest that more than 139,200 km² of the continent is urbanised – less than 0.5% of the landmass.

TABLE 2.5 | Urban land area for African cities and regions (km²), 2015

Area (km²)	Urban land area (km²) by region of Africa					
	Africa	Eastern	Middle	Northern	Southern	Western
10 million plus	2,867			1,774		1,093
5–10 million	15,791	9,079	3,179	392	3,179	2,712
1–5 million	36,724	13,751	3,460	5,526	4,345	9,642
0.5–1 million	10,929	4,402	952	1,418	1,495	2,662
300,000–500,000	7,509	3,052	533	764	1,141	2,020
100,000–300,000	21,147	7,518	1,084	4,647	3,575	4,323
50,000–100,000	13,130	3,326	1,037	2,844	2,987	2,935
10,000–50,000	31,107	6,926	3,631	5,570	7,440	5,556
Total	139,205	48,054	13,877	22,935	24,162	32,943

Source: Estimates derived from Africapolis data (2015).

A study of 25 African cities on the rate of land-use conversion and population growth showed:

> "Between 2000-2014, the average annual growth rates of population and built-up area are 4.04% and 5.13%, respectively. Regarding the disparities among different-sized cities, the average annual growth rates of population in small, medium-sized, and large cities are 3.74%, 4.28%, and 4.35%, respectively, during 1990-2014. Correspondingly, the average annual growth rates of the built-up areas in 1990-2014 are 5.41%, 5.28%, and 5.42% in small, medium-sized, and large cities, respectively" (Xu et al., 2019, p.802-810).

Based on these estimates, an additional 120,000 km² of land may be converted from rural to urban in Africa by 2030. More than 30,000 km² is likely to be converted for urban development in secondary cities. Significant work is required to provide better conversion estimates of forest and rural to urban land in Africa, especially at the secondary city level. Currently, the lack of data, technology and expertise makes more reliable estimates of the demand for land and other urban services difficult in most secondary cities. Without a better understanding of conversion rates from rural to urban, it will become challenging for cities to plan for infrastructure and other urban services.

2.2.6 Emerging Spatial Patterns of Urban Development

Land use has become more intensified in the central business districts of Africa's most prominent cities. Premium upmarket housing areas have developed as gated communities around airports and shopping centres in some middle-income housing areas. This spatial intensification has generally not occurred at scale in sub-Saharan primary or secondary cities outside of South Africa (Lall et al., 2017, p. 32). Secondary cities in northern Africa have a denser and tighter urban form and scale than sub-Saharan cities due to climate, water, and cultural factors.

In sub-Saharan Africa, secondary cities are predominantly low-rise, dispersed, and poorly constructed. Some have small, tight, urban-commercial and government business centres, with a mix of congested and conflicting land-use activities around bus and rail stations and central marketplaces. Many have extensive peri-urban settlement areas of low-density urban development, often where inhabitants may be involved in home-based horticulture, animal keeping and trade services/repairs activities to supplement the family income. Despite the low-density housing construction, urban population densities remain high in these peri-urban areas because of high household sizes. In many countries, peri-urban areas comprise two households per house, each having more than six persons. They are home to high numbers of migrants, seasonal workers and transient visitors seeking low rent.

The low-density, dispersed, and poorly constructed dwellings in many African secondary cities nevertheless require essential urban services, which results in infrastructure expenses. The challenge for local governments is how to achieve more significant urban consolidation to reduce unit transaction costs and improve the quality of services delivery. Degradation of soils and loss of vegetation through farming and firewood collection in peri-urban areas surrounding many secondary cities, especially in the Sahel region, has become a significant issue, adding to environmental damage, more intense ambient air temperatures and declining food production. The future impact of climate change in many secondary cities can be significant, not just in arid zones, but also in coastal and recently cleared forested areas.

2.3 A New Economic Geography of Agglomeration

A new geography is emerging in the spatial patterns and development of secondary systems of African cities. A recent OECD report (OECD/SWAC, 2020) noted:

> *"The diverse and multifaceted nature of Africa's contemporary urban transition gives rise to new dynamics, new urban forms and new scales of urban development. In several countries, new settlement and mobility patterns lead to the emergence of large metropolitan regions around metropoles in areas of high urban concentration. This regionalisation of urban dynamics, in some cases across borders (e.g., Greater Ibadan Lagos Accra corridor), displays strong functional integration at scales beyond the agglomeration, while at the same time reinforcing spatial decoupling from the rest of the territory and increasing discontinuities within national urban systems"* (p. 16).

FIGURE 2.6 | Urban agglomeration patterns emerging in West African Corridor

Border
Urban agglomeration (above 300 000 inhabitants)
Urban agglomeration (bellow 300 000 inhabitants)

Sources: OECD/SWAC 2018, Africapolis (database); Geopolis 2018 - Map : François Mariconi E-brard

In densely populated parts of Africa, especially in the West African coastal corridor (see Figure 2.6), Lake Victoria Basin, and the countries of Ethiopia and South Africa, an urban spatial pattern of dispersed agglomeration has emerged in rural areas close to metropolitan regions and large secondary cities. Many secondary and small cities (less than 50,000) have sprung up in these peri-urban-rural areas, becoming catalysts for daily employment or longer distance commuting to large urban centres. The resultant dispersed patterns are an urban agglomeration form of rural-urban, regional, low-density cluster development. These clusters of cities and towns create permanent and part-time formal and informal jobs, mainly in warehousing, trading, repairs, logistics, housing construction, education and training, health, security, transport, and personal services industries. Very few have high value-adding economic activities.

2.4 Economic Density, Growth and Trade

Cities have only recently begun to play a more significant role in the development of sub-Saharan economies. Northern and southern Africa have had the advantages of high levels of urbanisation, agglomeration, and industrialisation. Generally, the links between urbanisation, agglomeration and prosperity appear weak in Africa (Sulemana et al., 2019). As one World Bank report has noted: "Cities in Africa are not delivering agglomeration economies or reaping urban productivity benefits; instead, they suffer from high costs for food, housing, and transport. These high costs – rising from coordination failures, poorly designed policies, weak property rights, and other factors that lower economic density – lock firms into producing non-tradable goods and services" (Linard et al., 2013, p. 32).

Typical African cities share three features that constrain urban development:

- Crowded, not economically dense — investments in infrastructure, industrial and commercial structures have not kept pace with the concentration of people, nor have investments in affordable formal housing; congestion and its costs overwhelm urban concentration benefits.
- Disconnected — cities have developed as collections of small and fragmented neighbourhoods lacking in reliable transportation, which limits workers' job opportunities while preventing firms from reaping scale and agglomeration benefits.
- Costly for households and firms — high nominal wages and transaction costs deter investors and trading partners, especially in regionally and internationally tradable sectors; workers' high food, housing and transport costs increase labour costs to firms and thus reduce expected returns on investment.

2.4.1 Economic Productivity in Cities

TABLE 2.6 | Economic performance data for selected sub-Saharan African cities (2015)

City	Country	GDP/Capita City (US$)	Population (million)	Density (pp/km²)	Area (km²)	Est GDP $bn	$m/Ha	GDP/Capita (US$)	City/GDP/capita
Luanda	Angola	6,769	5.30	7,233	733	35.9	49.0	5,657	1.2
Cotonou*	Benin	968	0.68	4,266	159	0.7	4.1	836	1.2
Gaborone	Botswana	13,427	0.25	2,452	102	3.4	32.9	5,616	2.4
Bujumbura	Burundi	430	0.95	3,62	315	0.4	4.2	288	1.5
Kinshasa	Democratic Republic of the Congo	282	9.2	16,924	544	2.6	4.8	253	1.1
Libreville	Gabon	22,746	0.69	4,04	170	15.6	91.9	15,268	1.5
Bamako	Mali	964	0.73	5,571	132	0.7	5.4	593	1.6
Windhoek	Namibia	9,774	0.34	4,01	84	3.3	39.2	8,781	1.1
Niamey	Niger	763	1.03	6,298	316	0.8	5.2	393	1.9
Zaria*	Nigeria	777	0.69	9,002	77	0.5	7.0	1,603	0.5
Bloemfontein*	South Africa	7,896	0.42	2,761	152	3.3	21.8	7,544	1.0
Cape Town	South Africa	10,211	3.80	5,825	652	38.8	59.5	7,544	1.4
Durban	South Africa	8,221	3.05	3,908	780	25.1	32.1	7,544	1.1

City	Country	GDP/Capita City (US$)	Population (million)	Density (pp/km²)	Area (km²)	Est GDP $bn	$m/Ha	GDP/Capita (US$)	City/ GDP/ capita
Gqeberha*	South Africa	7591	1.14	5794	196	8.6	44.0	7,544	1.0
Johannesburg	South Africa	11,608	8.10	3,755	2157	94.0	43.6	7,544	1.5
Pretoria	South Africa	11,925	1.82	1,668	1091	21.7	19.9	7,544	1.6
Bangui	The Central African Republic	671	0.73	9,446	78	0.5	6.3	619	1.1
Banjul	The Gambia	805	0.40	13,681	29	0.3	11.0	494	1.6
Lomé	Togo	860	1.55	4,913	315	1.3	4.2	569	1.5

Source: Godfrey, N. and X. Zhao (2015) * Secondary cities.

Economic data on GDP, investment and productivity for African cities is difficult to obtain and, in many cases, unreliable and outdated. For secondary cities, data is extremely poor and not easily estimated, given the informal sector economy's size. Most secondary cities produce or export little in the way of manufactured goods and services. The exceptions are cities in northern Africa and in the country of South Africa; more heavily populated countries have many service industries supporting systems of secondary cities. While franchising is an important element in advanced economies' business activities, it is not widespread in African cities, apart from the fast-food and fuel industry sectors. Local economies' multiplier effect can be high for secondary cities, which are significant primary exporters of agriculture products, minerals, petroleum, and tourism; however, profits, dividends, royalties, and tax benefits flow to metropolitan regions, overseas, or central governments. Consequently, there is little flow back of these transfers into the local economy in reinvestment, and little value is captured from taxes to build local infrastructure and improve services.

The productivity of African cities is low compared to Asian and Latin American cities (Linard et al., 2013). Data from a report by LSE/Oxford economics (Godfrey & Zhao, 2015) show that GDP per capita for secondary cities correlates closely with national average GDP per capita. A measure of GDP economic density and cities' performance is production or GDP per square kilometre (World Bank, 2009, p. 440). In 2012 nominal prices, GDP per km² was extremely low for African cities (see Table 2.6), compared to Asia, which averaged over $100/km². This position is the product of African cities' low density, low productivity, and low capital investment per capita. The lack of adequate infrastructure and services adds significantly to business transaction costs, especially for inland cities, undermining most African cities' competitiveness.

The increasingly rapid integration of the global information economy will be among the most critical factors shaping urban economies' viability in all countries in the coming decade. Except for a few cities with economies based on natural resources and tourism, African primary and secondary cities are integrated poorly into global economic systems. . As a result, they are struggling to attract investment into the urban sector, with most cities growing primarily from the expansion of government services and consumption. There are very few examples of prosperous cities with expanding export-orientated industries in sub-Saharan Africa. If secondary cities are to grow and develop, there must be a much stronger focus on endogenous growth, particularly in developing small-scale enterprises which could capitalise on regional advantages in natural resources, human capital and communications.

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In 2012 nominal prices, GDP per km² was extremely low for African cities, compared to Asia, which averaged over $100/km².

2.4.2 The Concentration of Wealth in Primate Cities

TABLE 2-7 | Nominal wealth of African cities (2017)

City	Country	Percentage of Country's Population	City Wealth (US$ billion)	Country Wealth (US$ billion)	Percentage of Country's Wealth	GDP/ Capita (US$)	Wealth (US$ million/ km²)	US$/ adult	Wealth Adult / Capita (US$)	City Wealth/ Country
Johannesburg	South Africa	17.9	276	761	36.3	6,132	120	44,966	12,9	3.5
Cape Town	South Africa	7.9	155	761	20.4	6,132	237	57,339	12,9	4.4
Cairo	Egypt	27.0	140	330	42.4	2,495	73	8,53	3,168	2.7
Lagos	Nigeria	6.7	108	253	42.7	1,969	91	14,957	4,881	3.1
Durban	South Africa	6.6	55	761	7.2	6,132	67	24,119	12,9	1.9
Nairobi	Kenya	8.9	54	104	51.9	1,568	37	12,176	1,809	6.7
Luanda	Angola	36.6	49	81	60.5	4,096	48	9,404	3,649	2.6
Pretoria	South Africa	4.7	48	761	6.3	6,132	35	29,717	12,9	2.3
Casablanca	Morocco	12.9	42	254	16.5	3,448	76	17,316	11,118	1.6
Accra	Ghana	17.3	38	63	60.3	2,026	30	12,98	4,292	3.0
Abidjan	Cote d'ivoire	21.0	27	46	58.7	3,76	64	9,239	3,352	2.8
Alexandria	Egypt	5.1	25	330	7.6	2,495	74	8,061	3,168	2.5
Dar Es Salaam	Tanzania	12.4	25	60	41.7	1,005	21	7,698	3,069	2.5
Abuja	Nigeria	1.1	13	253	5.1	1,969	24	9,443	4,881	1.9
Windhoek*	Namibia	15.5	13	21	61.9	5,646	140	55,199	16,101	3.4
Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	3.7	13	60	21.7	768	22.4	5,39	3,085	1.7
Tangier	Morocco	3.1	11	254	4.3	3,448	90	14,337	11,118	1.3
Kampala	Uganda	9.9	11	16	68.8	632	16	7,088	1,603	4.4
Marrakesh	Morocco	3.1	11	254	4.3	3,448	85	18,566	11,118	1.7
Maputo	Mozambique	5.8	10	21	47.6	461	11	6,388	880	7.3
Lusaka	Zambia	15.9	10	20	50.0	1,535	15	6,856	1,064	6.4
Gaborone*	Botswana	17.5	9	12	75.0	7,893	53	33,925	8,917	3.8
Mombasa*	Kenya	2.9	8	104	7.7	1,568	47	8,43	1,809	4.7

Sources: Adapted from New World Wealth, AfrAsia Bank (2018); * denotes secondary cities.

Significant differences and disparities are witnessed in the concentration of public and private wealth and wealth per capita in African cities. Credit Suisse (2017, p. 165), a global financial services firm, conducts regular national wealth surveys that include some larger cities' wealth. A report on the wealth of African cities (AfrAsia Bank, 2018) compiled from Credit Suisse data estimates the wealth for 23 African cities at US$1.15 trillion, based on a set of measures related to cash and fixed deposits, income, commodities, real estate, interests, etc. Table 2.7 gives a breakdown of city wealth, wealth per adult, and wealth per km². More than half of the total wealth of these 23 cities is tied up in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Cairo, and Lagos. These metropolitan regions are financial cities, with significant investments in commercial, industry and government assets.

There is significant variation in the city and national wealth levels per capita, with a mean difference of 2.8 for the cities measured in Table 2.7. Maputo and Nairobi have the highest inequity levels between city and national wealth per capita. Generally, the higher the level of inequity between city wealth and national wealth, the higher the Gini coefficients in poverty within national systems of cities. The wealthier cities attract and control a disproportionate share of a country's wealth and capital to the detriment of the development of secondary, middle, and smaller cities.

Should these and other metropolitan regions in Africa be affected by significant disaster, civil unrest, crime and climate change in the long term, the impacts on national economies could be significant.

A more progressive and dispersed but clustered approach to public and private investment in hard and soft infrastructure, commerce, education, health and endogenous industry in secondary and smaller regional cities is needed to avoid national wealth concentrations in metropolitan regions. Government should aim to enhance and build strong national systems of cities to achieve greater dispersion of wealth through African countries. This would lift the overall economic performance of the national system of cities and reduce risk exposure to metropolitan regions.

2.4.3 Foreign Direct Investment

The 2018 UN-Habitat State of African Cities Report included an extensive investigation into African cities' FDI (Wall et al., 2018, p. 127). Africa's total world FDI share is small, at roughly 5%, given its approximate 15% global population share. In recent years, Chinese firms' significant increase in FDI has helped establish and complete industrial chains in Africa, mainly in minerals, transport and energy.

Foreign direct investment to Africa for 2003–2016 totalled US$605.2 billion (World Bank Data, 2020). Of this, an estimated US$157.2 billion (26%) was invested in African cities. The sector breakdown of FDI into cities is not readily identifiable. A proportion of this was in public investment in urban infrastructure services. Other investments have supplemented this under national loan programs for urban infrastructure, which have also benefited smaller cities. Private FDI has mainly been directed into commercial and residential real-estate, economic processing zones (EPZ), industrial parks and upmarket accommodation development.

TABLE 2.8 | The FDI ranking of African cities at the African and global scale (2003–2016)

City	Country	Region of Africa	(US$ millions)	Growth (%)	Percentage of Africa	Cum %	US$/capita
Cairo	Egypt	Northern	13,716	-1.25	8.7	8.7	669
Johannesburg	South Africa	Southern	13,211	6.23	8.4	17.1	1,651
Tangier*	Morocco	Northern	10,542	23.84	6.7	23.8	10,04
Lagos	Nigeria	Western	9,213	7.23	5.8	29.6	439
Casablanca	Morocco	Northern	8,37	9.38	5.3	34.9	3,488
Algiers	Algeria	Northern	8,016	-14.74	5.1	40.0	1,002
Cape Town	South Africa	Southern	6,434	0.33	4.1	44.1	1,609
Nairobi	Kenya	Eastern	5,978	25.01	3.8	47.8	1,495
Abidjan	Côte d'Ivoire	Western	5,534	25.44	3.5	51.4	1,203
Dakar	Senegal	Western	4,775	-1.75	3.0	54.4	1,687
Rabat	Morocco	Northern	4,737	-6.54	3.0	57.4	8,056
Marrakech	Morocco	Northern	4,258	-17.2	2.7	60.1	7,217
Accra	Ghana	Western	4,066	34.72	2.6	62.7	1,402
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	Eastern	3,482	-4.75	2.2	64.9	1,075
Tunis	Tunisia	Northern	3,453	-7.78	2.2	67.1	5,481

City	Country	Region of Africa	(US$ millions)	Growth (%)	Percentage of Africa	Cum %	US$/capita
Tete *	Mozambique	Southern	3,441	-6.23	2.2	69.2	9,831
Luanda	Angola	Southern	3,022	2.06	1.9	71.2	581
Maputo	Mozambique	Southern	2,915	13.86	1.8	73.0	1,869
Djibouti	Djibouti	Eastern	2,899	-3.95	1.8	74.8	4,676
Oran*	Algeria	Northern	2,845	-5.08	1.8	76.6	3,428
Port Elizabeth*	South Africa	Southern	2,827	0.09	1.8	78.4	2,376
Durban *	South Africa	Southern	2,701	7.1	1.7	80.2	1,185
Alexandria	Egypt	Northern	2,553	-4.07	1.6	81.8	824
Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	Eastern	2,512	12.58	1.6	83.4	1,047
Port Harcourt	Nigeria	Western	2,47	-6.55	1.6	84.9	1,328
Kampala	Uganda	Eastern	2,377	8.38	1.5	86.4	925
Kigali	Rwanda	Eastern	2,302	11.21	1.5	87.9	2,677
Abuja	Nigeria	Western	2,294	10.19	1.5	89.3	1,687
Midland	South Africa	Southern	2	-4.93	1.3	90.6	3,333
Khartoum	Sudan	Eastern	1,963	-15.8	1.2	91.9	373
Beira*	Mozambique	Southern	1,886	-5.2	1.2	93.1	3,627
Pretoria	South Africa	Southern	1,615	11.27	1.0	94.1	1,003
Lusaka	Zambia	Southern	1,572	15.43	1.0	95.1	683
Mombasa	Kenya	Eastern	1,386	4.9	0.9	96.0	1,711
Kinshasa	Democratic Republic of the Congo**	Central	1,363	-2.75	0.9	96.8	114
Gaborone *	Botswana	Southern	1,139	-0.01	0.7	97.5	4,556
East London *	South Africa	Southern	1,084	5.66	0.7	98.2	3,097
Port Said	Egypt	Northern	1,022	-7.06	0.6	98.9	1,503
Windhoek *	Namibia	Southern	958	9.11	0.6	99.5	2,521
Harare	Zimbabwe	Southern	415	-0.63	0.3	99.7	277
Walvis Bay*	Namibia	Southern	401	-6.1	0.3	100.0	8,02

Source: Credit Suisse (2017, p. 165); *denotes secondary cities. ** NDRC (2008, p. 122).

Table 2.8 shows the estimated FDI into African cities from 2003 to 2016. Nine large cities received over 50% of the FDI of the 41 cities for which data is available. Per-capita investment within cities also varied significantly between countries, with Morocco benefiting mainly from FDI. Cities such as Tangier (Morocco) and Djibouti have benefited from significant investment in port infrastructure, while Gaborone (Botswana), Windhoek (Namibia) and Tete (Mozambique) have benefited from global firms and mining interests. The extent to which there have been flow-on effects and benefits of FDI into other secondary cities, such as in EPZs, is unknown. Secondary cities, however, have tended to fare poorly in the allocation of both public and private sector FDI. This imbalance in the flow of FDI to secondary cities is an area in need of research.

2.4.4 Special Economic and New Enterprise Zones

Many African countries have embarked on developing special economic zones (SEZ) to replicate the success of Asian economies. Chinese investment has played a significant role in the development of SEZs in recent years. There are an estimated 237 SEZs in Africa, with many more under construction, as well as several free ports (UNCTAD, 2019). Special economic zones operate in 38 of the 54 economies on the continent, with the highest number in Kenya (61). Most African economic zones are traditional EPZs and industrial parks designed along the lines of the Asian model. Most are clustered around the major cities or ports; others are dispersed to regional areas, and some to secondary cities. Unfortunately, few African SEZs have been successful (Farole & Moberg, 2017). There has been some initial success in Kenya and Lesotho. For the most part, however, African SEZs "have failed to attract significant investment, promote exports, and create sustainable employment and failed to generate significant improvements in investment, employment, and exports, both relative to their internal targets and in international comparison" (Farole & Moberg, 2014, p. 23). Their failure is due, essentially, to the nature of the political economy of SEZ schemes, which results in the prevention of the replication of best practices; coordination failures from institutional incentives; poor locational choices; weak enabling environments and logistics systems; and a failure to encourage the development of industry clusters to spawn innovation and creativity and reduce costs and access to common user services.

In a strong critique of EPZs, one author (Stein, 2012, pp. v) notes:

> "Most zones in Africa have remained rather small, with few linkages to the local economy and small foreign-exchange earnings. The main problem is that aid agencies have driven many zones in SSA with promises of special access to foreign markets, which have proven to be quite limited... In addition, the vision has been driven by the rather faulty theoretical notions in World Bank policy papers and elsewhere that EPZs are simply the second-best solutions to the total liberalisation of economies. In contrast, in many successful export zones in Asian countries, EPZs have been part of a broader industrial policy where zones are not an end in themselves but a component of the broader strategy to transform institutions to improve developmental competitiveness and industrialise the country."

One of the biggest challenges for governments has been to promote industrial deconcentration in secondary cities. Where this has occurred, such as in Kenya and Nigeria, it has been done poorly. Generally, SEZ policies support infrastructure, tax provisions and job-creation incentives and ensure connectivity to agricultural value chains and primary cities and ports. However, policies seeking to create industrial parks and SEZs in regional secondary cities or apply the concept of 'one industry one district', as in Ghana[1] (Mensah, et al. 2020), to disperse industry development across secondary cities have not worked in many less populated African countries.

Secondary cities need more than hard infrastructure and a few incentives to be successful. They must have a critical mass of competitive infrastructure to provide a catalyst for innovation and the creation of spin-off industries. Few secondary cities have the critical mass of hard, and especially soft, infrastructure and the concentration of input business into local supply chains to operate at scale to support export development zones. In secondary cities, foreign businesses in SEZs are often the first to be closed when large multinationals economise or re-shore operations. Special economic zones in secondary cities need to create endogenous growth and import-substitution opportunities to support the development of domestic markets, as well as subnational aggregate demand for value-adding and green industry services outside metropolitan regions. This outcome requires a more balanced approach by national governments to spatial economic and urban development policy, focusing on endogenous growth and the development of regional hard and soft infrastructure supporting more decentralised regional development.

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> *One of the biggest challenges for governments has been to promote industrial deconcentration in secondary cities.*

Secondary cities need to build economic enterprise zones, not SEZs. These zones require a new superstructure to support specialised export and localised/domestic endogenous-growth employment and investment opportunities. This superstructure is necessary to support the development of industry clusters and collaboration opportunities for high local and regional value-added processing, manufactured products, personal, community and business services that are engaged with intercity trade, not just metropolitan regions. Until secondary cities can build this new superstructure, it is difficult for local firms and institutions to create the critical mass to compete and operate at scale, generate efficiencies and cost-savings, build human capital skills and competencies, raise productivity, and reduce transaction costs to compete against metropolitan regions. If African governments want industrial development and jobs to grow in secondary cities, they must move away from an export model of SEZs to a more localised and enterprise-driven development model to increase domestic market demand and production of goods and services. Every effort should be made to reduce the current propensity to import goods and services if the prospects of export growth industries are poor.

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> *Secondary cities need more than hard infrastructure and a few incentives to be successful. They must have a critical mass of competitive infrastructure to provide a catalyst for innovation and the creation of spin-off industries.*

2.4.5 Trade Between Cities

While international manufacturing merchandise trade between regional cities in advanced and developing economies continues to grow, this is not the case for most African countries. Trade corridors are developing strongly along the western and north-western coasts of Africa and internally in Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Trade development between western and northern African primary and secondary cities is generally more developed than in eastern Africa. However, trade is impeded by poor infrastructure, regulations, customs arrangements, rent-seeking, and poor integration of supply chains and logistics facilities in towns and cities along rail and road corridors. As a result, unlike in Asia, there is little competition for trade and development between primary cities and systems of secondary cities within countries. This leads to significant regional disparities in the development of secondary cities, many of which are little more than subnational and local government services and large regional market and passenger transport centres.

Since colonial times, the value-added trade activities involving trade in materials, resources, manufactured goods, parts, and other commodities and processing between the network of secondary and metropolitan systems of cities have substantially slowed. Historically, there were much higher localised integration levels of trade between national systems of cities in process and production value-adding activities and supply chains. This allowed Zimbabwe to be a significant exporter of farm machinery and mining equipment, for example, and Ghana to produce a wide range of clothing and textile items for the domestic and regional export markets (Madonko, 2016; Amankwah-Amoah, 2015). There was significant integration between supply chains and value-adding between firms in cities both within the country and in adjacent countries.

The shrinkage of these activities, owing to the adoption of free-market and free-trade, a lack of capital to invest in the modernisation of industry and improved transport, energy, and telecommunications networks required to remain competitive, led to a collapse in higher value-adding industries and city-to-city investment and trade in goods, services, materials, and products. What remains today is an economic system where trade and value-adding between secondary and smaller cities have become metropolitan-city centric, involving imported commodities and consumer products and services, with limited production and trade in higher value-added products and services in the other direction.

2.5 Structural Characteristics of Secondary City Economies

Three broad economic structural characteristics can be associated with the development of different secondary cities. The first characterises cities that have strong growth paths and dynamic local economies. For example, Wolfsburg, the headquarters of Volkswagen in Germany, is well connected nationally and internationally to a competitive trade, development and investment system. Other examples include are tourist, resource industry, and specialised manufacturing cities. All tend to have a strong export focus or an outward business orientation. Although few secondary cities in sub-Saharan Africa fit this category, there are some, such as Luxor (Egypt), Tangier (Morocco), Arusha (Tanzania), Stone Town of Zanzibar (Tanzania) (Zanzibar Tourism Authority, 2010), and Touba (Senegal). However, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown how exposed these economies can be to a high reliance on international tourism growth.

The second structural characteristic consists of logistics and boomtown economies, driven by migration and industrial development. Secondary cities such as Mombasa (DCP Kenya, 2019), Gqeberha (South Africa), and Sekondi-Takoradi (Ghana) (Government of Ghana, 2015, p. 435) fall into this group. This group has a diverse range of economic activities servicing local and national markets. They may be larger agriculture, resource industry and manufacturing cities. Many struggle to attract investment and to create sustainable jobs. Some are located at the peri-urban fringe of large metropolitan regions and form part of a clustered-city network. Many are growing rapidly due to inner-city deindustrialisation and relocation associated with developing export processing zones, which provide the catalyst for their development. Many struggle to manage urban development and environmental issues. Others are regional capital secondary cities. They have meritocracy economies that are striving to become more competitive.

The third characteristic is that of laggard, economically depressed, and underperforming cities. These fall into two broad types: the first type includes cities experiencing increasing urbanisation levels, with large numbers of urban poor people, migration and refugees. These cities have extremely low public investment levels in infrastructure and services delivery and high informal-sector employment levels. The fast-growing refugee cities of Kakuma and Dadaab in Kenya (DCP Kenya, 2019) and Yida in South Sudan are examples of this type of secondary city. The second type includes secondary cities undergoing post-industrial restructuring and economic decline, with ageing and declining populations; these are mainly located in Europe, North America and Japan. African cities are more likely to fall into the first secondary city type than the second, although the city of Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) was once an important manufacturing centre.

Little data is available on the flow of trade, capital and investment within African secondary cities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that trade in most secondary cities is not balanced and is dominated by net imports of construction materials and fittings, personal and consumer household goods, and services. There is a remnant of localised general services, some small-scale engineering, manufacturing, and export of agriculture products and materials; however, these are becoming less significant economic activity drivers in secondary cities. Regional shortfalls in income to pay for imported goods and services from overseas and metropolitan regions are being met by increased levels of household debt from lending (Ntsalaze & Ikhide, 2017), forced land sales, increased rents, and domestic and international remittances – 30% to 40% of which go to rural and regional economies (IFAD, 2009, p. 20) – with a significant proportion of this spent in secondary and smaller cities.

Secondary city economies in Africa are significantly different from the economies of metropolitan regions and secondary cities in advanced economies. This can be illustrated by comparing secondary cities and metropolitan regions in Ghana and Canada (see Table 2.9). The table provides a breakdown of the industry employment structure for the secondary cities of Cape Coast (pop. 170,000) and Tamale (pop. 223,000) and the metropolitan region of Accra (pop. 1.6 million) in Ghana; and the secondary city of Kingston (pop. 115,000) and the metropolitan region of Toronto, Ontario (pop. 5.5 million) in Canada for 2010–2011. (Kingston was chosen because the Canadian government supported the 2010 census, and the categorisation of industry groups is the same for the two countries.) The contrast in employment and economic structure between two secondary and primary cities varies, with Accra dominating the wholesaling, transport, retail and information services sectors. Cape Coast (see case study Chapter 7) has a clear competitive position in education services.

Compared to Kingston, Ontario, clear differences are seen in the service sector economy's structure and development. Almost half of the total employment is in government, education, health and social services, compared to less than 20% in Cape Coast and 10% in Tamale. The retailing and wholesaling sectors in the two Ghanaian secondary cities contribute to more than 50% more jobs than in Kingston. These differences provide important indicators of where structural changes are likely to occur in these economies in the future.

TABLE 2.9 | Comparison of industry employment structure of secondary and metropolitan regions – Ghana and Canada

Industry Sector	Employment by sector (%)				
	Cape Coast	Tamale	Metro Accra	Kinston Ontario	Metro Toronto
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	7.4	18.2	2.4	0.1	0.3
Mining and quarrying	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Manufacturing	13.1	12.5	14.1	4.8	9.1
Utilities	0.9	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.5
Construction	5.3	3.8	4.2	3.4	6.0
Wholesale and Retail; repairs of vehicles	25.1	33.4	35.2	14.4	15.2
Transportation and storage	4.0	4.2	5.3	1.9	5.4
Accommodation and food service activities	10.0	7.6	10.0	8.6	6.3
Information and communication	0.9	0.3	1.5	1.6	3.4
Business, financial and insurance activities	1.2	0.6	1.9	3.3	8.0
Real estate activities	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.8	2.7
Professional scientific and technical activities	1.9	1.7	2.1	4.2	10.9
Administrative and support service activities	1.3	1.2	1.8	1.9	4.9
Public administration and defence; social security	3.3	1.9	3.0	15.5	3.9
Education	14.1	6.5	4.0	16.1	7.3
Human health and social work activities	3.3	2.0	2.0	15.6	9.4
Arts entertainment and recreation	1.2	0.6	1.5	1.1	1.9
Other service activities	6.1	3.8	8.6	3.2	4.3
Activities of households as employers	0.8	1.1	1.4	1.9	0.3
Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: 2010 Ghana Census District Analysis; City of Kingston, Ontario (Watson & Associates Economists, 2019, p. 170).

Given that services offer the most significant potential for job creation and growth in African secondary cities, the challenge for Ghanaian and most other African secondary cities is how to transition to greater investment and employment in higher value-added services, such as finance, education and health, when the employment base is heavily embedded in wholesale, retail and a declining manufacturing base. Some means of doing this are explored in the case studies.

Similar differences can be seen in the labour force professional groups and skill levels between secondary and primary cities (Table 2.10). Because of its university, colleges, and tourism industry, Cape Coast has developed a higher level of professional skills in these industry clusters than Tamale has. However, both cities are significantly weaker than the national capital in management occupations. In comparing the metropolitan regions of Toronto and Accra, the significant structural differences in advanced business, finance, education and health services are clearly shown.

TABLE 2.10 | Occupational economic structure for secondary cities in Ghana and Canada (2010)

Occupation	Labour force by occupation (%)				
	Cape Coast	Tamale	Metro Accra	Kingston Ontario	Metro Toronto
Managers	3.7	2.4	5.3	9.8	12.2
Professionals	13.2	8.1	7.9	14.0	18.4
Technicians and associate professionals	3.5	2.0	4.0	5.7	8.7
Clerical support workers	3.5	1.4	3.7	18.3	5.7
Service and sales workers	32.5	33.0	38.5	24.2	11.5
Skilled agricultural forestry and fishery workers	6.8	17.6	1.7	1.3	3.9
Craft and related trades workers	23.6	21.5	20.1	11.6	23.0
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	4.9	5.1	6.1	10.2	11.1
Elementary occupations	8.2	8.6	12.6	2.8	0.7
Other occupations	0.0	0.1	0.2	2.0	4.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: 2010 Ghana Census District Analysis; (Watson & Associates Economists, 2019, p. 170).

The analysis of both secondary cities shows that significant thought must be given to examining ways to diversity and specialise the economic bases of secondary cities in the two cities of Cape Coast and Tamale. Ethiopia is also a country where urban development policies have also focused on promoting planned secondary city development in advance of urbanisation, largely as industrial enterprises are relatively clustered (Songwe, 2018). In 2009–2010, Addis Ababa had 11 times the number of manufacturing enterprises as the secondary city of Awassa (Gebreeyesus, 2016). As noted in Hommann and Lall (2019, p. 59), "Few secondary cities have substantial local specialisation in manufacturing. For cities that do have a local specialisation, much of that industry concentration is in very traditional activities such as textiles and clothing — minor industries".

2.5.1 Competitiveness of Cities

Many global studies have been undertaken on the competitiveness of cities. The notion of competitiveness conveyed in the literature is one of a league of competing cities measured with sets of indicators. International companies and organisations like McKinsey, Mercer and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) have investigated economic competitiveness, business dynamics and liveability of mega and larger secondary cities (EIU, 2012). The EIU defines a city's competitiveness as its ability to attract capital, business, talent and visitors. Few reports have focused specifically on African cities' competitiveness (Wall et al., 2018, p. 127; Mitullah, 2020). Many economists argue that competitiveness is more than a focus on business, but involves a broader range of factors, some of which are intangible and not easily measured.

TABLE 2.11 | Competitive ranking of African cities by Economic Intelligence Unit

Ranking	City	Overall Ranking	Score
1	Johannesburg	67	50.5
2	Cape Town	73	47.4
3	Durban	94	41.2
4	Cairo	113	42.9
5	Nairobi	115	36.9
6	Alexandria	116	34.6
7	Lagos	119	29.9

EIU (2012) Hot Spots 2025 Benchmarking the future competitiveness of cities.

Despite strong economic growth over the past two decades in many African countries, the continent's cities lag the rest of the world in competitiveness ranking. Table 2.11 shows the EIU's (2012) report on the ranking of African cities. The rankings are based on city performance across eight broad categories: economic strength, human capital, institutional effectiveness, financial maturity, global appeal, physical capital, environment and natural hazards, and social and cultural character. In terms of global competitiveness, these cities rank low on the global index, with Johannesburg ranking the highest at 67.

Care is required in comparing the competitiveness of African cities to other world cities. African cities have a significantly different economic structure from that of developed and developing economies in Asia and elsewhere. They are less economically diversified and developed within the industrialisation cycle, have much higher informal sector employment, and have a lower level of infrastructure and public services. Cities like Nairobi and Bangkok are not comparable because they have different economic structures and infrastructure development stages. Cities Like Nairobi and Accra are comparable, but not Mombasa and Casablanca. The competitiveness of cities in Africa is best compared to the similarity of economic and workforce employment structure, GDP, and governance arrangements.

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Many economists argue that competitiveness is more than a focus on business, but involves a broader range of factors, some of which are intangible and not easily measured.

2.5.2 Competitiveness of African Secondary Cities

The idea that the competitiveness of secondary cities can be compared in the same league as large cities is not realistic or helpful. It is akin to comparing the competitiveness of league divisions for sports. Large cities are well-resourced, enjoy agglomeration advantages and are often the primate centres of national government, finance, business, and cultural institutions. Some secondary cities do have unique factors which enable them to compete against large cities, however.

In the context of secondary cities, the focus of competitiveness should be on optimising factor costs of inputs and outputs of products and services. Population size, scale and function significantly affect the magnitude and extent to which these can be optimised. The competitiveness of secondary cities can be lifted by improving local factors linked to production, such as infrastructure, demand, other factor conditions, and governance, but this does not overcome scale and other issues when competing against larger cities and international factors. However, secondary cities can collaborate to enhance their competitiveness based on the principle of collaborative advantage. This dual focus of enhancing the competitiveness of secondary cities' performance at the local level and collaboration to compete at scale is advocated strongly as a competitiveness model by this book.

One study on South Africa's secondary cities (Marais, 2015) notes that "local economic development strategies for these cities pay too little attention to creating effective links with their rural hinterlands." Also, globalisation has increased both vulnerabilities and opportunities for secondary cities, but most are ill-prepared to manage the impacts of the former or benefit from the latter. Local economic development strategies focus on industry cluster initiatives (Viviers et al., 2015). Such strategies increase competition with the larger metropolitan areas. South Africa's secondary cities are too small to achieve the scale and critical mass to overcome the agglomeration advantages of Cape Town and Johannesburg (Leipzig & Dimitrov, 2015).

A study of 74 African cities (50 metropolitan and 24 secondary cities) with a specific focus on 13 competitiveness indicators, including household consumption expenditure, government effectiveness, and ease of doing business, shows that secondary cities fare much worse in the competitive rankings (Angelopulo, 2016, p.69): 'A key focus of competitiveness relates to Inclusive' urbanisation. That is the way cities function as "gateways to investment and global markets, as generators of wealth, hubs of innovation and business formation, leading to prosperity and a rising quality of life for their citizens". Using a score rating system of 100, the sampled metropolitan regions had an index score of 36, compared to 29 for the secondary cities. There was an 11-point difference between Tshwane (Pretoria) and Nelson Mandela Bay (see case study Chapter 13), both two secondary cities in South Africa.

A significant factor undermining the competitiveness of cities in South Africa is a high level of parochialism, a feature common to other federated states such as Nigeria and Ethiopia. Within unitary states, gaps in competitiveness between capital and metropolitan region cities appear wider, with the central government having a more direct role and control over economic development and investment activities. Enhancing the competitiveness and performance of secondary cities will be crucial to the development of national economies. This calls for better research into factors and drivers that can help make secondary cities perform better and contribute to national development.

In an increasingly competitive world of cities, the lack of knowledge about the competitiveness of secondary cities in Africa calls for better research using a range of rapid assessment tools and techniques to measure and analyse the dynamics, governance, logistics, and supply chain systems and deficiencies gaps in the local economies of secondary cities. This is needed to identify the strategic infrastructure, enabling environments, and human capital development gaps that need to be addressed, build competitive advantage, attract investment, and become more prosperous and liveable cities.

Other reports and studies have sought to measure economic and governance factors and sustainability by ranking cities in terms of the prosperity performance and development of African cities. (Jackson, 2015; Arimah, 2017) The City Prosperity Initiative (UN-Habitat & ESCAP, 2012) is a tool from UN-HABITAT that measures sustainable urban development across the globe in a comparative manner using indices that cover productivity and infrastructure, quality of life, equity, and social inclusion, as well as environmental sustainability. The tool shows that the economic development and competitiveness of cities is not dependent on economic factors alone. Other factors, such as social and cultural capital, liveability, and cities' essence, are important factors in attracting capital to cities.

2.6 Connectivity within Systems of Secondary Cities

Connectivity is defined as "the state or quality of being connective or connected" (Merriam-Webster, 2018). The term can be applied widely to many types of network systems and how the different elements or components of those systems interact. Connectivity has both physical (Mariyappan et al., 2005, p. 66) and metaphysical (Clifford, 1992, p. 49) attributes. These attributes can be measured in terms of exchanges and flows of information, knowledge, goods and services between hubs and nodes that make up national and regional systems of cities involving infrastructure and enabling environment networks. Physical connectivity, i.e., roads, telecommunication, etc., is relatively easy to document and measure flows across networks. Metaphysical connectivity, i.e., knowledge and information sharing between cities and firms, social capital, etc., on the other hand, is much more challenging to identify and measure. Although countries like Morocco and Tunisia seek to improve connectivity, overall, African cities, businesses and institutions are poorly connected, both physically and metaphysically.

Factors that affect connectivity and development within systems of cities include:

- Physical nature and ease of access to cities and connectors that provide seamless access to infrastructure networks that support the flow or exchange of information, physical, or spatial movement of many types of goods and services.
- Economic, governance, ideological, social, legal, and other non-physical types of rules, regulations, technologies and modalities that provide access to public and private goods and services within cities and to other locations.
- Freedom of movement between places, ideas, immigration and speech.
- General levels of literacy, education, skills and language that give equitable access to knowledge and learning.
- Quality, scope, scale, density, flexibility and capacity of infrastructure and networks to deliver services and respond to change.
- Opening of local economies to competition, change, foreign investment, international exchanges and foreigners.
- Shared community values, beliefs, tolerances, welcomeness, and belonging to country, place and society.

The need for improved connectivity within and between systems of cities in Africa has been documented in several reports. The World Bank's *Africa's Cities: Opening Doors to the World (Lall et al., 2017) notes:*

> *"The lack of connectivity, particularly the absence of reliable transportation, limits job opportunities for workers and prevents firms from reaping scale and agglomeration benefits" (p. 36); and "urban Africans have little connectivity in their neighbourhoods, as shown by the low exposure and high fragmentation in the intensity of land occupation" (p. 69).*

FIGURE 2.7 | Low density of airline connectivity in Africa countries

Source: Flight Connections 2020.

The report, *Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub Saharan Africa* (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020, p. 24) notes further:

> *"The quality of major link roads in a country's system of cities generally deteriorates by their distance from the primary cities. In addition to poor road connectivity, transportation systems are inefficient, marked by unreliability, low levels of passenger comfort and poor road safety (Arup, 2016). Additional challenges include weak data systems for monitoring growth and informing decision-making, inadequate critical infrastructure and optimal connectivity, and weak economies and low human capital development, all of which can be attributed to weak governance and institutional deficiencies in secondary towns and cities."*

Figure 2.7 shows the frequency of flight connections per day for Africa, the Middle East and southern Europe. Many African countries, e.g., Ghana, with a similar or higher population and network densities of secondary cities similar to that of Turkey, have a substantially less dense network of connectivity for air and bus services. The number of flights from capital cities to metropolitan regions and from city to city are substantially less than 50 per day, except for in a few countries. Most services to secondary cities consist of less than 10 connections per day. Low levels of air services of less than 10 per day between metropolitan and larger secondary cities indicate low-level business services connectivity. Even countries like Vietnam, which has a similar GDP capita to that of Egypt and Tunisia, have a substantially higher density and air traffic flow to secondary cities. According to Songwe (2018, p. 1),

> *"Unbalanced national urban systems often characterise African countries with a very large primary city and less competitive smaller cities. Urban systems tend to be top-heavy with expensive and crowded primary cities, and secondary cities are too small to be viable alternatives for competitive industries. In response, some African countries have put in place policies to rebalance urban systems, which risks wasting resources."*

In recognition of the need to improve connectivity within systems of African cities, much of the focus in reports and other studies has been on building hard or physical infrastructure networks for improved access to urban and inter-regional services. This involves substantial investment in arterial roads, air and road transport facilities, electricity, and telecommunications systems – especially Wi-Fi networks. However, in the context of African cities, improved connectivity needs to expand beyond improved physical infrastructure, utilities, transport, and logistics facilities to support the movement of materials, goods, services, and people. Factors such as quality, density, choice, flexibility, and adaptability of infrastructure networks and the level of social capital development also influence the nature of connectivity and performance within systems of cities and the way they function. The means, type, and levels of soft infrastructure connectivity in developing national and regional economies and cities in a modern world matter just as much as hard infrastructure connectivity.

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> *Factors such as quality, density, choice, flexibility, and adaptability of infrastructure networks and the level of social capital development also influence the nature of connectivity and performance within systems of cities and the way they function.*

The 2014 World Economic Forum Report (World Economic Forum, 2014, p.6), describes soft connectivity as follows: "the city's social capital is as important as hard connectivity in the 21st Century's knowledge economy – while soft and hard connectivity is mutually reinforcing, soft connectivity is also about supporting an open society in the city, which spurs ideas, entrepreneurship, innovation, and growth."

Many soft connectivity elements — like information and data sharing, collaborative governance, knowledge capture and formalized information networks, smart city systems, communities of interest and creativity in building social capital — are poorly developed in many parts of Africa – especially sub-Saharan Africa. There is an intense vibrancy and dynamism in many secondary cities, which has built strong local social capital connections within communities, but this tends not to develop into solid business networks across and between countries, except for consumer goods trade. Some diaspora networks are well-developed at the secondary city level, but tend not to be cross-tribal and cross-country. Tribalism remains a significant impediment to cross-cultural, business, and trade connectedness in developing national economies in Africa (Okogu & Umudjere, 2016). This barrier must be overcome to develop a shared vision for national economies and a dynamic regional system of competing, creative, innovative and trade-linked cities.

Enhancing the development of hard and soft infrastructure networks to improve connectivity remains one of Africa's most challenging problems. Countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda, Tunisia, and South Africa recognise the importance of enhancing connectivity within national systems of cities and secondary cities (Parilla & Trujillo, 2015; GGGI-Global Green Growth Institute, 2016). However, there is still a long way to go, especially in building stronger networks of secondary cities. The means of achieving this are explored in Chapter 16.

2.7 Sustainability of Secondary Cities Development

TABLE 2.12 | Best cities ranking and report of African Cities

	RANK - Adjusted Liveability Index	Change in Rank	Green Space	Sprawl	Natural Assets	Cultural Assets	Connectivity	Isolation	Pollution
Johannesburg (South Africa)	40	4	2.8	4.2	2.7	4	2.8	2.5	3.5
Casablanca (Marroco)	53	-2	3.2	1.8	4	4	3.8	4	2
Cairo (Egypt)	55	3	2.5	1.3	3.7	2	3.3	3.8	5
Nairobi (Kenya)	62	-1	2.8	3.5	2.7	5	3.8	4.8	3
Lusaka (Zambia)	63	-1	4.8	3	1.7	5	5	5	4
Dakar (Senegal)	66	-2	4.5	2.3	3.3	4	4.8	4.8	5
Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)	67	-1	4	2.8	2	5	4.8	4.5	3.5
Lagos (Nigeria)	69	-1	4.8	2.7	4	5	4.5	3.3	4.5
Harare (Zimbabwe)	70	-1	4	3.8	3.3	5	5	5	4

Source: EIU (2019) (1 = best; 5 = worst).

The EIU report (Table 2.12) provides a measure of the liveability of 140 cities. It includes 10 African cities, not one of which is a secondary city. Factors such as cultural assets, connectivity, isolation, and pollution all rank as 'poor' or 'extremely poor' for the major cities listed; however, secondary city indicators are generally worse. Metropolitan and capital cities are endowed with national cultural, transport, education, sports facilities, and other government assets, which secondary cities are seldom given the capital to build and maintain. As a result, the standard of public assets, utilities and facilities in secondary cities are poor, and the funds needed to keep and maintain them are limited.

However, some African countries are showing greater interest in improving the sustainability and quality of their assets, the urban environment, and public open space in secondary cities to make them more attractive to investment and development. For example, as Gubic and Baloi (2020, p. 129) note, "Rwanda's secondary cities, identified as economic nodes of growth, are currently undergoing revision of their masterplans in consideration of climate change realities and the pressure on infrastructure and services due to rapid urbanisation. Currently, cities in Rwanda do not yet have a system of public open spaces".

The European Investment Bank has recently given support to capacity-building technical assistance support through the African Sustainable Cities Initiative (ASCI) to enable up to 10 secondary cities in four sub-Saharan African countries to better access financing for their investment needs. Secondary cities have been targeted in recognition of their high need to become more competitive and sustainable; for a long time, they have not received equitable donor funding, as these programs have tended to be directed to capital or larger cities (EIB, 2020).

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> *Metropolitan and capital cities are endowed with national cultural, transport, education, sports facilities, and other government assets, which secondary cities are seldom given the capital to build and maintain. As a result, the standard of public assets, utilities and facilities in secondary cities are poor, and the funds needed to keep and maintain them are limited.*

2.8 Infrastructure Investment

It is not just the gap in urban infrastructure but also the lack of city planning, inefficient land use, regulatory blockages, and vested interests that hold back African secondary cities' development. The result is sprawling, fragmented and hyper-informal cities that are expensive to live in. According to the World Bank, the cost of living in African cities is 29% more expensive than in comparable Asian cities: "Locals pay 100% more for transport, 55% more for housing, 42% more for transport and 35% more for food. All of this slows down business, cutting firm productivity by close to half while dramatically increasing the input costs of consumer goods" (Muggah & Hill, Jun 2018).

The World Bank's *African Cities Diagnostic Kit* (World Bank, 2021) provides a helpful tool for diagnosing the state of infrastructure. It has been applied in 31 African cities, in all the metropolitan regions. There is little evidence of the kit being used in the analysis of secondary cities. However, another report, *The Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub Saharan Africa* (UNICEF & UN-Habitat 2020) provides detailed insights into infrastructure investment problems, especially water and sanitation, for secondary cities, primary cities, and rural areas in four countries.

FIGURE 2.8 | Sources of drinking water in four African countries for primary and secondary cities and rural area

Source: DHS, Nigeria, 2018.

Figure 2.8 Sources of drinking water in four African countries for primary and secondary cities and rural area shows that there are significant differences in the availability of drinking water between primary and secondary cities. Secondary cities fare marginally worse in terms of piped water to dwellings in Namibia, Guinea, and Ethiopia, but are better off in Tanzania. For secondary cities, the variation between countries in water, sanitation, waste management services, formal roads and transport services is significant; however, countries with lower GDP per capita or landlocked countries tend to have poorer urban services levels.

Economically, secondary cities in Africa remain underexploited because of under-investment in city infrastructure, compared with large cities – a factor that slows local investment. One study, however, argues that the ability of secondary cities to provide basic infrastructure does not differ much from that of metropolitan municipalities (Marais, 2016. p. 34). However, secondary cities rank low in central governments' priorities regarding infrastructure funding and budget allocations when decision-making power is concentrated in large capital cities (Kriticos, 2019). The provision of infrastructure is becoming more unbalanced in meeting the development needs of national systems of cities, further stalling their productivity and growth potential. African secondary cities will struggle to become more competitive and efficient unless the infrastructure investment and assets maintenance funds increase substantially. Without this, urban growth pressure in metropolitan regions will increase in the coming decades, further accentuating congestion costs.

2.8.1 Industry Clusters

Industry-cluster development is an initiative that has been used to boost secondary cities' productivity and competitiveness in Africa (Hoffman, 2015; Nallari, 2013). Industry clusters can form part of a program of economic and industrial reforms to support the acceleration and structural transformation of the production system in its cities. Morocco has been a territorial development model incorporating a cluster development policy (Amraoui et al., 2019). However, efforts at supporting the development of industrial clusters have met with limited success (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & McCormick, 2007), mainly due to poor decisions about location, the importance of well-developed and integrated industry supply chains, and limited investment in research and development.

A key issue for secondary cities wishing to develop competitive industry clusters is how to operate at a scale and generate critical mass to become more competitive. Critical mass can be achieved by developing inter-regional collaboration, resources, and information sharing between competitive firms in regional towns and secondary cities by creating regional networks or corridor development associations of collaborating businesses, institutions, and local governments. Rwanda has recognized the importance of collaboration between regional city governments (Francioni, 2017), but few other countries have advanced to intercity regional collaboration between competing industries and firms to create a scale of industrial development that is internationally competitive.

FIGURE 2.9 | Comparing Wealth Index

2.9 Human Development Indicators and Poverty

The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2011, p. 185) is used to measure and benchmark countries' health and well-being and the performance of countries in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Comparatively, few HDI studies have been conducted on secondary cities' social and human development in Africa. Some studies of cities have been undertaken in a few developed countries (de la Torre & Moreno, 2010, p. 47; UNDP, 2010) . Household income and health data are available for several African countries (Fink et al., 2012; Ilinca et al., 2019, p. 196), but in many cases, data is not disaggregated to the secondary city level. The paucity of

socio-economic data on secondary African cities makes it difficult to assess or draw conclusions about the extent to which large metropolitan and secondary cities are any better or worse in terms of social and human capital development levels. *The Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub Saharan Africa* (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020) and the *State of Arab Cities* (UN-Habitat, 2012) suggest household in secondary cities are significantly more deprived of access to public goods and services than those in large metropolitan regions.

2.9.1 National Sub-Indices in Health, Education and Wealth

A study published by the London School of Economics (LSE) explored the relationships between the design of the built environment, health, and well-being in cities, focusing on how urban density affects different population groups' experiences (Paccoud, 2011). The research drew upon a dataset of health, socioeconomic, and density data indicators for more than 129 cities worldwide, including 12 in Africa (Table 2.13). The LSE study was one of the first attempts to create HDIs at the metropolitan level for a regionally representative sample of comparable African cities. The HDI indicators for a selected number of metropolitan and secondary cities in Africa provide indicators to measure health, wealth, and education. Table 2.13 includes national benchmark indicators for health, education and wealth; the ratio between LSE cities and nations on these indicators; and indicators for LSE cities' EMR indices.

Gini coefficients (GC) also can be good indicators of poverty levels in cities. The UN-Habitat (2010, p. 224) *State of the World Cities Report 2010/11* lists GCs gathered for several large and secondary cities in different regions. Much of this data is more than 10 years old, so the figures should be treated cautiously. Many countries have seen a significant reduction in GCs in recent years. For African cites, GCs are high, ranging from 0.43 for Uganda to 0.75 for South Africa. By comparison, GCs for Asian cities lie between 0.3 and 0.4.

There are significant differences in GCs between secondary cities in some countries, with GC rates in some secondary cities rising fastest. There are push factors in Nigeria, related to land and other social factors driving people into cities, that are causing GCs to rise. Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (Gqeberha), South Africa, is an example of a city where push factors have resulted in one of the highest GC rates for a country's secondary city.

TABLE 2.13 | National Sub-Indices in Health, Education and Wealth for extended metropolitan regions and cities

Extended metropolitan region (EMR)	Nation	EMR population	LSE cities, national indices			EMR to nation ratios on			LSE cities EMR indices		
			Health	Education	Wealth	Health	Education	Wealth	Health	Education	Wealth
Cotonou	Benin	1,523,836	0.358	0.320	0.375	1.039	1.246	1.08	0.372	0.399	0.405
Kinshasa	Congo DRC	9,426,523	0.183	0.305	0.185	1.179	1.177	1.161	0.215	0.36	0.214
Abidjan	Côte d'Ivoire	7,845,100	0.331	0.258	0.384	1.075	1.192	1.09	0.356	0.308	0.419
Alexandria	Egypt	9,433,514	0.543	0.479	0.534	1.016	1.035	1.024	0.551	0.496	0.547
Nairobi	Kenya	7,806,748	0.316	0.463	0.384	1.077	1.093	1.145	0.34	0.506	0.44
Bamako	Mali	4,414,117	0.208	0.187	0.346	1.066	1.237	1.075	0.221	0.232	0.372
Johannesburg	South Africa	11,191,700	0.283	0.593	0.593	1.045	1.044	1.048	0.295	0.619	0.622
Cape Town	South Africa	5,223,900	0.283	0.593	0.593	1.113	1.028	1.023	0.315	0.61	0.607
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	4,149,873	0.331	0.295	0.362	1.096	1.13	1.122	0.363	0.334	0.406
Kampala	Uganda	3,840,400	0.285	0.397	0.351	1.068	1.139	1.161	0.304	0.452	0.408
Lusaka	Zambia	2,467,467	0.183	0.387	0.363	0.994	1.056	1.105	0.182	0.409	0.402
Harare	Zimbabwe	3,847,834	0.201	0.463	0.126	0.986	1.072	1.026	0.199	0.496	0.129

Source: Paccoud, 2011.

2.9.2 Income and Employment

Africa has the highest wage inequality levels in the world, with significant GC differences between primary and secondary cities and rural areas. Unemployment rates in secondary cities are high, including youth unemployment, which does not bode well for improved economic and social development in the youth population cohort (aged 0–24 years). This cohort is projected to experience an increase of nearly 50% between 2017 and 2050 (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020). The projected sub-Saharan Africa 'youth bulge' offers the opportunity for a high working labour force, innovation associated with youth, and a reduced dependency ratio.

An analysis of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) wealth index, a composite index measuring a household's cumulative living standard in four sub-Saharan African countries, shows that populations in primary cities are significantly wealthier than populations in secondary cities (Figure 2.9). The UNICEF and UN-Habitat (2020 p. 27) analysis of the impacts of economic deprivations in sub-Saharan African cities revealed that "people living in secondary cities are more deprived than those in metropolitan regions in terms of income and employment, which increases the chances of experiencing almost all the other deprivations, key ones being housing, WASH, and education".

Research by Mayer (2002 p. 66) concluded that low parental income is one of many risk factors that affect children both as they grow up and when they reach adulthood, underlining that "on average the life chances of poor children are worse than the life chances of more affluent children". And as De la Barra (1998 p. 46) noted, "Being poor is a health hazard; worse, however, is being urban and poor. Much worse is being poor, urban, and a child".

2.9.3 Environmental Factors and Climate Change

No comprehensive data is available to allow water and air quality, waste, and ecosystem conditions to be compared between African countries. The Global Cities Index (A.T. Kearney, 2012) and Global Cities Indicators Facility (GCIF, 2013) have a small sample of data on African cities, but this is not sufficient to make meaningful comparisons about trends and environmental quality changes. Africa's diverse climate also exerts a strong influence on particle pollution and other pollution levels in countries that experience wet and dry seasons, with air pollution noticeably peaking during the dry season (Petkova et al., 2013). Figure 2.10 shows a map of African cities and regions associated with significant climate change risk.

With limited environmental monitoring capacity outside a few large cities, much evidence of rising air pollution and climate change impacts for all cities remains scattered or anecdotal. Resilience efforts to address environmental issues is most dominant in the literature on capital cities. There is less emphasis on secondary cities and towns. However, the information is vital for a deeper understanding of the role played by inter-municipal and inter-metropolitan collaborations (Kareem et al., 2020).

The WHO Database on Outdoor Air Pollution in Cities (2012) lists many cities with recorded annual mean air pollution for PM10 µg/m^3 levels. Compared with other regions of the world, sub-Saharan Africa has low air pollution levels, although these are rising in primary cities such as Nairobi, Lagos, and Johannesburg. Little data is available for African secondary cities, except for a few documented small studies (Petkova et al., 2013).

Environmental problems associated with water pollution and flooding have become more acute for inland secondary cities, where government funds for mitigation works are limited. Many secondary cities, such as Warri in Nigeria, are located on floodplains or at the estuary of river systems, making them highly prone to tidal storm surges. Coastal ecosystems also tend to be more heavily polluted and degraded than inland ecosystems, as they accumulate downstream pollutants – especially plastics. Many coastal cities often contain large slum housing areas built over coastal swamps and wetlands, giving rise to significant public health problems (Feiden, 2011, p. 27).

The impacts of climate change on African secondary cities' development and management are significant but varied. Figure 2.10 shows a map of African cities and regions associated with climatic risks. While steps are being taken to prepare for climate change, most cities do not have baseline data or indicators to measure and track climate change or manage its impacts. At best, secondary cities in Africa will need to focus on adaptation, as they have neither the capacity nor resources to support intensive mitigation programs – other than conversions to solar. As Kareem et al. (2020 p. 15) note,

> *"More research is needed on the role played by inter-municipal and inter-metropolitan collaboration in enhancing resilience to climate change in Africa. The growing magnitude of risks and impacts in African cities means that interdependence amongst actors and decisions in capital and secondary cities is critical for effective planning on the resilience of urban systems".*

FIGURE 2.10 | Map of African cities and regions associated climatic risks

Source: Kareem et al. (2020).

2.10 Secondary Cities Crucial to the Economic Development of Africa

Although African cities are the powerhouses of national economic growth and development for the continent, it is the metropolitan regions and large metropolitan regions that are primarily responsible for this. The largest 69 cities, representing 16% of Africa's population, account for over 36% of GDP, with this proportion expected to rise in the future. Secondary cities are being outpaced and left behind in the development stakes. This leads to growing spatial inequalities in investment, wealth, income and access to government, education, and health services. The trend towards increased primacy (as previously noted, for more than half of all African countries, 30% of the urban population lives in the largest city) undermines the growth and development potential of creating strong national systems of secondary cities. It also places national economies at more significant risk than when wealth, population, and production are more evenly geo-spatially distributed within countries. This trend is not sustainable and does not provide a pathway for the future development of African cities.

While the primary cities are absorbing a significant proportion of urban growth, it is the secondary cities of between 500,000 and 1 million that are likely to experience high growth rates in the future. African governments must give greater attention to supporting the development of these cities – especially improvements to the capacity and efficiency of logistics, supply chains and value-adding systems. The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) has predicted that the 'middleweight' cities with populations between 150,000 and 1 million will be making a more significant contribution to global GDP than they have in the past. The implications of the MGI prediction and other research findings point to secondary cities playing an increasingly prominent role in developing nations in the years to come. However, there will be significant regional differences in secondary city development across Africa, as there is much less dispersion of economic activities from national systems of cities to secondary cities. At the same time, economic growth rates per capita for cities in Asia and other regions are expected to increase substantially.

In contrast, those for Africa are expected to be more subdued. These findings suggest that significant structural adjustment is needed for secondary cities' economic governance and economies in the sub-Saharan region. They will have to run hard and reform quickly if they are to catch up with more rapidly developing regions of the world.

The impact of an additional 900 million people living in African cities by 2050 will be enormous in terms of the consumption of land, water and food, along with the increased demand for shelter, infrastructure and jobs. By then, employment growth will almost entirely occur in cities. Over 450 million additional jobs will be added to urban workforces over the three decades. Rural populations and employment prospects will decline due to continued – but slowed – migration and natural population growth rates. Stabilization of urban areas' population growth is not expected until the latter part of the century (United Nations, 2012). The challenge for governments will be to shape national spatial and economic development plans to support migration to secondary cities and to equip these cities with the resources and governance systems needed to manage more staged and targeted internal migration. This means that some regions and secondary cities may need to grow faster. In contrast, the growth of others may need to be slowed – especially where climate change and other environmental factors call for the reduction of population growth to provide a basis for sustainable city development and to manage urban growth.

The challenges of increased urban-rural migration, the post-COVID-19 impacts of more technology-driven development and systems, the decoupling of economies and a greater emphasis on economic security, and the need to address the growing problems of climate change, as well as ethnic prejudice and declining foreign aid all place additional pressures on the governments, business and citizens of Africa in the way they plan for the sustainable development of its cities over the next two decades. For all the challenges facing the development of Africa, there is a vibrancy, liveliness and optimism that thrives in its cities, especially the secondary cities and smaller towns, which can be harnessed to create jobs and improve living conditions and incomes. African cities have shown they are good at self-organizing and mobilizing community efforts to improve living conditions and the built and natural environments, as well as managing development — provided that local government and business are given the resources and freedoms to do so. It is worth repeating that local governments are key to developing resilient, robust and dynamic secondary cities.

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This chapter has explored trends, patterns, impacts, and changes created by the African continent's urbanisation, focusing on secondary cities. More detailed research is needed on the economic, business, management, governance, liveability and environmental issues facing the future development of these cities. What are the prospects for the growth and development of sustainable secondary cities in Africa? How are some secondary cities going about improving their economic prospects, governance, well-being, and liveability? Later chapters that focus on specific countries will explore how central and local governments support the development of secondary cities, with a more in-depth case study of a secondary city for each country. The learning outcomes from these studies can be used to develop a framework that can help support national urban and economic development policy to enable secondary cities to play a more decisive role in developing national and local regional/rural economies.

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ENDNOTES

(1)   One District One Factory (1D1F) initiative, Ghana. https://1d1f.gov.gh/

3

DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

BRIAN H. ROBERTS AND
GODFREY O. ANYUMBA

Secondary cities — often called intermediate middle-sized, and second-level cities — present conceptual, administrative and definitional challenges for African governments. Only a few African countries recognise this typology of cities or incorporate the term 'secondary cities' into national urban policy frameworks or urban settlement development (Muawwad & Hassan, 1999; Kenaway, 2017). Others recognise secondary cities only as part of political and administrative structures and for the de facto roles they play as economic centres important to connectivity within rural hinterlands. However, recent literature shows an emerging awareness of the importance of secondary cities by African governments (UNICEF and UN-Habitat, 2020), not just in terms of their administrative role, but also their significance in supporting devolution, decentralization, connectivity, functionality, logistics, value-adding, trade and production within national and global systems cities (Roberts, 2014). There are varying viewpoints about the characteristics and functions of secondary cities (as discussed in Chapter 1).

Although population size has been used as a basis for determining what constitutes a 'secondary city', functionality may play a more important role – especially for smaller secondary cities in some countries. For example, in countries with small national spatial territories and demographically low-level urbanisation, such as Burundi, Djibouti, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Eretria, Lesotho and Somaliland, the ratio of the population of the capital city to the next largest city does not fit the traditional mould of secondary cities based on population size. At the other extreme are large cities with populations of over 1 million, such as Ibadan (Nigeria) and Mombasa in Kenya (DCP Kenya, 2019), which are nevertheless considered 'secondary cities' rather than 'metropolitan regions'. The nomenclature for secondary cities also varies by different countries: in Rwanda, they are referred to as 'niche secondary cities' (Rwanda Governance Board, 2016), while Kenya and South Africa refer to them as 'secondary cities' (Otiso, 2005; South African Cities Network, 2012). In Ethiopia, they are referred to as 'intermediate cities' (OECD Policy Studies Institute, 2020); in Uganda, they are known as 'regional' and 'strategic' cities (Cities Alliance, 2016a); and in Egypt, they are referred to as 'new urban communities' (Ellahham, 2014).

PHOTO 3.1
Korhogo, Côte d'Ivoire: many people use motorbikes as vehicles to get around the rural and urban areas

© Stockphoto ID: 1693212181.

This chapter seeks to summarize the main challenges facing the development of Africa's secondary cities. It draws on an extensive range of studies on urbanisation, urban systems, planning and development of African cities (Pumain & Moriconi-Ebrard, 1997; Nwaka, 2005; Njoh 2007; Matos et al., 2009). However, the literature on secondary cities is not substantial, it is geographically uneven, and it varies in content and detail. Data is generally limited, with few primary research studies available.

Along with development challenges, the chapter covers themes related to social planning, poverty alleviation and community development; land administration and management; environmental management; and social issues.

3.1 Development Challenges facing Secondary Cities

The challenges and problems facing African cities have been documented extensively (JICA Research Institute, 2013), but with minimal focus on secondary cities. In national urbanisation policy debates, plans and strategies, secondary cities are seldom considered part of the solution to connectivity issues. Their potential role in fostering equitable economic growth and balanced migration is seldom recognised. Secondary cities have a strategic role in producing and distributing agricultural products consumed in metropolitan regions. They are centres for 'the preservation of traditions', architecturally, culturally, religiously, linguistically. In this respect, secondary cities are "an extraordinary heritage to be safeguarded and can play the fundamental role of preserving the environment, traditions and diversity" (Monica, 2020).

Secondary cities have many issues in common with smaller and large cities across the continent, but some issues are unique or more challenging to secondary cities. The following sections focus on secondary cities in Africa and review some of the literature on the development challenges and problems they face. A section on policy responses to these issues then follows.

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> *Secondary cities have many issues in common with smaller and large cities across the continent, but some issues are unique or more challenging to secondary cities.*

3.1.1 COVID 19

The most immediate challenge to African secondary cities is COVID-19 recovery. No country was prepared for the local or global impacts of the pandemic. But the impact on already vulnerable African countries and cities has been catastrophic (Cillers et al., 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic is simultaneously both a severe health problem and a severe economic problem, which will have profound, ongoing economic, governance, health, social and poverty impacts (Onzili, 2020). The conditions that prevail in Africa's urban areas – the unplanned nature of cities, the prevalence of informal areas and slums (see Photo 32), poor governance, lack of infrastructure and services, poor economic and logistics capabilities, high poverty levels and overcrowding – aggravate the pandemic's transmission. These conditions have also impeded the roll-out of vaccination programs (UN Habitat, 2020).

While the impacts of COVID-19 have been most pronounced in Africa's largest cities, they are likely to be prolonged and just as significant in secondary cities and rural regions, where testing facilities, medical services and logistics are especially inadequate.

PHOTO 3.2
Izwelethu, also known as 'Covid', is an informal settlement outside Cape Town

© Samantha Reinders for NPR.

The pandemic has also had significant impacts on international and local trade and the flow of international development assistance worldwide. This is likely to have marked repercussions for many African countries and cities, irrespective of their size. Therefore, significant international development assistance is essential to aid the recovery of African countries and cities. Development assistance must be given equitably across all cities, including secondary cities, and not be focused on the metropolises.

Central governments have deployed national budgets and central banks to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic, but significant shortfalls and cutbacks are expected in other 'less essential' areas as governments prioritise spending on COVID-19 response and recovery. Such restrictions will affect all sectors of the economy at both national and local levels. The economies of secondary cities in particular, which have a high dependency on transfers from central governments, will be significantly impacted. A recent OECD-CoR survey found that sub-national governments in medium and highly decentralised countries are more likely to experience higher revenue losses due to COVID-19 than are those in more centralised countries (OECD-CoR, 2020).

The unpredictability and disruptions caused by COVID-19 create challenges to managing the spread of and recovery from the pandemic. These challenges include providing adequate finances, supplies, and logistics support needed to minimise short- and long-term impacts and restore a degree of normality and recovery to people's lives and the economy. Meaningful recovery will require well-developed and equitable national and local policies, as well as international support.

3.1.2 Urban Development Policies

The previous chapter provided an overview of urban development policies in Africa. The development of secondary cities is being hindered by ineffective national urban policies that have become biased towards the development of metropolitan regions. Few secondary cities have updated spatial or land-use plans or have enforced the provisions of these. Most plans are unrealistic in terms of the financial and human resources needed for their implementation. Many secondary cities do not have qualified planners or building inspectors. Secondary cities lack essential services such as energy, water, roads and communications networks, and their installation occurs at a much slower rate than does the growth of urbanisation (Monica, 2020).

The bias towards the development of metropolitan regions runs throughout Africa. Nairobi's domination within Kenya's system of cities has had very negative consequences for secondary city development (Otiso, 2005). South Africa's National Development Plan of 2011 noted that a principal focus of urban development was towards the country's largest cities – in contrast to the stagnation of small rural towns (South African Government, 2011). Kigali, Rwanda's capital, accounts for 50% of the country's urban population and has received the most investment in urban development; however, this will change with the current decentralisation plans. Similar concerns are expressed about the over-concentration of urban development in Accra and Kumasi in Ghana (Yankson et al., 2017) and Kampala City in Uganda (Sladoje et al., 2019).

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> *Many secondary cities do not have qualified planners or building inspectors.*

3.1.2.1 Urban Planning

The planning policy frameworks for the development of secondary cities across Africa are relatively weak and ineffective. This applies to secondary cities in regional areas and those on the periphery of large metropolitan regions. Most large cities have master plans to guide the physical development of the metropolitan regions, including plans for satellite secondary cities. Unfortunately, many are outdated, are poorly formulated, carry no risk assessment and do not have the funding sources for implementation. Even where cities have moved to structure planning in order to provide more flexibility in the planning process, implementation at both primary and secondary city levels has proved problematic (UN-Habitat, 2004, p. 52).

Urban planning and management in Africa are ineffective – and are key reasons for poor quality urban development, growth of informal settlements and the lack of infrastructure in many secondary cities (Kessides, 2005, p. 116; Silva, 2012, p. 50). Secondary cities have been more adversely affected than metropolitan regions (John, 2012, p. 73; UN-Habitat, 1991, p. 154) by the ineffectiveness of urban planning and management, as many have no planning and development control capacity.

The education of planners in Africa is inadequate but is fundamental to addressing the planning and management issues. There are insufficient numbers of adequately trained graduates or experienced planners to meet demand. Urban planner education and training need to be improved and be more responsive to Africa's urbanisation problems (Lwasa, 2012; Odendaal, 2012, pp. 50–51), especially for planning peri-urban and informal settlement areas.

Some countries, such as Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, have introduced planning reforms and legislation, but few have advanced beyond land-use planning to more strategic and integrated planning. Many have adopted participatory (stakeholder engagement, consultation) planning. None have developed integrated, online development-approval systems where progress on development applications can be tracked. The reform and

use of e-based platforms for managing planning land-use and development-control processes are crucial to the modernisation of planning in secondary cities. Integrated planning, including online systems for development approval, monitoring and evaluation, is essential to modernising the planning systems and overseeing progress in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at national and local levels.

3.1.3 Economic Development

Studies show a widening gap between primary and secondary cities in economic development and investment opportunities (Roberts, 2014; UNICEF and UN-Habitat, 2020). This gap has occurred because African secondary cities have not advanced in the development cycle as far as other regions of the world. Governments have been slow to enact policies and investment regimes that narrow the gap.

All cities go through an evolutionary stage of development. A set of dynamic changes can take a secondary city from a regional service-centre economy shaped by population size to a higher level, for example, the development of a large-scale mining project. Figure 3.1 shows the dynamics of growth and diversification in the development of secondary cities. Regional population growth and migration combined with locational advantages and good transport and logistics systems influence factors that trigger the growth and development of secondary and metropolitan regions. Secondary cities eventually reach a level of agglomeration where economies of scale create opportunities for diversification and development. Secondary cities then begin to specialise, create local growth industries and compete against each other for trade, investment and development opportunities. Governments often intervene to stimulate new growth industries, which lead to greater specialisation and spin-off supply chain industries. This gives secondary cities a competitive advantage, from which to develop trade and export markets.

FIGURE 3.1 | Dynamics of growth and diversification in secondary cities

Source: Rondinelli (1983).

During the 1980s in other regions of the world, especially Asia, globalisation led to many secondary cities capturing and creating new industries, supported by cheap semi-skilled labour and land, good infrastructure, limited environmental approval conditions and tax incentives (see discussion on EPZs, section 2.4.3). As a result, secondary cities become fully integrated into global supply chains, financial networks and new technologies. By being flexible and innovative in responding to change, and by creating significant productivity gains, many secondary cities in developing and middle-income countries have diversified and added depth to the development of their local economies. Many secondary cities compete internationally for markets, trade, and investment in more advanced countries, increasing competitive and collaborative advantage.

Few secondary cities outside southern and northern African countries have moved beyond the comparative advantage stage of development. Some have managed to capture a competitive advantage in tourism, such as Arusha in Tanzania and Warri in Nigeria, but economic diversification is low. African economies have remained broadly protective, and governments have failed to develop strategic infrastructure and foster competition nationally and internationally between cities. As a result, they are often inefficient, uncompetitive, and weak in trade negotiations. Most African secondary cities have developed and remain primarily consumption-driven regional market centres that produce few value-added primary, manufacturing, or service industry products. This is not sustainable if these cities are to create decent jobs in the future.

The policy challenge for governments is how to turn around the economic development and diversity of secondary cities. National urban and regional development policy has failed to adequately support secondary cities' development and instead has focused on inequitable spending in metropolitan regions. African secondary cities are endowed with many natural and material resources, but they have low economic strength, weak economic governance, little value-adding transformation capacity, and are not engaged in specialisation, nor have they capitalised on their uniqueness (UN Habitat, 2020). However, there are some good models, such as Teuton in Morocco, that have focused on creating a competitive position based on the strength of their tangible assets and advantages, e.g., cultural, historical, and religious pilgrimage destinations.

African secondary cities fall behind metropolitan regions in virtually all SDG development indicators (UN Habitat, 2020). Most are not connected to global networks that propel urban investment (see Chapter 2). Little direct foreign investment (FDI) finds its way into private capital markets, works programs, and secondary cities' investment. As a result, many are cut off from access to funds, information and goods, new infrastructure, and development opportunities.

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African economies have remained broadly protective, and governments have failed to develop strategic infrastructure and foster competition nationally and internationally between cities. As a result, they are often inefficient, uncompetitive, and weak in trade negotiations.

Cities Alliance's *Future Cities Africa* report (Cities Alliance, 2016b) argues that the robustness of a city's economy and economic development is dependent on five key factors:

- Productivity of the city's human capital.
- Diversity of the local economy, including the informal sector.
- Supportive institutional and governance environment.
- Influence of national and regional factors on the local economy.
- Impacts of local economy outputs.

Human capital refers to the knowledge, skills, competencies, and other features relevant to support local economic functions and development. Human capital development in African secondary cities is weak – especially in the legal, financial, built environment, professional and knowledge services. There is also a lack of financial-management capabilities and data that are specific to a given city. Personnel, social services and health workers in secondary cities tend to have poorer qualifications and professional educations. The weakness in these human capital assets and capabilities has long-term impacts on developing secondary city economies across the continent (UN Habitat, 2020).

In Uganda, however, the strategic policy is to develop specialised secondary cities driven by planned economies. These include Hoima (oil) (Shell, 1999), Nakasongola (industrial), Fort Portal (tourism), Moroto (mining) and Jinja (industrial). A key objective to support job creation in Uganda's secondary cities is to collaborate in a regional approach to development attained by boosting growth-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the growth of knowledge industries, and locational advantages in secondary cities. Uganda's emphasis on balanced urbanisation and investment in secondary cities is not without problems. There is still insufficient attention to capacity building and to building awareness about how secondary cities can adopt and translate policies that drive local economic development (Randolph et al., 2019).

Uganda also needs policies and programs to develop and strengthen local networks that connect government and business to support private sector development. A 'community college' (Mann, 2017, p. 21) model form of partnership between the education, local government and business sectors could significantly benefit the development of Uganda's secondary cities (Cities Alliance, 2012). The pivotal issues include strengthening coordination between national and local stakeholders to formulate and implement job creation/economic policies and plans for secondary cities and forge local, multi-stakeholder coalitions to support SMEs and job creation (Sladoje et al., 2019).

In Ethiopia, knowledge gaps (lack of requisite/empirical data on how ICs can contribute to economic development) in intermediate cities (secondary cities) hinder rural and regional development. These cities are viewed as catalysts for rural transformation, but with poor socio-economic data, weak governance systems, lack of decision-making autonomy and limited financing, it is not easy to plan for the strategic infrastructure required (see Chapter 8, on Ethiopia). Ethiopia's secondary cities face a development gap due to a lack of coordinated policies to address and meet the needs and the shortcomings of local government capacities and lack of infrastructure.

Rwanda's urbanisation strategy focuses on promoting secondary city economic growth and development beyond the capital, Kigali. Rwanda has identified six secondary cities to support in order to stimulate their growth and development. The policy objectives for the strategy include the following:

- Make their future more predictable, given specific regional challenges, current necessities, and structural transformation needs (Rwanda Governance Board, 2016).
- Enhance institutional and capacity building in leadership.
- Orient economic development in niche sectors specific to the six niche regions.

Musanze is the fourth largest town in Rwanda. It is a tourism destination and a base for visiting the nearby gorilla colonies. It is envisaged as an 'ambassador city' designed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign visitors to increase export earnings to the country and the northern province district.

Morocco has recently announced a strategy that identifies the role of intermediate cities in the post-COVID-19 recovery under the National Strategy of Intermediate [secondary] Cities in articulation with the Sustainable Development Goals (Mebtoul, 2020). Intermediate cities in Morocco are considered key in creating economic growth engines, creativity, innovation, and attraction outside the metropolitan regions. They constitute important strategic links that contribute to the structuring of the national urban framework.

3.1.4 Urban Governance

Both public and private institutional performance of secondary cities are crucial for local and regional development and efficient public services delivery. The quality of governance in public institutions – their effectiveness and efficiency – can be a catalyst to facilitate and enhance economic development – or to impede it. Institutions encompass both government structures and governance processes, including regulatory frameworks. They also embody leadership. Institutions play critical roles in the economy and society and in addressing environmental issues. They can have positive and negative effects on factors ranging from economic performance to quality of life.

Governance and institutional deficiencies permeate African secondary city management, creating gaps in urban governance capacity and sound urbanisation policies. Typically, these lack a combination of firm legal foundations, institutional capabilities, administrative procedures, and financial instruments, resulting in dysfunctional governance. This is caused, in many cases, by the lack of clarity in the separation of powers and responsibilities between levels of government and the lack of autonomy given to local governments. Inherent institutional weaknesses are central to determining urban governance effectiveness, reflected at metropolitan and lesser city government levels (UN Habitat, 2020). The parallel structure of chieftaincy adds another level of governance that makes decision-making difficult, especially concerning land, resulting in clashes between civil and customary laws and land-use practices.

In Kenya, devolved governance was incorporated into its constitution, but it has not proved easy to implement. In the pre-devolution era, the unwillingness to share political and fiscal power with regional and municipal governments was a reason given for the failure in Kenya's national governance and administration structures (Otiso, 2005). A decade after devolution, the central government is still dictating terms, especially on grants and other fiscal transfers, economic development, and infrastructure projects. Despite recent local government reforms, the devolution process has been slow (Nassiuma et al., 2015) and is frustrated by the lack of institutional capacity at the local-government secondary-city level.

Mozambique faces governance challenges in fragmented urban institutions, lack of capacity and ineffective administrations (Cities Alliance, 2016). By contrast, South Africa's planning system is possibly the most comprehensively structured in Africa. However, the South African government has not recognised the notion of 'secondary cities' as encompassing a unique set of cities requiring a distinct governance approach to their potential for driving the country's development (South African Cities Network, 2012). In many South African secondary city municipalities, the poor state of management is evidence that a well-articulated institutional governance structure based on the national constitution is no guarantee for efficient and effective local governance. The mismanagement of finances, inadequate service delivery and corruption in metropolitan and secondary cities have had detrimental effects on developing the country's national system of cities (Siddle & Koelble, 2016).

Although the good intentions of many governments are to devolve administrative and fiscal functions and to clarify responsibilities for implementing services and capital works programs in African metropolitan and secondary cities, few cities have reached the functional level of governance that existed under colonial rule. Substantial international development assistance has been given over many decades to improve regional urban management and governance. Although some progress has been made, it has not been sufficient for secondary cities to catch up with or get ahead of what is needed to manage rapid urbanisation and foster sustainable economic development.

National policies and programs to reform and revise constitutional and other provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities to local government, especially recognising the role of secondary cities is crucial to enhancing national economic performance and sustainable development. Without this recognition, secondary cities will not compete with other regions of the world for trade, investment, and jobs. There is currently a tendency towards re-centralisation of government in Africa, which has become more prevalent with COVID-19. The challenge in post-COVID-19 recovery is getting decentralization of governance back onto the policy agenda. The need for advocacy policies from all industry sectors and the community will be crucial for this to occur.

3.1.5 Finance

Due to their smaller populations, secondary cities are constrained by higher transaction costs, and they can't take advantage of economies of scale and match the agglomeration advantages of metropolitan regions. Secondary cities' revenue and capital needs far exceed local governments' capacity to deliver critical infrastructure and social services, even in the best-run cities (Sy, 2016). This lack of capacity undermines their competitiveness and limits the potential for market growth. Financial challenges faced by African secondary cities include reduced fiscal transfers, poor access to capital, and lower returns on investment than for metropolitan regions. Greater decentralization and devolution of administrative, fiscal and services delivery has improved productivity, performance and governance in secondary cities in some countries, but progress has slowed and, in some cases, has been reversed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As noted in the OECD report, *The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government* (OECD, 2020, p. 29):

> "In countries where the level of decentralisation is high, the impact on subnational government expenditure will be higher, particularly in spending areas most affected by the crisis (i.e., health, social protection, education, utility services, economic development, etc.). This is also true for revenue. This is confirmed by the OECD-CoR survey, which shows that subnational governments in medium and highly decentralised countries are more likely to anticipate experiencing higher losses in revenue as a result of the COVID-19 crisis than in more centralised countries."

Municipal finance policy reforms are essential and urgent. Financial management and local revenue collection challenges to support the development of secondary cities and improving service delivery and are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Other policy reforms are required in the areas discussed in the following sections.

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Greater decentralization and devolution of administrative, fiscal and services delivery has improved productivity, performance and governance in secondary cities in some countries, but progress has slowed and, in some cases, has been reversed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

3.1.5.1 Social Contract to Pay for Urban Services

African cities' local governments generally are poor at collecting property taxes and other charges. There is still a heavy reliance on central government grants and transfers to fund infrastructure, maintenance, and local government services. In secondary cities, more than half the budget outlays are spent on wages and salaries. Studies show that secondary cities collect less tax per capita than large cities. Kampala collects US$6 per capita in Uganda compared to less than US$4 per capita in secondary cities (Hommann & Lall, 2019).The wealthy and diaspora property owners pay an inequitable share of taxes for the services they use or the resources they consume. Improved revenue collection remains a systemic problem for secondary cities. In many African countries, the unwillingness of central and local governments to do anything about it has been one of the most outstanding public sector financial management failures since independence.

Not only do the rich and powerful in municipalities and secondary cities avoid paying taxes, but the informal sector workforce also pays little central and local government tax towards the cost of providing and maintaining infrastructure and urban services. Approximately 70% of non-agricultural employment in Africa is in the informal sector (Jackson, 2016), which generates over 42% of sub-Saharan Africa's gross national income (Verick, 2006). This is much higher in cities (Etim & Daramola, 2020, p. 134), especially in secondary cities, which tend to have higher informal-sector employment levels.

The informal sector is central to the economy of secondary cities. However, informal-sector employment activities are mostly unregulated, uncontrolled, and occur in unsafe working environments (Cities Alliance, 2021; Masakorala & Dayawansa, 2015). Many small businesses engaged in the sector are significant contributors to waste and groundwater pollution, consume unmetered water, and illegally access electricity. Central and local governments have a strong reluctance to collect local taxes and revenues from the informal sector, despite compelling evidence that the informal sector should, and would be willing to, pay taxes for better services (Joshi et al., 2014). Current collection mechanisms are inefficient, given the low amounts per individual collection and the high costs involved for each transaction, and the mechanisms are subject to abuse and corruption. Informal taxation systems exist in the most impoverished residential communities in African cities, with vigilante groups imposing informal taxes to provide essential urban services and protection. There is an obligation also in many informal-sector poor communities to pay tithes to local mosques, churches and traditional religious leaders.

Policy and regulatory reforms are needed to indirectly capture local revenue from formal and informal employment sectors to pay for improved public utilities and services. South Africa and Tanzania have introduced policies for local governments to outsource tax revenue collection in secondary cities (Haas & Manwaring, 2016, p. 14). However, central governments should also allow local governments to capture revenue via community services charges through services such as banking, mobile phone, electricity, gas, or water bills. This practice has been used elsewhere, for example, in Sri Lanka.

Local government financial management must ensure greater community engagement in budget policy and responsibility for paying for urban services. This is a contentious but necessary area of policy reform, if secondary cities are to adequately fund the public services their economies need, not only to exist but significantly to grow and develop and to offset some of the costs of informal settlements and create a more equitable revenue platform.

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The wealthy and diaspora property owners pay an inequitable share of taxes for the services they use or the resources they consume. Improved revenue collection remains a systemic problem for secondary cities.

3.1.5.2 Foreign Direct Investments

Foreign direct investment is central to government policy to support the development of African cities and countries. Private FDI firms discriminate on the terms and conditions and locations for their investments. Metropolitan regions receive the majority of urban sector FDI (see Chapter 5). Most goes to transportation corridors, agriculture, energy, and telecommunications. Africa's secondary cities generally only feature as part of FDI if they are close to primary cities or close to national highways, rail, and port networks (UN Habitat, 2018). For example, since its founding, Thika, a secondary satellite city to the north of Nairobi, has benefitted from its proximity to Nairobi.

Governments have been slow to recognise that secondary cities only attract FDI when enabling environments are in place to create a competitive advantage from the location to resources, materials, agglomeration, integrated logistics and transport systems and industry clustering. To build these enabling environments, specialist infrastructure, skills, technology, education, research and development facilities must be available, produced, and provided to international standards. Increasingly, quality of life factors, such as good quality housing, education and health services, are also a necessary part of the mix. Central and local governments need to identify new ideas and policies to create more specialised and competitive enabling environments to attract FDI to secondary cities and explore ways to tap the informal sector's unrealised human capital potential (Cities Alliance, 2018a; Masakorala & Dayawansa, 2015).

3.1.6 Entrepreneurship

There is no shortage of entrepreneurship in African secondary cities or amongst the diaspora associated with them. Strong support for local entrepreneurship is crucial to overcome underutilised human capital challenges. Fostering entrepreneurship can encourage business development and develop innovative solutions to building or restoring infrastructure and services and rebuilding dysfunctional institutions. It is crucial for improving the socio-economic conditions that prevail in most secondary cities.

A relatively unexplored area of finance and investment support is associated with youth entrepreneurs. A study of youth entrepreneurs in 10 African countries (Gough & Langevang, 2017) found that many young people have begun investing in local entrepreneurial enterprises – from software to designer garments.

The study found that the level of youth entrepreneurship based on the opportunity was 87%. The primary intentions were to create jobs for themselves and others, create personal wealth, earn more money, and become bosses. Many of the youth entrepreneurs had tertiary qualifications, were well-travelled, optimistic, technologically savvy, and previously employed. Friends and family had played a crucial role in the formation of the entrepreneurs. Across the 10 countries, the challenges were found to be similar, with the most significant being access to finance – indicating a need for commercial banks to review their lending policies. The study recommended that governments take a more active role in policies and initiatives that give greater access to finance, reduce administrative burdens, improve tax regimes, and encourage the private and educational sectors to develop entrepreneurship. In addition, technology and telecommunications networks should be expanded to provide better access to business support and training and improved access to electricity supply and other essential services (Chiloane & Botha, 2019).

A vital policy lesson from this study is that secondary city governments need to work with central governments to develop low-cost start-up premises, access to shared-use facilities, and provide small amounts of venture start-up capital. Such policy reforms will be necessary to create new entrepreneurs and businesses in secondary cities post-COVID-19.

3.1.7 Infrastructure

A report by the African Development Bank (AfDB), *An Integrated Approach to Infrastructure Provision in Africa* (African Development Bank, 2013) provides a quantitative account of infrastructure challenges in large and secondary cities, rural hinterlands, and 'deep rural' Africa. World Bank Indicators show that Africa's urban infrastructure is lagging significantly behind other low-income countries. The most significant gap is in the energy sector: ICT services are inadequate, except in countries like Rwanda. Road densities, access to potable water and sanitation services are comparable to some lower-income Asian economies. The capital costs of infrastructure provision by density (US$ per capita) for different delivery technologies for water, sanitation, power, roads and ICT are significantly lower in large cities compared to secondary and smaller cities (African Development Bank, 2013, p. 62). Economies of scale and demand are the primary factors for the differences.

Overall, infrastructure capital costs are lower in high-density large cities. The unit costs of infrastructure are significantly higher in secondary cities and even higher for 'rural hinterland' and 'deep rural areas. However, sustainable technology solutions can reduce capital and operating costs, improve latrines and community

septic tank sanitation, and introduce local area solar energy networks, waste management, and recycling. The AfDB has called for a strategic vision for the infrastructure agenda to introduce greater technology to reduce infrastructure construction and life cycle costs (African Development Bank, 2013, p. 62). New but not necessarily advanced technologies adapted for local use are needed to develop smart infrastructure for secondary cities. This step is crucial to lowering infrastructure transaction and lifecycle costs in secondary cities to enable them to become more competitive and overcome the agglomeration and economies-of-scale advantages enjoyed by metropolitan regions.

Access to transportation and communication networks; energy grids; sewerage and waste disposal systems; health, social and educational facilities; and economic infrastructure are essential to make secondary cities an attractive place to work and live. The absence or low level of infrastructure investment is a barrier to the development of secondary cities (Roberts & Lindfield, 2020). Infrastructure is not restricted to (hard) physical assets; it also includes the soft infrastructure, including governance and social and fiscal capital. The quality of infrastructure affects competitiveness, investment attractiveness and visitor flows (UN-Habitat, 2020).

Asset management and maintenance is also a significant problem for secondary cities. Poorly run and maintained infrastructure and physical assets add to operational and external costs of business and government. Most African secondary-city local governments underspend substantially on or have inadequate funds to maintain infrastructure assets. Few local governments budget for the financial, human and material resources needed to manage infrastructure assets over their lifespan (Hanif et al., 2021). Elected representatives have a propensity to focus on 'new and shiny' projects that win votes. Neglected infrastructure leads to asset inefficiencies, reduced returns and higher replacement costs. New infrastructure is often built without an asset management framework that supports reliable, inclusive, and sustainable essential services and maintenance (Hanif et al., 2021, p. 67). This can be extremely costly to the ongoing operation of the infrastructure and budgets in secondary cities, as noted in a comprehensive United Nations manual on *Managing Infrastructure Assets for Sustainable Development* (Hanif et al., 2021):

> "Underinvestment in infrastructure maintenance is estimated to cost some developing countries up to 2 per cent growth in GDP. Under-maintained infrastructure assets are more likely to fail, disrupting essential services like transport, water and sanitation or solid waste management. Such vulnerabilities become particularly evident — and the consequences even worse — in times of crises that put a strain on these assets" (p. 67).

3.1.8 Connectivity

Connectivity is "the state or quality of being connective or connected" (Merriam-Webster, 2018). The term can be applied widely to systems and how the various elements or components interact. Connectivity has both physical (Mariyappan et al., 2005, p. 66) and metaphysical (Laszlo and Abraham, 2010) attributes. These attributes can be measured in terms of flows and exchanges of information, knowledge, goods and services between hubs and nodes that make up national and regional systems of cities involving infrastructure and enabling environment networks. Physical connectivity, such as roads and telecommunications, is relatively easy to document and measure across networks. Metaphysical connectivity, e.g., knowledge and information sharing between cities and firms, and social capital is much more challenging to identify and measure. Countries such Morocco and Tunisia have started focusing on improving inter-city connectivity, but in general, African cities, businesses, and institutions are poorly connected, both physically and metaphysically.

PHOTO 3.3
State of roads to ports: Severe road erosion, the Democratic Republic of the Congo

© Source: The Maritime Executive.

Factors that affect connectivity and development within systems of cities include:

- The physical nature and ease of access to infrastructure networks that support the flow or exchange of information, material, or spatial movement of many types of goods and services.
- Economic, governance, ideological, social, legal, and other non-physical types of rules, regulations, technologies, and modalities that provide access to public and private goods and services within cities and other locations.
- Freedom of movement, immigration, ideas, and speech.
- General levels of literacy, education, skills and language, etc., that give equitable access to knowledge and learning.
- The quality, scope, scale, density, flexibility, and capacity of infrastructure and networks to deliver services and respond to change.
- Opening of local economies to competition, change, foreign investment, and international exchanges, and foreigners.
- Shared community values, beliefs, tolerances, welcomeness, and attitudes of belonging to country, place, and society.

Africa's secondary cities are generally poorly connected physically by national highways, rail, air services and ICT networks. The transcontinental routes between north and south and between east and west Africa, planned for more than a century, have never been completed. Shipping and air connections between countries, except northern and southern Africa, are limited. Pipe and transmission line infrastructure are also crucial to enhanced connectivity of energy and water systems (UN Habitat, 2020). Connectivity and access to health, education, financial and transport services are critical to well-functioning and liveable cities. Secondary cities, especially inland, have poor access to many of these services. One of the few areas where secondary cites are better off than metropolitan cites, however, is in connectivity to open space.

China has recognised poor continental connectivity as the major hindrance to Africa's development. Building Africa's infrastructure has become a priority investment for China, which is becoming the most significant single financier for infrastructure in Africa. The Chinese-funded infrastructure projects' realisation is expected to improve Africa's lack of internal trade significantly (Du Plessis, 2016). These infrastructure investments are linked to metropolitan regions such as Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Kampala, and Lagos, connecting those cities with secondary cities, towns, and rural areas into a development corridor along the roads under construction.

The importance of collaborative networks between secondary cities and the role of national and regional governments in supporting their development is an important area of urban systems policy development (Roberts & Lindfield, 2020). The development of a networked system of secondary cities helps such cities improve supply-chain efficiency and production systems (Roberts, 2019, p. 106). It also ignites opportunities for resilient economic growth with multiple endogenous trade benefits, local economic development, and market opportunities. It can nurture secondary city collaboration, synergies, and innovation to reduce scale and transportation costs of goods and services. Spatially dispersed but integrated, networked national and regional cities will lead to efficiencies that will buttress efforts to address climate change and environmental, economic and security concerns.

Several African counties have recognised the importance of and have developed policies for enhancing connectivity and logistics within their national systems of cities. Rwanda's 2020 Vision aims to make Rwanda a very efficient place to do business. Four of its six secondary cities, Nyagatare, Rubavu, Muhanga and Rusizi, have strategies focused on enhancing connectivity as potential means of promoting export-oriented development industries. Uganda's secondary cities are envisaged as centres for job creation through the growth of SMEs and by boosting incentives to encourage local content (Sladoje et al., 2019).

Soft connectivity policies are also becoming increasingly important to Africa's cross-border secondary cities, which function as twin towns and cities (Soi & Nugent, 2017). When the populations of peri-urban settlement areas are added to these towns and cities, many develop into large urban agglomerations, especially on the Uganda/Kenya and Ghana/Togo borders. Connectivity at border secondary cities and towns (which often operate as single-entity bi-frontier trading cities under different governance systems) could significantly improve with bi-lateral national and local government agreements. Such an economic trade agreement works well between Singapore, Bintan-Batam (Indonesia) and Johor Baru (Malaysia) to the mutual benefit of all and is a model that African countries and cross-border secondary cities and towns could adopt.

> *Connectivity and access to health, education, financial and transport services are critical to well-functioning and liveable cities. Secondary cities, especially inland, have poor access to many of these services.*

3.1.9 Human Capital Development

Localities with a large pool of well-developed and diversified human capital, i.e., knowledge and skills, competencies and qualities relevant to economic development attract FDI. Secondary cities, with their comparatively smaller economies, resources and skills bases and less capacitated local governments, are especially weak in their depth of human capital, especially professional services (UN Habitat, 2020). They face significant challenges in acess to education, knowedge and skills (Rwanda Governance Board, 2016). To become more productive, African secondary cities must improve the performance, quality, efficiency and effective use of their limited human capital.

Census and survey data on employment, skills, and education levels in secondary cities in regional areas is poor in most African countries. There is a lack of reliable information on labour markets, employment, and the economic multiplier effects of an investment in local economies; GDP or gross regional income for secondary cities is seldom available. Labour force planning, education and training are factors in the economic development of secondary city economies and should be aligned with their growth and development needs. The capacity and quality of education and training staff, facilities, and support infrastructure are weak. Many African students in secondary cities suffer from a poor learning environment, with few books and without access to computer and internet facilities to aid learning and develop skills in the use of emerging technologies.

An increasing number of university and technical colleges are being developed in secondary cities; however, attracting skilled instructors and good teachers is challenging. Many vacancies in schools, higher education and government centres are partially filled with untrained instructors. Consequently, secondary cities in many poorer African countries cannot build a high level of knowledge capital to raise the overall skills base. Many migrants to secondary cities have only basic literacy skills, which make formal learning difficult. Consequently, skills development and transfer occur primarily through tacit knowledge and learning on the job.

The provision of more technical college courses is critical to developing a skilled labour pool to construct larger local capital works projects, which are more often than not currently awarded to national firms. However, higher-order professional skills, e.g., engineering, health, finance, science, and technology, are lacking in many secondary cities and are a significant impediment to building the skills and competencies needed to attract, develop, and manage cities. These higher-order professions are critical to social and human development planning and are missing in local government, business and institutions in many secondary cities.

PHOTO 3.4
Many African students suffer from a poor learning environment

© Source: Reuters Khamis (2016).

The mismatch between qualifications and job responsibilities in secondary cities and regional offices of line agencies and the rapid changing of positions across agencies result in a loss of corporate knowledge in the public sector. Many officers employed in line agencies and secondary city departments are appointed to positions when they do not have the necessary skills or qualifications to do the job correctly. The permanency of employment conditions in the public sector makes it difficult to dismiss incompetent staff. Human resource management reforms of secondary city local government have also proved very difficult. In many instances, there are not enough skilled people outside of metropolitan regions, where working conditions are far from ideal, to fill vacancies.

Policies are needed to lift the level of skilled staff and human capital development in secondary cities. Some secondary cities have recognized the importance of this. Two of Rwanda's econdary cities, Rubavu and Musanze (designated to become major tourism destinations), are developing skills to support the economy's capacity to strengthen human capacity to support targeted growth industries and local government (World Bank, 2017, p. 3). A study of secondary cities in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Ghana found that only a fraction of managerial, technical and support staff were qualified to undertake their jobs: more than 60% did not have the required qualifications; and secondary city staff often were poorly paid compared to their private-sector counterparts. Unpredictable payment, freezing of salaries, and the cutting of staff, establishment costs, and operational budgets are common and are not conducive to a stable labour force, employment security, and the human resource development required to manage these cities (Cities Alliance 2018b; Masakorala & Dayawansa, 2015).

One effective way secondary cities can make up for the shortfall of human capital is to mobilise the diaspora's knowledge and resources. The diaspora has greater access to capital, technology, finance, knowledge, experience and expertise. It is a valuable source of relatively untapped specialised human capital that can be used to fill skills and knowledge gaps in secondary city local governments, institutions and businesses. The advantage of diaspora skills and knowledge is that it can be translated and transferred through peer learning into the local language and cultural context at a minimal cost. Kakuma, a secondary city refugee camp in northwest Kenya with over 186,000 people, successfully uses this approach to develop micro-enterprise and technology skills among refugees. Local governments could work with diaspora groups to tap advanced knowledge, experience and expertise to rebuild and create new jobs for secondary city economies, particularly during post-COVID-19 recovery efforts.

3.2 Social Planning, Poverty Alleviation and Community Development

Poverty alleviation has been a principal focus of the SDGs and international development assistance agencies. At the same time, poverty in Africa has decreased significantly over the past three decades. It remains a significant challenge in cities, however, and is becoming more pronounced in secondary cities where job opportunities are fewer than in metropolitan regions. Unfortunately, COVID-19 has returned many people in African cities to below the poverty line, which calls for a renewed focus on social development. Local governments will need to develop policies and strategies to foster new types of employment, restore wealth, and improve education and health services access. A range of policy initiatives has been designed to address urban poverty in secondary cities (Kessides, 2005, p. 116; Cities Alliance, 2012; Bertrand & Giraut, 1999, p. 477).

Secondary cities are often transitory staging points (Cassiman, 2007, p. 13) for migrants seeking to move to large metropolitan regions and overseas destinations. Many basic skills and knowledge are gained by migrant workers in secondary cities (Kessides, 2005, p. 116), enabling them to find essential employment and learn new skills to capitalize on if they choose to move elsewhere. Improvement to spatial and social planning in secondary cities and rural towns offers the potential for urban employment opportunities (Muchemwa & Ngwerume, 2013), which will help retain skills in secondary cities to support the development of their economies.

Central to addressing urban poverty problems in African secondary cities is a better understanding by local governments and communities of the vulnerability and risk factors facing people living in slums and informal settlements. Greater emphasis on capacity building of local institutions and organizations is also essential. Local governments can be mobilized effectively to support poverty reduction (Johnson & Rogaly, 1997; Kanbur & Squire, 2011); however, policies

and programs need to be coordinated and targeted at job creation and providing seed capital for micro and small-scale enterprises. Some secondary cities have been very successful in targeting poverty reduction, often with international assistance.

There is evidence that the deprivation in cities and the emerging urban public health problems related to institutional failures perpetuate social exclusion and inequalities between the urban poor and the urban non-poor. There is an unusually large inter-country variation in the reported concern with crime and disorder. Surprisingly, firms in capital/metropolitan regions do not claim to suffer this problem more than do those in secondary cities (Kessides, 2005, p. 116).

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> *Secondary cities are often transitory staging points for migrants seeking to move to large metropolitan regions and overseas destinations.*

3.3 Land Administration and Management

The AfDB places the onus for land management problems of African cities, including secondary cities, on formal land institutions and the related legal and regulatory frameworks. Land management in many African countries is a delicate balance of indigenous land rights embedded in customary law and colonial legal and administrative frameworks. The levels of conflicting cultural and legal interpretation of rights vary from country to country. While customary law may function seamlessly in rural areas, conflicts become apparent in secondary cities that are transitioning to or have adopted Western law. Another problematic area of land management is the preference by government administrations for centralised procedures. This process results in high transaction costs arising from the complex and time-consuming requirements for land registration and ineffective land-use policies and city planning systems (African Development Bank, 2013). The situation encourages the rise of informal settlements that bypass prescribed systems.

Most cities lack realistic master and spatial development plans. Where plans do exist, challenges often arise with their interpretation and implementation. Many secondary cities do not have modern plans that provide for anticipated growth areas. As a result, they are not in a position nor are they equipped to manage urbanisation. Many plans are disconnected from the reality of local conditions, especially the capacity to fund infrastructure and community services and to manage illegal settlements. Numerous attempts at land administration in Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Angola have been slow to reform land conversion and registration processes. Court systems can be extremely slow in resolving ownership disputes. Such disputes are increasingly common with the development of regional secondary cities such as Mekelle in Ethiopia (Photo 3.5) and clustered secondary cities on the periphery of metropolitan regions such as Accra and Lagos.

South Africa has constitutionally driven comprehensive planning and land management systems. However, the growth of primary and secondary cities severely tests the system's ability to cope with urbanisation and land management pressures. In Ghana, the secondary twin-cities of Sekondi-Takoradi face significant land management issues, but do not have adequate mechanisms and resources to manage them. These pressures are driven by economic migration from an expanding oil and gas industry, insufficient rental property supply, rising middle-class incomes, demand for estate housing and land speculation, some of it by the diaspora. Land disputes are widespread. For example, according to a news story from the town of Adigrat in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, "Amhara officials say the disputed lands, equal to about a quarter of Tigray, were taken during the nearly 30 years that the TPLF dominated central government before Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018" (Aljazeera, 2021, n.p.).

Mozambique has an ineffective land administration and management system with limited local capacity for planning and implementation. Secondary cities like Beira, Nampula and Chimoio cannot provide sufficient land. As a result, 80% of the population live in unplanned informal settlement areas (Jachnow et al., 2017).

PHOTO 3.5
Mekelle, Tigray region: Disputed lands make planning for development difficult

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Land administration and management is a significant problem for African secondary cities. Title registration, land management and land conversion responsibilities are multi-layered and range from centralised to decentralised systems. Customary land systems and laws often overlay these systems. For example, in the Ashanti region of Ghana, the King has a land registry that operates parallel to the Registry Office. Parallel systems also operate within government agencies and local governments on issuing licenses, leases and land-use rights, leading to duplication, overlapping and inaccurate boundary and area descriptions. Few land registries can register long-term leases or property covenants on titles. Property and tax maps are inconsistent in defining property boundaries and structures, valuations are outdated and property ownership and tax records are often not correctly recorded. Residents of informal settlements have no title or security of tenure.

These land administration and management problems facing metropolitan and secondary city local governments in Africa are systemic. They have a profound impact on the ability of city governments to manage land, determine ownership and collect taxes. Unless secondary cities can address these challenges through better policies, laws, and regulations, the impacts will be just as significant as those experienced in metropolitan regions. Land management policy reform for cities is one of the most pressing issues facing urbanisation in Africa. Poor land management affects the efficiency of land and property markets, security of tenure, development rights, and the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.

3.4 Environmental Management

Generally, environmental conditions in secondary cities are better than those of primary cities. They tend to have lower emissions and lower soil, surface, and groundwater pollution problems, and they generate less waste per capita. Factors contributing to this are the lower urban-development levels, populations and traffic densities, and lower fuel, energy and water consumption of secondary cities. However, secondary cities rely more on unclean energy sources, such as wood and charcoal fuels and kerosene (UN Habitat, 2020). When secondary cities develop on the outskirts of metropolitan regions, new residential and industrial developments lead to increasing pollution levels from households, vehicles and factories that negatively impact the natural environment and the surrounding agricultural areas. As urban areas expand, pollution of airsheds, water catchments, rivers and coastlines also increase (Dodman et al., 2017). Excessive drawdown of groundwater to meet the growing demands of clustered secondary cities surrounding Lagos, for example, has led to water shortages and increased salinisation of aquifers close to the coast.

Onsite sanitation is the main form of human waste disposal in most African cities. World Bank studies show that between 10% and 15% of the population have access to a sewer network in most primary and secondary cities, but few have sewerage treatment plants beyond primary stage treatment. About 80% of the population depend on onsite facilities such as septic tanks and pit latrines (Morella et al., 2008). In the Mozambique secondary cities of Tele and Nampula, over 50% of the urban population lack toilets, leading to regular disease outbreaks. Basic sanitation and potable water remain one of the most pressing challenges for all cities. Low-level technology and local area network wastewater, sanitation and solid waste collection systems offer the quickest solution to improving secondary cities' environmental and public health standards.

Larger secondary cities located on river and lake systems such as the Niger, the Nile and the Central African lakes are a growing source of pollutants, including wastewater and solid waste along waterways (White et al., 2017). This pollution has a cumulative effect, as downstream towns and cities must deal with increased pollution levels, including plastics, other flotsam wastes and reduced water quality, all of which add to treatment, environmental and health costs in cities in the lower catchments. Sustainable Development Goal 6 calls for access to water and sanitation for all. The problem in localizing the SDGs at the secondary city level, however, is that towns and cities located along river and lake systems are highly parochial and have different priorities on the goals they support. There is a need for increased collaboration between cities so that water quality along river and lake systems can be addressed comprehensively to achieve SDG 6 and its targets.

PHOTO 3.6
The growing waste problem in Kisumu, Lake Victoria

© Source: CUSSH 2018.

Climate change is one of the most significant challenges of our time. Cities contribute an estimated 75% of greenhouse gas emissions, with urban transport and buildings among the most significant contributing factors to climate change. Populations living in coastal and drier regional secondary cities will be hit hard by climate change impacts, and their ability to adapt will be difficult. African governments, cities and municipalities have limited scope for influencing the current global warming rate (Cartwright, 2015). Actions that can positively contribute, however, are changes in unsustainable land-use practices, reafforestation and localised adaptation measures, including water catchment management, use of alternative fuels for cooking, and local-area network solar systems.

Little research has been done on climate change impacts on secondary cities, as some have pointed out. "Resilience efforts in capital cities are the most dominant in the literature, but far less emphasises is given to the needs of secondary cities and towns, which is necessary for a deeper understanding of the role played by inter-municipal and inter-metropolitan collaborations" (Kareem et al., 2020, p.1). Strategies and measures to support global warming mitigation and the SDGs are essential, but governments and cities should pay attention to adaptation measures to address climate change impacts – especially on vital infrastructure.

There is an urgent need for improved environmental awareness and education from the primary to tertiary education levels on sustainable development and climate change. Polices are also needed which incorporate indigenous African knowledge on the natural environment. Africa cities can learn from and replicate Asia's clean industries and many other 'innovations' – including those based in traditional knowledge, which are more likely to find acceptance in small rural towns (Erbach & Gaudet, 1998).

3.5 Social Issues

The need to reduce absolute poverty levels and high birth rates, and improve life expectancy rates, public health, education, and living standards has accelerated trade and consumption-driven urbanisation and secondary-city development since the 1990s. Secondary cities are often the first step in migration from rural areas and small towns to larger cities. Growing populations and migration has led to trade-commerce-consumer driven urbanisation, resulting in increased pull-migration towards secondary cities across all African states, as rural migrants search for jobs and a better quality of life. Ibadan in Nigeria provides an example of a secondary city that, in the mid-twentieth century, had many small-scale enterprises which generated limited but widely distributed income across the city and hinterland. This resulted in increased demand for inexpensive, locally produced consumer goods. Local small-scale commercial and manufacturing enterprises responded to the increased demand by importing, at reduced costs, the materials necessary for local production. This led to the rapid expansion of business and population growth for the city (Erbach & Gaudet, 1998, p. 78).

Africa's secondary cities suffer from poor social infrastructure and community services. The absence of social facilities creates physical and mental health issues, can lead to crime and violence and a loss of inclusiveness. There is a general lack of policies to protect vulnerable people like refugees, resulting in unfavourable living and working conditions for these groups (UN Habitat, 2020). In addition, cities that have poor physical and social infrastructure also struggle to attract investment.

Inadequate housing is a problem facing all African cities. The demand for housing and accommodation in secondary cities can be great, especially where significant development pressures are being experienced. The twin secondary cities of Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana, for example, are experiencing significant social and housing mobility problems (Yankson et al., 2017). A study by Yankson et al. (2017) focused on the dynamics of physical and social transformations, mobility, and livelihoods around migration to Sekondi-Takoradi, residential mobility within the twin cities, the normal mobility of residents, and how these interactions form networks of residents' livelihood strategies. The effect of a rapid transition in the cities' housing markets increased the risk of tenure insecurity, rapidly rising rents, with minimal improvement in housing stock quality. The quality of accommodation, access to urban services and public transport are significant issues affecting housing in secondary cities, for which policy responses have been inadequate at all levels of government.

Poverty in secondary African cities is often associated with high levels of crime and violence. Regional secondary cities and towns, especially those on or near international borders and ports, are particularly susceptible to criminal activities, especially drugs, arms, contraband, and people smuggling. Border towns and cities in East Africa are

zones of significant risk, as they provide opportunities for quick money-making ventures and deals that tend to attract a range of criminals. Border security and policing in regional and border secondary cities has become increasingly complex, with law enforcement lacking the facilities, equipment, technologies and skilled workforce to fight crime. In different countries across many parts of the Sahel, secondary cities and towns have become unsafe because governments can no longer enforce the rule of law. This situation has a significant adverse impact on security and personal safety, as well as on economies, communities, and social well-being of this enormous region. It is forcing many people to migrate vast distances across the continent in search of a safer place to live and work.

Poverty, crime, insecurity, and lack of social infrastructure facilities and services are products of governance failure. These issues are exacerbated by poor communications, education and health services, as well as by politics, tribalism, and corruption. These factors impede the delivery of social and community services needed to improve the well-being of rural and urban populations. Countries such as Rwanda and Kenya are taking steps to address these issues, but progress is slow. In some of Africa's secondary cities, in the absence of the policies necessary to support secondary city social and cultural development, citizens are taking the initiative and evolving their own distinct and often organic coping strategies outside the shadows of their metropolises.

Studies of Kisumu in Kenya (DCP Kenya, 2019), Kankan in Guinea, and Korhogo and Bouaké in Côte d'Ivoire illustrate different approaches of how the people of these small cities have reacted and moved on to confront nationally and locally unfavourable political, financial, social and cultural infrastructural situations (Ammann & Sanogo, 2017). In Kisumu, the city's frustrated youth, in the face of an indifferent municipal cultural cluster that was not addressing their basic cultural infrastructure needs, took matters into their own hands to explore outlets for their potential involvement in the cultural industry, with some success (Unseld, 2017).

Growing populations and migration has led to trade-commerce-consumer driven urbanisation, resulting in increased pull-migration towards secondary cities across all African states, as rural migrants search for jobs and a better quality of life.

In Kaduna, Nigeria, where funding for cultural activities is minimal, youth have taken the initiative to create independent films with their smartphones (Africanews, 2019). Opportunities exist for mature volunteers to add weight and support to youth culture through mentoring and corporate social responsibility networks.

Government agency programs to support social development in secondary cities and regional towns fall short of meeting population needs. International agencies and NGOs have had to fill many of the gaps. Few attempts have been made at resource sharing and collaboration between regional secondary cities and towns, such as leveraging resources and building a critical mass of resources, infrastructure, and human capital to support social services delivery, despite very strong policy recommendations made in reports such as, *Assessing the Institutional Environment of Local Governments in Africa* (Cities Alliance & UCLGA, 2013).

Secondary cities and towns should consider using a regional-cluster collaborative approach to policy development and implementation to create the social infrastructure and services required to support social development. The challenge with this approach to collaboration between regional and local governments is a new governance model that requires trust and a willingness to pool resources. It is the antithesis of the current system – where regional local governments compete for the minimal resources available. Collaborative governance at a secondary and regional cities level is crucial to improved social and community services delivery, supporting social development,

and achieving the SDGs. There is, therefore, a clear need for education and learning about collaborative urban-governance models in African secondary cities, as they currently are unable to independently create the critical mass of infrastructure, services and capacity required to deliver even essential social support services to address poverty and other social problems.

3.6 Conclusions

Africa's secondary cities support the livelihood of more than 750 million people living in rural areas. Most are centres of trade and commerce, and government services. Except for natural resources extraction industries such as oil and petroleum, industrialisation has not played a significant role in driving the development of secondary cities. South Africa and northern African countries are the countries with substantial and growing manufacturing industries located in their secondary cities. The key driver of employment and economic development in secondary cities is the growth of services – especially government, health, education and transport (see discussion in Chapter 2).

Colonialism laid the foundations for development and urbanisation, following similar patterns to Asia, South America and Europe at the beginning of their respective industrial revolutions. African countries have sought to industrialise and take advantage of cheaper labour, tax incentives and proximity to European markets, but they are not industrialising as rapidly as Asia, and industrialisation is not occurring in secondary cities. They are, however, urbanising at a faster rate (see Chapter 5).

Large African metropolitan regions will likely continue to attract a more significant proportion of migrants from rural and smaller regional towns and cities and a significant proportion of investment. Many secondary cities will grow rapidly, as rural inhabitants are pulled by economic opportunity and pushed by civil unrest and climate change. There is likely to be spinoff flows from metropolitan to secondary cities and hinterlands in trade and remittances (Adepoju et al., 2007, p. 308). But the rapid urbanisation in secondary cities will also give rise to many of the problems experienced by large metropolitan regions.

Although the library on secondary cities in Africa is small, it is growing. The first studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s focused on these cities as extensions of the agriculture sector. Initially, the primary function of these cities was to act as secondary logistics and production hubs to support products and materials to larger cities and overseas markets. Interest in the development of secondary cities waned in the early 1990s, except for some UN-Habitat studies. In the mid- 2000s, however, international agencies and researchers demonstrated a renewed interest in the development of secondary cities.

The literature shows that challenges facing the development of secondary cities are also growing. The issues of weak urban governance, the need for improved planning and urban management, basic infrastructure, and environmental, education and social development have been covered in this chapter.

Secondary, intermediate, and middle-sized cities are not yet part of the vocabulary of urban policy development in Africa. A few countries, including Rwanda, Ghana and Morocco, have developed policies to support the development of these cities under national urbanisation strategies. However, in South Africa, where there is a relatively well-developed system of secondary cities, bringing them into the focus of debate and discussion is still a challenge.

Secondary cities play a significant role in the development of national economies. They are still a neglected area of research and policy development, especially in improving governance, logistics, infrastructure, and job creation and attracting investment. Most secondary cities lag well behind the development of larger metropolitan regions. Catching up will be a significant challenge and will require a substantial shift in policies to avoid the situation where one or two cities dominate an entire nation's economy.

Setting new strategic directions for the development of secondary cities requires a much deeper understanding of what is happening socially, economically and environmentally to their development. Only through a deeper understanding of their role in the development of national urban systems can appropriate frameworks and strategies be created that will allow secondary cities to realize their potential.

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4

URBAN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT

BRIAN H ROBERTS AND
GODFREY O. ANYUMBA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the role of African secondary city development policies from the pre-colonial to the postcolonial period. The review draws on an extensive range of literature and studies on urbanisation, urban systems, planning and development of African cities (Njoh, 2007; Moriconi-Ebrard, 1997; Nwaka, 2005; Matos et al., 2009). However, the literature on secondary cities' development is not substantial, is geographically uneven and varies in content and detail. Data is generally limited, with few primary research studies available. The chapter covers three themes:

- The historical context of urbanisation and secondary cities development.
- Colonialism and other influences on urban and secondary cities development.
- National policy responses to urbanisation and secondary city development.

4.2 Historical Context of Urbanisation

Africa has a long history of urbanisation and city development over more than four millennia. During this time, conditions in Africa have given rise to numerous empires, kingdoms, societies, colonies, cities, and trading partnerships. The following discusses the historical path of urbanisation in Africa and the various factors that have shaped urban development patterns and secondary city growth across the continent.

4.2.1 Early History

Urbanisation and development of towns and cities began over four millennia ago with the development of the Egyptian, Greek and Roman civilisations' settlement of northern Africa. Parallel to this was the development of indigenous urbanisation, with a long history of urban settlement and culture dating back nearly three millennia (Anderson & Rathbone, 2000; Hull, 1976).

Northern Africa was one of the first regions to experience urbanisation, with the Nile Valley being home to some of the world's oldest continually inhabited cities. Secondary cities formed an essential part of the Egyptian hierarchy of cities engaged in the production, logistics and integrated supply-chain systems required to support a growing population under rulers of successive dynasties.

The Romans were the colonialists who developed towns and cities across northern Africa. Most of these communities were small, like Cyrene, Leptis Magna and Sabratha in present-day Libya, but some like Alexandria (Egypt), Carthage (Tunisia), and Volubilis (Morocco) grew to several hundred thousand. Several of these were secondary cities, serving as capitals of Roman provinces. Over 120 urban settlements of varying size were built across northern Africa, with settlements and supply chains often extending far inland. These towns and port cities formed a vital part of the supply-chain network of food, cash crops, and mineral resources that service the empire. "Everywhere, the Romans built on the same general pattern, leaving behind the familiar elements of Roman urban planning and civic life that characterise the archaeological sites that remain today. Roman towns typically had many grand public buildings, including a Capitol, Basilica, Amphitheatre and Public Baths, a triumphal arch and Forum (central square), with wide streets laid out on a grid. Water was brought into town via elaborately built aqueducts, and the towns were usually surrounded by a defensive wall with grand entrance gates and sentry posts along their length" (African World Heritage, 2018).

The Romans laid down the foundations of a pattern of urban settlement and development, which was to be replicated in the colonial period at began in the fifteenth century until the present day. The fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century resulted in the end of the earliest phase of Africa's urbanisation and development.

The spread of Islam across northern Africa, the Sahel, and eastern Africa in the seventh century profoundly impacted cities' development and urban form. Islam led to the rapid growth of many coastal and inland trading cities. Many of these were administered as traditional kingdoms. Islam did not impose a specific type of governance and administrative system upon the northern part of the continent, but operated in parallel with traditional tribal governance structures. Islam strongly influenced ideas, policies, customs and practices, particularly in city design and architecture, education, public health and civil codes of behaviour. The increased level of trade between cities that developed under Islam led to a significant expansion and development of inland cities and towns along caravan and river routes. Many larger centres, such as Sokoto, Nigeria, began taking on secondary city characteristics, as the ports and market centres of inland river and productive regions engaged in artisan activities and industries involved in the processing of agriculture and natural resource products.

FIGURE 4.1 | Central African itinerary from Sokoto to Timbuktu, old map with Timbuktu insert plan

Source: Shutterstock stock photo ID: 83126437

Islam became integrated into many aspects of traditional culture, trade, business, and governance practices. Cities often developed separate Islamic or Moorish residential districts or quarters, where most of the residents were traders. Many secondary cities developed a unique architectural form for the house, mosque and market design. Some, such as Malindi in Kenya (DCP Kenya, 2019) and Timbuktu and Djenné-Djeno in Mali, became specialised centres of religion and learning, trading and metals manufacturing. Colonialism and modernisation in later centuries led to a decline of many inland Islamic secondary cities. Islam remains a powerful force in developing

and continuing the functions and operations of cities today. Christianity would have a similar influence on other parts of Africa.

Timbuktu originated as a spiritual centre and then expanded later as a trading centre, as did Kano in Nigeria and many other towns and cities in the region. Others grew from the development of the slave trade and industrialisation. Benin City in Nigeria is famous for its brass work manufacturing, dating back to the thirteenth century and its ivory and wood carvings. The Great Zimbabwe ruins, considered a proto city although a minor development, was once a centre of 18,000 people involved in producing stone works, ivory, ceramics and skins that were traded with Arab traders.

The next phase of urbanisation emerged from incipient indigenous traditional forces in different parts of the continent, starting around the tenth century in western Africa. This was led by the expansion of African empires such as Benin and Oyo in modern-day Nigeria, Mutapa (Zimbabwe), Numidia (Tunisia), Mauretania (Morocco and Algeria), the Aksumite Empire (Ethiopia), and the Kingdoms of Mapungubwe (South Africa), Sine (Senegal), Sennar (Sudan) Great Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe), Kongo (Angola and Congo (DRC) and Ife (Nigeria). City-building was a small but significant part of developing these empires and kingdoms – to oversee local populations and administration, foster trade and economic development, and ensure the realm's defences.

While Africa's historic urban systems were small and dispersed compared to the current day, they were nevertheless established and developed well before the colonial era (Hull, 1976). Alliances between tribal groups, the intellectual exchange between Hausa Reformists and Arab Scholars and pilgrim movements led to further trade and the spreading of common trading language in different regions. A well-established system of customary cities and towns began to develop in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries across North Africa, with high connectivity and interactions between many of them (Figure 4.2).

Much of Africa's early urbanisation occurred along coastlines and rivers, but other inland urban centres such as Kano and Timbuktu also had relatively large populations and were important regional market centres. Many of the connections between these ancient cities continue today, especially along the western African coastal trading corridor. These larger cities were the primary market and transportation hubs of their day, with a well-developed network of trade and feeder routes to secondary (sub-regional) city hubs. A city-state network of trading cities developed during the pre-colonial phases of urbanisation across Africa's northern and eastern coasts. Many of these were the nascence of today's secondary cities and were engaged in small-scale raw materials and agriculture processing and production with significant trade. These early years of urbanisation laid the foundation stones for urban settlement, transport networks, communications and trade.

FIGURE 4.2 | Trade routes, North Africa and the Sahel, twelfth century

Source: Easy Zoom (2021).

4.2.2 Colonial Urban Settlement and Development of Secondary Cities

Colonialism had a significant impact on the settlement and urbanisation of Africa. European colonialism led to the development of territorial protectorates and colonies, ports, roads and railways, regional towns and cities covering most of the African continent. It played a significant role in shaping African secondary city development, especially introducing local government to occupied territories. The different colonial powers resulted in noticeable differences between Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone, and Arab countries within modern Africa. The subsequent emergence of independent African nation-states perpetuated the urbanisation approaches and planning trends of former colonial characteristics.

Before colonisation, less than 10% of the African population lived in urban settlements; most lived in villages and towns. Colonisation led to more organised local governments, cities, trade, and communications across the region. In the sixteenth century, colonialism brought about significant changes to urban settlement patterns – and urban development began across Africa. The changes were driven by rival European imperial strategies and influenced strongly by governance systems of colonial powers and colonial railway infrastructure. The Industrial Revolution in nineteenth-century Europe led to rapid population growth and a rapidly rising demand for food, materials and natural resources in that region, much of which was sourced from conquered African colonial territories.

Colonial powers needed well-organised administration systems, cities and towns, infrastructure and transport systems in Africa to support industrialisation. They introduced new governance systems and policies. They began developing roads, railways, and other infrastructure, new towns and agricultural settlements in many parts of Africa, exploiting minerals and forests, planting new crops, and developing new industries, taking advantage of cheap labour and proximity to materials. In many cases, colonial and traditional systems related to economic and social development, governance, land administration, law, health, education, and planning ran parallel and continue today. However, conflicts between the two systems have been a significant impediment to some countries' growth and development.

The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 was Africa's undoing in more ways than one. The European colonial powers superimposed their domains on the African continent irrespective of natural borders and customary land territories (Figure 4.3 Map showing the Berlin Conference partitioning of Africa). Colonial countries with the most significant impact on the continent included Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. By the late 1950s and 1960s, when many African countries regained their independence, they acquired a legacy of political fragmentation and colonialism that could neither be eliminated nor made to operate satisfactorily.

The arbitrary division of natural and customary boundaries imposed by colonial powers destroyed many historical patterns of trade. The changes to cultural groups and language made it extremely difficult for African nations to engage in the meaningful exchange of information, trade and investment, which were still primarily controlled by external interests. Postcolonial policy and the development of urban systems in Africa are still largely shaped by the legacy of whichever former colonial power ran the country, a situation that has not changed in more than half a century.

Colonial planning systems, therefore, have had a significant influence on the current pattern and rate of urban development in different parts of Africa. The publication *Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa* (Njoh, 2007)provides a multidisciplinary perspective of British and French colonial planning powers in town and country planning in Africa. Those powers significantly influenced colonial administrative and economic strategies, especially in the early

FIGURE 4.3 | Map showing the Berlin Conference partitioning of Africa

African Colonies after the Berlin Conference of 1884

twentieth century. The stated goal of colonial town and country planning was: "to accomplish the laudable objectives of ensuring sound architectural standards, protecting public health and promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the built environment… colonial authorities employed urban planning policies and projects as tools to facilitate the accomplishment of broader goals of colonial enterprises involving self-preservation, cultural assimilation, political domination, social control, territorial conquest and perpetual consolidation of colonial rule" (Njoh, 2007, p.ix).

The legacy of the colonial planning systems in Africa defines the patterns of urban settlement, communications, economic development, class segregation and culture that prevail today. It is responsible for the significant differences and gaps in local and regional economic and social development levels in countries across the region. The following summarises the influence that different colonial planning systems and policies had in shaping the region's urban and economic geography.

4.2.3 British Colonial Urban Settlement and Development

Britain gained most from the Berlin Conference and secured many colonies from Cape Town to Cairo through their control of Egypt, Sudan (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan), Uganda, Kenya (British East Africa), South Africa, Malawi (Nyasaland), Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), Eswatini (Swaziland), Lesotho (Basutoland) and Botswana (Bechuanaland). The British also controlled Nigeria, Ghana (Gold Coast), Sierra Leone, and part of Cameroon. Many of its colonies were in areas with plentiful rainfall, good arable soils and grazing lands, with control over significant rivers, lakes and coastlines. British colonisation of sub-Saharan Africa was founded on the need for food security and the demand for resources, especially animal products, cash crops, and minerals needed for the growing population of the United Kingdom, its economy, and other British colonies. Provincial and municipal systems of local government and towns were established in strategically located ports, agricultural or mining centres.

The British colonial development policies and governance structures led to the establishment of many prosperous secondary cities, such as Kumasi in Ghana, Arusha in Tanzania, Durban, and Mombasa. Many of these cities were well-planned and had sound governance systems and infrastructure. Many expanded significantly after the Great Depression of the 1930s and after the Second World War, when strong policies were in place to support migration and settlement – especially in eastern and southern Africa.

While central colonial governments strongly influenced national economic development planning, at the time, there was still a high level of devolution and delegation given to provincial and municipal governments in some colonies, particularly in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa. This helped to foster competition between colonies and cities, with investment in mining, industry and agriculture. It stimulated growth and rural-urban migration to primary and secondary cities, which generated significant jobs growth in agriculture and in the agricultural and forestry processing, construction, mining and manufacturing sectors.

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By the late 1940s, British colonial policy began to focus on industrialisation in its colonies, with countries like North and South Rhodesia (Zambia and Zimbabwe), South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana developing industrial estates. Industrialisation resulted in new towns like Tema, 20 km east of Accra in Ghana, developed in the late 1950s to support a range of heavy industry development and industrialisation. In Lagos, Nigeria, in 1958–1959, the Department of Commerce and Industry created two industrial estates to focus on developing federal industrial establishments (Fourchard, 2011, p. 70). By 1950, Zimbabwe (formerly South Rhodesia) had a relatively well-developed industrial base, with the only integrated iron and steel plant in sub-Saharan Africa. By 1953, it was estimated that manufacturing accounted for 10% of GDP and 8% of Zimbabwe's exports (Ndlela, 1984). Much of Zimbabwe's industrial development was located in Harare and Bulawayo.

At the time of independence, many nations began planning new national capitals to take on a primarily secondary city function as a political capital. Secondary cities like Lilongwe (Malawi), Dodoma (Tanzania) and Abuja (Nigeria) were developed as post-independence new towns. Many of these developments drew on the British new towns and Buchannan transport plans (Buchannan, 1963). The development of Abuja began in 1976, and it has become a primate city of over 3 million people. Other countries such as Ghana and Zambia examined new national capitals and new towns, but did not proceed with their development.

Following independence, many governments throughout the former British colonies largely neglected urbanisation and balanced urban development policies. Many countries had 5-year development plans that were never effected and policies that were, more or less, left on 'autopilot' – with disastrous consequences. Constant coups and long periods of military government led to minimal investment in subnational regions and cities and the undermining of local government, except in South Africa. Only recently have some former colonies begun progressive reforms and taken a fresh look at urbanisation and secondary city development, with countries like Uganda and Ghana leading the way. Case studies on the development of secondary cities in South Africa (Gqeberha, formerly Port Elizabeth), Kenya (Mombasa), and Nigeria (Ibadan) are presented later in this study.

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4.2.4 French Colonial Urban Settlement and Secondary City Development

France and Belgium were the Francophone beneficiaries of the Berlin Conference. France controlled much of western Africa, from Mauritania to Chad (French West Africa), Gabon and the Republic of Congo (French Equatorial Africa). Francophone governance, finance, law, planning and engineering practices influenced African colonies' development and their cities' development. However, the interests of each country were slightly different. French interests in Africa date from 1659, and the establishment of a trade port on the western African coast at St. Louis (Photo 4.1). French interest and participation in western Africa did not increase substantially until later in the nineteenth century, particularly after the Berlin Conference.

French interest in the interior regions focused on gum arabic (acacia gum used as a food preservative), groundnuts (peanuts) and other raw materials to support industrial expansion in France. Cities like Touba in Senegal became important secondary cities for sourcing raw agriculture products and materials and for pilgrimages (see Senegal case study, Chapter 14). The French West Africa colonies (then territories) were administered as a single territory by a governor based in Dakar. The constituent territories of French West Africa were divided into cercles (administrative units).

PHOTO 4.1
View of Saint-Louis, a colonial secondary (intermediate) city, Senegal

© Source: Shuttercock stock photo ID: 727520323.

Many parts of French West Africa had established towns and small cities, some of which were the ruling centres of kingdoms or places of religious importance and scholarship. By the beginning of the twentieth century, French colonial urban planning principles had crystallised, at least in theory, according to Njoh (2007). The French government began to invest in developing coastal and interior secondary cities to support the development of pastoral lands and mining activities. "In practice, the lack of funds rendered their implementation impossible. Cities in French Sub-Saharan African colonies developed mostly according to the desires of businessmen who were able and willing to make the necessary investments" (Njoh, 2007, p. 20). In the Federation of French Equatorial Africa, which was much less populated than French West Africa, almost all infrastructure investment went into Brazzaville's development to support the forestry sector.

A significant difference between French and other colonial administrations relates to land tenure. French colonial governments were focused on replacing indigenous land tenure systems with French land administration and management systems. It was common for French colonial governments to transplant land-use and related legislation from one colony to another. This resulted in much greater uniformity of planning systems in African towns and cities of French colonies compared to British colonies. In 1949, the French created the central planning agency, le Bureau Central d'Etudes pour les Equipements d'Outre-Mer, to prepare urban plans and become involved in housing and other urban development activities. Urban plans took the form of master plans, many of which were ambitious in their design, but with minimal funding available to support infrastructure development. Those urban development management plans are still used in some former colonies.

Through its international agency, the French government has continued to support primary and secondary cities' planning and management in the postcolonial era. Like those in former British colonial countries, many of the planning practices and laws related to urban planning and development have changed little since the countries gained independence in the 1960s. The failure to adequately maintain planning systems and enforce development control has resulted in laissez-faire patterns of urbanisation in most primary and secondary cities throughout Africa. In this respect, the failure to continue, modify and adapt colonial planning systems is a crucial reason why so many African cities lack facilities, have large informal and poorly managed areas of urban development, and weak transport systems and networks. A case study of the secondary city of Touba-Mbacké, Senegal, is presented later in this study (see Chapter 14).

4.2.5 Belgian Colonial Planning

Belgium, a Francophone and Flemish-speaking country, occupied the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Belgian Congo). Belgium's interest in the colony was primarily the exploitation of rubber, copper and other minerals in the upper Lualaba River basin to support the bankrupted monarch, Leopold II. In the early twentieth century, the Belgian government established a province and territory system as a forerunner to developing areas for colonial settlement related to agriculture, cash cropping and mining. By the mid-1920s, copper and diamond mining were the mainstays of the economy. Some mining companies built regional infrastructure and towns for workers in 1930, from which the migration of rural inhabitants to urban areas began.

To the present day, the development of many secondary cities in the Congo region continues to be driven by a legacy of private Belgian investment in mining regions. Other private foreign actors, such as China and South Africa, are also driving investment in agriculture and forestry in the mineral-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo. Compared to French colonial territory planning and development, the development of the former Belgian Congo was driven more by private profit and interests than by genuine government interest in supporting colonial settlement. As a result, Brazzaville and secondary cities development were poorly planned compared to many other parts of the continent.

4.2.6 Portuguese Colonial Settlement and Secondary City Development

The Portuguese have had a long history of involvement in Africa, dating back five centuries. Portuguese speaking Africa (Lusophone Africa) includes five countries: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Luis Silveira's 1957 essay Ensaio de Iconografia das Cidades Portuguesas do Ultramar – (Essay of Iconography of Portuguese Overseas Towns) indicates that the Portuguese approach to colonisation and urban settlement was to translate colonies into provinces with the same administrative partition and urban development patterns as in Portugal (Silveira, 1975)

Until the early nineteenth century, Portugal's primary interest was in developing coastal cities to support the slave and ivory trades. However, by the 1860s, it had introduced comprehensive programs to develop its colonies' interiors to support farming, urban settlement and gold mining. The selection and development of planned cities were very formal, with approval sought from the Town-Planning Committee for the Overseas Territories in Lisbon. Many of these cities were formally laid out, but took many years to develop. There was also a systematic hierarchical system of urban settlements developing and linking the primate and secondary cities, similar to Spanish practices in Latin America (Hidalgo, 2009).

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Unlike other colonial powers, Portugal was not in a strong position to fund the substantial infrastructure investment needed to expand road and rail networks, and its local government was weak. The end of Portugal's 500 years of colonialism in Africa was marked by bitter civil wars in several colonies, which led to the destruction of national urban systems and vital infrastructure and the loss of the human capital necessary to support those nations' ongoing development. These factors have significantly impacted the development of former Portuguese African colonies since independence. Many secondary cities that developed during the colonial era have struggled to manage the influx of impoverished rural migrants.

Nevertheless, central governments have made considerable efforts and further efforts are being made, with international assistance, to develop new planning and governance systems to support their national and regional development.

4.2.7 German Colonial Settlement and Secondary City Development

Germany had three colonies in Africa: Namibia (German Southwest Africa), Tanzania (German East Africa, Tanganyika) and Cameroon. Under German colonisation, commerce and agriculture were high priorities. It was realised early that economic development would depend on reliable transportation, and the colonial government embarked upon an expansive roads and railway building program to open up land for coffee, sisal and other cash crop production in Tanzania. This led to the establishment of a pattern of rural towns and settlements across the country, with the transport systems converging on the primate city of Dar Es Salaam.

German colonisation of Tanzania, however, was not a success. The colony was heavily subsidised, and after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, it was ceded to the British. British colonialism led to the significant expansion and growth of regional towns and cities to service an expanding agriculture sector. Road and railway systems were expanded, including a link to the 10,228 km trans-African Highway from Alexandria to Cape Town. Part of the plan, which was first proposed in the late nineteenth century, was to establish an inland route through Tanzania to boost colonial trade and development by developing a trade corridor and promoting industrial and agriculture cities between Kenya and South Africa.

German South-West Africa (Namibia) was the only colony where Germans settled in large numbers. However, a reasonable number of German settlers remained in Tanzania and South Africa. German immigrants were drawn to the colony by potential economic riches in diamond and copper mining and farming, but the arid climate and hostilities with indigenous people restricted the development and urban settlement. Britain, and later South Africa, showed little interest in developing the country except for mining. As a result, there is no well-established urban settlement pattern. Windhoek is the largest city in Namibia, with a population of 431,000 in 2020. There are nine small cities with populations less than 60,000, many of whom are now experiencing urbanisation and informal settlements.

4.2.8 Italian and Spanish Colonial Settlements

At the Berlin Conference, Ethiopia was allocated to Italy. Spanish West Africa, comprising the Western Sahara Desert, was allocated to Spain. Neither country took a strong interest in colonising their administered territories, especially Spain, which had lost most of its Latin American colonies during the early nineteenth century. While Ethiopia has a large population, it is landlocked, making it difficult to service from surrounding countries. Ethiopia is one of the least urbanised and industrialised countries in Africa, but several of its secondary cities have grown rapidly (Schmidt & Kedir, 2009, p. 38). A case study on Ethiopia and the secondary city of Dire Dawa (UN-Habitat, 2008, p. 32) is presented later in the book (see Chapter 8).

4.3 Post-Colonial Era: Urban Development Policies and Practices

The postcolonial era in Africa has been one of rapid development, but it has also been associated with turmoil, disruption and political division. There has been a propensity to blame much of this on colonialism's legacy – especially the partitioning of Africa into artificial territories with no respect for indigenous groups or customary boundaries. But the postcolonial era also has a history of lost opportunities caused by competing political, social and economic ideologies and corruption. Since the 1960s, Africa has had more civil wars, coups and periods of military and despot rule than any other regions of the world.

Attempts have been made to modernise and develop solid economic structures, but many have failed to meet expectations, such as the East African Community between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, which collapsed in 1977. The building of industrial estates at Tema (Ghana), Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) (see Photo 4.2), and Warri (Nigeria) was slow to materialise. The policy of Ujamaa in Tanzania – cooperative economics based on the cooperation of local people in towns and villages to provide the essentials of living, to build and maintain stores, shops, and other businesses and profit from them together – was a failure. Northern African countries have fared much better, with significant manufacturing investment and growing industrialisation in Morocco, Algeria and Egypt.

PHOTO 4.2
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe: An industrial secondary city hub of Africa

© Source: Shutterstock stock photo ID: 1293879727.

Since the end of colonial rule, uncertainty, disruptive changes and corruption have undermined confidence and investment in developing the region's secondary cities. Most Africans long for stability and well-functioning social, economic, and governance systems. Instead, the uncertainty, loss of economic opportunity and insecurity have seen millions of Africans migrate to other regions and parts of the world (Adepoju et al., 2007; IOM, 2008, p. 38). This migration has drained African cities of the intellectual capital, competencies and skills needed to develop subnational regional cities. The enormous loss of human capital in urban management, especially engineering and planning, has been a significant factor in the failure to manage urbanisation in the postcolonial era (Rogerson, 1989). Many secondary cities in Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Cameroon do not have a qualified planner or engineer.

The colonial era left a legacy of economic and physical systems across Africa that has profoundly shaped urban and regional development (Nwaka, 2005). As indicated earlier, many African countries still have planning laws that are a legacy of colonial legislation. The 1947 UK Town Planning Act, for example, remains a legacy of planning laws and regulations in most former British colonies. French and Portuguese planning codes are embedded similarly in Francophone and Lusophone countries.

With the exceptions of South Africa, Kenya, Morocco and Nigeria, planning for urban and local economic development in Africa remains heavily centralised. Federal government structures have facilitated some competition for development between cities and subnational regions; however, the postcolonial era has generally seen a continued weakening of local government structures, competitiveness, and financial autonomy. This has placed Africa's secondary cities on the periphery in terms of their potential contribution to national development.

Despite their sporadic and poorly managed development, many secondary cities, except those in the Sahel, thrive and develop. They play important administrative roles and add value to mineral, agricultural and forestry production, tourism, satellite and university towns, transportation hubs, and gateway border towns. A few secondary cities have developed as new or expanded growth centres, namely, the new capital cities such as Lilongwe (Malawi), Dodoma City (Tanzania), Yamoussoukro (Côte d'Ivoire) and Abuja (Nigeria) – the latter of which is now the capital city and a metropolis.

For the most part, policies designed to encourage secondary city growth poles generally have not been adopted by African countries, primarily because governments do not have the resources to develop these; however, Kenya is planning a large technology growth pole – Konza Technopolis – and Egypt is planning more than 20 new cities, as discussed below (Al-Youm, 2018). The future development of new secondary cities in Africa will predominantly result from expanding fast-growing middle-sized cities and towns – especially around Lake Victoria in eastern Africa, the Nile Valley and the Nile Delta. Significant growth in secondary cities is also expected in western Africa along the Atlantic Coast and around the Mediterranean Sea's port cities.

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4.4 National Urban Development Policies

4.4.1 National Urban Policy

As discussed in chapter 3, African secondary cities' development has been hampered by national urban policies that focus primarily on the development of metropolitan regions and primate cities (Kriticos, 2019). Only a few African cities have updated spatial or land-use plans or enforced the provisions of these. Most plans are unrealistic in terms of the financial and human resources needed for implementation. Many secondary cities do not have qualified planners, engineers or building inspectors. Secondary cities lack essential services such as energy, water, roads and communications networks, and their installation is at a much slower rate than the growth of urbanisation (Monica, 2020).

It has been pointed out in Chapter 3 that the urban development bias for primate cities runs throughout Africa. Nairobi's domination within Kenya's system of cities has had very negative consequences for secondary city development (Otiso, 2005). South Africa's National Development Plan of 2011 noted that a principal focus of urban development was towards the country's largest cities – in contrast to the stagnation of small rural towns (South African Government, 2011). Kigali, Rwanda's capital, accounts for 50% of the country's urban population and has received the most investment in urban development; however, this will change with the recent decentralisation plans. Similar concerns are expressed about the over-concentration of urban development in Accra and Kumasi in Ghana (Yankson et al., 2017) and Kampala City in Uganda (Sladoje et al., 2019).

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) research found that for African primary and secondary cities to realise their potential as 'engines of growth', they must address policy issues related to:

- The evolution of political and institutional platforms to enable cities to support equitable growth.
- Effective partnerships between locally elected officials and their constituencies.
- Adequate technical skills and organisational capacity to manage urban development systems effectively and efficiently.
- Getting the basics right to support growth.
- Management of the impacts of climate change.
- Integrating systems of cities through the cluster of cities and trade corridors (JICA Research Institute, 2013).

4.4.2 Implementation of National Urban Policies

For a long time after independence, many African governments viewed rural development and industrialisation – not urbanisation – as the pathway to national development. However, most African governments now recognise that cities are central to creating future jobs and industries. City development management must be supported more strongly by national and reformed local governments to fulfil this role. National urbanisation policies and plans, incorporating roles and responsibilities for secondary city development, are an excellent way to support a more robust, dynamic, vibrant national system of cities. Without these, African countries are likely to face significant challenges in managing urbanisation, and primacy levels are likely to increase. Ensuring an appropriate balance of power and responsibility between government levels (Cartwright, 2019) in developing and implementing national strategies and policies to manage urbanisation and urban development is a lesson learned from the management of urbanisation in other regions of the world.

Less than 20 African countries have or are developing national urbanisation policies, strategies, or plans, despite their critical role in properly managing urbanisation and development resulting from migration and the co-dependencies between cities and countries (Cartwright, 2019). Policies designed to slow down migration and urbanisation and create jobs in rural communities have failed. Urbanisation is an integral part of Africa's development – just as it has been for all other regions of the world.

Unlike many African countries that have done little to implement national urban policy reform since independence, South Africa has one of the most comprehensive national urbanisation policies in Africa, which was developed in the wake of Apartheid. Its policies for secondary cities are embedded in the urbanisation policies of the 1996 Constitution. Although the policies have tended to work well, they are not, however, without their problems (Marais & Cloete, 2017).

4.4.2.1 Weak Institutional Enabling Environments

City Alliance's *Assessing the Institutional Environment of Local Governments in Africa* (Cities Alliance & UCLGA, 2018) argues that for African cities to be effective implementers of urban development policies, they must operate within a robust legal framework with explicit, unambiguously stated roles within the national urbanisation policy, with mandates and subsidiary responsibilities. In 2013 and 2015, two surveys were conducted of the institutional environment for city action of over 50 African cities. The criteria used to assess whether the institutional environment is favourable to cities and subnational governments included:

- Constitutional and legislative frameworks.
- Local governance; financial transfers from central to local governments; local authority own resources; capacity building for local governments; transparency in the operation and management of local governments; citizen participation.
- Local government performance; the existence or lack of a national strategy for urban management.

Table 4.1 shows the summarised results of the study for the three periods, 2012, 2015 and 2018. Just a few countries had a favourable institutional environment and policies for urban development. Many countries required significant institutional environment improvements, and 26 out of the 50 countries achieved minimal improvement. Secondary cities often perform poorer in environmental and urban policy implementation than do metropolitan regions.

TABLE 4.1 | National institutional environment for cities

Colour Classification	Number of African countries		
	2012	2015	2018
Green Countries with the most favourable environments for the action of cities and local authorities in accordance with standards adopted.	3 out of 49	4 out of 50	4 out of 50
Yellow Countries whose environment is relatively favourable to the action of cities and local authorities but where improvements are needed.	4 out of 49	9 out of 50	12 out of 50
Orange Countries that require significant reform efforts to move towards an environment that is favourable to cities and local authorities.	25 out of 49	17 out of 50	13 out of 50
Red Countries whose environment is generally unfavourable to the action of cities to local authorities.	17 out of 49	17 out of 50	13 out of 50

Source: Cities Alliance & UCLG Africa (2018).

4.4.3 Decentralisation

A report on the pre-2010 Devolution Constitution indicated that development policies and approaches had not helped Kenya's development of its secondary cities – due to flawed rural development and centralist government policies favouring city primacy (Otiso, 2005). After a decade of regional devolution, Nairobi's primacy has not been dented.

A UN-Habitat study (UN-Habitat, 2008) of national urbanisation policies noted that the Ethiopian government understood and accepted arguments for a more decentralised national urbanisation policy. Ethiopia approved a policy framework in 2005, and Ethiopia's intermediate (secondary) cities now appear to be in a better position to foster and leverage the country's rural transformation (see Chapter 8, on Ethiopia).

Rwanda's national policy, linked to Rwanda's Vision 2020, recognises urbanisation as a 'positive tool' for development. The policy is for the country to exit from being a low-income country, with urbanisation as its driver for economic growth. The Rwanda National Urbanisation Policy recognises the importance of secondary cities (Republic of Rwanda, 2015).

The Nigerian government initiated the National Urban Development Policies in the 1990s. However, in 2012 the federal government reported:

> "Successive governments in Nigeria have shown little concern for solving urban problems… even though Nigeria adopted a robust Urban Development Policy and enacted a comprehensive Urban and Regional Planning Act, both in 1992, there has been generally little achievement to show in terms of their implementation. Today, the general apathy towards urban planning persists in the country" (the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2012, p.4; UN Habitat, 2014).

The general failure of Nigeria's national urbanisation policy and the federal government's lack of active involvement has created significant regional development imbalances (Okeke, 2014). However, the planning and building of Abuja, Nigeria's new federal capital, illustrates that Nigeria's cities could be different if there were commitment. There is no reference to secondary cities in Nigeria's urban development policies.

The UN-Habitat (2014) study of Morocco, Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Mali presents a mixed picture of different types of policies that may be considered as national urbanisation policies. However, most African countries do not have explicit national urbanisation policy policies focused on secondary and medium-sized cities. The problem within national urbanisation policies and plans is the lack of a systems approach to cities' development and management.

A more integrated approach is required to national urban policy, planning and development, incorporating the need for secondary cities to play a more decisive role as intermediaries in enhancing connectivity, resources, information, data and knowledge sharing between cities, and identifying opportunities for efficiency gains, value-adding, reducing logistics and energy costs within national systems of cities.

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The problem within national urbanisation policies and plans is the lack of a systems approach to cities' development and management.

Decentralisation and devolution policies embraced so enthusiastically in the 1990s have not worked, and central governments are taking back more control – especially over budgets, grants and transfers. The control by national governments on local governments remain strong. This situation has worsened as the result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Cities Alliance (2016) study of secondary cities in Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda and Mozambique highlighted the problems with decentralisation policies and central government control of devolution processes: the devolution of powers not commensurate with the implementation abilities of secondary cities, government determination of secondary city budgets, fragmented institutions and powers, and partial political authority.

4.5 Secondary Cities Urban Development Policies

Several countries in Africa have introduced incentives and policies specifically for secondary and intermediate cities. Rwanda (Government of Rwanda and GGGI, 2015), Kenya (Otiso, 2005), Morocco (Mebtoul, 2020), Egypt (Nisreen, 2014), Uganda (Cities Alliance, 2016), Ethiopia (OECD (2020) and Senegal (GGGI, 2018) are leaders, in this relatively recent policy direction. However, the development and management of secondary cities are not priority urban agenda matters for most African countries.

Some countries have used research and advanced technology applications involving geographic information system (GIS) and scenario testing to develop policies, guidelines and development plans for secondary cities. The use of technology in planning secondary cities and towns in Africa is an innovative new planning step. Rwanda not only has a well-considered future through its Vision 2020 (Republic of Rwanda, 2000) and Vision 2050 (Republic of Rwanda, 2015) has become a leader in this field by applying land and information technology to plan and develop six niche secondary cities through a National Roadmap for Green Secondary Cities (Government of Rwanda and GGGI, 2015; Ntirenganya, 2016) (See Box 4.1 and Figure 4.4, for a brief summary).

BOX 4.1 | Rwanda Networked Cities

Rwanda suffered devastation as the result of genocide and civil war in the early 1990s. The Rwanda Vision 2020 (Government of Rwanda, 2000), launched in 2000, set out an ambitious medium-term goal of transforming the country from an agrarian to a knowledge-based economy. Vision 2020 provides a roadmap for Rwanda which supports urbanisation, promotes regional economic integration and cooperation, actively encourages science and technology, education and ICT skills, and addresses the fact that the country is landlocked. Rwanda has developed several progressive initiatives, such as flagship programs to support private-sector development in the skills, employability and entrepreneurship program (SEEP). It has prioritised ICT as an enabler of its socio-economic development through the five-year (2013-17) national strategy on ICT development, called 'Smart Rwanda'. It has also taken the lead in Africa in a broadband network. These initiatives are moving the country towards Vision 2020, and they strongly relate to improved connectivity between cities.

Rwanda is embarking on an ambitious task of developing a network of six green secondary cities. Two key priorities are integrated development planning and management and secondary cities' development as growth poles. Another priority is the focus on green urbanisation and innovation (Figure 4.4 Priority areas for economic transition - Rwanda). In May 2016, the Government of Rwanda, in partnership with the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), launched the National Roadmap for Green Secondary Cities Development in Rwanda (GGGI, 2016). The roadmap supports Rwanda's Green Growth and Climate Resilient Strategy and serves as an implementation tool for its economic development and poverty reduction strategy (EDPRS2). A vital element of the green cities agenda is the focus on connectivity around five priority economic transformation areas for rapid growth.

LANDSAT have developed a spatially explicit logistics regression model for Kampala to test city growth scenarios with alternative policy options on future urban-sprawl patterns and quality of life (Vermeiren et al., 2012). In South Africa, studies have presented substantial policy arguments that secondary cities can play a unique role as catalysts for developing their rural hinterlands, alleviating primary city demographic pressure, and more (South African Cities Network, 2012). The study aimed to increase South Africa's understanding of its secondary cities' roles in and contributions to the national space economy

The most proactive national policy to counter the primacy of its cities is Egypt's New Urban Communities Programme (Ellahham, 2014). Some 24 planned new cities are at various stages of construction. Many challenges have arisen concerning Egypt's approach to building these new secondary cities, however (Salem, 2017).

FIGURE 4.4 | Priority areas for economic transition - Rwanda

Source: Jeong (2014)

Uganda's case for secondary cities presents a less clear policy intent. In 2016, Cities Alliance and Arup indicated that Uganda's Vision 2040 had identified "five regional and five strategic cities which are intended to attract investment away from the capital, providing general services to a large catchment area (regional) or a functional speciality for national economic development (strategic)" (Cities Alliance, 2016, p.12). The document refers to Uganda's secondary cities as "municipalities within current government administrative structures". Regional cities are referred to as "urban centres that provide general services to a large catchment area". Strategic cities have a functional speciality for national economic importance, including oil, industry, tourism, and mining. The document indicates some inconsistency, as the capital Kampala is included among the five regional cities when it is, in fact, a primate city.

Ethiopia has a vision for developing intermediate (secondary) cities, which offer rural Ethiopia urban market centres for provision and trade of goods and services, employment opportunities, destinations for rural migrants, and financial flows through local and international remittances of land prices adjacent to towns (see Chapter 8, on Ethiopia). Ethiopia's intermediate cities provide the scope for facilitating rural-urban transformations through the functions identified above. The cities serve as market centres for agricultural goods and encourage value-adding to rural food and crop production, but the linkages need to be strengthened. Intermediate cities provide possibilities for strong employment creation (OECD Library, 2020).

4.6 A legacy of Lost Urban Policy Opportunity

Africa's secondary cities support substantial numbers of people living in rural and regional areas. Trade, commerce, and government services have historically been the primary drivers of economic development, high migration and natural population growth. Except for natural resources extraction industries, such as oil and petroleum, industrialisation has not played a significant role in driving Africa's secondary city development. South Africa and some northern African countries are the only states with substantial and growing manufacturing industries located in their secondary cities. The critical driver of employment and economic development in secondary cities is the growth of services – especially government, health, education and transport (see discussion in Chapter 3).

Colonialism laid the foundations of urbanisation and economic development in Africa, following similar patterns in Asia, South America and Europe at the beginning of their respective industrial revolutions. However, neglect of urban planning and policy, on the whole, has brought about the loss of significant opportunities for secondary cities to play a stronger role in the development of African nations. Some African countries have sought to industrialise and take advantage of cheaper labour, tax incentives, and proximity to European markets, but they are not industrialising as rapidly as Asia, and industrialisation is not occurring in secondary cities.

Large primate cities in Africa will continue to attract more skilled migrants from regional towns and cities and proportionate investment capital. Many secondary cities will grow rapidly, and they likely will benefit from spinoff flow from hinterland trade (Adepoju et al., 2007). But the rapid urbanisation in secondary cities will also give rise to the scale of problems experienced by large metropolitan cities. Catching up will be a significant challenge and will require a substantial shift in policies to avoid situations where one or two cities dominate an entire nation's economy.

Secondary /intermediary cities are not on most national urbanisation or regional economic development policy agendas in African countries. Urban policy development is still largely conducted in metropolitan regions because these have a political voice and because the magnitude of environmental and social problems they face is severe. The most recent United Nations World Cities Report made 17 references to metropolitan areas compared with 4 for secondary cities (UN-Habitat. (2020). The New Urban Agenda mentions 'metropolitan' 10 times, with no mention of secondary cities and a single mention of intermediate cities (UN-Habitat, 2016). The imbalance of focus on large metropolitan regions needs to be rectified, especially in African countries where the severity of urbanisation problems in secondary cities is growing rapidly. With secondary cities of 300,000 to 1 million people predicted to experience very high growth shares, the need for a policy agenda for them is important.

For secondary cities in Africa to realise their development potential, a new policy agenda and strategic directions in national and regional planning, as well as economic development policies are needed. This need calls for a deeper understanding of what is happening physically, socially, economically and environmentally in the development of secondary cities and why they are not performing well (Cohen, 2019). Only through such an understanding can appropriate urban frameworks and strategies be developed and implemented to enable secondary cities to play a much stronger role in developing both national economies and the regions in which they are located.

"

Colonialism laid the foundations of urbanisation and economic development in Africa, following similar patterns in Asia, South America and Europe at the beginning of their respective industrial revolutions.

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5

POPULATION, DEMOGRAPHY, MIGRATION

BRIAN H ROBERTS,
LUC CHRISTIAENSEN,
GODFREY O ANYUMBA

> Africa has been urbanising fast over the past few decades, and much of the world's urbanisation over the coming decades will happen in Africa and Asia. They are the last continents with below 50% urbanisation. Africa's rapid urbanisation comes along with high overall population growth (the highest in the world). Sixty (60%) of the continent's population is under the age of 25. The United Nations estimated, in 2015, 226 million young people aged 15-24 lived in Africa, representing 20% of the continent's population and one-fifth of the world's youth population.

This chapter reviews the drivers of Africa's secondary cities development, including trends and demography within the broader context of Africa's rapid urbanisation. It focuses on migration patterns to large, medium, and small urban areas, internally displaced persons, and the economic impacts of migration using a case study of Kakuma, Kenya. The impact of forced migration involving refugees and internally displaced people significantly impacts the development of secondary cities, especially in those located close to international borders. The final section of the chapter presents a series of policy agendas for improved population management related to migration and urbanisation concerning secondary cities.

PHOTO 5.1
Africa's growing urban population

© Source: UNSOM Somalia 2017.

5.1 Urban Population Growth and Trends

Africa's cities are youthful, with more than 66% of urban dwellers below the age of 30 (UN DESA, 2015. Many cities have become large and are growing rapidly, especially the megacities of Lagos in Nigeria and Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Estimates for Kinshasa's population growth predict the city will grow from 17 million in 2021 to 35 million by 2050. The population of many of the secondary cities is also rising rapidly due to economic and forced migration, as well as internal population growth and reclassification. The effect of rapid urbanisation has resulted in many changes to urban landscapes. Existing cities have grown, and many new urban centres have emerged through urban natural population growth, migration, and the merger and absorption of rural villages into existing urban agglomerations or their reclassification as new urban centres. This has resulted in diverse spatial settlement patterns, further affected by environmental characteristics such as terrain, soils, climate, and land use (Prieto Curiel, 2020). Together they determine the rate of urban growth and the size and form of built-up areas.

The widely differing forces of urban expansion and the political and administrative reasons to distinguish 'urban' from 'rural' have made it so that a common globally accepted definition of 'urban' does not exist (OECD/SWAC, 2020a; Dijkstra et al., 2018). This has complicated spatial demographic comparisons between countries.[1] Two widely used data sources for analysing urbanisation patterns across countries in Africa are the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) project, *World Urbanisation Prospects* (UN DESA, 2018), and Africapolis, a project of the OECD-supported Sahel and West Africa Club (OECD/SWAC, 2020a).[2]

The United Nations uses definitions of 'urban' as applied by national statistical offices relying on census and administrative boundaries.[3] It also uses various methods to interpolate data over time to estimate urban population and city size when census data is unavailable. These urbanisation data have the advantage of being officially recognized. On the downside, they are not strictly comparable across countries and only provide a breakdown of urban data by city with populations above 300,000.

Africapolis uses GIS to identify spatial concentrations of greater than 10,000 people with a continuously built environment of less than 200 m between buildings.[4] This recognizes patterns of connectivity and distance that operate as urban agglomerations[5] It also enables a breakdown by city size of below 300,000 people.

This section reviews the evolution of the distribution of Africa's urban population by city size and prospects for the future, drawing on the UN DESA urbanisation data and Africapolis. In this chapter, secondary cities with population agglomerations of between 100,000 to 1 million are used for analysis. A few secondary cities in Africa, such as Mombasa (Kenya) and Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth, in South Africa), are larger than 1 million and essentially function as secondary cities.

> ## *The effect of rapid urbanisation has resulted in many changes to urban landscapes.*

5.1.1 Urban Agglomerations

According to the UN World Urbanisation Prospects (UN DESA, 2018), Africa's urban population is projected to pass the 50% threshold in 2035 (Figure 5.1). Africapolis data suggests that Africa may already be more than 50% urbanised (OECD/SWAC, 2020a). Based on data from 50 African countries, the population of urban areas in 2015 was 567 million, compared to 491.53 million estimated by the UN DESA (2018). The difference is explained by the way urban areas are defined. However, regardless of how urban agglomerations are defined, by 2050, Africa's cities are predicted to be home to an additional 900 million people.

FIGURE 5.1 | Urban and rural population sub-Saharan Africa 1950-2050 (estimated)

Source: UN DESA (2018).

Looking at the distribution of the urban population across cities, known as the urban hierarchy, the proportion of urban people living in large, and megacities (>5 million inhabitants), was 14.7% in 2020 (UN DESA, 2020; Figure 5.2). When taking 1 million as the threshold, a little bit more than one-third of the urban population (36.7%) is living in cities of 1 million inhabitants or above.

FIGURE 5.2 | Distribution of African urban population by city size, 2020 (UN DESA, 2020)

Source: UN DESA (2020)

Africapolis has similarly identified 74 urban agglomerations of built-up urban areas within Africa, with more than 1 million inhabitants, housing 40% of its estimated urban population in 2015. About one-third of these 74 urban agglomerations of more than 1 million are in three countries alone: Nigeria (12), Egypt (7), and Kenya (5). The small variations in the percentage of population shown for city size between UN DESA (2018) and Africapolis are explained by data collection and coverage methods. UN DESA uses administrative boundaries, Africapolis uses urban footprint.

FIGURE 5.3 | Distribution of African urban population by city size, 2015 (Africapolis)

Source: Africapolis Database, OECD/SWAC (2020a).

There are six supra-agglomerations in different parts of the continent (Figure 5.4). Some agglomerations are well-established metropolises and primate cities. Others are fast-growing, dispersed polycentric, and economically, and spatially clustered integrated urban-centric concentrations of smaller towns and cities, which have developed around expanding secondary city provincial capital cities. Kisumu, Kenya, (population 380,000) is the centre of a large polycentric agglomeration of smaller cities and towns, with a metropolitan region population of over 3 million people, covering an area of approximately 2,500 km² with a population density of 1,200 ppkm².[6] This population is within a radius of 28 km or a little over 45 minutes of Kisumu city centre commuting time.

As Africapolis notes: "One of the main drivers of urban growth in Africa is the expansion of built-up areas, leading to absorption and merging with urban agglomerations and smaller settlements. Environmental characteristics, such as relief and land-use, impact urban forms and the size of built-up areas" (OECD/SWAC, 2020b). This urban agglomeration pattern of clustered urban development in Africa is not dissimilar to the concept of 'agripolis', first identified in Asia during the late 1970s (Friedmann & Douglass, 1978). It highlights the importance of reclassification (or in situ urbanisation) as a driver of urban growth, in addition to natural population growth and migration.

Of the total urban agglomerations identified by Africapolis in Africa, over 630 (about 8%) are secondary cities between 100,000 and 1 million inhabitants. Together, they house 28% of the urban population. The urban population share of secondary cities varies significantly between countries, from less than 10% in countries like Burundi and Mauritania to more than 60% in countries like Gabon, Gambia, and Eswatini. The urban population share is around one-third in Tanzania, Senegal and Tunisia, and one-sixth in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali. Overall, Africapolis classifies a more significant percentage of Africa's population as 'urban' and a greater share of its urban population in larger urban centres.

FIGURE 5-4 | Urban agglomerations in Africa

Source: Africapolis (2018).

5.1.2 Urban Expansion

Annualized population growth rates for African cities calculated from UN DESA data have remained high, at over 3.7% since 1990, but rates continue to fall. The growth rate of urban areas varies significantly between regions and city size (Table 5.1). At more than 4.5%, eastern, middle, and western Africa cities have the highest expected average annual population growth rates. Southern and northern Africa population growth rates for cities are much lower, reflecting the already high levels of urbanisation within the countries in these two regions.

TABLE 5.1 | Average annual change (%) in population by city size of Africa (1990–2020) UN DESA

City size	Africa	Central	Eastern	Northern	Southern	Western
<0.3	4.0	4.4	6.8	2.6	1.8	6.0
300,000 to 500,000	3.2	3.6	3.4	1.5	4.6	3.7
500,000 to 1 million	3.2	4.7	3.3	2.3	2.5	3.2
1 to 5 million	3.3	4.6	3.8	1.7	2.7	1.3
5 to 10 million	3.7	4.6	4.0	1.8	3.8	3.1
>10 million	3.4	2.1		2.5		3.7
† Average annual growth rate (%)	3.7	4.5	4.5	2.3	2.5	4.3

Source: UN DESA (2020) Derived Population in Cities Classified by Size Class of Urban Settlement, Region, Subregion, Country, and Area, 1950-2035 (thousands) † AAGR estimates derived from the historical population for cities reaching population threshold level in 2020.

Population growth rates using UN DESA data show that cities in Africa with between 5 and 10 million inhabitants are growing at an average of 3.7%, but there are significant variations between regions. Smaller cities in central and western Africa are growing fast, at 4% or more. Recent studies confirm that some of the biggest increases in urban population occur in small- and medium-sized urban agglomerations in mid-latitudinal Africa (Guneralp et al., 2017). Secondary cities between 300,000 and 1 million are growing slower, at 3.2%. However, smaller secondary cities, regional cities, and towns in eastern, southern, and western Africa with low urbanisation levels also have high population growth rates. The rates of population growth by city size vary between countries within regions. There is significant variation in the growth of cities within countries.

Africapolis data shows even higher growth rates for African cities (4.8% on average) (Table 5.2). Cities in the 0.1 – 0.3 million band are, on average, again growing fastest (at 4.5%), but compared with the results from UN DESA, the patterns differ across sub-region. The Africapolis numbers further point to fast growth of secondary cities and towns in East Africa. As indicated earlier, UN DESA population data does not necessarily capture spill-over urban populations outside administrative boundaries of cities, which are functionally part of the urban agglomeration (OECD/SWAC, 2020a). This explains the lower (and different) growth rates compared to Africapolis.

TABLE 5.2 | Average annual change (%) in population by city size of Africa (1990-2020) AFRICAPOLIS*

Africa	Africa	Central	Eastern	Northern	Southern	Western
10,000 to 50,000	3.5	5.2	2.9	1.2	4.3	3.4
50,000 to 100,000	4.1	3.6	4.1	2.6	3.5	3.8
100,000 to 300,000	4.5	5.2	7.4	5.1	3.3	3.5
300,000 to 500,000	4.1	3.0	4.9	1.7	5.1	3.5
500,000 to 1 million	4.0	3.1	8.1	6.1	5.9	2.2
5 to 10 million	4.3	3.6	5.2	3.3	2.6	5.4
10 million-plus				2.4		
AA % Change	4.6	5.0	6.5	3.8	4.0	4.5

Source: Africapolis (2020) * Estimates derived from Africapolis was adjusted to align with UN DESA country region classification

Finally, neither UN DESA nor Africapolis capture day and night population data. With increasing levels of daily commuting from peri-urban areas into cities, more reliable estimates of the day and night-time population are required to plan for infrastructure and urban services.

5.1.3 Projections

Current rates of population growth for cities in Africa are falling, but the patterns differ depending on the rates of urbanisation and migration. Figure 5.5 shows Africapolis urban agglomeration spatial projection to 2030. The projection shows significant urban population growth occurring in corridors, especially in western, eastern, and northern Africa. Significant shifts and changes in cities' spatial patterns and structures across the regions are expected over the next few decades (OECD/SWAC, 2020a). A report from UNICEF and UN-Habitat (2020, p. 19) notes:

> "Urban growth projections show that secondary cities in SSA will continue to grow in terms of population and urban area. Intense growth is expected in East Africa, especially around Lake Victoria towards Nairobi, central Uganda, Rwanda, and the northern United Republic of Tanzania" (Figure 5.5).

"Accelerated urbanisation is also expected in West Africa on urban areas along the Atlantic coast, stretching from Port Harcourt in Nigeria through Porto Norvo (Benin), Lomé (Togo), and Accra to Abidjan (Ivory Coast). Secondary cities along this western coastal stretch from Dakar (Senegal) to Conakry (Guinea) are expected to grow into primary cities, increasing from less than 1 million to 5 million between 1990 and 2030" (UNICEF and UN-Habitat, 2020, p. 19).

Urbanisation is expected to accelerate in East Africa around the Great Lakes Region. Population growth rates remain high, especially in Uganda (Government of Uganda-NPC, 2020). Population growth rates are around 3%, and almost half (47.9% of Uganda's population) is below 15 years.

"In southern Africa, the fastest-growing towns are in Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique. South Africa's cities are experiencing growth but not as much as the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa" (UNICEF and UN-Habitat, 2020, p. 19).

FIGURE 5.5 | Urban agglomeration spatial projection to 2030

Source: Africapolis (2018).

In northern Africa, the population is concentrated generally within 50 km of the coastline in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and along the Nile Valley. Migration to coastal areas is expected to continue as climate change affects many fertile inland areas, causing them to receive less rainfall and experience higher temperatures (Meddi & Eslamian, 2021).

5.2 Demography of Secondary Cities

The UN Urbanisation Prospects (UN DESA, 2018) and UNFPA (2021) reporting provide good macro-information on national demographic change for Africa. However, systematic demographic information on African secondary cities is generally poor or survey data is produced at an aggregate level (Henderson et al., 2019). Most countries produce subnational statistical reports based on census and household survey data on demographic change. This comprises reports prepared by statistical offices on subnational regions. Occasionally, metropolitan regions and secondary city reports are produced. There are some good studies on metropolitan regions in Ghana and a few in-depth demographic investigations of secondary cities, such as the one produced for Tamale (Ghana Statistical Service-GSS, 2014).[7]

5.2.1 Country, Primate, and Secondary City Population Pyramids

Population pyramids provide insights into future changes in the demographic structure of countries and cities. The changes in age-cohorts can have implications on future land use, social and economic and development demands for public goods and services. A pyramid with a very narrow base of under 15-year-olds may signal a long-term decline and an ageing population. This will have consequences for long-term planning needs and infrastructure and social services operational costs at both national and local levels. The following shows differences in population cohort pyramids at country, primate, and secondary cities levels within Africa and two countries: Kenya and Egypt.

National Population Pyramid

Overall, Africa's population is young. The median age of the population is 19.7 years, compared to a global median of 29.6. Niger, at 14.9, has the youngest population cohort globally; Tunisia is the oldest at 32.7 (Figure 5.6). The population pyramids show some small variations of the age and sex of a population due to migration and health factors.

FIGURE 5.6 | Population pyramid Africa, Niger, and Tunisia

Africa 2020 | Population: 1,340,598,113

Niger 2020 | Population: 24,206,636

Tunisia 2020 | Population: 11,818,617

Source: UN DESA 2020.

There are significant differences in the population cohort structure between rural and urban areas within countries. These are illustrated clearly in the population pyramids for urban and rural areas in Kenya, where the national median age is 20.1 years (Figure 5.7). Kenya's rural area population pyramid depicts a wide base in the level of the population aged below 15 years, arising from high fertility rates. The population pyramid for urban areas indicates that most of the population is concentrated between ages 20 and 34 among both sexes. Individuals in this cohort are all working age, many migrants from rural areas, and towns and cities from within the country (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2020).

FIGURE 5.7 | Kenya, population pyramid (2020)

Kenya 2019 | Population: 52,573,967

Urban Population Pyramid Kenya

Rural Population Pyramid Kenya

Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census Reports (2019, p. 12); Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2020).

Primate City Pyramid

The Cairo, Egypt, population pyramid is typical of older African primate cities (Figure 5.8). First, the Cairo pyramid varies significantly from the national one in the working-age groups, which migrants boost. The population cohort for 0–14-year-olds is lower, compared to the national population. There is a gender distortion in the balanced population of the working age. Women are more represented than men in the 20–29 age group. However, there is not a high level of engagement of migrant women in the workplace. They tend to migrate for marriage reasons, be less educated, and take care of children and do domestic work. In other African primate cities, women's participation in the workforce is higher.

FIGURE 5.8 | Population pyramid for Cairo, Egypt

Population Pyramid (Cairo, Egypt)

Egypt 2017 | Population: 92,442,590

Source: Weebly, Creative Commons 2017

Egypt is 43% urbanised. Birth rates are high, at 3.3 births per woman. The urban population will continue to rise and bring about even greater demand for land and housing development and housing – especially in Cairo. To reduce pressure on Cairo, Egypt's New Cities Programme aims to build over 35 satellite towns that are, essentially, secondary cities away from areas of population concentration (Barrada, 2004; Kenawy, 2017).

Secondary City Population Pyramid

Data that would enable a more detailed analysis of the structure and dynamics of the population of the secondary cities in most African countries is difficult to secure. Even when available, it is often difficult to obtain. Many large secondary cities have significant spill overs of the population into the surrounding (peri-urban) area of mainly rural local government. These extended urban areas remain classified as rural in census records. Many migrants live in peri-urban areas and depend on the secondary city for employment and other basic needs.

Some African countries such as Morocco, Kenya, Ghana and South Africa have good census data to map and analyse the demographics of secondary cities. Others have census data that could be utilized effectively, if available, in digital format to provide better information on the cohort structure and change in secondary city populations, including migrant mix. This information would enable better social development plans to be prepared and services provided for secondary cities (Christiaensen & Lozano-Gracia, 2021).

Figure 5.9 shows the population pyramid for the secondary cities of Grahamstown (now Makhanda) and Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality, Eastern Cape South Africa [Gqeberha] (Roddy, 2012). Grahamstown shows a typical pyramid profile of a small struggling secondary city in Africa. Grahamstown has a population of 70,000. It is a university town, renowned art and cultural centre, and a regional market centre. The cohort of the under 15-years age group, especially 0–4 years, is small. This may be an outcome of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, consistent with the low number of females in the 30–34 age group. This reflects the significant decline in the fertility rate in South Africa between 1988 and 2000 of almost 50%. There are comparatively large numbers of 20–24-year-olds -who are at Rhodes University. This is not uncommon in smaller secondary cities with a university or boarding high schools (as observed in Cape Coast in Ghana). The most significant factor is a very rapid tapering off to the 26–49 age cohorts. This is due to the working-age population migrating to other parts of South Africa, including former students searching for employment after completing their studies.

Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality (NMBM, 2020) shows the differences that often occur in the pyramid profile for a large secondary city. This municipality is attracting many migrants from rural-urban and intra-urban migration in search of employment (see the case study in Chapter 13). The population profile of 0–14-year-olds follows the national cohort, while the working-age (16–39-year-olds) population is larger than the national average, due to migration. The graph also shows that Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality secondary cities are a significant attraction for retirees (aged 70 years and over) — especially women and widows. This is the case with secondary coastal cities in South Africa and northern Africa.

FIGURE 5.9 | Pyramid of secondary city: Grahamstown (now Makhanda), Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality

Source: Statistics South Africa (2012)

5.2.2 Demographic Profiles of African Countries, Primate Cities, and Secondary Cities

Table 5.3 shows a range of indicators that provide a demographic profile of African countries, primate, and secondary cities.

TABLE 5.3 | Demographic profile of African countries, primate cities, and secondary cities

	Countries	Primate Cities	Secondary Cities
Eastern Africa	Kenya (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2020)	Nairobi (2019)	Mombasa (2019)
Population	47,564,296	4,397,073	866,820
Annual population growth rate (2015–2020) (%)	+2.3	+3.96	+3.47
Total Fertility Rate – live birth per woman	3.5 children	2.7 children	3.2 children
Urban population (%)	27.3	NA	NA
Population density people per km²	82	6,247	5,495
Life Expectancy (years)	66.4	57	
Infant Mortality (infant deaths/ 1,000 live births)	30.6	95.0	

	Countries	Primate Cities	Secondary Cities
Southern Africa	South Africa	Cape Town	Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth)
Population	59,308,690	3,433,441	967,677
Annual population growth rate (2015-2020) (%)	1.28	1.68	0.98
Total Fertility Rate – live birth per woman	2.4	2.8	2.3
Urban population (%)	66.3	NA	NA
Population density per km²	48	1,700	
Life Expectancy (years)	63.78	64.0	56.4
Infant Mortality (infant deaths/ 1,000 live births)	23.6 per		
Central Africa	Angola	Luanda	N'dalatando
Population	32,866,272	2,776,168	383,100
Annual population growth rate (2015-2020) (%)	3.27	3.63	
Total Fertility Rate – live birth per woman	5.6	7.5	
Urban population (%)	66.1	NA	NA
Population density per km²	26	4,400	
Life Expectancy (years)	62.3	61	
Infant Mortality (infant deaths/1,000 live births)	53.4	Worse in poorer communities	Worse in poorer communities
Western Africa	Nigeria	Lagos	Kano
Population	206,139,589	14,368,000	4,103,000
Annual population growth rate (2015-2020) (%)	2.58	3.3	2.6
Total Fertility Rate – live birth per woman	5.4	5.3	6.8
Urban population (%)	51.2	NA	NA
Population density per km²	215	6,872	550.8
Life Expectancy (years)	55.8	54.5	52
Infant Mortality (infant deaths/1,000 live births)	54.7	74.2	20.5
Northern Africa	Algeria	Algiers	Boumerdas
Population	43,851,044	2,768,000	786,499
Annual population growth rate (2015-2020) (%)	1.85	1.48	
Total Fertility Rate – live birth per woman	2.89	2.9	5.6
Urban population (%)	72.6	NA	NA
Population density per km²	18		592
Life Expectancy (years)	77.5		
Infant Mortality (infant deaths/1,000 live births)	18.4		

Sources: Various United Nations data sets and national statistics office data.

The indicators show several demographic differences between primate and secondary cities. In general, secondary cities tend to have urban population growth rates closer to the national average. Fertility rates tend to be higher than in primate cities, but migration rates are usually lower.

5.2.3 Gender Regional Differences in African Cities

Male birth rates in Africa are slightly higher than female birth rates (1.038:1), but on average, women live longer. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019) estimates put the population of males at 679,230,901 and females at 679,196,279. Large primate cities tend to have a larger male cohort, particularly in the 20–45 age group. Countries with lower urbanisation tend to have fewer females living in cities than in rural areas; however, this varies substantially within Africa.

Overall, men are more engaged in the urban labour market than women and under better conditions. Men tend to be more employed than women; they work more hours and have significantly higher wages. Furthermore, across countries, male migrants are more likely to work than are male residents; although there is no systematic difference in the employment rates of female urban migrants and female residents (Christiaensen & Lozano-Garcia, 2021).

Most women are not highly skilled, and their jobs are mostly informal, low-paid, and part-time. This gender divide becomes wider in organizational management structures with low levels of female representation. Nevertheless, some companies actively seek female employees to improve the gender balance among their staff (University Rotterdam, 2018). Across Africa, gender inequality differs widely, with the gender employment participation gap also differing widely. However, the gap between male and female employment participation in cities tends to be lower.

> **"**
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> *Most women are not highly skilled, and their jobs are mostly informal, low-paid, and part-time. This gender divide becomes wider in organizational management structures with low levels of female representation.*

5.2.4 Household Structure and Size

The median household size in Africa is around 4.4 persons per household. Djibouti has the highest at 9.33, and Mauritius the lowest at 3.42. Household size continues to fall. In Kenya, the average household size fell from 5.3 persons per household in 1969 to 4.0 in 2014 (Statista, 2021). More than half of Africa's population lives in extended household structures. Average household size between urban and rural areas varies between countries. In South Africa, the average household size for urban areas is 4.75, compared to 6.09 in rural areas, with subnational variations ranging from 4.98 for Gauteng (Johannesburg) to 6.14 for Natal (Global Data Lab, 2020). In Algeria, the urban household size is 5.6 persons, compared to 5.86 in the rural areas. There is only a small variation between poor and non-poor households for urban and rural areas country. The household structure also varies. In South Africa, 40% of urban households are 2–3 persons, compared to 31.3% in rural areas. Six-person households are, respectively, 11.3% for urban and 20.6% for rural areas (Statista Data Base, 2021).

In more highly urbanised countries, with large secondary cities, household sizes can exceed the national average. In Nigeria, the national average urban household size is approximately 5.2. For secondary cities in the north of Nigeria, some such as Kaduna, have more than 6.3 persons. Cultural factors, migration rates, and wealth are significant factors that shape the regional differences in the size and composition of secondary city household structures. Countries or subnational regions are experiencing significant rates of urban-rural migration; secondary cities have a larger household size and dependency ratio than large cities. The housing construction rate tends to be slower in secondary cities because of higher construction costs and difficulties accessing finance. This partly explains the generally more inferior quality of housing in secondary cities compared to metropolitan regions (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020; Gollin et al., 2021).

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The median household size in Africa is around 4.4 persons per household. Djibouti has the highest at 9.33, and Mauritius the lowest at 3.42. Household size continues to fall.

5.2.5 Education

Education remains a significant challenge for all African countries. In Mali, more than 51.5% of 6–8-year-olds do not go to school and are not literate (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020). Despite doing well, less than 40% of girls in the same age cohort do not attend school, with attendance rates for girls in urban areas at only 62% — and falling. A study by UN-Habitat on Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa found that these cities are more deprived of education facilities, teaching, and access to technology than are primate cities. The future of employment is anchored in good quality education services. Many secondary cities, such as Cape Coast in Ghana, are important education centres that contribute significantly to the local economy. However, most secondary cities lack high-quality technical colleges or university campuses — a significant disadvantage in developing the human capital needed to grow local economies. The need to improve the development of education facilities, quality of education, and years of school attendance — especially for females — is crucial to improving the economic prospects, health, and welfare of people living in secondary cities.

The difficulty in attracting and retaining good teachers and trainers at secondary city schools and technical colleges is a challenge facing most African secondary cities. Most schools do not have sufficient qualified teachers and instructors. National expenditure on education remains low and lower per capita in secondary cities and rural areas. Overcoming skilled teacher shortages is critical to the development of secondary cities and regional areas. "About 6.3 million primary school teachers are needed: 2.4 million to fill new teaching posts to accommodate all children and 3.9 million to replace the teachers expected to leave the profession. At the secondary level, the region must recruit 10.8 million teachers by 2030, including 7.1 million for new teaching positions and 3.7 million to replace those who have left" (UNESCO, 2016, p. 2).

More E-education services are crucial to closing the gap on equitable access to education, skills development and learning opportunities between metropolitan regions, secondary cities, and rural areas. Currently, only 14% of households have access to the internet, and around 92% of learners in sub-Saharan Africa do not have access to a computer at home (UNESCO, 2020). Improving basic education standards remains one of the highest priorities for Africa in addressing poverty, economic development opportunities, and improving health and quality of life in secondary cities, rural and regional areas. E-education offers significant opportunities for secondary African cities, but needs substantial investment through national and international development programs across the continent.

5.2.6 Public Health (including mental health)

Secondary cities are undergoing significant transformations which impact the physical and mental health of residents. Health conditions across most secondary cities need significant improvement. Not much is known about secondary cities from an epidemiological perspective. Little data is available about the mental health and well-being of residents of secondary cities. However, many secondary cities in the Sahel have large numbers of refugees suffering trauma from the effects of conflict.

PHOTO 5.2
Public health education to prevent HIV/AIDS i
Education Outreach Centre in Angola

© Source: Wiki land.

Africa has an estimated 60% of the world's population living with HIV and accounts for 90% of all malaria infections. Significant efforts have been made to reduce and eliminate urban malaria and other water-borne diseases; however, contamination of coastal waterway areas is of increasing public health concern, with the continued dumping of waste and effluent into waterways. Secondary cities' water and sanitation indicators indicate that basic sanitation and public health services are significantly below metropolitan regions (see Chapter 2, State of African Secondary Cities).

The creation of healthier secondary cities is a significant challenge for African countries. Essential health services such as hospitals, clinics, and day surgery facilities are inadequate, as is the professional level of staffing, equipment, and technologies needed to run them. Many provide regional base-hospital and medical services for large rural and smaller towns where no medical emergency services are available. Organizations like Mission Aviation Fellowship provide essential services to secondary cities in countries like Tanzania. However, many secondary cities do not

have all-season usable runways. Emergency air services are also expensive and not affordable to people in remoter parts of Africa. Most African countries have a meagre budget allocation for public health, and in some cases, this is not entirely spent. Neither do they have the capacity nor funds to improve public health services, particularly in regional rural areas. Secondary cities can play a more strategic role in providing improved public health services. However, this calls for a build-up of capacity and capability in E-health services, and the training of paramedical staff who can handle routine health services and educational needs for the local population. It also calls for a greater focus on public health and sanitation programs, particularly targeting the education of the poor and illiterate.

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Essential health services such as hospitals, clinics, and day surgery facilities are inadequate, as is the professional level of staffing, equipment, and technologies needed to run them.

5.2.7 Crime

Crime in cities in many African countries is a significant problem. Data records on crime are poor, and most crimes go unreported. Most crimes relate to theft, drug abuse, and violence. A study of Nigeria suggests that crime rates are highest in the primate cities of Abuja and Lagos and are significantly lower in states with smaller urban centres (Bulwark Intelligence, 2016). This situation holds across African cities (Gollin et al., 2021, Table 6). Crime is becoming a significant issue in secondary cities in border locations, associated with the movement of contraband goods and drugs. Many of these cities have high male unemployment rates, with idle youth becoming involved in gang-related criminal activities. Policing in many of these cities is ineffective, with police often engaged in rent-seeking from criminal activities. There is a need for action in addressing growing criminal activities in secondary border cities. Encouraging more free trade agreements between countries within regions, would remove many rent-seeking opportunities in the movement of contraband goods.

5.3 Secondary Cities and Migration

Africa has historically experienced high levels of inter-regional cross-border and internal migration. Migrants fall into different groups ranging from rural-urban, urban-rural, urban-urban, economic, and refugee. Poverty is seen conventionally as the principal driver of migration in Africa, especially in rural-urban migration, but this is subject to debate (Flahaux & Hein De Haas, 2016; Gollin et al., 2021). It seems that Migrants move in search of opportunities, and sometimes safety, but also in search of better public services and amenities.

The presence of large numbers of economic migrants in northern Africa seeking to get to Europe has raised the focus on migration in Africa. However, African migrants aged over 15 years residing in OECD countries were estimated at 12.5 million in 2015/16, representing only 10.4% of the 121 million migrants in this age cohort residing in OECD countries (OECD, 2019). The majority of African migration occurs within and between African countries. To put things in perspective, in 2017, about 36 million of those living in Africa were living somewhere other than their place of birth. The highest level of migrants leaving the continent is from North Africa.

Despite a growing depth of knowledge on international migration, studies on the causes and patterns of internal migration within Africa are poor compared to other developing countries (Christiaensen et al., 2021). Existing data sources provide a limited picture of migration trends in Africa. Only about half of African countries have prepared a national migration profile report (Hovy et al., 2020). Research on the socio-demographic spatial pattern and characteristics of migration in secondary cities is limited. Secondary cities appear to have high levels of migration and migrants. However, the way migrants are assimilated into the local communities, the workforce, and where they live, and the socio-economic problems they face are not well documented.

The following provides a short overview of migration trends and spatial patterns in Africa. More specifically, it focuses on secondary cities and explores three important questions:

1. What factors contribute to the migration component of urban growth in African secondary cities?
2. What are the patterns and stages of migration from rural to town, town to city, city to metro process, i.e., where do migrants go in countries and how long do they stay in places?
3. What are the socio-demographic features of the flows and settlement patterns of migrants in secondary cities?

In responding to these questions, some overall trends, and drivers of migration in African countries are presented based on recent research (OECD/SWAC, 2020a).

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5.3.1 Patterns and Trends in African Urban Migration

Migration takes many forms. Most migrants are economic migrants who take the opportunity to leave where they were born in search of a better life (or better public services and amenities). Others are refugees, forced to leave where they live — by civil war and unrest, political persecution, religious, ethnic, cultural differences, and climate change. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are 6.6 million of these refugees in Africa (UNHCR, 2014), mostly living in border zones in impoverished camps and cities in Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and more. In the case of Kakuma in Tukana Region, Kenya, some people have been living there for almost 30 years.

5.3.2 International and Regional Migration

Figure 5.10 shows the relative size of migrant population flows between African countries and international destinations. In 2017 there were 26.6 million international migrants within and outside of Africa (UN DESA, 2019). This compares to 15.1 million in 2000. By far, the most intensive flow is from North Africa to outside Africa, mainly to Europe. However, the magnitude of flows in the west and east of Africa are significant. Currently, international migrants comprise just 2% of Africans, compared with 3.5% of the world's total population (International Organization for Migration-IOM, 2020).

Over 79% of all international migrants residing in Africa were born in Africa (Hovy et al., 2020). The number of economic migrants by region for 2017 is shown in Figure 5.12. 'Economic migrants' can be defined as people leaving their home countries primarily in search of employment.[8] Table 5.4 shows the origin of the top 10 countries of origin for economic migrants.

The dynamics of migrant movements are not fully understood, but a study of eight southern African countries of 629 secondary urban areas (towns and cities between 5000 - 100,000) showed that population growth rates across eight sub-Saharan African countries for 2000–2015 were 2.44% (Zimmer et al., 2020). However, small urban areas were also shown to have "experienced higher growth rates when distant from primary cities, had variable rainfall patterns and a greater amount of surrounding agricultural land to provide resources for a growing population" (Zimmer et al., 2020, p. 2514). These findings are important for understanding intra rural-urban dynamics, distance, and the contribution of local food systems to urban population growth rates in southern Africa. Recent evidence from Tanzania underscores the importance of distance in determining migrants' choice of destination (town or city), with the deterring effect of distance significant and more extensive for the uneducated and the poor. With towns more nearby to where the rural poor live, they also are a natural destination for many rural migrants, especially for the first move. (De Weerdt et al., 2021).

TABLE 5.4 | Africa's economic migrants: Top 10 countries of origin (2017)

Country of Origin	Number of Migrants in 2017	Population	Level of Freedom	Per Capita Income	Corruption Perceptions Index Score*	Human Development Ranking
Ethiopia		87,000,000	Not Free	5370	34	174
Nigeria	17,487	170,000,000	Partly Free	$1,280	28	152
Guinea	12,158	11,000,000	Partly Free	$430	27	183
Cote d'Ivoire	11,966	21,000,000	Partly Free	$1,090	34	171
Morocco	9,558	33,000,000	Partly Free	$2,970	37	123
Gambia	7,711	1,800,000	Not Free	$500	26	173
Mali	6,953	16,000,000	Partly Free	$610	32	175
Algeria	6,444	37,000,000	Not Free	$4,470	34	83
Sudan	5,852	33,000,000	Not Free	$1,310	14	165
Senegal	5,786	13,000,000	Free	$1,070	45	162

Source: UNHCR - Refugee Statistics (2020) UNHCR data.

FIGURE 5.10 | International and interregional migration patterns in Africa

Inflows:
Eastern Africa received close to 2.5 million migrants from other African regions

International migrants:
The region provides the largest contigent of migrants outside of Africa

Cheap labour:
The need for low-skill jobs can cause migrations from the poorest countries

Return flow:
A minority of migrants choose to move back to Africa

Regional flow:
Most of the intra-Africa migration takes place within the region for Western African people

Two tales:
The large middle class migrates to rich countries, and poorer people migrate to the region for low-wage jobs

This chart demonstrates the relative size of estimated flows between African regions and from Africa to the rest of the world in 2017. The circles's segments represent the origins of migrants and their destinations using an arrow shape. The size of estimated flow is indicated by the width of the link per region and can be read using the tick marks (in millions) on the outside of the circle.

Source: Bouchet et al. (2018).

5.3.3 Internal Migration in Africa

The internal level of the migration rate and migrants to cities for African countries is difficult to estimate. Some countries collect census information that captures the previous places of residence from census data, allowing for migration tracking. However, censuses are often conducted at irregular intervals in many countries, making consistent cross-national estimates difficult (Bell & Charles-Edwards, 2013).

During the 1980s, studies showed that an excess of births over deaths among urban residents accounted for 62% of urban growth in developing countries, leaving rural-to-urban migration and reclassification accounting for the remaining 38% (Lerch, 2017). Unfortunately, little data is available to estimate the splits between internal and international migrants residing in urban and rural destinations. Table 5.5 shows the typology of migration and forced displacement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and international migration.

TABLE 5.5 | Typology of migration and forced displacement of internal and international migration

	Internal (millions)	International (millions)
Migrants (economic or voluntary)	740–763	Migrants 240
Forced	Climate-driven IDPs: 20 million	(Climate-driven or mixed flows)
	FCV-driven IDPs: 41	Refugees: 26

Source: World Bank (2019).

The Botswana National Migration Survey of 1978–1979 showed that 36% of all people surveyed in the four largest towns were rural-urban migrants; it also showed that 6% had been urban-rural migrants (Case, 1982). Overall, the contribution of internal migrants, as a proportion of total urban population growth, is declining — especially in countries with high urbanisation rates, despite natural growth rates in urban areas being lower than in rural areas (Menashe-Oren & Bocquier, 2021).

More than 30% of Africa's urban residents are estimated to be internal migrants who have left their original place or region of birth. Overall, migrants tend to be more frequent in big cities; they tend to come more from other urban areas in secondary cities, whereas they are slightly more rural and stay for shorter periods in towns (Christiaensen & Lozano-Gracia, 2021).[9] Estimates, however, vary significantly between countries, depending on the level and rates of urbanisation. For example, Djibouti is 78% urbanised. In Djibouti City, where 62% of the country's population resides, less than 5% of the city's population are internal migrants and 10% international (Macrotrends, 2021). Uganda is only 25% urbanised, but an estimated 45% of the urban population are internal migrants.

The proportion of migrants living in urban areas will be higher when international migration and adjustments are incorporated into the estimates. The composition of migrants (internal, external, refugee, and transient) in African cities requires more research and better modelling to understand the needs of migrants.[10] In some countries, total migrants (rural-to-urban migration, net international migration) and other classifications, accounted for more than half of the urban growth in Rwanda (79%) and Namibia (59%).

West Africa has the highest concentration of international migrants — with the most significant proportion in urban areas. There is a long history of migration along the West Coast of Africa, e.g., between Ghana and Nigeria and between the Sahel and coastal countries (e.g., Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire). The lack of reliable research into the makeup of the migrant structure and mix in Africa makes it diffident to determine the needs — especially for planning and provision of socio-economic infrastructure and services (Christiaensen & Lozano-Gracia, 2021).

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5.3.4 Demographic Differences Between Migrant Groups

5.3.4.1 Economic Migrants

Economic migrants choose to emigrate from one region to another, including crossing international borders, seeking an improved standard of living, because the conditions or job opportunities in the migrant's region are insufficient, or those at the destination are particularly attractive. About 25% of migrants in sub-Saharan Africa are international economic migrants.

Comparing the population pyramids of the general population of Uganda with the migrant stock (Figure 5.11) reveals that the latter is more evenly distributed across different age groups (International Organization for Migration-IOM, 2020). The pyramid shows a very different structure to the overall population of non-migrants. There is little difference between gender in younger age cohorts. The 0–4-year age group has a significantly lower percentage cohort than the total population. The proportion of the population in the +50-age cohort is significantly larger, explained by family migration, often by parents. Differences in the pyramid structure between small, secondary, and large cities are not well researched; however, large cities tend to have a larger cohort of aged migrants. Migrant income, education, and wealth levels are generally higher in migrants living in large cities, and where children are in a better financial position to assist parents and family migration.

FIGURE 5.11 | Population pyramid comparing national and migrant stock for Uganda

a. Population in Uganda by Age Group 2015

b. Migrants Stock in Uganda by Age Group 2015

Source: This data was derived from UN DESA (2018).

Recent research comparing urban migrants with urban residents by city size across six African countries shows that the average age of migrants in small towns and small and large cities is 5 to 6 years younger than the resident population (Figure 5.12a).[11] Wide average age gaps (>6 years) for rural-urban migrants to secondary (small cities) may be partially explained by student migration.

Dependency ratios are also lower for migrants than residents, as shown in Figure 5.12b. The gap is more significant for urban-urban migrants than for rural-urban ones (who tend to have higher fertility) (Menashe-Oren & Stecklov, 2017). With fewer children or elderly to take care of, migrants are more likely to work more hours and enjoy higher welfare levels (income, expenditures) per adult equivalent, even if their hourly or monthly wages are lower (Jedwab et al., 2019). This is only part of the story. Migrant welfare (except for rural-urban migrants) still tends to be higher, even after controlling for household dependency status. This holds, especially for the town and small city migrants.

Migrants are more educated than residents, with the difference declining by city size and turning negative for rural-urban city migrants, as shown in Figure 5.12c (Christiaensen & Lozano-Gracia, 2021). Overall, educational attainment of the urban labour force increases by city size, with big-city dwellers (migrants and residents alike) more educated than those in large towns and small cities, who are, in turn, more educated than those in small towns. In Uganda, it was found that 80% of internal migrants were literate (MGSoG, 2017). There appears to be a strong correlation between literacy and propensity to migrate, due to increased perceived capacity to thrive in the new environment, especially if moving to urban areas. These rates appear higher in urban-urban migration, given the poor level of education of rural-urban migrants.

A final trend is that the majority (56%) of internal migrants reported that they were working, while 39% were not working (International Organization for Migration-IOM, 2013). Being younger, with lower dependency ratios and higher education, migrants to towns and small cities reinforce the labour force in towns and secondary cities, even more so when coming from other urban areas. These advantages are smaller for rural migrants to big cities (even turning negative for education) and more consistent with the popular perception of migrants joining the lower ladders of the big city labour force (which may still be more advantageous than their opportunities in their villages of origin).

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>
> *Recent research comparing urban migrants with urban residents by city size across six African countries shows that the average age of migrants in small towns and small and large cities is 5 to 6 years younger than the resident population*

Agriculture remains a non-negligible proportion of urban employment in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in towns and small cities and for urban residents (Figure 5.12d). About one in four non-migrant residents is still employed in agriculture in small towns (<20,000 inhabitants) and about one in seven in large towns and small cities combined (20,000–1,000,000 inhabitants). Continuously high employment in agriculture in Africa's urban centres (also compared to other countries at a similar level of development) has been highlighted before. It underscores Africa's lack of industrialisation (Henderson & Kriticos, 2018) and the centrality of urban-rural linkages for secondary towns and cities (Cattaneo et al., 2021). Small town migrants, however, are on average 11% less likely to be employed in agriculture than are small-town residents, with the difference declining as urban centres grow, to virtually disappearing in large cities, where agricultural employment is much less frequent to begin with (only a few percentage points of overall employment). Urban-urban migrants are even less likely to be employed in agriculture, compared to residents, than are rural-urban migrants.

FIGURE 5.12 | Differences between migrants and natives in urban areas

a. Age gap (migrant-resident)

b. Dependency ratio (migrant-resident)

c. Education gap (migrant-resident)

d. Nonagriculture share gap (migrant-resident)

Rural-Urban — Migrants — Urban-Urban

Source: Christiaensen and Lozano-Gracia (2021)[(12)]

5.3.4.2 Refugee Migrants

Refugees are displaced people, mostly from conflict zones or following climate change and/or natural disasters. The World Bank has predicted up to 86 million internal climate migrants in sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 (Clement et al., 2021). Those people have little choice but to leave – to avoid death, violence, or starvation. In 2019, Africa was estimated to be hosting 7.3 million refugees (including asylum seekers) or 25% of the global refugee population (28.7 million) (Cattaneo et al., 2021). Many refugees are located along 15 migration corridors (UNCTAD, 2018). Table 5.6 shows the number of refugees hosted by regions in Africa. Over half of all refugees in Africa were hosted by three countries.

TABLE 5.6 | Refugees by African regions

African Region	Estimated Refugees (2019)
Eastern Africa	3.8 million
Middle Africa	1.4 million
Northern Africa	1.4 million
Western Africa	383,000
Southern Africa	288,000

Source: International Organization for Migration-IOM (2020).

Between 2000 and 2019, the increase in the refugee population on the African continent (97%) significantly outpaced that of the global refugee population (74%), with the number of refugees hosted more than doubling in eastern, middle, northern, and southern Africa. As a share of all international migrants in 2019, refugees were particularly numerous in eastern Africa (48%), northern Africa (46%), and middle Africa (38%). Overall, 1 in every 4 international migrants in Africa is a refugee, compared to 1 in every 10 international migrants globally.

The situation regarding African refugees is serious (Adepoju, 2019). African countries host over 5.1 million refugees, about 40% of them coming from South Sudan (Table 5.7). In addition, there are over 9.8 million internally displaced persons.

TABLE 5.7 | Number of host country and origin country of refugees

Countries	Host Country Number of Refugees	Countries	Origin Country of Refugees	Countries	IDPs UNHCR
Uganda	1,396,773	South Sudan	2,189,141	Somalia	2,967,500
Sudan	1,058,771	Somalia	814,551	Ethiopia	2,733,628
Ethiopia	770,755	Sudan	787,755	Sudan	2,552,174
Democratic Republic of the Congo	525,528	Eritrea	521,949	South Sudan	1,600,254
Chad	472,108	Burundi	373,036	Burundi	21,863
Kenya	443,336	Rwanda	245,806		
Cameroon	414,852	Ethiopia	151,336		
South Sudan	302,132				
Total	5,093,470		9,875,419		

Source: UNHCR Data (2021).

The primary propellant of forced and voluntary migration is triggered by a range of factors, including homegrown conflicts, national or regional underdevelopment, poor political governance, economic and social deprivation, environmental crises, and human rights abuses. Most African forced and voluntary migrants relocate to neighbouring countries in search of security and improved livelihoods. Overall, refugee movements are mainly confined to the continent. Nevertheless, African refugees find themselves in ongoing, highly fluid situations. The number of refugees in Africa, their composition, their challenges, and the limited success of searching for a permanent solution requires sustained efforts by governments and the international community (Verwimp & Maystadt, 2015).

5.3.5 African Towns and Secondary Cities: A Growing Catalyst for Migration

Africans are migrating in increasing numbers to urban areas, nationally and internationally. Most migrate voluntarily in search of a better and safer life. Contrary to popular belief, most rural-urban migrants do not migrate directly to large metropolitan and secondary cities. Instead, the process is transitional, starting with migration to the nearest regional town or small city and then moving to larger cities after gaining urban life skills and experience (Ingelaere et al., 2017). Most secondary city migrants are a combination of rural-urban and town-urban-urban migrants. International and interregional migrants generally migrate between large primate and secondary cities. Many refugee facilities, such as camps and processing centres, tend to be located close to international borders in regional towns that have grown to become secondary cities, as people search for greater economic opportunities (see Box 5.1).

Many push-pull factors are responsible for migration to cities in Africa (Christiaensen & Lozano-Gracia, 2021). Poverty is often cited as the major factor in migration. However, "the idea that African migration is driven essentially by poverty ignores evidence that demographic and economic transitions and development … are generally associated with increasing rather than decreasing levels of mobility and migration and that the relationship between development and migration is fundamentally non-linear" (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016).

Several factors start the migration process at the rural level. A study in Tanzania found, overall, "the need for money for the fare, a network at the destination to get set up, the ability to function in a cash economy and the professional skills needed to obtain meaningful employment" are the most frequently mentioned reasons why people migrate from rural areas to the nearest town or city (Ingelaere et al., 2017, p. 17). In addition, secondary towns offer off-farm employment opportunities nearby, facilitating rural livelihood diversification, which has long been an important vehicle driving urban-rural migration. "Secondary towns emerge as the more feasible urban destinations, as they are both physically and culturally more accessible" (Ingelaere et al., 2017, p. 21). Where migration is peaceful and not forced, physical proximity to home is an insurance policy — if the move does not work out, a migrant can always return home.

Family circumstances often provide the rationale for migration to the nearest town or cities. However, unless forced, few migrants suddenly leave the security of family, land, and relationships without preparation. There are critical factors that migrants consider before migrating. Of critical importance are pre-existing migration networks, which determine migration's choice, act, and destination. In addition, there is a natural and well-established support system that aids migration for most migrants, especially in moving to larger cities and for international migration. When it comes to gender, women are more likely than men to migrate to smaller towns. Marriage or domestic employment opportunities, often with family or relatives, provide a secure environment for the transition to urban life. Men looking for non-seasonal or more permanent work tend to migrate to larger urban settlements and secondary cities with better prospects of gaining employment, knowledge, and skills-building access.

Migration generally occurs within a finite age-related window of opportunity. This is most often before people start families and take on associated responsibilities. Small regional towns are generally the first space rural-urban migrants move to and experience urban life (De Weerdt et al., 2021). Later, as the migration trajectory unfolds, some make a progressive transition to a larger city or secondary city and often to a primate city. This applies particularly to migrants who were born in regions distant from primate cities and metropolitan areas.

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When it comes to gender, women are more likely than men to migrate to smaller towns. Marriage or domestic employment opportunities, often with family or relatives, provide a secure environment for the transition to urban life.

BOX 5.1 | Case Study: Kakuma, North-west Kenya

CHALLENGES OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN SECONDARY CITIES

The Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya is one of the largest in Africa, with a population of over 186,000. Many recent arrivals, especially in the Kalobeyei new settlement areas, are still living in tent housing. Housing in the older camp communities is more permanent, constructed of timber, mudbrick, block, and mainly corrugated iron roofs. Water supply, sanitation, and waste management are inadequate. Ongoing tensions between the refugees and the local community have resulted in occasional conflict, partly because host communities perceive that the refugees often have better access to services. Compared to the rural population, the Kakuma camp has better health facilities, more children in full-time education, and better access to basic and financial services. The camp is an integral part of the regional economy and a part of the livelihood options available.

The Kakuma Camp has attracted considerable attention from refugee stakeholders, with a great range of issues covered. For example, The Norwegian Refugee Council (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2018) notes that Kenya's restrictive refugee movement laws prevent relocation to parts of the country where they can plan a more direct role in becoming more self-sufficient. The creation of livelihood opportunities contributes to offsetting the reliance on humanitarian assistance and limits refugees' ability to add to the local host community economy. It renders refugees with a sense of hopelessness and leaves them open to corrupt exploitation. It also leads to mental health disorders that may continue when they are either repatriated or after they are settled in a safe country.

The economic impacts of Kakuma are best seen at night. Night-time lights indicate that refugee inflows increase economic activity in areas within 10 km of the camp centre (Alix-Garcia et al., 2017). Household consumption within the same distance is 25% higher than in rural areas further away. Refugees have had a positive effect: increased availability of new employment and rising prices in agricultural and livestock markets have benefited local producers. Education and inclusion have improved the integration of the refugees into the local community (Bellino & Dryden-Peterson, 2018), and have better equipped youth refugees if they migrate back home or elsewhere. In 2010, online courses in basic medical training were introduced. The goal of the online course was to focus on relevant health issues around Kakuma. Other courses have been developed with top-level universities, such as Princeton in the United States (Princeton University, 2019).

Kenya's Kakuma-Kalobeyei experience shows how support to regional secondary cities and towns can help support large numbers of dependent refugees and build a more robust economy. The refugees in Kakuma have created more than 2,500 local businesses, adding at least $56 million per year to Kakuma's economy (Rummery, 2019). The management policies at this secondary city by the international community and government have been positive. However, more can be done to boost the development of the economy and social adjustment, if many stakeholders in the community are better coordinated. The key to the hope and prosperity of this region is improved education, connectivity, and collaboration between refugees and the local Turkana community and refugees and their connection to diaspora and regional business networks. Similar observations and dynamics have been recorded observed in other refugee housing.

PHOTO 5.3
Kakuma Refugee Camp North-west Kenya

© Photo: Brian Roberts 2019.

Migration to secondary cities is often seen as a play-off between the social connectedness close to where migrants were born or grew up and the realization of self-development and economic opportunities. Secondary cities often provide opportunities to gain higher skills and access to capital to develop micro-scale enterprises. However, often when family migration occurs, the opportunities to move on to a larger urban centre become more restricted because of the need to support the larger family; and uncertainty around establishing necessary networks before more significant economic opportunities are realized.

5.4 Policy Consideration to Address Migrant Issues

Secondary cities are popular destinations for internal migrants, internally displaced persons, and refugees, given their proximity to international borders. However, local secondary city governments are less equipped to manage the impact of population growth, especially those with large refugee populations. Several research publications (Iazzolino, 2018, p. 50) suggest that secondary cities have a greater capacity to absorb migrants and meet their expectations of more affordable living costs than capital cities. If capacitated, those cities could form important components of comprehensive migration management strategies. However, this will require a better understanding of city-specific drivers and dynamics of rural to urban migration and the particular draw of secondary cities and the challenges faced by these cities compared to rural areas, capital cities, and international destinations.

Two reports — a report on rural to urban migration related to secondary cities in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda (Iazzolino, 2018) and the Cities Alliance Joint Work Programme on Cities and Migration (Cities Alliance, 2019, p. 46) — recommended policies to address migrant issues and associated problems in secondary cities. Those recommendations have Africa-wide relevance and need to be embraced by governments and official development assistance (ODA) and incorporated into national and subnational assistance programs to support migrants living in African secondary cities. Recommendations adapted from those reports are suggested as follows:

- Supporting migrants and migration programs for secondary cities can significantly accelerate poverty reduction, reduce inequalities, and alleviate the desire to migrate to primary cities. The management implication is that governments should not impose cross-national or internal barriers to migration, as has occurred in many post-independent African countries.

- Networking and collaboration between migrants in secondary towns and cities would build social capital and networking between migrant groups, increase national productivity and prosperity, and reduce the pressure of rural-urban migration on the development of large metropolitan regions and significantly reduce poverty levels and disparities in regional development.

- Reliable data on the number of IDPs in Africa does not exist. Improved collection of data on IDPs would significantly help governments resettle some of these people in secondary cities where cultural and social assimilation may be beneficial.

- Local administrations request greater involvement in national-level discussions and more accurate data on the number of residents in order to better inform national fiscal transfers and aid allocation decisions. From a management viewpoint, the systems of data collection must be revisited and recalibrated to a more frequent reflection of localized sets of data, rather than the agglomeration of data that is the norm in virtually all African countries.

- Before targeting specific populations, support programs should begin by supporting secondary cities' financial and institutional capacity to plan and develop. If divisions between migrants and residents are distinct, targeting displaced populations and the most impoverished migrants in urban areas through income-generating schemes and ensuring the protection of vulnerable individuals, such as women and informal workers, should be undertaken. This also adds to the social stability of secondary cities and the mental well-being of migrants.

- Developing 'communities of interest' with diaspora groups provides financial and well-being support and connections with families and cultural groups.

5.4.1 National Population Plans

The call for African countries to adopt population policies dates back over three decades. For decades, many African governments had an anti-urban attitude, with population policies designed to stem migration to cities. Most African governments now recognize that cities are the primary drivers of economic activity, employment, and where most people will live. However, in formulating national urban strategies and development plans, inadequate consideration is given to the importance of developing national spatial population plans which align closely with the above. National population policies play an essential role in how nations manage population growth and provide social and community infrastructure to support the needs of rapidly growing urban populations.

Tunisia is the first country in Africa to implement a national population policy (Clarke, 1969; Dérer, 2019). It is one of the most progressive Arab-speaking countries in terms of women's rights. Countries should prepare national population policies and align with national development and urbanisation strategies to align social needs with economic and governance systems. National population policies need to be guided by clearly defined objectives. The African Development Bank Guide on Policy on Population Strategies for Implementation (African Development Bank, 2000) includes some useful principles to guide national population policy. These include the following:

- Population is a cross-cutting issue in planning for urban and regional development. Population forecasting and demographic factors must be incorporated into social, agriculture and infrastructure projects, given the magnitude and multi-faceted nature of population and urbanisation problems facing African countries.

- The relationships between population growth and economic growth and subsequent impact on poverty and sustainable development, are critical to implementing any population policy. High-level officials need to be informed on these issues through specific training and other related programs.

- Economic empowerment of women is a prerequisite to successfully implementing maternal and child health and reproductive health programs. Family planning services and maternal and child health have desirable effects at an urban and rural level as part of an integrated economic empowerment and production incentive package. Family planning is key to ensuring that women and couples, in general, do effectively control their desired family size and can reconcile their occupations with family or maternal obligations.

- Adolescent sexuality and services adapted to the specific needs of the youth must be given full consideration in population policy. In Africa, 15-19-year-olds account for a large and growing segment of the population, and among school-going girls, unwanted pregnancies constitute a significant cause of school dropout. The prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS is also high among the youth. Yet cultural barriers and biases among families and health workers often limit their access to reproductive health facilities.

- Partnerships between key institutions can enhance the skills mix on a range of population-related issues and cost-sharing. This is especially important given new and emerging issues such as the increase in female-headed households, the result of civil wars and men's economic migration, HIV/AIDS, and the refugee situation. All of these have affected family structures and the age pyramid, but they have also worsened the overall quality of life of the populations.

- National population policies need to consider gender, religious, social differences, and other forms of discrimination and how the needs of these groups can be accommodated.

5.4.2 Secondary City Population Planning

At the subnational level, there is a need for secondary cities to prepare population forecasts and projections to clearly define the future planning needs of development, community services, and population growth. More detailed demographic information about spatial changes in demography and socioeconomics is required to develop projections on population growth. Studies also need to be conducted of rural hinterland population demographics to identify the propensity to migrate, providing estimated migration flows by size and age within 5-year timeframes. Local governments should establish university research and monitoring programs on secondary city populations' health, well-being, and gender-related needs as part of localizing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) programs. Such programs could be undertaken in collaboration with surrounding local governments, with central government support, to study and monitor a range of population-health-environmentally linked factors, particularly disease control, treatment, and management. Other initiatives related to city population planning include the following:

- Support for policies and programs for inclusiveness and conflict resolution initiatives to prevent the eruptions of violence in some places, which has become regular, particularly during elections and other major public events in contested cities, and to reduce tension between migrant and indigenous sectors of the population.

- Programs for community engagement so that the key concerns expressed by the community can inform policy priorities, including employment, social services, and security, to prevent irregular migration and to ensure that secondary cities can meet the expectations of the existing population and migrants and can absorb new migrants.

- Preparation of population projections, demographic change, and policy plans to identify future needs of the community and social services.

- Support for the development of self-organizing communities of interest groups to supplement government delivery of social services and local infrastructure.

- Development of migrant/refugee support services through community associations (including local chambers of commerce) and advocacy groups to assist migrants/refugees to readjust, overcome trauma and settle into their new community.

In secondary cities with large numbers of refugees, ensure regular dialogue between refugee and resident community representatives to address conflict, mutual responsibility, and collaboration on developing and maintaining the urban and peri-urban environment.

5.4.3 Engaging with the Diaspora

The diaspora is the most underutilized pool of social capital in Africa. The remittance flow to sub-Saharan Africa in 2019 was estimated at US$48 billion. But it is not just money that is remitted to African countries. Goods, notably used clothing, machinery, and equipment, are shipped and sold through family and other networks in local markets. Many small-scale exports through diaspora networks into international markets are traditional products and foods, for which there is a limited expatriate market. The formation of local diaspora associations is helpful in the development of networks for the transfer of skills, technology, access to markets where locally produced goods can use indigenous design to create hybrid products for sale in international markets.

Some African cities have recognized the importance of the diaspora to fill skills gaps in gaining access to new technologies and expertise that can help build new jobs and industries, especially within cities and regions. Nigeria and Uganda have developed national diaspora policies to encourage their diaspora to participate more fully in national and regional development. Diaspora services departments have been established that deal with diaspora matters, including facilitating the diaspora's contribution to society, economy, technology, and social development. These initiatives need to be taken further to develop local secondary city local chapters/organizations of diaspora communities, which would provide a city hub for learning, access to knowledge, technologies, marketing networks, and finance to support local economic and social development — including the provision of health care and business development services.

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The formation of local diaspora associations is helpful in the development of networks for the transfer of skills, technology, access to markets where locally produced goods can use indigenous design to create hybrid products for sale in international markets.

5.5 Need for Migration and Demographic Research on Secondary Cities

African secondary city populations are amongst the poorest but fastest-growing in the developing world. Many lack basic infrastructure, education, and healthcare facilities, have very poor-quality housing, low levels of well-being and income, and higher infant mortality and refugee migrant populations than large metropolitan regions. They are, however, vibrant places with a rich mix of multicultural, language, and artistic expression. They are home to more than 180 million people.

The dynamics of Africa's urban population and cities are continually and rapidly changing. African cities are young, as are their populations. They are absorbing a growing number of economic migrants and refugees. Nevertheless, the number of in-depth research studies on the dynamics of population change and the demography of secondary cities is sparse. Secondary cities are an important intermediary step in the urban migration transition process, which sees many internal migrants move later to larger cities, nationally and internationally. The population pyramid of both primate and secondary cities shows that young migrants are attracted to those cities to search for better economic opportunities and quality of life. Cities in conflict zones, especially in the Sahel and North Africa, are receiving disproportionately more refugees.

African countries suffer from poor subnational data and statistics on spatial patterns and changes in urban population and demography. More significant efforts and resources must be made available to improve research on population dynamics and demography of African cities — especially secondary cities. The current lack of information on population makes the future planning of urban areas extremely difficult. Improved data and information to support city government, business, social services development, delivery, and physical and social infrastructure will aid better city management and support for social and economic development. Effective use could be made of national identity cards data to monitor population changes through address and other data-capture means.

This chapter concludes with a plea to national governments and international development assistance agencies to boost expenditure — to develop and adequately resource national statistics offices, population research centres, and universities to improve the research and policy outputs on urban population and demographic studies. Additional international resources are also needed to provide better information on inter-regional migration within Africa.

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ENDNOTES

(1) These problems are exacerbated by differences in the countries' geographic regions used by data collection agencies. The blurry boundaries between what is rural and what is urban has also led scholars to go beyond the rural-urban dichotomy and to consider the rural-urban continuum and study urban catchment areas differentiated by city size instead (Cattaneo et al., 2021).

(2) Unless otherwise indicated: 'Africapolis' generally refers to the database at https://africapolis.org/en; while 'UN DESA' and 'UN World Urbanisation Prospects' generally refer to data available at https://population. un.org/wup/. For more information on both of these sources, see also OECD/SWAC (2020) and UN DESA (2018).

(3) Census organisations use more than 25 definitions of 'urban' in Africa countries.

(4) The OECD uses yet another definition for 'urban' centres, consisting of contiguous grid cells with a density of at least 50,000 persons or 1,500 inhabitants per km^2 (see Dijkstra et at., 2019).

(5) These patterns are most intense in the more fertile parts of the continent.

(6) Over 150 cities in the Africapolis data base (https://africapolis.org/en) show very significant increases in population between 1990 and 2015. This is due to the classification of the emergence of polycentric secondary city-type clusters of urban settlements showing agropolis-type network structures that have high levels of dependency on urban employment.

(7) Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) is a notable exception.

(8) Oxford Dictionaries (2015) "Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary" p. economic migrant. Archived from the original on 2015-09-14.

(9) In the 6 African countries studied by these authors, the migrant share of the urban population varied largely between 30% and 40%, with the share's highest big cities (>1 million in habitants) (39%), followed by secondary cities (100,000–1,000,000 inhabitants) (31%) and towns (25-27%).

(10) Christiaensen and Lozano-Gracia (2021) make a useful step in this direction.

(11) Note that the age gap for rural-urban and urban-urban migrants compared to residents has been calculated for three countries, while age gap for all migrants concerns six countries, explaining why the latter does not necessarily lie in between the former, as in the other panels in the figure.

(12) The terms 'rural-urban' and 'urban-urban' denote migrants from rural to urban areas and intra-urban migrants. The age gap is the difference in the average age of internal and international migrants relative to the local population. Dependency ratios are a percentage measure of non-working-age household members to working-age household members (working-age population = 15–64-year-olds). The education gap is the difference between the years of education of migrants relative to the resident population. The non-agricultural share gap is the difference (percentage points) between the share of migrants in cities employed in the non-agricultural sector compared to the share of the resident population working in the nonagricultural sector. For migrants, differences are based on six African countries; the migrant category (rural-urban; urbanurban) is based on three countries. Differences are presented each time by city category.

6

FUNDING
AND FINANCING
SECONDARY CITIES

ASTRID R.N. HAAS

6.1 Introduction

Secondary cities will continue to account for over 40% of sub-Saharan Africa's urban population between now and 2030 (OECD, 2020). Global evidence from 51 countries between 1980 and 2004 shows that for a given level of urban population growth, secondary cities are overall better at driving poverty reduction (Christiaensen & Todo, 2014). In African this seems to hold true as well: empirical evidence from Tanzania shows that secondary cities are in fact better at driving poverty reduction quicker than primary cities (Christiaensen et al., 2017). There are several reasons for this, including the fact that secondary cities are located closer to rural populations and thus can more easily support the transition from agricultural to non-agricultural work. Furthermore, secondary cities also provide important markets for agricultural goods.

On a continental level, secondary cities have a central role in enhancing trade and in operationalising the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Data from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) shows that AfCFTA is meant to increase trade by 50%–69% and boost African GDP by US$44 billion (UNECA, 2020). This provides a major opportunity for small and medium-sized cities, particularly those located in border areas. For example, a study from 18 western African cities has shown that those cities within a 50-km radius of border regions are experiencing some of the fastest economic growth, with some of the most dynamic markets (UNECA, 2020). This can have large, important effects on welfare for informal traders, who are mostly women, and currently contribute an estimated 20%–75% of intra-regional trade (UNECA, 2020).

In terms of spurring local economic development through firm investments, secondary cities still have a major advantage in the fact that there is comparatively more land available there than in primary cities. As such, they have opportunities to attract firms, such those operating in the manufacturing space, which have land as a core factor of production. This in turn can provide opportunities for employment within the city and its surrounding areas. To attract these types of firms, having land available is necessary, but not sufficient. There is a need for governments to invest in infrastructure to improve connectivity and services both within the cities themselves, as well as to surrounding markets. Furthermore, investments are also needed to improve the liveability for people moving to cities (UNICEF, 2020).

PHOTO 6.1
Hargeisa, Somalia - The challenge of gaining access to international finance

© Source: Hargeisa, Somalia. Photo: Shutterstock.com.

Unlocking these opportunities of economic productivity across African cities will therefore require significant financing; the current infrastructure gap in Africa is estimated to be US$130–170 billion annually and growing (AfDB, 2018). The gap may be even wider when considerations are made for investments in climate-smart infrastructure. At the same time, there is also growing evidence that the overall longer term pay-offs, in terms of both GDP and job growth, can be substantial (CUT, 2021). Therefore, for African secondary cities, which are set to undertake most of their urbanisation in the coming decades, ensuring that infrastructure investment can happen in advance of settlement is key to unlocking the urban dividend. It is also important to avoid the financial, political and social costs of retrofitting as much as possible. However, to achieve the commitments of the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), some retrofitting cannot be avoided. A central question for city governments with limited resources is how to balance the need to invest in new infrastructure with retrofitting already existing infrastructure. This challenge may be even more substantial for many secondary cities that have not experienced investment for many decades, and so both their retrofitting and new investment needs are significant.

The challenges in terms of raising such substantial financing in the coming years are significant for African cities overall, but particularly significant when considering the current capacities of secondary cities. The slowness of decentralisation is common across the continent, resulting in local governments taking on increasing responsibilities for infrastructure and service provision, without commensurate expansion in their fiscal space. As such, the fiscal viability of local governments is declining and there is a growing dependence on intergovernmental fiscal transfers. This dependence is problematic: prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic crisis, these transfers already were generally not consistent and commensurate to the needs of cities. As a result of the ongoing economic crisis, national government finances have been even further constrained. It is estimated, for example that in Uganda, in 2020, the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was the equivalent of 4.5% of Uganda's GDP (Owori, 2021). This has a consequent effect on how much revenue is available to transfer to local governments. As such, the investment needs for secondary cities are large and growing as urbanisation rapidly progresses, yet the funding and financing opportunities are becoming further constrained.

For example, policymakers in Hargeisa, located in the Woqooyi Galbeed region and capital city of self-declared Somaliland, understand the urgency and necessity of collecting property tax, as discussed below. This is due to the highly decentralised nature of their political system, which means that the city is responsible for delivering most services and infrastructure investments. Furthermore, although Somaliland has been a self-declared autonomous region since 1991, it is not internationally recognised as a country. This means that neither the country nor the city can benefit from substantial flows of financial aid. Thus, the city has had to rely on its own revenues.

The challenges in terms of raising such substantial financing in the coming years are significant for African cities overall, but particularly significant when considering the current capacities of secondary cities.

A stable flow of municipal finances is key to ensuring the overall longer-term sustainability for secondary cities and in particular their infrastructure and public services. As such, this chapter explores, using case studies from across Africa, potential ways that secondary cities can consider expanding their financing and funding bases. In this context, it is important to highlight that 'financing' refers to the monies that need to be raised to cover the overall capital investments in infrastructure, whilst 'funding' refers to how the infrastructure will ultimately be paid for, such as through taxes, user fees, or external development assistance.

This chapter begins with a focus on funding, starting with intergovernmental fiscal transfers, as these are the most important source of funding for most secondary cities. It will then go on to focus on the need for secondary cities to grow their own-source revenue and, in this context, the opportunities that exist through more local administrative reforms, as well as more substantial policy reforms. In these contexts, the case studies used will highlight how reforms can be further strengthened by investments in technology and digitisation, emphasising, however, that technology is not a panacea in itself. Following funding, the next section will focus on improving cities' access to finance through a two-pronged approach of improving cities' creditworthiness, coupled with expanding their access to capital markets, with a particular focus on the role of subnational intermediaries. It will also look at the untapped potential of remittance flows and areas that governments can focus on to tap into these to help finance investments. The final section will highlight what development partners can do to support the agenda on financing and funding secondary city development, using a case study of the African Development Bank, and other institutions' current efforts in this area.

6.2 Secondary City Funding

The primary area that secondary cities need to focus on is to improve their funding, which will also improve cities' access to financing. As the subsection highlights, to date, for most secondary cities, funding is composed of intergovernmental fiscal transfers from higher levels of government. However, these flows are not sufficient and often are challenging in terms of their regularity and timing for the budget process. Therefore, reducing dependence on intergovernmental fiscal transfers through increasing own-source revenues will be important. Two ways this can be done, which are highlighted in the next part of this section, is through administrative and policy reforms. Both these types of reforms can be supported by investments in soft infrastructure through digitisation and other technological innovations. Key in increasing own-source revenues will be in tax reforms, particularly around property taxation, as well as other forms of land value capture.

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> *(...) for most secondary cities, funding is composed of intergovernmental fiscal transfers from higher levels of government. However, these flows are not sufficient and often are challenging in terms of their regularity and timing for the budget process.*

6.2.1 Intergovernmental fiscal Transfers

Intergovernmental fiscal transfers, which are the transfers made by higher tiers of government to cities, are a necessary component of all cities' budgets. These transfers can help cover the differences between expenditures and revenues that can result in a city's low revenue base. Furthermore, these transfers can also support smoothing national horizontal fiscal imbalances between cities (Bird & Valliancourt, 1998). Given the size of the transfers with respect to many secondary cities' budgets, they also have an important role to play with respect to credit market development, as the revenue from these transfers may be used to back loans or general-obligation bonds (Freire & Petersen, 2004). However, across many countries in Africa, the budget data is not always immediately available and, where it is, transfer payments may not be detailed. This lack of transparency in intergovernmental transfers is compounded by the fact that they may not happen regularly and may be off the normal budget cycle altogether. This not only creates difficulties in terms of determining the full scope of a secondary city budget, but it can create challenges for the cities themselves in the budget planning process.

A city's over-dependency on intergovernmental fiscal transfers can have a destabilising effect on its budget. This is particularly the case when, as noted, transfers are irregular in terms of their timing, as well as their size and scope. Yet for many secondary cities across Africa, even within those countries that have ostensibly decentralised many of their revenue-raising functions, the largest share of city budgets is comprised of these transfers. A pertinent example in this respect is Uganda. In 2020, Uganda officially gazetted 10 new cities. Looking at the data of these cities, which can be seen in Table 6.1 (from Babale, 2021), own-source revenue as a contribution to their overall budgets is extremely low. In fact, across Uganda, the average for all local governments is about 4% of total budget, although it is a bit higher for urban municipalities, where it can make up to 27% of the budget (Ofungi, 2020). In 2017, the Government of Uganda reformed the fiscal transfers by collating all the different unconditional portions of these transfers into a single grant called the 'Discretionary Development Equalisation Grant'.

TABLE 6.1 | Funding status of 10 newly gazetted cities in Uganda UGX Bn (US$ millions)

FY 2020/21	Arua	Fort Portal	Gulu	Hoima	Jinja	Lira	Masaka	Mbale	Mbarara	Soroti	Total
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (UGX Bn)	23.28	18.63	55.71	40.57	26.54	23.59	37.06	39.12	36.90	15.30	316.70
US$ (millions)	6.358	5.088	15.212	11.078	7.248	6.443	10.120	10.683	10.076	4.177	86.483
Own-Source Revenue (UGX Bn)	3.005	2.940	4.746	1.856	7.411	3.404	2.921	3.365	4.863	2.010	36.520
US$ (millions)	0.821	0.803	1.296	0.507	2.024	0.929	0.798	0.919	1.328	0.549	9.973
TOTAL (UGX Bn)	26.289	21.573	60.454	42.423	33.953	26.997	39.979	42.488	41.760	17.305	353.221
US$ (millions)	7.179	5.891	16.508	11.585	9.272	7.372	10.917	11.602	11.404	4.726	96.456

Source: Babale (2021).

Given the importance of intergovernmental fiscal transfers for secondary cities, an important set of reforms is to support national governments to stabilise the flow of these types of transfers to secondary cities. This will assist cities greatly in their budget planning and execution. Furthermore, particularly given that secondary cities are still relatively small, their needs are rapidly expanding; ensuring that there are ways that these transfers are fairly distributed between cities will be important. This can be done through a formulaic approach, such as is used in South Africa (Farvacque-Vitkovic & Kopanyi, 2014), which ensures that all cities receive their fair share of transfers, with respect to their current and future needs (see Box 6.1 for an outline of South Africa's formulaic approach).

At the same time, as will be discussed in subsequent subsections, ensuring that secondary cities expand their own-source revenue base is key. Although in the immediate term, intergovernmental fiscal transfers are going to remain an important source of revenue for secondary cities, particularly for those cities located in more centralised governmental systems, in all cases these transfers are likely to be too small to meet the infrastructure investment and service needs for rapidly growing cities. Lessening secondary cities' dependency on these transfers has other benefits too. It can increase their autonomy in decision making, as well as improve local accountability with respect to their own constituents. Furthermore, as noted, these transfers are not likely not to be stable within and across budget cycles. This is particularly pertinent during periods of economic downturns, like the one associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, when overall national government revenues fall. As such, improving the own-source revenue base can improve the sustainability in terms of overall budgeting.

BOX 6.1 | South Africa's intergovernmental fiscal transfers

The basis of South Africa's formulaic approach to intergovernmental fiscal transfers is laid out in its Constitution. This makes the provisions for the fact that the equitable division nationally raised resources, between its 9 provinces and 257 municipalities, must be determined on an annual basis. It also outlines the provisions upon which the division of resources needs to happen, including:

- National interest.
- Debt provisions.
- Maintaining national flexibility to respond to emergencies.
- Resource allocation for basic and developmental needs based on the powers and functions of the respective sphere of government.
- Fiscal capacity and efficiency of the respective sphere of government.
- Reducing horizontal economic disparities.
- Promoting sustainability and predictability.
- To enact the transfers each year a Division of Revenue Act is passed, which considers the consultations with the Financial and Fiscal Commission.

Source: South Africa Treasury (2016).

6.2.2 Own-source Revenue Generation

In addition to increasing the budget available for infrastructure investment, strengthening secondary city funding is central to unlocking financing. As noted, a key component of this is ensuring that secondary cities can expand their own-source revenues. Two levers to do this are:

Administrative reforms: These sets of reforms focus on enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of revenue generation. A major advantage of administrative reforms is that they are usually largely in the cities' own control and can lead to substantial initial increases in revenue. A drawback to administrative reforms, however, is that increasing revenue generation from these reforms is finite once administrative efficiency has been achieved. However, for most secondary cities, achieving this is still very far off and as such, implementing administrative reforms still has substantial potential.

Policy reforms: These sets of reforms include changes to laws, policies and regulations around revenue generation. Compared to administrative reforms, policy reforms can result in much more substantial increase in revenue. This is especially the case when the reforms undertaken focus on expanding the authorising environment for secondary cities to raise own-source revenue. This includes, for example, changes to tax rates and bases or the types of user fees that cities can collect. However, policy reforms can take much longer to implement, since they often require legislative support for any changes to happen.

The following subsections will use case studies from different secondary cities across Africa to highlight both the opportunities and challenges with different reform programmes in areas of administration and policy. They will also highlight how both administrative and policy changes can be supported by investments in digitisation and technology. However, any of these investments will only be as useful as the underpinning institutional and administrative structures they are meant to support.

6.2.2.1 Administrative Reforms

Outsourcing Tax Collection

As highlighted, administrative reform has substantial potential to improve revenues, particularly in cities where existing revenue sources are still underperforming. Such reforms may be easier to implement, as investing in improvements in administrative structures is something that is usually in the control of the city government itself to initiate and carry through. As such, these reforms are usually also quicker to implement, and can thus show results in a relatively short period of time.

There are different ways administrative reforms can be implemented, and increasingly, the focus is on improved digitisation through technological reforms. The benefits and drawbacks of this aspect of reform will be covered in the next subsection. Another area is to increase the capacity of tax collectors, which ample evidence shows can improve revenues (Besley & Persson, 2009). Especially where tax collection is still carried out manually, which is often the case in secondary cities, there is an overall constraint, given the number of tax collectors, on how many taxpayers can be visited at any given point for the issuance of bills and collection of payments.

One way to increase the capacity of tax collectors is to engage local leaders in supporting governments with tax collection (Knebelmann et al., 2020). Evidence from Kananga, a city in the south-central part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the country's fourth largest city, shows that this type of partnership can work to increase local tax revenues (Begeron et al., 2021). In the case of Kananga, the city started implementing property taxes in 2016 (the potential of property taxes will be separately examined in the subsequent sections). Before the new tax was launched, city chiefs already had an important role with respect to the management of properties, often mediating in disputes and acting as intermediaries between the government and city residents. To increase revenues from property tax collection, a city-wide experiment was conducted in 2018. As part of this experiment, the city's 45,162 properties were randomly assigned to either have a government tax collector or a city chief visit them for tax collection. All other administrative and policy aspects of the property tax collection were kept the same across both samples.

The results showed that those properties visited by city chiefs had 52% higher compliance with their property tax payments, generating an additional 43% of revenues. Furthermore, contrary to concerns by the government that there may be increased mismanagement if tax collection was outsourced, there was little evidence of this. Perhaps one of the most interesting findings from this experiment was the fact that the local city chiefs and the government tax collectors visited the same amount of properties on average and, as such, this was not the driving factor behind the revenue increase. Rather it was primarily because city chiefs knew their constituents better and were therefore able to better target those individuals who were more likely to pay their property taxes.

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This example shows two important factors about administrative reforms. Firstly, by undertaking reforms that are merely targeted at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of generating funding, major improvements can be made to generating revenues. Secondly, ensuring that administrative reforms are localised and respond to the requirements of a specific area, in this example, are more likely to be successful than merely adopting strategies from elsewhere without understanding how they can be localised successfully. In the case of Kananga, the propensity of an individual to pay was an unobservable factor and therefore not something that government tax collectors could discern easily.

Technological Innovation for Administrative Reform

In supporting administrative reforms for improving municipal finance, investing in soft infrastructure, in the form of technology, is increasingly seen as one of the major areas to improve efficiencies in revenue generation. There are different aspects of revenue administration that can be digitised. This includes creating databases of information, which in turn can improve coordination, as the same information can be accessed and used by various tiers of government. Having information digitised can also improve transparency, giving taxpayers a clearer overview of what they are required to pay, as well as tracking the inflows of their tax payments. In terms of revenue collection, digitisation can also be used to improve the ease of compliance for payers of taxes or user fees. Examples include automated billing or cashless payments, such as through means of mobile payments. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted another benefit of digitisation, namely improving the resilience of tax collection as systems that were digitised could continue in the face of lockdowns. In places like Rwanda, where several tax collection and payment processes have been digitised, there was a much smaller loss of revenues than would have occurred if tax collections still occurred manually (Haas et al., 2021). As such, investments in technology are often taken as a measure of modernisation and therefore improved efficiency of municipal finance systems.

Some secondary cities, like Kisumu, Kenya, have embarked on digitisation as a central tenant of their municipal finance reform processes. Kisumu, which has a population of 1.2 million, with approximately 50% of those living in urban areas, had a FY18/19 budget of about US$72 million, which is approximately equivalent to US$60 per capita (Fleck, 2021). The 2010 Kenyan Constitution increased devolution and has enabled cities like Kisumu to increase their abilities to raise own-source revenues. However, to date, Kisumu has struggled to meet the revenue potential, with their budget still composed of 78% of national transfers. As such, the city government decided to embark on reforms centred primarily around improving tax administration through digitisation. One of the reforms, for example, focused around improving collection of unstructured revenue streams, such as market fees, which are small amounts paid daily and at the source. To do this, the city procured 100 point-of-sale devices at a cost of US$500 each. These were distributed to fee collectors to improve collection and payments. In addition to the point-of-sale devices, the city also introduced a system where market fees could be paid via mobile payments.

Kisumu has not yet seen the anticipated revenue increases from the market fees, given the capital investments in digital technology. One reason was that 300 point-of-sale devices were required, but the city could not afford that many at the time. As such, nearly two-thirds of market fees continued to be collected manually. Perhaps more important was that this technology was superimposed on an institutional system that already had challenges. For example, there were no systems for audits and verification, which were also needed to ensure that the correct information was being input into the devices.

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> *The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted another benefit of digitisation, namely improving the resilience of tax collection as systems that were digitised could continue in the face of lockdowns.*

The case of Kisumu highlights that there are several factors to consider when investing in and implementing any technological solutions. Most importantly, technology is not a panacea to institutional challenges and therefore should not be superimposed on systems that are already not working. Rather, technology should be considered as one input into more comprehensive reform processes. Furthermore, in adopting digitisation, the systems selected should not simply mimic the manual processes that were in place the first place. Rather overall reforms in terms of efficiency measures should be considered, which in turn can then be supported by digital processes.

A further major consideration when it comes to implementing technological reforms in secondary cities, is the question of human resource and financial capacity. It is critical that any chosen system both mirrors and considers the prevailing capacity constraints. In Mzuzu, Malawi, for example, the digitisation of the property tax systems, which involved automation of the registration, billing and payment processes, used simple and open-source software that is also flexible enough to be easily amended to respond to future required changes (Delbridge et al., 2021b). In understanding the capacity needs of the key actors across the municipal finance chain, which include both those who are implementing the system as well as users of the system, ensuring sufficient, testing, training and communication through the technology roll-out phase is key to its success.

Reforms in Tanzanian secondary cities provide further examples of how technological innovation can be used to support administrative reforms to improve local government tax collection (Figure 6.1). Using a geographical information system (GIS) application, several secondary cities have established systems linked to revenue enhancement and urban development management for property identification, verification, taxation and spatial development governance. Twenty-three cities have had official development assistance (ODA) in introducing GIS systems, many of which are linked to taxation and financial management systems databases. The project is an important step forward for Tanzania to improve secondary cities' information and financial management systems. However, important lessons have been gained from the process, which include the needs to (i) examine and integrate the entire business process of urban councils; (ii) create an appropriate data structure that could support a functional set of city business processes; and (iii) improve the granularity of data, connectivity and interoperability between GIS and other functional areas of the council, including asset management and valuation. As the project report highlights:

> "…the use of open-source software will enable every user of spatial data to have similar sets of data and to add data accordingly, and thus facilitate the process of populating the GIS databases." (Namangaya, 2018, p. 571)

There are also other lessons be gained from the case study of these projects:

> "… it is evident that despite the indication of ownership of GIS system and mainstreaming of the same in the respective councils shown by the fact that the councils funded GIS operations from internal revenues, the systems remained as a departmental affair, mainly limited to departments dealing with lands administration/planning and revenue mobilization. Moreover, the data system of internal revenue sections and those on by the departments dealing with land matters (buildings and plots) were not linked, leading to revenue leakages and untapped revenue sources. There were also serious gaps in the data with many houses left out and inaccurate valuation data" (Namangaya, 2018, p. 564).

FIGURE 6.1 | Projects institutionalizing GIS for revenue mobilization for secondary cities in Tanzania

Despite these challenges, the application of technology has proved successful in Tanzania. A study of Arusha shows that yearly revenue collection increased by 14.5% between 2013 and 2016 (McClusky et. al, 2018).

There are still many challenges for local governments in introducing technologies to improve revenue enhancement, information and data management. This area needs continued assistance until local governments have the capacity and funds to maintain and upgrade technologies for improved revenue and budget management.

6.2.2.2 Policy Reforms

Property Tax Reform

As noted, policy reforms, which affect laws, policy and regulations, can have an even more substantial impact on generating own-source revenues, compared with solely focusing on administrative reforms. In this context, one area that many cities and local governments are exploring is how to implement or better generate property taxes, as shown in the previous example of Kananga. This revenue source is one of the most underexploited taxes across the continent. An indication of its potential is reflected in the fact that property taxes currently account for approximately 2% of GDP in OECD countries, but still only about 0.5% of GDP across sub-Saharan Africa, with this percentage being substantially smaller for most secondary cities (Franszen & McCluskey, 2017). Leveraging property tax in African cities, particularly for funding local infrastructure investments, has great potential (UNICEF, 2020). If designed and administered well, property taxes can allow city authorities to capture value created by rapid urbanisation and reinvest this into the city's infrastructure and services in a virtuous cycle.

There are several features of property tax that make it an extremely desirable tax, particularly for rapidly growing secondary cities to consider. Some of its notable features include:

- It is fairer compared to other forms of taxes as, if implemented well, it captures publicly created value. For example, with rapid urbanisation there is increasing demand for property, which in turn increases its value. In addition, property values also rise when public infrastructure investments are made in their proximity. In all these instances, value is publicly, rather than privately, created and therefore it is fair that this value is captured by governments to be reinvested for the public.
- Depending on the property tax system, it is a relatively more equitable tax than other taxes, as those who own properties tend to be richer.
- As a tax it is relatively easier to administer than other taxes, given that properties have a fixed base and many of the characteristics required for valuation are observable.
- Given that it is a tax that can demonstrate a direct connection between the tax paid and the local infrastructure and services provided, it is a tax that can help strengthen the social contract between government and citizens.

For this potential from property tax to be realised, however, many cities require not only administrative but also policy-related reforms. The actual ability for cities to administer and collect property tax depends very much on the legislative and institutional environment they are operating in. As such, different types of reforms, with respect to property tax, will be more or less feasible, given this context. One set of policy reforms that should be considered irrespective of the institutional environment is how to assess the value of the properties that the tax is based on.

For any taxing authority, deciding on the most appropriate assessment model may be constrained by what is specifically defined in legislation. However, even within what is prescribed, there may be opportunities for reform, as well as the possibility to determine whether considering a change in legislation is worth it. The variety of options when it comes to assessment models exists on a spectrum, reflecting increasing complexity in terms of their implementation, but also revenue potential. As is evident from Figure 6.2 (Collier et al., 2018), different models have important trade-offs to consider: on the one end of the spectrum, there are purely area-based systems. These are arguably the simplest forms of valuation to administer and require the least amount of data, as they only need the area of the property to be taxed. At the other end of the spectrum, there are highly complex capital value-based systems. These have the benefit of being buoyant in terms of the fact that they change with increases in property values, and are, in general, more equitable than more area-based systems. Furthermore, if administered well, a value-based system is likely to generate more revenue for the taxing authority relative to the area-based system, as it captures more of the full revenue potential of the property tax.

A value-based system requires higher capacity to administer much more sophisticated data. Therefore, in lower-income contexts, even where legislation may provide for using a value-based system, taxing authorities may still decide on implementing a simpler area-based system. This is particularly likely given prevailing capacity constraints, especially in administration, as well as the fact that property markets, and therefore data pertaining to these, may be under-developed. As has been the experience in many systems, starting simple can have important benefits: it can help broaden the tax base by bringing more properties into the tax net, sensitise increasing numbers of taxpayers to paying the tax and, importantly, as a result, generate much-needed revenue. These simpler systems can then be built on and further developed over time. This is the case in most jurisdictions currently using an area-based assessment; in fact, hardly any use solely the area to value property. Rather, most area-based systems already incorporate adjustment factors to incrementally move toward capturing more of the property value. In doing so, systems whilst becoming more complex to administer, become more equitable at the same time.

FIGURE 6.2 | Assessment models for property tax systems

Type of assessment	Accuracy	Data requirements on transactions	Data requirements on land contents/ characteristics	Estimation capacity required	Transparency
Capital Market Value	High - though requires regular reassessments	Significant (on assets transactions)	High for greater accuracy	Significant	Can be low
Rental Value	High (where rental values are available and rent controls are not applied)	Significant (on assets transactions)	High for greater accuracy	Significant	Can be low
Points/Proxy	Medium (depending on calibration to market values and number of proxies included)	None needed - though helps in accuracy	Depends on number of proxies	Medium	Relatively hight
Area-based	Low	None	Very limited	Limited	High
Construction cost	Low	High - on supply side transactions	High	High	Relatively high

Source: Collier et al. (2018).

An interesting example in this context is the city of Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. Whilst it is a primary city, its revenue base is small, akin to many of the smaller secondary cities across Africa. Interestingly, however, unlike many secondary cities, the largest component of its total revenues are own-source revenues. In 2016, the total revenue for the city was about US$8.2 million, with 80% being attributed to own-source revenue collection (Delbridge et al., 2021b). One of the largest components of its own-source revenue is its property tax, and reforms to its area-based system have increased the city's property tax revenue by four-fold since 2008. The foundation of Hargeisa's property tax system is based on the calculation of the taxable property's area. When the property tax was introduced, this was a relatively straightforward calculation, as most buildings were constructed in similar styles. In particular, the majority were only one-storey and had one of three areas: 12 by 12 m, 24 by 18 m, or 6 by 9 m. They were usually located closer to the centre of the city as shown in Figure 6.3 (Tempra et al., 2007).

FIGURE 6.3 | First steps to strategic urban planning

| City Block | Freestanding | Informal Shelter | Compound Type |

Source: Tempra et al., 2007.

As the city started to grow and attract large investments, however, the buildings themselves became more complex and less standardised. The system has therefore been updated to be able to consider building height. For multi-storey buildings, a percentage of the ground floor value is calculated for each subsequent floor at a decreasing rate. For example, a second floor is taxed at 80% of the ground-floor rate, 70% for the third floor and so on (Haas, 2018).

Perhaps the main benefit of such an area-based system is that it is relatively easy for the city to administer, as calculating the area of buildings, particularly with standardised ones, is quite straightforward. This can be further aided by using GIS technology. This was first done in Hargeisa in 2004/2005, and it expanded the property tax register by over 270% — from about 15,850 properties to 59,000 properties. The subsequent GIS mapping exercise undertaken in 2017 expanded the register by approximately 30,000 further properties (Delbridge et al., 2021a). An area-based system is also relatively transparent and thus is easy to communicate to a taxpayer.

There are also several challenges with the system. One major drawback for city officials is the fact that the only way that the property tax revenue for the city can currently expand is if new structures are built. Furthermore, this expansion can only happen once the valuation roll is be updated, and it took 12 years for the last update to happen. Yet, the fact that the roll expanded by nearly 30,000 properties highlights the fact that construction in Hargeisa is indeed booming, and there would be merit in trying to capture these new structures as soon as they are built. Furthermore, the current valuation rolls are compiled by generating the relevant GIS data. For both the 2005 and the more recent valuation exercises, the generation of the roll was funded by the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat). Like many secondary cities, however, Hargeisa only receives limited development partner funds and support, although in the case of Hargeisa, this is due to the unrecognised status of Somaliland. Therefore, finding ways to supplement the roll, when development partner funds are not readily available, is also important, given how rapidly the city is growing.

A second significant issue with the primarily area-based system is that it is not fully buoyant, as it does not capture any of the increases in the value of properties. As noted, for fast-growing cities like Hargeisa, this increase in value is both because of growing demand as well as the increasing complexity of structures being built. It is important to highlight, that if the system does not consider the complexity and quality of a structure, it is likely to be regressive. This is because, for example, a modern shopping mall would be taxed at the same rate as a simple house, if the two had the same floor area. Yet the shopping mall is likely to have far higher value.

Technological Innovation for Policy Reform

Further property tax reforms that better capture the overall value of buildings can have significant impacts on revenue. A secondary city that has piloted innovative reforms in this area is Mzuzu, Malawi's third largest city. The city had a population of about 221,272 people in 2018, and like Hargeisa, intergovernmental fiscal transfers made up less than 20% of Mzuzu's total US$3.3 million budget for FY 2019/20 (Delbridge et al., 2021b). As in Hargeisa, the principal source of own-source revenue for Mzuzu is property rates, which are charged on the value of land plus improvements, as well as ground rents. The potential of property tax is much higher than what is currently being collected, however, as the tax base is significantly constrained by the fact that 60%–70% of Mzuzu's urban population live in informal settlements and therefore were left out of the tax base.

In 2013, the city of Mzuzu, with support from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) revenue mobilisation programme, decided to undertake significant reforms to its property tax system. Prior to these reforms, the valuation roll was only updated once every 20 years, on average, and as such missed out an estimated 75% of properties. In addition to the properties missing from the roll, those which featured on it were significantly undervalued. The reform process not only undertook the automation of the entire property tax process, including registration, billing and payments, it further helped Mzuzu implement a points-based property tax system, as the first city to do so in Malawi. This simplified value-based system uses the area of a property and then adjusts this for easily observable characteristics to be able to calculate an estimated market value, by which the property can be assessed (Grieco et al., 2019). This is then weighted by certain points, which add to the value based on positive features of the property, such as having a strong outer perimeter fence or high-quality roofing or deduct from the value when there are negative features, such as no access to running water. Although the system considers aspects that capture value when it comes to property, it is much simpler to administer and understand than a full market-based system. Through these reforms, Mzuzu managed to increase its revenue seven-fold from US$68,000 in 2013 to US$478,000 in 2018 (Delbridge et al., 2021b).

The case of Mzuzu shows that policy reforms, particularly in a pilot phase, can sometimes more easily be carried out in secondary cities where the political economy may be more conducive to testing innovative reforms. However, this example of Mzuzu also offers a word of caution. Although the reform was implemented in Mzuzu, it was then legally challenged, as the Local Government Act of Malawi stipulates that all property valuations in Malawi needs to be undertaken by certified valuers from the Surveyors Institute of Malawi (Delbridge et al., 2021b). This highlights that policy reforms may be more difficult than administrative reforms, due to the overall institutional framework changes that must take place.

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6.2.2.3 Land Value Capture

One of the most important assets for all cities is the land that they are located on. This land can provide a key resource for financing and funding a city's development. In fact, for some cities, land can make up 90% of their total asset base (Freire & Kopanyi, 2018). Through the urbanisation process, it is the increasing scarcity of land as people and businesses begin to locate on it, coupled with public investments made on the land to improve productivity and liveability, that drives up its value. As such, it is important for secondary cities, particularly those that are still at the relative outset of their urbanisation process, to have in place mechanisms that can capture the value of land and then use the revenues from this to reinvest into the cities.

Many African secondary cities are asset rich and revenue poor. Land values have increased substantially in metropolitan regions and secondary cities. In some secondary cities, such as Cape Coast in Ghana, land values of US$200,000 per hectare are not uncommon, with prices rising over 50% per annum. Property taxes are as low as 0.01% of the land value. Across Africa, little attempt is made at value capture from rising land prices, nor is there legislation or political willingness to introduce it to collect property taxes and other land taxes at market prices. Few secondary cities have cadastres and valuation rolls, and for those that do, the property values are not based on current market values or adjusted regularly for rises in land value. In some cities, personal and property wealth levels in terms of property assets are commensurate with some middle-income countries.

There are several policy tools that can be considered when looking at land value tax, a summary of which is provided in Table 6 (Haas & Kriticos, 2019). However, a major challenge in considering how to implement these tools is the underlying complexity of tenure systems, coupled with an opacity in land administration, which means that many cities in Africa, have not yet successfully implemented land value capture instruments. Yet these should be considered, particularly for secondary cities, where a major opportunity stems from the fact that most of their city growth, and therefore increases in values of land, is yet to happen.

TABLE 6.2 | Land value capture instruments and characteristics

Instrument	Type of Charge	For What	Who Pays	When (usually)	Examples
Land Value Increment Tax	Tax	Increased value because of public action (e.g., zoning)	Landowners (for reinvestment into public benefit)	Either on a fixed-frequency basis (e.g., yearly) or at the time of transfer	Taiwan
Betterment Levy	Tax or Fee	Increased value because of public investment (e.g., construction of a road)	Land or property owners in a pre-specified area of influence based on the gains they have accrued	After completion of project within a bounded period	Bogota, Colombia
Development Impact Fee	Fee (Monetary)	Cover the cost of additional infrastructure and services because of a development	Developer	One-time, upfront charge	Hong Kong
Exaction	Fee (Non-Monetary)	In-kind contribution linked to the cost of additional infrastructure and services because of a development	Developer	One-time, upfront contribution	Medellin, Colombia

Source: Haas & Kriticos 2019

One way for these cities to capture the value of land, is through proper planning of urban expansion. Changing or adopting new land-use management plans, and the resultant impact on land values, can provide a major source of revenue for a city. In those cities where land is publicly owned, the sale or lease of land for city growth is perhaps the most straightforward way to finance urban infrastructure. The major difference between selling versus leasing is that land sales, whilst providing an immediate source of revenue, will only result in a one-off cash inflow for cities. As the city then no longer owns the land, its sale then prevents it from benefiting from any potential increase in its value in the future. Through land leasing, the city can retain overall ownership of the land and then charge rent or a fee for user rights and, as such, a regular cash inflow. This, however, is coupled with the potential administrative costs of managing the leased land and the collection of any fees. In many cities, a combination of selling and leasing is used, and a detailed capital investment plan can help a city determine and prioritise which land assets it should sell to finance its development priorities.

Another way to capture the value of land is through rezoning and then leasing the land for urban use. For example, agricultural lands on the periphery of current urban areas, which are likely to be absorbed as part of future city growth, can be re-zoned to urban land uses. This will, in general, automatically increase its value. Given that the power of re-zoning lies with the government, this is a clear example of publicly created value where the value should be captured and reinvested for the public accordingly. This was the type of model that has to date been successfully used in China to finance a large part of its infrastructure investments, including in its secondary cities, during its rapid urbanisation process (Dercon et al., 2019).

Irrespective of whether the city decides to sell or lease its land, it is extremely important that it plans for its urban expansion. One of the major challenges facing many of the primary cities in Africa to date, is that settlement has happened before investments in infrastructure. As such, cities are having to grapple with the financial costs of retrofitting, which evidence from Latin America has shown can be up to three times more expensive, coupled with the political and social costs of moving people from their land (Fernandes, 2011). Therefore, planning for density by ensuring that there is sufficient space left for public infrastructure, can be key to generating further productivity, liveability and therefore revenues for cities.

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The New York University's Marron Institute is partnering with four secondary cities in Ethiopia, namely Adama, Bahir Dar, Hawassa and Mekelle, to undertake this planning for urban expansion (Lamson-Hall, 2020). This requires forecasting up to 30 years of potential population growth, which given current sources of data can be done relatively easily, and then using this to estimate how much land will be required for development. Once this is done, the cities work on securing the land in the future right of way for the urban expansion areas, with a particular focus on the arterial roads. Depending on the land tenure system, this can be done through direct expropriation for the public benefit or by paying the required compensation to landowners to guarantee that there no construction takes place in those areas in the future. In some cases, physical barriers, such as trees, are erected to demarcate the areas that should be kept free from construction. In the case of these four Ethiopian cities, 570 km of roads had been constructed by 2018, providing settlement space for around 140,000 new settlers and generating approximately 26,000 jobs (NYU Marron Institute, 2020). The total cost of this urban expansion programme across the four cities is estimated to be about US$35 million over 5 years, the equivalent to about 50% of those cities' construction budgets.

This method of planning for urban expansion has benefits beyond ensuring the space is maintained for future investments in infrastructure. It can help direct the direction of settlement as it shapes community and business expectations for future infrastructure investment. In Bahir Dar, for example, an industry zone, providing employment for surrounding populations was developed, given the investor expectations of future infrastructure. Overall, cities have seen an increase in formal settlement as new arrivals to the cities are able to purchase leases around the urban fringes. Furthermore, in Hawassa, about 7,000 informal settlers were resettled with formal leases in this way too (NYU Marron Institute, 2020).

Perhaps more importantly, investments like this, coupled with public investments in infrastructure, will increase the land values, which if managed well, can generate revenues for the city to invest in the future infrastructure. Another way to do this is for the cities to sell or lease the blocks of land surrounding the arterial roads. Specifically, as the grids around the arterial roads develop, and as the public infrastructure investments happen, this can increase the land values for the city. To date, in the case of the Ethiopian cities, it is estimated that approximately US$77 million of leases have been sold across the four cities (NYU Marron Institute, 2020). This money can then be reinvested to service the land, as well as provide for further infrastructure in the expansion areas. In fact, from land value and revenue projection models that were developed for these four cities, considering all the associated costs of implementing the urban expansion programme, including the compensation for land, costs of infrastructure and costs of developing arterial grids, the expectation was that all four cities would still have a revenue surplus in the future.

6.2.2.4 Subnational Value Added Tax

A value-added tax (VAT) is a tax that is levied at all stages of production, with an inbuilt compliance incentive, as suppliers across a value chain need to ensure payments of their counterparts to ensure they can claim input credits. It has become an overall popular tax for developing countries, particularly as an efficient revenue-generation mechanism. In general, VAT is a national tax, and the revenues may then be distributed to a state or municipal level. There are only a few countries, mostly with federal systems, where VAT is levied as a subnational tax. This is due to, amongst other challenges, concerns about the administrative feasibility and overall efficiency of levying such a tax at a subnational level.

One of the countries that levies VAT at a subnational level is India, which through reforms between 2003 and 2008 decided to replace its subnational sales tax with subnational VAT. The aim of this reform was to help spur revenue growth at a state level (Sen, 2015). By 2005, 27 out of the 29 states decided to implement this subnational VAT and research shows that in 18 of those states there was an up to 8% increase in overall revenue efficiency, i.e., comparing the difference between the net cost of administering the tax versus the net benefit in terms of revenues generated. By 2008, revenues from VAT made up approximately 64.4% of own-source revenues in those states (Sen, 2015).

There were three main reasons that it was possible in the Indian context to levy tax at a subnational level:

- India has a federal government structure and as such states have much more autonomy to set the relevant revenue laws at a subnational level.
- Prior to implementing subnational VAT, the sales tax was already a state tax, whereas in many countries, this is in fact a national tax. Therefore, in effect, the adoption of VAT was merely replacing a more inefficient tax.
- Even though the states were responsible for administering the subnational tax, the central government still set the model legislation which the states had to follow. This included three tiers of rates, a 12.5% standard rate, a 4% reduced rate for items of necessities, as well as a 1% rate for gold, silver and precious stones. States were permitted to issue rates above these thresholds, which some subsequently did in 2010, but not below it to induce a quasi-trade war across state boundaries.

Like India, Ethiopia is also a federal country where the collection and administration rights of VAT is at a state level, although the responsibility for the actual collection is divided between central and state tax administrators (Yesegat & Krever, 2018). The revenues from VAT, which are a substantial source of tax revenue for the government, are divided in a unique manner, however: the state government gets to keep any revenue collected from unincorporated firms, and the central government keeps the revenues from those that are incorporated. Furthermore, the allocation of VAT by state is based on the registration of the location of the firm. As such, the final allocation of VAT revenues, rather than being based on consumption of the final goods and services, is dependent on the registration status and geographic location of the firms. This bifurcated system has the implication that effectively buyer-states are being cross-subsidised by consumer-states.

In general, the public financial management literature is clear that levying VAT at a subnational level is highly inefficient. Rather it advocates for the central administration of VAT and then the distribution of the revenues to a subnational level. As the cases of India and Ethiopia show, in some federal systems, VAT is managed at a state level. Although, at least in India, these reforms seem to have borne some of the intended increases in subnational revenue efficiency, it is unlikely that this is a feasible major revenue source for many secondary cities in Africa. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the revenue efficiency increases were recorded in India's most economically prosperous states, and those which had lower economic development and thus less capacity to implement this to start with did not derive the same benefits from these reforms (Sen, 2015).

6.3 Improving Access To Finance

There are major constraints on African cities' access to capital markets for financing the upfront capital costs of infrastructure investments. These challenges, which are both of a legislative and administrative nature, exist for primary cities and are even more pronounced for secondary cities. In some places, decentralisation is far enough advanced that cities can, according to legislation, borrow from capital markets. One of these places is Tunisia, which is described in the chapter on Gabés. Following the 2010/11 Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, which resulted in a new constitution in 2014, the institutional structures saw a major shift in decentralisation. One of the main outcomes of this was to provide cities and municipalities with stronger political and administrative status, as well as the enhanced fiscal autonomy to both generate own-source revenues and to access finance.

In the context of this increased devolution of fiscal powers, the Mayor of Bizerte, Tunisia's sixth largest city, decided, in 2020, to undertake a full credit rating to determine the current financial strength of the city and, importantly, where the city should focus its municipal finance reform efforts. Perhaps more than the rating, the detailed recommendations of the main challenges within the fiscal and overall planning systems of the city were the most useful outcome of this exercise (PBR Rating, 2020). As a result of this, the Bizerte's Director of Finance, under the auspices of the mayor, is developing a municipal finance action plan that outlines detailed areas and sequencing in which the city wants to improve its fiscal health.

Undergoing a credit rating or a shadow credit rating is one way to determine the creditworthiness of a city. In the case of Bizerte, it has led to a concrete action plan to improve the city's rating for the city to be able to borrow on capital markets. To date, only very few cities across Africa, and primarily in South Africa, have been able to borrow from capital markets. As Gorelick (2018) highlights, this is primarily due to the general weak authorising environment in which cities in Africa operate. This impacts the weak or overall lack of policies and legislation that would be needed to govern cities' ability to raise finance and to create the necessary assurances for markets, particularly prospective issuers of bonds, such that transactions can take place. In this context, therefore, it would be too expensive for cities to undertake a credit rating. Perhaps more importantly, in many cases it would be unnecessary given that the reasons for cities' creditworthiness may already be clear. Furthermore, for many secondary cities it would not be possible to determine creditworthiness, as this requires inventories of assets, balance sheets and other financial information that may not be available. There are other, and less expensive means of diagnosing challenges related to municipal fiscal health. Another challenge in undertaking full credit ratings at a stage where a city's municipal fiscal health is clearly in need of reform, is that receiving a sub-standard rating may send wrong signals to financial markets, and this market confidence may be difficult to reverse at later stages.

As noted, in most cases the challenges facing secondary cities' creditworthiness are relatively easy to diagnose, and this can be done without undergoing a full credit rating. Their challenges in this context, tend to fall into three main, yet interlinked, areas, namely:

- Poor municipal fiscal health.
- A high cost of capital due to several risk factors.
- The project requirements are too small to attract market interest.

Although many of these are structural constraints, secondary cities can still work to rectify them by putting in place reforms. These reforms will, in the longer term, further support them in accessing domestic, and perhaps even international, capital markets.

The first major set of reforms, in improving access to finance, are related to funding and increasing own-source revenue, as has been discussed in the previous section. This section will focus on improving cities' creditworthiness through budget reforms, particularly looking at the costs and benefits of moving from cash to accruals accounting systems. It will also look at the increased use of and support to subnational finance intermediaries that can also assist in pooling projects, as well as the untapped potential of remittances.

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> *Another challenge in undertaking full credit ratings at a stage where a city's municipal fiscal health is clearly in need of reform, is that receiving a sub-standard rating may send wrong signals to financial markets, and this market confidence may be difficult to reverse at later stages.*

6.3.1 Cash Accounting vs. Accrual Accounting

Over the past decades, many governments, particularly in developing countries, have been looking for ways to increase the efficiency, accountability and transparency of their budgeting process. A lack of transparency into a city government's budget is one of the major obstacles in giving it overall access to financial markets. Considerations in this regard relate to having budgets that clearly distinguish between current and capital expenditures, as well as between revenues and loan receipts. This is particularly pertinent if city governments want to borrow, as it is important to be able to distinguish between borrowing for investments and for financing operational expenditures (Freire & Petersen, 2004).

Central amongst these considerations is the accounting system that a government uses, as this can provide transparency of information and thus signal to the market a city's municipal fiscal health. One area of reform in this regard is to move from a predominantly preferred use of cash-based accounting system to an accrual accounting system, a system already favoured by the private sector (Cavanaugh et al., 2016). The predominant difference between cash and accrual accounting is when an economic transaction is recognised in the final financial accounts. With cash accounting, transactions are only recognised at the point when cash is transacted, whereas with accrual accounting the transaction is recognised as soon as assets and/or liabilities are exchanged. This is important, as assets and/or liabilities can be exchanged before any cash flow occurs and therefore, if it does, their exchange would not immediately be recognised in a cash-based accounting system. At the same time, the economic impact

of this transaction may have already happened at the time of the exchange. In general, cash accounting adds or subtracts to a government's cash balance, whereas accrual accounting adds or subtracts to a government's net worth, measuring the governments quasi-debt liabilities and thus the overall burden of its financial commitments. In terms of financial reporting, accrual accounting results in additional financial reports, such as a statement of financial position, operating statement as well as a statement of cash flows.

A summary of the main advantages and disadvantages of each accounting system can be found in Table 6 (compiled from Cavanaugh et al., 2016, and IFAC, 2002). In general, the main disadvantage of a cash-based accounting system is that it does not provide the full picture of economic events, where these may not align with cash as paid and received. Conversely, therefore, the main advantage of a well-implemented accrual accounting system is that it should improve transparency and accountability in terms of how a government agency performs, i.e., how it executes its budget to fulfil its mandate. Understanding this can improve budgeting practices, especially transparency, and therefore support in improving government resource allocation. Importantly it can also improve accountability with respect to taxpayers.

Therefore, reforms targeted at a move towards accrual-based accounting should be one area for consideration for secondary cities. However, transitioning accounting systems is a major policy and regulatory undertaking. For secondary cities, which usually have inherently weaker accounting systems, considerations should be made from the outset both in terms of the human and financial resource capacity needs, as well as the overall sequencing of the reform process. There are several foundational factors that are critical to a successful transition, including:

- A need for a strong cash-based system to be in place, prior to undertaking the transition to an accrual-based accounting system, particularly as cash management is a central part of an accruals accounting system.
- A strong cash management system, which has a systematic recognition and valuation of all governments assets and liabilities and thus the creation of a complete asset register is a major requirement of this reform process.
- Any reforms to the accounting system need to be part of a broader set of public financial management reforms. It is important that it is not the accounting system that drives the subsequent reforms, but that the accrual system should rather support whatever broader reforms are happening to the budget.
- Sufficient time and sustained political commitment as full transitions to accrual accounting systems is estimated to take anywhere from 6 to over 10 years (Khan & Mayes, 2009).

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The predominant difference between cash and accrual accounting is when an economic transaction is recognised in the final financial accounts.

TABLE 6.3 | The main advantages and disadvantages of cash accounting compared to accrual accounting

	Cash Accounting	Accrual Accounting
Advantages	Simplicity in terms of: • Compilation of budgets and reporting. • Understanding by implementers and users of the system. • For legislature to understand how the monies spent compared to what was appropriated for that budget period. • Less subjectivity in terms of when a transaction gets recorded (i.e., it is exactly when cash is transacted is relatively straightforward). • Lower cost as less skill and IT systems required.	• Can lead to better resource allocation as accruals and/or liabilities may be significantly different from cash payments in a reporting period. • Provides a more comprehensive overview of economic activity. • Links revenues and expenses to a government's net asset position. • More comprehensive information around the budget. • Improved monitoring of governments overall liabilities as well as contingent liabilities. • Improved transparency of the total costs of service provision by governments (especially as governments tend to hold large assets/liabilities). • Can be used to better assess city municipal finance performance and thus improve accountability.
Disadvantages	• Limited scope, as only cash transactions are recorded within a particular reporting period. • Ignores all other resource flows except for cash flows. • Limited insights into overall assets and liabilities held by a government. • Subjectivity in determining when transactions are on or off budget and thus when they get recorded.	• Introduces more complexity into government accounting systems. • Complexity can be used to mask information. • Requires a major overhaul in accounting systems including human resource skills and IT systems. • Major financial and human resource costs in setting up and maintaining new systems. • Can take many years for full implementation.

Source: Compiled from Cavanaugh et al. (2016) and IFAC (2002).

Many secondary cities in Africa will still be a long way from meeting many of these pre-requisites for a full transition to an accrual-based accounting system; therefore, this may be a medium to longer term goal. In the shorter term, however, reforms that work towards and adopt elements of accruals-based accounting, such as setting up and updating an asset and liabilities register, will have benefits in improving municipal fiscal health. This phased approach has been used in South Africa, where not all government entities are required to use the same accounting standards and where entities can work on transitioning based on their capacity (Lubbe & Mkubukeli, 2016). Whilst it is important that budgeting systems in secondary cities do evolve towards accrual-based accounting, these reforms can and should evolve over time with commensurate increases in capacity, resources and needs of the city.

6.3.2 Subnational Financial Intermediaries

Aside from their own municipal fiscal health, there are other major challenges when it comes to secondary cities accessing finance from capital markets, which include:

- The overall national institutional and legal framework is not permissive of cities borrowing. This may relate to concerns that many national governments have about the effect of subnational debt on overall national debt exposure and the potential of moral hazard if the national government must step in as the lender of last resort in the event of a city's fiscal indiscipline.

- As noted, even if cities are allowed to borrow, the cost of capital is too high, and their credit ratings are low or non-existent.

- For many secondary cities, particularly the smaller ones, the type of investments they would like to borrow for are too small compared to the market's interest to lend.

To help overcome these challenges, various forms of subnational municipal finance institutions have been established across the continent. These institutions have different mandates and instruments. At one end of the spectrum are subnational development banks, which are public banks with the mandate to provide financing to local and regional governments or private entities for local infrastructure and service provision. These banks are owned, governed and supported by national governments to execute a public and development-oriented mandate, with most of their portfolio geared on supporting local and city government projects. They also have an independent legal status and financial autonomy. They can either be first-tier banks, where their lending extends directly to the city itself, or a second-tier bank, where they lend to commercial banks, which then on-lend to the city (Farvacque-Vitkovic & Kopanyi, 2014).

Most of these types of subnational development banks operate in francophone Africa, for example the Agence National d'Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales – ANICT (National Agency for Investment in Local Regions) in Mali or the Fonds National d'Investissement Communal – FONIC (National Fund for Local Investment) in Burundi. Both the examples of the ANICT and FONIC have a major role to play in lending to secondary cities and towns in their respective countries.

The FONIC in Burundi has a mandate to support the disbursement of national government grants to municipalities (Niyongabo, 2020). Since 2015, each municipality in Burundi is entitled to 500 million FBU of development project expenditures (≈ US$250,000). This amount is disbursed by the FONIC based on the readiness of the project proposals it receives as well as the absorption capacity of the respective municipal authority requesting the funds. A 2018 guideline issued by the Burundian national government suggests that annually 20% of this grant should go towards the construction of social infrastructures, whilst 80% should go to infrastructure or services that can generate economic income. In addition to being the conduit for the central government funds, the FONIC also acts as a financial intermediary for external finance that is intended to support local urban development. It further provides technical support to the municipalities for project development and execution.

Another model of a subnational financial intermediary that fulfils similar functions are local municipal development funds. One example of such a fund is the Development Fund for Local Authorities (DFLA) in Malawi. This fund was founded in 1993 with the aim to support increased revenue generation by Malawi's local governments (Delbridge et al., 2021b). It was initially run and capitalised, at US$12 million, by the World Bank, half of which was a loan, and the other half was grant funding. In 2017, the management of the DFLA was handed over to the government Malawi, through a dedicated chief executive officer position. Municipalities and other local authorities can apply to the DFLA for commercial loans for projects that have a dedicated revenue stream in the short-term or a longer-term infrastructure loan. These loans come at a favourable rate, attracting a 14.5% interest rate, which is equivalent to that from the Reserve Bank of Malawi, and lower than commercial loans, which can attract rates upwards of 26%. The tenor of these loans is up to 10 years. To apply for a loan, the entire municipal council is involved in the application process and funds are disbursed based on availability. The types of projects that have been financed by the DFLA have ranged from rubbish collection vehicles to funds to update property valuation rolls. Unlike the FONIC, the loans are not disbursed to the municipal council directly, but rather used to pay suppliers. However, the relevant municipal councils are responsible for loan repayment, and the DFLA has seen steady loan recovery since its inception.

BOX 6.2 | New Zealand's Local Government Funding Agency

On 1 December 2011, the Local Government Funding Agency (LGFA) was established in New Zealand, under the Local Government Act (2002). The aim of the LGFA is to provide efficient and diversified financing sources for New Zealand's local governments. The LGFA is incorporated as a limited liability company, where each local government guarantees to indemnify each other. The local governments can borrow centrally from the government, but they also have a choice to also raise loans which are then bundled to local government. The governance structure of the LGFA is formed by 20% ownership of the New Zealand National Government and 80% of the 30 local councils. In addition, there is a LGFA Shareholders Council, with 5–10 members at any point in time and a Board of Directors.

It took several failed attempts throughout the 1980s and 1990s for local governments to come together to form a corporation to borrow funds. Ultimately some of the success factors that led to the LGFA's establishment in 2011 included:

- The global financial crisis coupled with New Zealand's growing infrastructure deficit that brought on the realisation that increased borrowing and diversified funding sources were needed.
- The passing of the Local Government Borrowing Act in 2011 that allowed local governments to legally borrow.
- Successful examples of local government corporations from Nordic countries that could be used as examples and then tailored to New Zealand's local requirements.
- An initial capitalisation from the New Zealand Debt Management office of 500 million NZD.
- An initial credit rating, delivered by both Standard & Poors as well as Fitch's, of AA+, which was equivalent to the national credit rating.

Source: New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency - LGFA (2016) .

These types of subnational financial intermediaries have an important role to play in terms of increasing the creditworthiness of secondary cities by improving their financial capacity. Through the disbursement of smaller and less expensive loans, than what they would access on capital markets, it allows cities to become more familiar with taking on debt and initiates their credit history. In addition, these institutions can act as intermediaries to help them access domestic and international capital markets, whilst providing local currency financing. Where they have technical assistance functions, like the FONIC in Burundi, they can strengthen cities and regions' capacities in terms of generating a project pipeline of bankable projects.

Across Africa, there are, however, only a handful of similar institutions, and where they do exist, their potential remains constrained due to legal, technical and financial barriers. For example, the DFLA has not received any recapitalisation since its inception in 1993, and the interest paid on the loans just covers the administration costs of issuing the loans and running the DFLA itself. The FONIC in Burundi has also encountered capacity challenges which has sometimes hindered the timely release of funds to municipalities. Another innovative model, as described in Box 6.2 in the case of New Zealand, is where local governments form a corporation to raise debt on collectively better terms than if they raised debt individually (LGFA, 2021). All these forms of financial intermediaries play an important role to reduce risk, provide competition, and foster subnational sovereign and national lending. This would be particularly significant with regards to secondary cities' needs and the fact that many of them will take several years to build their creditworthiness to borrow from capital markets directly. As such, overall support to subnational financial intermediaries should be strengthened across Africa.

6.3.3 Remittances

A feature of secondary cities across Africa is their proximity to rural areas and therefore the ties that city dwellers maintain to their rural origins. In fact, there is an emerging literature that refers to African households as 'trans-locational' based on the economic, social and cultural ties that are maintained by them at different levels (Tostensen, 2004). One area that these ties manifest themselves is in the form of financial flows between those who have migrated to cities and those who remain in rural areas, as well as those who may have migrated to larger primary cities and those in secondary cities.

Although the research of the impact of remittances on secondary cities, particularly in Africa, is scarce, evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean pertaining to international flows of remittances shows that the majority of these go back to secondary cities and towns (Orozco, 2008). This has become an increasingly important source of finance for some households, as trade, globalisation and migration flows have expanded. According to a study looking at remittance flows to eight secondary cities in Latin America and the Caribbean, certain cities with large numbers of international migrants may receive up to as much as 20% of the total remittance flows for that country. The same study shows that most remittances are spent on education, health, housing and insurance. The flow of remittances tends to have an overall consumption smoothing effect as a relatively stable source of income for households. This is also evident by looking at the aggregate data of remittance flows globally, which is evident in the fact that as there are economic downturns, the volume of remittances increases.

One of the few countries where remittances and their impacts have been studied in Africa, is in Ethiopia. In 2010, the World Bank undertook a survey that looked at both international and domestic remittances (World Bank, 2010). This study showed that international remittances were far more prevalent, that only 22% of the adult population in Ethiopia had received domestic remittances, and that the average size of these remittances was eight times lower than international remittances. In a more detailed study of Gondar, a city of about 342,000 people in northern Ethiopia, Zewdu (2014) interviewed 544 households to discern their remittance patterns. Gondar has seen substantial emigration since the 1970s, which also explains that over 80% of the remittances received come from North America and Europe, with the United States accounting for over 60%. The study showed that about one third of households received remittances monthly, usually reflecting their sole source of income. In these cases, remittances were overwhelmingly used to support housing investments, businesses, and education. Other households received remittances primarily on public holidays and other special occasions. Another finding from this study was that remittances are not only sent in case, but increasingly in-kind, in the form of electronics, food, clothing and other forms. These types of in-kind remittances are generally not captured in any official records but are an important source of income for households.

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Although the studies of Latin American cities, as well as the more detailed studies on Ethiopia, focus largely on international migratory patterns, as noted, for many African secondary cities, the same flows may apply; however, their intra-national migratory patterns may potentially be more significant than they are in Ethiopia. In all cases, however, remittance flows tend to be external to the government budget and, therefore, cannot be channelled in a way to support local infrastructure and service development. For most cities, prevailing institutional structures have

not yet understood how to capitalise on these flows and rather the absorption of these financial flows into the local economy, very much depends on the structure of that economy and the recipients of remittances relationship to it.

To tap into remittances as a source finance, cities must have structures in place that allow for the absorption of the funds, as well as their utilisation in the productive economy. This includes more financial intermediation opportunities for micro funds, the ability to develop and communicate pipelines of investment opportunities that remittances can be directed to, as well as designing local public services, such as education and health care, where remittances can be directed. To ensure that this can be done effectively, there is a strong need for further work on remittance flows in Africa, particularly amongst internal migrants, as we know very little about this to date.

6.3.4 Development Partners

There are several ways that development partners have been supporting secondary cities to date. This includes directly financing city government budgets, the provision of technical assistance to them to help create pipelines of projects, or simply supporting capacity improvements to generate more own-source revenue. This subsection will not provide an exhaustive list of what can be done through development assistance. Rather it will focus on the case study of the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) with examples of their past and present work when it comes to supporting secondary cities.

6.3.4.1 African Development Bank

The AfDB has been engaging with cities across the continent since its founding in 1964. It issued its first Urban Development Policy in 1992, which was followed by an Urban Development Strategy in 2011. In 2022, it is set to publish a Sustainable Urban Development Action Plan, which further builds upon these previous strategies and policies to enhance the scale, efficiency and harmonisation of its operations in the urban sectors.

In addition to its policies and guidelines, the AfDB established an Urban Development Division in 2018 to work directly with cities and municipalities, including secondary cities, and to coordinate the AfDB's investments in them. To further support work and engagements in cities, the AfDB's Urban and Municipal Development Fund (UMDF) was launched in 2019 to provide technical assistance to cities to support infrastructure pipeline development, urban planning, as well as municipal finance and governance. To take the AfDB's interactions with cities forward in a concentrated effort and create impact along the complete investment value chain, the UMDF has created a dedicated cities programme, which expands its cohort by five cities per year. In the first cohort of cities in 2020, two out of the five cities which were selected to join the programme, are secondary cities.

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> *To further support work and engagements in cities, the AfDB's Urban and Municipal Development Fund (UMDF) was launched in 2019 to provide technical assistance to cities to support infrastructure pipeline development, urban planning, as well as municipal finance and governance.*

A further important instrument that was approved by the AfDB in 2019, is its Sub-national Finance Guidelines (AfDB, 2019). These Guidelines provide operational and policy guidance for how the AfDB can engage directly with these subnational governments, as well as other non-sovereign entities. Furthermore, the Guidelines also establish and promote the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks for the optimal functioning of these subnational entities, focusing on sub-sovereign lending, land-financing reform, subnational balance sheet and credit rating, and subnational borrowing. It also enhances its support by engaging at the national level as well. This ability for the AfDB to be able to engage directly at a subnational level improves its responsiveness to cities' needs and, through this, making an increasingly effective contribution to augmenting the supply of subnational finance across the continent. One example is that, upon approval of the Guidelines, a line of credit was approved to Morocco's subnational development bank, the Fonds d'Équipement Communal (FEC) which it is on-lending to cities, including secondary cities, in Morocco.

An analysis of the AfDB's loan portfolio between 2010 and 2020 shows that as a multilateral financial institution, it has already had significant engagements in smaller cities and towns. This has primarily been because of the investments it has made into transportation infrastructure that improves connectivity between and within cities. Over 70% of the AfDB's interventions have been in cities and municipalities with populations of less than 100,000 people. Furthermore, the AfDB has reached 54% of cities in Africa with populations of more than 1 million people.

As noted, this example of the AfDB's work is only one of many other examples that could be drawn upon to show the support that both multilateral, as well as bilateral development partners, could have in supporting the well-managed growth and governance of secondary cities. However, unlike the AfDB for many partners, urban portfolios still largely focus on primary cities and, therefore, developing programmes that respond to the specific needs of secondary cities will be key moving forward.

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6.3.4.2 World Bank

The World Bank has been supporting African cities through various technical assistance and programme support. Examples of specific programmes focused on improving the financing and funding of secondary cities specifically include:

Ghana Secondary Cities Support Programme: This programme valued at US$261 million between 2018 and 2024, aims specifically at improving the management of urban services. The programme complements Ghana's overall decentralisation programme and provides grant assistance to enhance funding to qualifying municipal assemblies. The qualification criteria are the same as those set forth in the national government's responsiveness factor grant and district performance assessment tool.

Côte D'Ivoire Infrastructure for Urban Development and Competitiveness of Secondary Cities Project: Although a component of this supports the municipal governments of Bouake and San-Pédro directly, the focus of this project is to enhance private sector finance to cities. It thus aims to improve the business environment in these

two cities, which were selected due to their importance for regional and global trade, to encourage investment, and therefore increase employment opportunities. In addition, the project provides direct assistance to small and medium enterprises.

Uganda Support to Municipal Infrastructure Development Programme (USMID): Like the programme in Ghana, this programme also supports increasing funding to cities. As noted in the subsection on intergovernmental fiscal transfers, in 2017 the Government of Uganda consolidated all unconditional intergovernmental fiscal transfers to secondary cities into a single Discretionary Development Equalisation Grant. The USMID programme finances this transfer for 22 municipalities across Uganda for a period of up to 2023.

Cities Creditworthiness Support Initiative: This is a programme solely dedicated to improving the financial health of cities with the overall aim to improve their creditworthiness and thus unlock investment from private sources. Through this initiative, the World Bank provides comprehensive long-term support through dedicated training academies and implementation programmes. It has already trained over 650 municipal officials across 261 local authorities in 30 countries. An example of the Initiative's support to secondary cities was its work in Tanzania, where work under this initiative resulted in the development of public-private partnership (PPP) pipelines in four local governments, a climate-smart capital investment plan in a further three local governments, as well as detailed municipal finance assessments and own-source revenue reviews.

6.3.4.3 United Nations Agencies

One of the most important United Nations agencies when it comes to enhancing the funding and financing for cities, including secondary cities, is the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). This works to offer last-mile finance models to unlock public and private resources, especially from local capital markets. One specific example of a project in Africa that UNCDF is leading, together with Cities Alliance, is the Local Economic Acceleration through Partnerships venture. This programme focuses on promoting local, national, and global dialogues to address investment in rapidly growing cities and to create avenues for PPPs. It currently works in two secondary cities in Ghana, namely Cape Coast and Agona Swedru as well as Mbale and Gulu, in Uganda. In terms of financing for these cities, the programme is specifically looking at providing municipal and county level financial modelling, based on historical financial statements, that can help these cities better undertake their financial planning through cost and revenue projections.

6.4 Conclusion

Infrastructure and service needs for secondary cities across Africa are rapidly growing, yet to date, the funding and financing opportunities have remained constrained. Although this chapter has not comprehensively covered all the opportunities in this area, it has covered some of the most significant ones, which can be summarised as follows:

In the near term, intergovernmental fiscal flows are going to remain a significant portion of secondary city budgets. As such, finding ways to support national governments to stabilise these flows will be key in supporting secondary cities better manage their budget.

At the same time, it is critical that the dependence on these intergovernmental fiscal flows is reduced by looking at ways to increase secondary cities own-source revenue generation. This can be done through administrative and policy reforms, both of which can be supported by technological interventions.

Key in terms of policy reforms is looking at unlocking the potential of property tax and land value capture more broadly.

The financing options for cities in Africa generally, and for secondary cities, remain limited, but are growing. Accessing these depend centrally on cities focusing on improving their municipal fiscal health and through this their creditworthiness.

Secondary cities should focus on improving their financial management, such as by embarking on processes to adopt accrual accounting, as these reforms will help both establish and improve their creditworthiness overall.

Technology can have an important role to play to support reform processes, such as by improving the availability as well as integrating data. However, it should always be used to support overall systemic changes, rather than be a reform process in itself.

Important players in this regard are subnational financial intermediaries, and more can be done to support their work in this area. Furthermore, there are already financial flows to cities, for example remittances, which are not being systematically tapped into yet.

Development institutions, including multilateral development banks, have a very important role to play in this context. The AfDB, World Bank and UNCDF are some of these intuitions, which through their portfolios and technical assistance, have already managed to impact several secondary cities across the continent. Other multilateral and bilateral development partners should also start refocusing their portfolios toward not only primarily engaging with primary cities but looking at secondary cities as well.

The case studies used in this chapter, which have been selected from across all regions of continent, demonstrate the immense potential for secondary cities to unlock the potential of financing and funding, which can be built on moving forward.

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SECTION II.

Secondary City Case Studies From Eight African Countries

7

CAPE COAST: GHANA

KOFI KEKELI AMEDZRO AND
BRIAN H ROBERTS

> Ghana is a country of many kingdoms and has a long history of colonial occupation. It was one of the first African countries to gain independence, in 1957, led by its first president, Kwame Nkrumah. At that time, Ghana had a standard of living equivalent to 80% of Spain; however, over successive decades, its economy collapsed due to military coups and poor governance. This situation led to the country's implementation of the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programme and Economic Recovery Programme measures in 1983. Since 2000, the Ghanaian economy has recovered to become one of the strongest growing economies in Africa. National wealth and prosperity have improved, but unfortunately, the benefits have not been evenly and equitably distributed.

Ghana's development pattern is characterised by a north-south divide (Figure 7.1). Urban development is concentrated heavily in the country's southern half, where colonial settlement infrastructure was located, and focused on facilitating trade and economic activities. The north lags far behind the south. As a result, there are significant inequities in the country's development, forcing many living in the northern parts and other remote areas to migrate to cities searching for employment and a better quality of life.

Modern Ghana is urbanising rapidly, but Accra and Kumasi, which are the primate and metropolitan regions, have benefited the most from this improved prosperity. Secondary cities tend to have weak economies, poor urban management and governance, inadequate public and private sector investment, and are poorly connected by transportation and communications systems. These factors have been significant impediments to their growth and development. The government is seeking to address the issues facing secondary cities and to support their development (World Bank, 2018).

FIGURE 7.1 | Concentration of population in Ghana

Source: Africapolis 2018.

This chapter explores the urbanisation, growth, and development of secondary cities in Ghana. It examines some of the critical challenges facing the management and development of secondary cities and the policies needed to support their development. A case study of Cape Coast is presented, which explores the development issues facing this secondary city in more detail. The chapter argues the need for significant urbanisation and regional economic development policy changes to create more equitable and sustainable development for the country's system of cities — especially its secondary cities.

7.1 Urbanisation and Secondary City Development in Ghana

Ghana's population of 30 million comprises a variety of ethnic and religious groups. Ghana's urban population has been increasing quite rapidly since Independence. Ghana was 23% urbanised in 1960. In 2010, the urban population reached 51% (see Figure 7.2 Urban and rural population, 1960-2020). It is now estimated to be 57% urbanised (2020) and this is projected to increase to 73% by 2050 (see Source: Author's Construct based on 2018 World Urbanisation Prospects Review Data Figure 7.3). A significant proportion of urbanisation growth has occurred in the South, in the Accra Metropolitan Region. The migration stream from Northern Ghana to the South is very significant, with about 83% of the people migrating from Upper West Region going to Accra. In Upper East Region, it was 48%, and from the Northern Region, 74.7% (Adaawen & Owusu, 2013). Migration to Kumasi was 17%, 25% and 52% among those interviewed who indicated that they migrated from Upper West, Northern, and Upper East regions, respectively. These trends in urbanisation are not expected to change as the country becomes more urbanised.

FIGURE 7.2 | Urban and rural population, 1960-2020

Source: Author's Construct based on 2018 World Urbanisation Prospects Review Data.

FIGURE 7.3 | Projected urban and rural share of population, 2025-2050

Source: Author's Construct based on 2018 World Urbanisation Prospects Review Data.

7.1.1 Ghana's Population Growth

Between 1960 and 2010, Ghana's population quadrupled, from 6 million to over 24 million. It is currently 30.8 million and projected to increase to 50 million by 2050. The population growth is partly attributable to the improvement in life expectancy (from 43 to 64 years for females; from 38 to 60 years for males) since Independence. The increase in life expectancy is attributed to economic and social development reflected in improved education, health care, and nutrition (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010). The highest absolute growth in population was for the intercensal period between 1984 and 2000, although the highest annual average increase was between 2000 and 2010. The population growth rate increase between 1960 and 1970 was 2.44%. The intercensal period (1984 to 2000) recorded the highest population growth rate, peaking at 2.73%. The 2000 to 2010 intercensal period witnessed a marginal decline in the growth rate, to 2.69%.

7.1.2 Demographics of Metropolitan and Secondary City Development

Figure 7.4 shows the total and urban distribution of the national and urban population from the 2010 Population and Housing census. Ghana has a two-tier structure of government: central and local government. Local governments are grouped into three types:

- (6) Metropolitan Assemblies
- (56) Municipal Assemblies
- (154) District assemblies

Sub-district political and administrative structures include sub- metropolitan, district, urban, town, zonal, area councils, and unit committees. These are subordinate bodies of assemblies. There is also a complex customary land administration structure that overlays many local government decision-making processes, especially land management. This overlying structure adds to both complexity and delays in decision-making. Figure 7.4 shows the geographic areas of local government and the proportion of the total and urban population in each assembly or local government area.

FIGURE 7.4 | Urban and population distribution in Ghana, 2010

Source: NSDF Study (2013) based on Ghana's Census (2010).

Table 7.1 shows the changing share of population size, number of settlements, and cumulative urban settlements by size (class) between 2000 and 2010. Urban areas with a population of less than 50,000 are growing, but at a proportionally slower rate than larger urban areas with populations up to 500,000. This trend is expected to continue over future decades.

TABLE 7.1 | Distribution of urban population in various urban centres

Population	Class	Share of urban population (%)		No of urban settlements	
		2000	2010	2000	2010
>1 million	1	35	31	2	2
500,000 to 1 million	2	0.0	4	0	1
250,000 to 500,000	3	7	9	2	3
100,000 to 250,000	4	9	11	5	8
50,000 to 100,000	5	7	6	9	13
20,000 to 50,000	6	13	12	35	49
10,000 to 20,000	7	13	13	76	123
5,000 to 10,000	8	16	14	188	257
				317	456

Source: NSDF Study (2013) based on 2000 and 2010 Population and Housing Census by GSS.

Ghana's system of cities is dominated by two large metropolitan regions: Accra and Kumasi. These metropolitan regions create the most well-paid professional public and private sector jobs. Other cities and towns in the districts struggle to create decent jobs or attract skills and investments. The 2010 National Population and Housing Census data show 456 towns and cities with populations of over 5,000 people in Ghana. Nearly one-third of the urban population lives in the Accra Metropolitan region. Almost a third of the urban population resides in the largest cities (size classes 1 and 2). The remaining urban population lives in secondary cities, small-sized urban centres and the urban centres ranging between 100,000 and 1 million.

Between 2000 and 2010, the class-1 (metropolitan region) settlement share of the urban population declined. However, the urban population share of secondary cities increased considerably (except for settlement size class 7). This emphasises the significance of secondary cities and how they will play a significant role in Ghana's urbanisation discussion (See Figure 7.5).

FIGURE 7.5 | Settlement size classes, 2000 and 2010

Source: NSDF (2013) based on Ghana Statistical Service 2010 Population and Housing Census

The Accra Metropolitan Region had the largest share of the urban population, but this has declined from 35% to 31%. Notwithstanding the decline, it still had nearly a third of the total urban population by the close of 2010 (Table 7.2). The percentage share of the urban population in secondary cities increased, and the trend shows this is likely to increase further. Aside from the rise in the percentage share, the number of secondary cities and other smaller-sized urban centres also increased rapidly.

7.1.3 Patterns of Growth in Secondary Cities

Africapolis provides useful data to the change in Ghanaian metropolitan and secondary cities' growth patterns (Table 7.2). Population estimates published by Africapolis are higher than those of the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). They incorporate urban development areas that fall outside the boundaries of administrative areas designated as 'urban' by GSS. The Africapolis data provides a truer representation of the urban agglomeration population of towns and cities' economic structures. In Ghana, the annual average population growth rates for secondary cities have averaged 5.4% since 1990. Kumasi and Accra have grown at 5.4% and 5.8%.

TABLE 7.2 | Population growth, density and built-up Areas of Ghanaian cities

City	Population 1990	Population 2000	Population 2010	Population 2015	Population 2020 Est	Density 2015	Built-up 2015	Growth Rate (%) 1990–2015
Accra*	1,185,614	2,167,932	3,882,529	4,452,483	4,694,492	3718	1197.69	4.91
Kumasi*	684,899	1,207,199	2,376,694	2,802,344	2,964,812	5053	554.62	5.77
Takoradi	136,914	289,595	550,839	679,797	724,797	8063	84.31	5.85
Tamale	157,808	202,317	274,022	312,881	321,565	2157	145.08	2.95
Cape Coast	71,531	82,291	178,492	217,377	227,260	5720	38	6.69
Koforidua	68,148	97,378	165,633	201,417	210,340	3316	60.75	4.96
Obuasi	77,211	115,564	154,049	173,463	179,171	4643	37.36	2.74
Sunyani	46,279	77,013	132,530	152,389	159,829	1925	79.17	4.65

City	Population 1990	Population 2000	Population 2010	Population 2015	Population 2020 Est	Density 2015	Built-up 2015	Growth Rate (%) 1990–2015
Ho	45,396	61,658	104,532	135,349	141,395	4230	32	5.38
Techiman	34,094	56,187	99,964	127,596	134,513	2483	51.38	5.62
Somanya	14,064	15,600	87,303	111,948	121,633	3556	31.48	14.04
Berekum	27,643	39,649	87,008	111,449	117,841	3309	33.68	7.13
Mankessim	12,722	25,481	96,101	110,072	119,995	4809	22.89	10.25
Hohoe	25,505	35,277	85,913	106,138	112,368	8830	12.02	7.62%
Agona Swedru	35,994	45,614	56,080	101,476	105,771	5554	18.27	5.48%
Lomé/Aflao	26,393	38,927	73,389	84,649	88,688	6927	12.22	4.77%
Winneba	31,369	40,017	69,548	80,974	84,105	3245	24.95	3.87%

Source: Africapolis Database 2020* metropolitan regions.

The current growth rate in the three largest urban areas in Ghana is around 5%. In secondary cities, the rate is slightly faster. In satellite secondary cities, such as Agona Swedru and Winneba, west of the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area, growth rates exceed that of the metropolitan region. These are spillover populated areas and are becoming prone to significant land speculation. The secondary cities of the north are less densely populated. Still, they are experiencing high growth rates due to rural-urban migration and higher rural birth rates than in southern district cities.

The average urban densities of Ghana's largest urban agglomerations are around 4,500 people per km^2. Secondary cities like Takoradi and Hohoe exceed 8,000 persons per km^2 (pp km^2). On average, the per-unit cost of infrastructure provision services in secondary cities is relatively cheap compared to in metropolitan areas.

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In Ghana, the annual average population growth rates for secondary cities have averaged 5.4% since 1990. Kumasi and Accra have grown at 5.4% and 5.8%.

7.1.3.1 Inequitable Economic Growth and Development

Inequitable economic growth between cities and regions remains a significant challenge for Ghana. The core development problem for Ghanaian secondary and smaller regional cities is that they are not receiving an equitable share in the distribution of grants, infrastructure, investment and economic growth. This leads to growing inequity in regional shares of development and prosperity, undermining the country's development potential.

FIGURE 7.6 | Subnational Human Development Index (HDI), 1990–2018

Source: Subnational Human Development Index (2018).

Figure 7.6 shows the development index for districts in Ghana from 1990 to 2018. National Human Development Index (HDI) indicators have improved from 0.454 to 0.596 during that period. The HDI has shown that the most significant improvement in recent years has been in the country's remoter regions, in the country's interior. The HDI is highest in the most urbanised regions, as reflected in employment, health, and educational data, and in the opportunities created by cities in these regions. In the Northern District, secondary cities like Tamale still lag behind the metropolitan regions and more prosperous southern districts.

7.1.3.2 Regional Wealth and Capital

Ghana has experienced a significant improvement in per capita wealth compared to other African countries. Table 7.3 shows the mean International Wealth Index- IWI (Ardiwijaya et al., 2014) score for Ghana's regions for selective years, 1995–2017. Overall national and regional wealth levels have improved significantly except for in the Greater Accra Region. The map shows the deciles for regions based on the IWI score.

TABLE 7.3 | Mean International Wealth Index Score for Ghana's Regions, 1995–2017

Region	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017	1995–2017
Ashanti	25.4	30.7	38.4	48.4	57.5	61.7	3.93%
Brong-Ahafo	18.1	23.3	30.7	40	45.5	47.3	4.26%
Central	24.8	25.7	29.1	42.3	51.9	56.3	3.63%
Eastern	23.2	26.4	30.2	42.2	47.6	49.3	3.33%
Greater Accra	44.5	49.7	55.9	61.7	65.6	67.5	1.83%
Northern	17.9	21.3	26.9	34.8	41.9	44.3	4.02%
Upper East	18.3	20.7	22.4	28.6	39.5	44.7	3.96%
Upper West	17.2	19	22.9	32.5	41.1	45.2	4.29%
Volta	15.6	20.5	26.4	36.5	45.5	49.7	5.17%
Western	20.9	26.5	33.3	42.6	54.7	60.5	4.73%

Source: Subnational Human Development Index 2018 and International Wealth Index Map Global Data Lab.

The Accra Metropolitan Region's wealth growth has risen more slowly than that of other regions of Ghana. By African country standards, it was already high. However, the living standards and wealth in the country and regions have improved and had caught up with the national capital region since 1995. The growth in regional wealth can be explained by decentralisation and structural reforms introduced in the 1990s and the roles provincial capital secondary cities play in driving growth. The expansion of demand for consumer goods and services in these cities has created jobs — especially in informal trades, commerce, and transport, but little in the higher value-added manufacturing and services sector employment.

However, despite regions benefiting from national urban growth, wealth and capital are increasingly concentrated in the metropolitan regions and a few larger secondary cities (ESRI, 2020). There is significant leakage of money and skills migration to the metropolitan regions. Secondary cities are failing to attract investment capital or retain profits for reinvestment. This is because the control of capital remains largely with residents living in Accra and Kumasi, or with diaspora interests outside the country. The latter control capital in land and private money lenders (including foreign exchange) and financiers that provide credit for traders and farmers. Remittances and intergovernmental transfers and grants play a significant role in injecting capital into Ghanian regions and their secondary cities. The problem is that little capital is invested in strategic economic infrastructure and technologies needed to improve productivity, develop local value-adding or import substitution businesses needed to grow local economies. The results of this situation are that regional secondary cities perform poorly, are not well managed, and are under-capitalised.

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> *The growth in regional wealth can be explained by decentralisation and structural reforms introduced in the 1990s and the roles provincial capital secondary cities play in driving growth.*

7.1.3.3 Connectivity Between Systems of Cities

Until recent years, connectivity between regional capitals and cities in trade, communications and transport has remained low. Significant efforts have been made to improve the national and regional road, telecommunications, and electricity grid networks – especially to more remote areas. These hard infrastructure improvements have played a significant role in lifting national and regional living and income standards. Air services have improved to Kumasi and five secondary cities since 2010, but these flights hub through Accra. Air services that connect secondary cities to each other directly are infrequent.

However, connectivity is not just concerned with hard infrastructure services. Connectivity to support economic and social services relies increasingly on the availability and quality of telecommunications, involving the use of mobile phones and the internet, access to data and information, e-governance, and the networks of diaspora and business connections both within Ghana and outside its borders. Apart from the Accra Region, the country is falling behind in developing the soft infrastructure services needed to support local government, business, and communities.

A survey of Information Communications' and Technology (ICT) use in Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service, 2020) in 2020 showed 54% of individuals aged five years and older own a mobile phone. This compares to 99.8% of Moroccans, for example, of which, 75.7% had smartphones 60.6% had computers (National Telecommunications Regulations Agency, 2018). When the data from Ghana was disaggregated by region (Table 7.4), 63.2% of individuals in the urban centres owned a mobile phone compared to only 44.8% of rural dwellers. In Morocco, secondary cities had ownership levels close to 70%.

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In most rural localities, 80.9% of individuals use mobile phones for personal activities, compared to urban localities, at 67.8%.

TABLE 7.4 | Communication device ownership for regions in Ghana

Percentage Mobile Phone Ownership by Region

Region	Phone	Laptop	Desktop	Tablet
Ahafo	48.8	3.8	0.8	0.7
Ashanti	54.5	5	2.1	1.8
Bono	55.9	3.1	1.6	0.6
Bono East	48.3	2.8	0.5	0.7
Central	58.2	4.4	1	1.1
Eastern	52.2	3.4	0.9	1.3
Greater Accra	73.7	14	1.6	4.2
Northern	42.8	1.8	0.6	0.5
North East	37.1	0.5	0.4	0.5
Oti	42.2	1.6	0.2	0.5
Savannah	47.7	2.6	0.4	0.1
Upper East	43.9	1.4	0.4	0.5
Upper West	36.3	2.6	0.4	0.9
Volta	52.7	2.4	0.5	0.6
Western	49.3	4.4	1.7	1.5
Western North	47.4	1.7	1.5	1.2

Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2020)[1].

At the national level, the GSS survey results indicated that 73.3% of individuals aged five years and older used their mobile phones for personal activities, whilst 0.5% used them for business only. (This compares to 11% in Morocco, with heavy city-to-city business communication and online purchasing). In Ghana, levels of laptop, desktop and tablet use in regions, especially for business and education, remain low. Increasing the use of these devices for business and education would create significant opportunities for improved economic development and public service delivery, including health and welfare payments.

More than 58% of individuals in Ghana use online services for banking; the rate of online banking in Ghana is amongst the fast-growing in Africa (World Bank, 2017). In most rural localities, 80.9% of individuals use mobile phones for personal activities, compared to urban localities, at 67.8%. Online services for procurement of goods and services by businesses in secondary cities are strongly orientated towards Greater Accra Region. There is no well-developed city-to-city network of business and trade in Ghana.

For this to occur, local manufacturing firms and trading businesses in secondary cities will need to become more innovative and connected and identify opportunities to use ICT services to add value to the production of locally produced products and services — especially in the food industry. Increasing the use of these devices for business and education would create significant opportunities for improved economic development and public service delivery, including health and welfare payments.

7.1.4 Local Governance and Financial Management

A significant problem for Ghanaian secondary cities is weak governance and financial management. For most secondary city local governments, outgoings on wages exceed capital expenditures for works and asset maintenance. Most secondary cities do not receive their full entitlement of central government transfers. These are often disbursed months behind the due dates of payments. Most receive less than 50% of their annual entitlement. Financial management capability is weak; the secondary cities lack the skills, staff, technologies, planning and budget management capability to oversee municipal financing.

7.2 National Policies on Urbanisation and Secondary City Development

Ghana's first national urban policy was prepared in 2012. Before that, Ghana's urban settlements were managed using town planning/urban planning and its associated instruments. The first post-independence official plan was completed for Accra in 1958. Some town plans were prepared to guide other secondary cities and urban centres such as Kumasi and Tema.

The first historical document contributing to urban settlements and secondary cities' management was the National Physical Development Plan (NPDP) (1963–1970). It provided a vision of the system or network of settlements and their functions to perform as service centres (see Figure 7.7). In this plan, the NPDP sought to develop multiple settlements that would prevent the concentration and provision of services in a few settlements.

The NPDP emphasised the economic significance of population concentration, noting that "services and facilities can be provided to a concentration of people more easily and economically than to people who are scattered throughout rural areas (Government of Ghana, 1965.p.14)". Thus, NPDP proposed a policy of a "planned settlement pattern to distribute economic and social investments" and for the many smaller settlements to become urban" (Government of Ghana, 1965, p.14).

FIGURE 7.7 | NPDP Proposed location of service centres

Source: Government of Ghana (1963).

The National Development Planning Commission launched a national development plan in 1995 titled 'The First Step:1996–2000' (Government of Ghana, 1996a). It set forth a 25-year long-term plan for transforming Ghana into a middle-income economy. It introduced a planning framework to guide ministries, departments and agencies in developing their plans. With five long-term objectives focused on human development, economic growth, rural development, urban development, and the enabling environment. The plan recognised that Ghana's urban development was characterised by spatial polarisation. It noted that investment and development were limited to a few cities and enclave economies, with stronger linkages to overseas economies than its own hinterlands. It indicated that "excessive urban bias manifested by development expenditures favouring the major cities had deprived rural service centres and the rural areas generally of adequate investment" (Government of Ghana, 1996a, p.37).

The Ghana Vision 2020 policy document attempted to address urbanisation and secondary cities challenges. It indicated the significance of urbanisation to national development but encouraged equitable distribution of urban growth between settlements of varying sizes. Specifically, it discouraged growth in Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi and encouraged growth in secondary cities and small towns. The objective was to reduce the pressures on these large cities. It sought to resolve the social, environmental and economic problems associated with large towns and cities while establishing a "hierarchy of service centres" with links to the rural settlements. It indicated that public investment in urban centres was to be restricted to towns of over 20,000 persons (Government of Ghana, 1996a).

The next policy document on secondary cities was the National Plan of Action on Human Settlements (Government of Ghana, 1996b). The spatially significant strategies related to secondary cities were intended to reduce Accra's congestion and promote spatially equitable population distribution in settlements of varying sizes, particularly in small and medium-sized towns. It also sought to accelerate the growth of selected small and medium-sized settlements to provide infrastructure and services to support the rural sector and develop the settlement hierarchy via providing services appropriate to the population's size, including in the hinterlands. Other medium-term plans that the commission prepared were the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003–2005); Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2006–2009); Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I (2010–2013), and Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda II (2014–2017).

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> *It set forth a 25-year long-term plan for transforming Ghana into a middle-income economy. It introduced a planning framework to guide ministries, departments and agencies in developing their plans.*

The Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA-I) 2010–2013 was prepared following the National Plan of Action on Human Settlements. It included a section on human settlements development with a stated goal of achieving well-planned and spatially integrated cities, towns, and villages. It identified the over-concentration of towns in the southern half of the country as a problem. The absence of intermediate cities between key urban settlements and rural settlements has resulted in less development in the northern part of the country. The object was to achieve a spatially integrated settlement hierarchy to decongest primary cities and select fast-growing settlements. It proposed that new growth points should be established to serve as countermagnets to fast-growing cities and regions and to accelerate the growth of medium-sized towns to large urban centres.

The second version of the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA-II) 2014–2017 had strong spatially relevant objectives with the concept of secondary cities. It sought to achieve a spatially integrated, ordered hierarchy of human settlements and create well-structured and integrated urban development. It intended to promote resilient urban infrastructure and essential services and create an enabling environment to minimise rural-urban migration.

The National Urban Policy- NUP (Government of Ghana, 2012) Framework, prepared by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) and approved in late 2013, is the most comprehensive expression of urban policy. Ghana is one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa to have developed an urban policy with an associated implementation plan to tackle urbanisation challenges and capitalise on its positive externalities (Githri et al., 2017). The NUP has seven guiding principles, three of which are spatially explicit: promote urban centres as engines of growth; promote socio-economic development through an integrated settlement system; and facilitate socio-economic development of lagging and rural regions. The goal of the NUP was to: Promote a sustainable, spatially integrated, and orderly development of urban settlements with adequate housing, infrastructure and services, efficient institutions, and a sound living and working environment for all people, to support Ghana's rapid socio-economic development.

The NUP had twelve objectives:

1. Facilitate the balanced redistribution of the urban population.
2. Promote a spatially integrated hierarchy of urban centres.
3. Promote urban economic development.
4. Improve the environmental quality of urban life.
5. Ensure effective planning and management of urban growth and sprawl, especially in metropolitan regions and other large urban centres.
6. Ensure efficient urban infrastructure and service delivery.
7. Improve access to adequate and affordable low-income housing.
8. Promote urban safety and security.
9. Strengthen urban governance.
10. Promote climate change adaptation and mitigation mechanisms.
11. Strengthen applied research in urban and regional development.
12. Expand sources of funding for urban development and strengthen urban financial management.

These objectives have not been achieved in nearly a decade since the implementation of the NUP. For example, Objective 5, which relates to effective planning and management of urban growth and sprawl, failed. The Greater Accra Metropolitan Area has extended beyond the regional boundary on the Northern and Western borders, expanding into the Central and Eastern regions (Agyemang et al., 2017) (See Figure 7.8). The Greater Kumasi (Acheampong et al., 2017), Tamale (Kpienbaareh & Luginaah, 2020) and Cape Coast Metropolitan Areas have sprawled well beyond the administrative boundaries and capacities of the existing governance arrangements and institutions. There is little political will in Ghana to commit to proper urban growth management.

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The goal of the NUP was to: Promote a sustainable, spatially integrated, and orderly development of urban settlements with adequate housing, infrastructure and services, efficient institutions, and a sound living and working environment for all people, to support Ghana's rapid socio-economic development.

FIGURE 7.8 | Urban sprawl of GAMA into Eastern and Central Regions

Source: Agyemang et al. (2017)

7.2.1 National Programmes to Support Secondary Cities in Ghana

Programmes and projects explicitly targeting the support of secondary cities have been absent in Ghana for many years. The Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (UESP) was implemented to improve basic sanitation in Ghana's urban areas. Accra, the largest metropolitan region in Ghana, benefited from this project. Sekondi-Takoradi, Tema, and Tamale also benefited from the UESP. The only programme developed to support secondary cities is the Ghana Secondary Cities Support Programme Project (GSCSP) funded by the World Bank (2018).

The programme's development objective is to improve urban management and essential urban services in 25 selected municipal assemblies (MAs). It aims to strengthen the decentralisation support programme with responsiveness factor grants and its related district performance assessment tool.[2] The GSCSP seeks to improve revenue collection (internally generated funds) and provide services such as electricity extension, streetlights, creation of walkways along roads, construction of markets, solid waste collection and management, and construction of storm drains.

The GSCSP encourages the MAs to develop spatial planning instruments such as Spatial Development Frameworks, Structure Plans, and Local Plans to manage the settlements' physical growth and development within their territorial jurisdictions. This is because many of these MAs (which are secondary cities) do not have spatial plans to guide physical development. Hence, the resulting haphazard development manifested in the urban areas of these MAs.

The provision of the earlier-mentioned services is supposed to be based on the local plans of the MAs, without which the MLGRD will not provide approval for funding as a requirement of the projects. In addition to this, street naming and property addressing, which are heavily dependent on local plans, are an essential element of the GSCSP to encourage local plan preparation.The street naming and property addressing which is encouraged by the project also has the object of improving municipal financing via identification of businesses and properties.

The implementation of the GSCSP is a result of the increasing recognition of the significant role of secondary cities, yet the poor management and delivery of essential urban services in Ghana is partly due to the non-existence of spatial plans. Also, the provision of services is uncoordinated as a result of weak local government and absence of Local Plans to guide the service delivery.

The GSCSP will help improve the capacity of secondary cities in Ghana to develop critically needed infrastructure. A significant gap in the policy on the development of secondary cities is the lack of attention to improving the way secondary cities are connected into supply chains and how cities in regions and along development corridors can collaborate to enhance value-adding activities and reduce transaction costs. There has been little effort to plan for clustered secondary city development around the two large metropolitan regions' peripheries: Accra and Kumasi. There are also opportunities to encourage secondary cities along the East-West corridor, forming part of the Lagos or Abidjan development corridor and the Accra to Bolgatanga Ouagadougou development corridor.

7.3 Case Study - Cape Coast

Cape Coast is a secondary city experiencing significant management and development problems (Agyei-Mensah & Ardayfio-Schandorf, 2007; Cities Alliance, 2017). It is the regional capital of the Central Region (Figure 7.9). The traditional name of Cape Coast is 'Oguaa', which originates from the Fante word 'gua', meaning 'market or trading place' (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). The Portuguese named the city Cabo Corso, which means 'short cape' in Portuguese, and later, the city was later renamed Cape Coast by the British. It served as an important trading centre, including for the transatlantic slave trade. Many remnants from this period still remain, such as Cape Coast Castle, a major historical attraction and a World Heritage Site. Cape Coast was the first national capital of Gold Coast under the then British Colonial Administration, until 1877, when it was moved to Accra.

PHOTO 7.1
Old Gold Coast Slave Port

© Photo: Brian Roberts (2017).

7.3.1 Summary Profile of Cape Coast

Cape Coast is one of the oldest districts in Ghana. It was given the status of a municipality in 1987[3] and upgraded to metropolitan status in 2007. The city fronts the Gulf of Guinea and is the capital city of the Central Region. It has an administrative area of 122 km² of which the urban development area covers 38 km². Table 7.5 Summary Fact Sheet of Cape Coast is a fact sheet that provides a range of physical, social-economic and governance indicators for Cape Coast. Some of these indicators are analysed in more detail in the case study.

Gold Coast provides an ideal case study of a secondary city in Ghana. It is a university city and an important tourist destination that has significant development potential because of its tragic historical past as a slave centre. It has also been studied extensively (Agyei-Mensah & Ardayfio-Schandorf, 2007; Cities Alliance, 2017), providing some of the best historical data and information on a secondary city in Ghana. Its population is heterogenous, unlike other secondary cities in some parts of the country.

Despite the substantial historical investment in infrastructure and prosperity, the city has many urban development and management problems. These are typical of many secondary cities in Ghana. Significant support in the form of data collection and consultation with public officials was given to the authors, which has enabled insights into the city's economic structure and competitiveness.

FIGURE 7.9 | Location of Cape Coast in Central

Source: Author's Construction, 2020.

TABLE 7.5 | Summary Fact Sheet of Cape Coast

Indicator	Details	Unit Measure
Urban Area	What is the estimated urban area in the city?	38 km² (Africapolis, 2018)
Demographics	What was the Estimate Population 2020?	221,025
	What was the population in 2000 or the last census	118,106 (2010)
	Is the city's share of the national population growing?	Urbanisation 3.2% Ghana (3.82%) Pop 2.4% (2000-2020)
	Estimated Density of Population	5720/km² (Africapolis, 2018)
	Has population density in the city increased or decreased?	Decreased Est 2.65% per year since 2000
Economic Strength	What is the city's estimated GDP?	$426 m (2017)
	An estimate of how fast is the economy-growing pa?	6.8% (Est 2019) 6.5% Ghana
	What is the fastest-growing sector of the economy?	Wholesale and retail
	What does the city mainly export or trade?	Tourism and Education
Income Levels	What is the estimated average income per month?	700.00 ¢ (U$120) (2020) Cost of Living Survey
	How much higher are incomes in the capital city compared to the city?	Accra ¢ 1,992.74 ($US 341) 2.8 times (2020)

Indicator	Details	Unit Measure
Employment	How many people are employed in the city by industry Sector?	119, 500 Est 2020 GSS data
	How big is informal sector employment?	68.4% est. (2010)
	What is the unemployment rate?	11.9% (GSS, 2016)
	Reliance on remittances to supplement household income?	9% (Mazzucato, 2008)
Poverty Rate	Estimate % of households living below the poverty line	NA (Poverty incidence – 2.6% (2015) GSS
	What is the Gini coefficient	37.3 (2015) GSS
Public Finances	What is the budget of the municipality?	$ 3,006,535.00 (2020 composite budget)[4]
	What are the primary sources of funds and expenditure?	Federal Government
Infrastructure	What % of the city's population has access to potable water?	83.5%
	What is the total length of urban roads	Total road network 220.83km. 17.60 km. Asphalted, 106.93 km bituminous. 96.30 km gravelled
	What is the distance and travel time to the nearest largest city?	2 hr 42 min (147.0 km) via Accra - Cape Coast
	How many intercity flights or buses are there a day?	A number of buses move to Accra
	Does the municipality have a GIS with an inventory of infrastructure	Yes
Housing and Land	What % of the city's residents' lives in slums?	Est 30% (2018)
Health Infrastructure	Number of doctors per 10,000 people...........Doc/10,000 Number of Public Hospitals ....3.............No	One hospital bed per 1000 population One doctor per? people
Governance	How competent is local government? Very competent = 5 not Competent = 1	3
	Transparency of Local Government: Very transparent = 5 not transparent = 1	3

Source: Various hyperlinks shown.

7.3.2 Population and Social Characteristics

Cape Coast City's population at the 2010 census was 169,894, consisting of 82,810 males (48.7%) and 87,084 females (51.3%) (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013a). The estimated population in 2020 was 221,000 (Cape Coast Municipal Assembly, 2017a). The population has been increasing steadily over the various census periods; however, Cape Coast's rate has been below the national urbanisation growth rate. Since the 2010 census, the urban population has grown at 2.6% per year, compared to 3.5% for Ghana. National population growth for the country since 2010 was around 2.28% and falling.

Like all Ghanaian secondary cities, the daytime and non-resident populations are higher than the resident population. For Cape Coast, the daytime and visitor population are much higher than for other secondary cities in Ghana because of its attraction as a tourism and education destination.

Migration levels into the city remain high. Of the total population recorded for the 2010 census, 42.5% (72,162 persons), were migrants. One-third (23,808) of migrants were born in other parts of the Central Region, while 4% (3,120) were born outside the country, with 63% born in other regions of Ghana. The data also indicates that 15.6% (11,241) of the migrants come from the Greater Accra Region and 11.5% (8,305) from the Western Region, while only 1% (800) come from the Upper West Region.

The total number of households in the city is 40,386, with an average household size of 3.5, which is slightly lower than the regional average of 4.0 and the national average of 4.4. The average number of households per dwelling is 2.3, which remains higher than the regional average of 1.7. In the city's urban areas, the average is 2.6, while the average figure for rural areas is 1.7. The average number of persons living in a house in Cape Coast is 7.9 (8.9 persons per house in urban areas and 5.9 persons per house in rural centres). This figure exceeds the national average of 7.1 persons in a house and a regional average of 6.1 persons in the Central Region (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013c).

As provided by the District Analytical report (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013c), the economic dependency ratio is 49.1% when two working people (15–65 years old) must take care of one non-working adult. The literacy rate of persons 11 years and older is 90% higher than the national average of 74.1% and the regional average of 78.2%.

7.3.3 Urban Development Dynamics in Cape Coast

Cape Coast's built-up area has been expanding rapidly over the last two decades. In 2000, the total built-up footprint/settlements covered a land area of around 10.39 km^2. This increased to 29.80 km^2 by the end of 2018 (see Table 7.6). From 2010 to 2018, the total built-up area expanded by almost 15 km^2.[5] Most of this settlement growth has displaced forest covers, which had the largest share of the metropolitan area's total land area in 2000.

TABLE 7.6 | Land Cover/Use Changes in Cape Coast City, 2000–2018.

Land Use/ Cover	Coverage area in (km²), 2000	Coverage area in (km²), 2010	Land use coverage area in km², 2018	Absolute Change 2000-2010	Absolute Change 2010-2018	Absolute change 2000-2018	% Change 2000-2010	% Change 2010–2018	% Change 2000-2018
Cropland	15.20	41.53	16.57	26.33	-24.96	1.37	63.39	-60.09	9.01
Forest	87.87	34.87	28.89	-52.99	-5.98	-58.98	-151.96	-17.16	-67.12
Grassland	3.81	28.87	44.21	25.06	15.34	40.40	86.80	53.15	1060.61
Settlement/ Built- up	10.39	14.89	29.80	4.50	14.91	19.41	30.24	100.15	186.89
Water	3.37	0.49	1.19	-2.88	0.71	-2.18	-593.22	145.66	-64.56
Total	121.00	121.00	121.00						

Source: Eparque Urban Strategies (2019).

The settlement expansion rate is partly attributable to the growing population in the city, coupled with single-storey development. The increasing population growth has also mainly been contributed by in-migration and not entirely natural population growth. As much as 42.5% (72,162 persons) of Cape Coast City in 2010 were in-migrants. Also, the rampant settlement expansion rate exerts pressure on the limited infrastructure available in the city as the settlement expansion's pace far exceeds the rate of infrastructure delivery/provision.

FIGURE 7.10 | Land use/cover change, 2000–2018

Source: Eparque Urban Strategies (2019).

Settlement expansion has been most pronounced from the northern part of Fosu Lagoon, although the eastern and western parts of the core built-up area in the south are also expanding rapidly. (See Figure 7.10, Land Cover Change). The main reasons why the developments in the north part of the lagoon are increasing at a tremendous rate include (Eparque Urban Strategies, 2019):

- Availability of relatively flat land, which is easier to develop;
- Creation of new commercial activities (housing developments for commercial (renting/sales);
- Presence of Abura market (second largest in the city);
- Proximity to the Cape Coast Teaching Hospital, Cape Coast Nursing and Midwifery Training College and Cape Coast Polytechnic (now Cape Coast Technical University), which generate economic activity;
- Further development of educational facilities and their attendants demand for hostels (Cape Coast Technical Institute);
- Emerging entertainment centres and supermarkets (night clubs, movie houses, etc.);
- Sense of security (proximity to the Regional Police Headquarters just around Pedu junction);
- Availability of municipal services (100% access to potable water, 24-7 availability of electricity due to proximity to Cape Coast Teaching Hospital, good road conditions);
- Availability of a proper local plan (layout for some of the areas is pleasant and hence, attracts people);
- Relatively cheaper cost of lands in the areas developing as slums (these are common in the Abura area);
- Availability of newly constructed roads.

7.3.4 Built-Up Areas Density Changes

Built-up densities in Cape Coast have reduced significantly in the past decade. Built-up/settlement population density, which is defined by the persons per km^2 of developed land/built-up area, is a good indicator of land-use efficiency and can be used as a guide to estimate the demand and cost of infrastructure and service provision. It also offers a better perspective for urban planning and management purposes, compared to general population densities.

TABLE 7.7 | Built-up density changes in Cape Coast Metropolis, 2000–2018.

	2000	2010	2018
Built-up area (km^2) in CCM	10.4	14.9	29.8
Population in CCM	118,106	169,894	211,324
Built-up Population Density	11,367	11,410	7,091

Source: Eparque urban strategies (2019) based on Forestry Commission Land Cover Data and USGS Landsat 8, 2018.

The built-up population density in Cape Coast increased marginally between 2000 and 2010, from 11,367 pp km^2 to 11,410 pp km^2. However, from 2010 to 2018, a contraction from 11,410 pp km^2 to only 7,091 pp km^2 occurred (see Table 7.7). Over this period, rapid urban development and expansion of the urban area have occurred at the city's periphery, with densities falling rapidly in the central area. There was a significant change in compound size and reduction in the extended family living culture in Cape Coast.

Reduced built-up density and population growth have also widened the city's environmental footprint. The city is underperforming to achieve many targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A substantive effort is required concerning Goal 11 to halt urban sprawl, but there has been an evident lack of political will to do so.

7.3.5 Overview of Housing, Infrastructure and Urban Services

Cape Coast had 17,738 housing units in 2010, out of which 66.7% (hosting 75% of the population) were located in urban areas (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). Cape Coast had an average of 2.3 households per dwelling, which is somewhat higher than the regional average of 1.5 and the national average of 1.6 as of 2010.[6] There are approximately eight persons per dwelling in the city (nine, on average, in the urban areas and six in the rural settlements).

Table 7.8 provides a breakdown of housing in the City of Cape coast by dwelling type. The 2010 Population and Housing census recorded the most common housing type in CCM was the 'compound house', which constituted 58.2% of the total housing stock (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). This was followed by 'separate house' and 'apartment' typologies, making up 17.0% and 11.4%, respectively, while improvised homes constituted 1.3% of the total housing stock. Few persons were resided in huts (1.3%) or uncompleted buildings (0.4%). The city trend indicates that the percentage share of compound houses will decrease quite considerably while the separate houses percentage share will increase. Improvised homes (kiosks/containers) are also growing in large numbers because efforts to provide low-income housing or social housing are non-existent.

Overcrowding within the existing housing stock was high, and it is likely to rise, as the 2010 Population and Housing Census provided evidence that this phenomenon is prevalent in the city. As of 2010, most households, including one-fifth to two-thirds of households with more than three members, resided in dwellings with just a single room, depicting a high overcrowding level (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). Two-thirds of households in CCMA occupied only one sleeping room, far exceeding the regional and national averages of 64% and 54.4%, respectively.

TABLE 7.8 | Types of dwelling units, 2010

Type of Dwelling	Number	% Share
Separate house	6,859	17.0
Semi-detached house	3,82	9.5
Flat/Apartment	4,586	11.4
Compound house (rooms)	23,488	58.2
Huts/Buildings (same compound)	474	1.2
Huts/Buildings (different compound)	54	0.1
Tent	76	0.2
Improvised home (kiosk/container)	507	1.3
Living quarters attached to office/shop	156	0.4
Uncompleted building	173	0.4
Other	193	0.5
Total	40,386	100,0

Source: GSS 2010 Population and Housing Census.

There is a wide-ranging variety of quality housing in the City of Cape Coast. The dominant types of housing and the urban services provided have led to residential neighbourhoods being categorised as first, second-and third-class neighbourhoods.

The first-class residential neighbourhoods comprise areas with the highest housing quality, good road networks and clean surroundings. Water and electricity services are almost always in constant supply. Waste collection is by a truck on a house-to-house basis on determined days. These areas usually have greeneries that are well-kept. Green Hill, North Ola, West End, First Ridge, Second Ridge, and Third Ridge and parts of Pedu are the first-class residential neighbourhoods in the city.

The second-class residential areas have decent quality housing stock, with good road networks and access to municipal services that are secure, although not as regular as in the first-class areas. Waste disposal in most second-class areas is via 'skip bin', public dumpsite containers usually in a designated area. Residents must walk to these skip bins to drop off their waste. Drains are well kept in most parts of these areas. The structural integrity of buildings remains solid. Toilet facilities are generally in-house, and water is in-house or on the premises. Akyem, Abura, parts of Adisadel, and Mempeasem are second class areas, and they constitute the largest share of houses in Cape Coast.

Third-class residential areas are mainly in the old or core parts of the city near the coast. Poor roofing and wall conditions and poor structural integrity characterise most of these buildings, mainly due to their age. These areas are very congested, with minimal or no vehicular access to most of the buildings. There are no in-house piped water systems, and hence, households there depend on community standpipes. Most of these houses do not have toilet facilities and rely on public toilet facilities. These core indigenous areas are mainly home to informal settlements, with drains filled with solid waste and human excreta.

Rental prices and land values have skyrocketed in Cape Coast due to the high urbanisation rate and economic growth. Within five years, rents in first-class residential areas increased by more than 100% (Eparque Urban Strategies, 2019). [7] (Table 7.9) The rent for self-contained, single room apartments in first-class neighbourhoods has shot up by around 200%.

The second-class neighbourhoods such as Akyem, Abura, parts of Adisadel, and Mempeasem had the highest percentage increase of around 200% in rents charged for single rooms. Unfortunately, this is the type of room most of the residents in the city can afford. The smallest increase was recorded for three-bedroom houses/apartments in second-class neighbourhoods, for which the price increased by 75%.

TABLE 7.9 | Changes in housing rent in Cape Coast, 2015–2019-GH₵/month.

Housing Type	First Class			Second-class			Third-class		
	2014	2019	Annual change	2014	2019	Annual change	2014	2019	Annual change
Single room	-	-	-	25–50	100–120	200%	15	30–50	167%
Single room, self-contained	80 –100	250–300	200%	30–60	100–150	180%	-	-	-
Chamber and hall	150–200	300–400	100%	-	-	-	-	-	-
2 Bedrooms	200–300	500–550	110%	150–200	300–350	85%	30–40	60–90	115%
3 Bedrooms	250–300	500–700	120%	250–300	350–450	75%	-	-	-
4 Bedrooms	300–350	700–1,000	160%	300–350	500–700	85%	-	-	-

Source: Eparque Urban Strategies (2019).

In the southern part of the city, the third-class neighbourhoods experienced a rental price increase of over 100% for all housing categories for the same five-year period.

Within a short period, the surge in rents signaled strong demand and a dire need for housing provision in Cape Coast, yet resources and plans to meet these needs seem non-existent.

The rapid increase in rents in Cape Coast Metropolis (CCM), which is highly unaffordable for most of the population, has resulted in homelessness for some, and for others, sleeping in kiosks. These kiosks, which are mainly made of wooden structures, are usually not suitable for human habitation. They lack sanitary services and access to potable water. These have adverse health implications on the slum dwellers and the homeless. Aside from human-centred considerations, the kiosks also tend to mar the aesthetics of the urban landscape.

TABLE 7.10 | Land value changes in Cape Coast (GHc & US$), 2014–2019

Plot Size	First Class			Second-class			Third-class		
	2014	2019	Annual change	2014	2019	Annual change	2014	2019	Annual change
30 x 30m (900 m²)	5,000 $1,457	25,000 $4,586	38%	2,000 $590	15,000 $2,752	50%	-	100,000 $18,345	-
30 x 21m (610 m²)	-	30,000 $5,503	-	3,500 $1032	25,000 $4,586	-		120,000 $22,014	-
30 x 18m (540m²)	7,000 $2,065	-	-	-		-	-	-	-

Source: Eparque Urban Strategies (2019). Mid-Year Exchange Rate 3.39c =$1US (2014) 5.45c =1$US (2019).

Akin to the rents, the price of land in Cape Coast has increased tremendously across various residential classifications (see Table 7.10). The rate of land price increases surpasses the increases recorded in rent for housing over the same five-year period (2014–2019).[8] The land price for a plot ranging from 30.4 m x 30.4 to 30.4 x 21 m in the first-class residential areas rose by around 350%, suggesting an annual growth rate of approximately 70%. The increase in land price for the medium/second-class residential neighbourhoods was even higher as the price of a plot of land increased more than six times within five years.

While the land price is increasing, the city does not have any mechanism to capture and leverage land prices to finance infrastructure or services. Leveraging the sharp increase in the price of land is a well-known measure for financing infrastructure needs. Land value capture (LVC) methods vary significantly among different countries with varying policy and institutional frameworks (Eparque Urban Strategies, 2019). The Cape Coast Municipal Assembly can take advantage and develop some byelaws to capture land values within the city for developmental purposes.

7.3.6 General Municipal Services

7.3.6.1 Water and Electricity Supply Services

Pipe-borne water is the primary source of potable water in Cape Coast and covers over 90% of the city (Cape Coast Municipal Assembly, 2017b). It is supplied by Ghana Water Company Limited, for which the Metropolitan Assembly has limited involvement. As of 2010, 33% of households had in-house pipe-borne water, 37.7% for urban areas and 18.8% for rural areas (Figure 7.11). As much as 35.6% of rural households have access to water outside their dwellings via public tap or standpipes, compared to 32% of urban households; 14.8% of urban houses access to pipe-borne water outside dwellings, compared to a higher figure of 26.0% for rural households. An emerging and increasing trend is the dependence on sachet water. Of households in rural areas, 16.7% relied on sachet water and 13.5% of households in urban centres relied on sachet water as their primary water source in 2010. A 2013 study conducted by Ecorys (2013) puts this figure at 30.6%.

The city experiences intermittent water shortages due to the installed waterworks system's inadequate capacity to supply the entire city in the face of a growing population, as well as the educational facilities in the city. Perennial drying of Brimsu Dam (the source of water supply), power outages, the old infrastructure system, distributing water to the various destinations, and irregular payment of water bills remain some of the challenges confronting water supply in the city.

Electricity coverage in the city is estimated to be over 90% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). A few peri-urban and rural communities do not have access to electricity. Electricity supply to Cape Coast Metropolitan Area remains the sole responsibility of the Electricity Company of Ghana with little or no influence of the Metropolitan Assembly on service provision. The city experiences intermittent power fluctuations because of increasing demand, partly emanating from the new developing/sprawling areas. The other sources of power for lighting in the city as of 2010 were kerosene, at 5.8%, and torch/flashlights, at 1.8% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013b).

7.3.6.2 Waste Management (Liquid and Solid Waste Management)

The most notable method of solid waste disposal in the city as of 2010 was public dumpsite containers, popularly called 'skip bins', 56.7% of the populace disposed of their waste using this method (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013b). The urban-rural split for this method was 67.1% and 25%, respectively. Skip bins are usually full and spill over to their immediate environments because private waste companies contracted to collect them usually delay undertaking their responsibility. A little over a fifth (21.9%) of residents disposed of their solid waste at an open dumpsite. These sites are just concrete, open space/ground, or compacted slabs, and are not professionally managed. The garbage is usually burned, causing lots of local air pollution and a nuisance to their immediate neighbourhoods. The least used method was house-to-house collection by waste trucks, which accounted for only 5.5% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014).

FIGURE 7.11 | Types of toilet facilities in the Cape Coast

Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2014), 2010 Population and Housing Census.

The dominant means of disposing of liquid waste in Cape Coast is by throwing these wastes into gutters (36.0% of households): 25.6% dispose of their liquid waste through a drainage system into gutters, while 18% throw their liquid waste onto their compounds. Throwing liquid waste on the street/outside, disposal via sewerage systems, via drainage systems into a soakaway or pits, and other methods, are 12.2%, 3.5%, 3.0%, and 1.8%, respectively (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013b).

The leading toilet facility used in Cape Coast is public toilets, creating many public health issues. Usage of this type of facility is the same in both urban and rural areas. The second largest is water closets, used by 38.4% of urban residents and 22.3% of rural residents. The most environmentally problematic issue is open defecation, which occurs in bushes and at the beach.

The management of faecal sludge is a significant problem in the city because private companies engaged in these activities dispose of this waste in un-engineered landfill sites and other unauthorised places. Liquid waste management remains poor because storm drains and gutters are usually abysmally managed and often choked with solid waste. This contributes to localised flooding in some parts of the city.

7.3.7 The Economy of Cape Coast

7.3.7.1 Employment Structure

Table 7.11 provides an estimated breakdown of the industry-sector employment structure for Ghana, Accra, and Cape Coast. Location quotients are shown comparing Cape Coast with the Ghana and Accra Region employment structure. Cape Coast City's economic structure is dominated by the services sector (especially education, accommodation and food services, and health and social work activities), which employed nearly three-quarters (73.20%) of the workforce (2010 Ghana Statistical Service, 2013a).

TABLE 7.11 | Employment Structure of Cape Coast's Economy, 2010

Sector	Ghana %	Total	Accra %	Cape Coast %	Cape Coast %	LQ Cape Coast	LQ Accra
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	39.9	4,139,098	5.3	4886	7.7	0.2	1.4
Mining and quarrying	1.1	114,110	0.4	156	0.2	0.2	0.5
Oil and Petroleum	0.2	20,747	0.1	52	0.1	0.5	1.5
Manufacturing	9.9	1,026,994	14.7	8367	13.1	1.3	0.9
Electricity and gas	0.2	20,747	0.3	263	0.4	2.1	1.4
Water supply; sewerage waste management	0.3	31,121	0.4	306	0.5	1.6	1.2
Construction	4.3	446,068	5.7	3441	5.4	1.3	0.9
Wholesale and retail motor vehicles	17.6	1,825,767	31.6	16182	25.3	1.4	0.8
Transportation and storage	5	518,684	6.3	2491	3.9	0.8	0.6
Accommodation and food service activities	4.3	446,068	9	6521	10.2	2.4	1.1
Information and communication	0.5	51,868	1.3	555	0.9	1.7	0.7
Financial and insurance activities	0.8	82,989	1.8	759	1.2	1.5	0.7
Real estate activities	0.1	10,374	0.2	13	0.0	0.2	0.1
Professional scientific and technical activities	1.1	114,110	1.9	1157	1.8	1.6	1
Administrative and support service activities	0.9	93,363	1.5	819	1.3	1.4	0.9
Public administration, defence; social security	2.3	238,595	3.1	2051	3.2	1.4	1
Education	4.8	497,937	4.2	8751	13.7	2.9	3.3
Human health and social work activities	1.5	155,605	1.8	2052	3.2	2.1	1.8
Arts entertainment and recreation	0.7	72,616	1.3	749	1.2	1.7	0.9
Other service activities	3.9	404,573	7.7	3792	5.9	1.5	0.8
Undifferentiated goods - and services	0.6	62,242	1.4	492	0.8	1.4	0.6
Total	100	10,373,678	100	63852	100.0%		

Source: GSS Population and Housing Census (2010).

The Ghana Living Standard Survey 7 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2018) shows that, on average, urban areas have 32.4% of their working labour force engaged in wholesale and retail sub-sector, which substantiates this rapidly expanding sub-sector claim. The change of residential housing use to commercial shops in the city's core areas provides enough evidence for the booming wholesale and retails sub-sector.

The second-largest service sector sub-category that employed most people is education, which engaged more than a tenth of the city's labour force. This is attributable, partially, to the presence of the University of Cape Coast, then-Cape Coast Polytechnic (now Cape Coast Technical University), and numerous senior high schools such as Mfanstsipim School, Wesley Girls' Senior High School, Holy Child High School, Adisadel College and St. Augustine's College, among other private and technical schools.

Education is one of the main economic activities driving population growth and the physical expansion of the city. The University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast Technical University, Mfantsiman Institute of Technology, and Cape Coast Nursing and Midwifery Training College create a growing demand for hostel accommodation and ancillary services.[9] These institutions are located in the Pedu, Apewosika, Abura and Amamoma residential areas close to the university.

The food and accommodation sector, which is strongly linked to tourism and weekend visitors, comprises 10.21% of the workforce. Since the census, this sector has expanded, but it contracted significantly in 2020 due to the COVID-19 global pandemic. Several middle- to high-end hotels have been constructed in recent years, including the Pempamsie and Ridge Royal hotels, which significantly improved room space capacity at the higher end of the market.[10] The city still lacks good quality 3- and 4-star capacity accommodations, for which there is a robust domestic market for the growing Ghanian middle class.

Of great importance to the Cape Coast tourism industry are its cultural heritage and historic buildings. Cape Coast Castle is a European-built fortress initially constructed in 1652. Its associated adjacent old port served as a trading post for European nations and was the British colonial administration headquarters for Gold Coast. It is a dark remnant of Ghana's past. The city has many wonderful classical houses, office buildings and religious buildings (Agyei-Mensah & Ardayfio-Schandorf, 2007), but many are in a state of disrepair.

But Cape Coast is also known for its cultural events such as the Fetu Afahye festival, like all other major cultural events in Ghana, which brings music and dance performances and a procession of chefs that add to the city's tourism industry. Cultural tourism can help significantly to diversify the city's tourism base, along with ecological and educational tourism.

A significant proportion of the workforce in Cape Coast was once part of the agriculture and fishing sector. It engaged 7.65% of the active labour force in 2010. The industry is in decline due to increasing agricultural land losses and dwindling fish stocks. This population sector is among the least educated and most impoverished income groups in the city, as income is neither regular nor growing. A significant challenge for the city is developing education levels and skills within this workforce so that they may instead find employment in the trade, construction, health or tourism sectors.

> **"**
>
> *A significant proportion of the workforce in Cape Coast was once part of the agriculture and fishing sector. It engaged 7.65% of the active labour force in 2010.*

The city's industrial base is dominated by the manufacturing (13.10%) and construction sub-sectors (5.39%). Mining and quarrying are not big industries. The city's main industrial centre is located along the West African highway (Armin Shangri soap manufacturing area). A proposed industrial site is planned to be developed at Esuakyir, where all artisanal workers will be located.[11] A significant disadvantage for Cape Coast is that it is not a port city and relies on the port of Tema, 40 km east of Accra, for supplies and exports.

High congestion levels along the coastal highway and within the Accra metropolitan region mean high transaction costs, especially transport. The development potential of the city for attracting heavier manufacturing industries is poor. However, the city has the potential to develop small- and medium-scale more advanced manufacturing. To do this, it will need to concentrate on local niche value-adding industries that involve tourism and accommodation, services to government, the construction industry and agriculture-based processing.

The city's main commercial hub is the commercial business district (CBD), where most banks and commercial office businesses are concentrated. The largest market is Kotokuraba Market (Asante, 2020), the largest and most heavily concentrated employment centre, which is undergoing extensive redevelopment. The second largest is Abura Market, north of the Accra-Takoradi Highway (West African Highway).

The CBD of the city has become very rundown. Many of its once-proud buildings need restoration. Much of the city's basic infrastructure, especially WASH, requires significant repairs, improvements, or replacement. Roads have become severely damaged and encroached upon by illegal development. Given the city's World Heritage status, it requires substantial investment in essential services and building restoration to stand with other World Heritage sites such as Luang Prabang (Leong et al., 2016), in Laos.

7.3.7.2 GDP and Competitiveness of the Economy

Table 7.12 shows an estimate of GDP by sector for the Cape Coast economy in 2018. The total GDP for the city's economy in 2018 was estimated at US$426 million. This estimate is likely to be higher, as much of the peri-urban population commutes to the city for work and shopping and spends money there rather than where they live. The estimated GDP per capita was $2,500 compared to $2,214 nationally. Agriculture contributed to less than 3.6% of the Cape Coast economy compared to 19.7% of the national economy. The manufacturing sector contributed to 26.3% of the city's GDP compared to 31.5% nationwide. Services contributed to 65% of the city's GDP compared to 43% nationally. The resources sector contributed to less than 5% of the city's GDP. The GDP data show the economy is becoming increasingly service sector-oriented. Growth is expected in the education, health and tourism sectors, with a decline in manufacturing as the economy's primary sector over the next decade.

A study conducted in 2019 by Cities Alliance assessed the competitiveness drivers for the Cape Coast economy. The assessment applied a tool for the rapid evaluation of city competitiveness developed by the Asian Development Bank (Choe & Roberts, 2011). The tool measures 6 primary and 32 sub drivers of economic competitiveness (or performance) derived from 58 indicators. (Table 7.13). The indicators have importance or influence upon the overall competitiveness of each city's economy. The indicators consist of a mix of qualitative and quantitative indicators grouped into sets and subsets of drivers.

Table 7.13 shows the list of drivers and sub drivers and the number of indicators used for each. There are two sets of performance indicators measured by competitiveness. The first (2nd column) assesses the current level of competitiveness of driver performance for each indicator. The second (3rd column) measures the future or desired or aspirational target performance level set for the indicator by 2025. The difference between the current and target performance levels provides a measure of the competitiveness gap (4th column) in capacity needed to improve the performance of an indicator in contributing to the development of a city's economy.

The target date of 2025 is an aspirational timeline set to improve the performance of indicators. A target of '4' (see explanation of scoring system below) is equivalent to the achievement of national best practice performance; however, this may not be achievable for all indicators. For example, suppose Cape Coast is to improve the competitiveness of its tourism sector over the next decade. In that case, performance indicators must exceed the level of national competitiveness.

TABLE 7.12 | Breakdown of GDP and Employment by Sector Cape Coast Economy 2018[12]

Sector	Ghana			Cape Coast	
	% GDP	GDP $ (m)	% Employment	% GDP	Est. GDP $m
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	19.7%	12,915	7.7	3.6%	15
Mining and quarrying	13.6%	8,916	0.2	2.9%	12
Oil and Petroleum	3.8%	2491	0.1	1.5%	6
Manufacturing	11.3%	7,408	13.1	14.2%	60
Electricity and gas	1.5%	983	0.4	2.9%	12
Water supply; sewerage waste management	0.5%	328	0.5	0.8%	3
Construction	7.1%	4,654	5.4	8.4%	36
Wholesale and retail; repair of motor vehicles	15.2%	9,965	25.3	20.7%	88
Transportation and storage	7.5%	4,917	3.9	5.5%	24
Accommodation and food service activities	3.8%	2,491	10.2	8.6%	36
Information and communication	2.4%	1,573	0.9	4.0%	17
Financial and insurance activities	4.2%	2,753	1.2	5.9%	25
Real estate activities	2.2%	1,442	0.0	0.4%	2
Professional scientific and technical activities	0.9%	590	1.8	1.4%	6
Administrative and support service activities	0.6%	393	1.3	0.8%	3
Public administration and defence; social security	3.3%	2,163	3.2	4.4%	19
Education	3.2%	2,098	13.7	8.7%	37
Human health and social work activities	2.1%	1,377	3.2	4.3%	18
Arts entertainment and recreation	0.1%	66	1.2	0.2%	1
Other service activities	0.6%	394	5.9	0.9%	4
Undifferentiated goods - and services	0.1%	66	0.8	0.1%	1
Total	100.0%	$65,556	100.0%	100.0%	$426

Source: Derived using Location Quotients of GSS Employment, Income, GDP, and World Bank sector data.

The current, target, and gaps in competitiveness or performance are shown in columns 2.4 of Table 7.12. Each indicator is assessed using a nominal (Likert) scaling system ranging from 0 to 5 (see Box 7.1). In some cases, 0.5 intervals have been used in scoring indicators to refine the data.

BOX 7.1 | Scoring system

5 = global best practice, with Singapore providing a general benchmark as a best practice guide.	2 = below the national average.
4 =reflects national or regional best practice.	1 or below represents serious problems or issues associated with the performance of the indicator.
3 = national average.	0 = not relevant or measurable.

Qualitative scores are derived in several ways: using an expert panel assessment and averaging the scores (ii) the consultant team members assessment; information sources derived from public information and publications. Scores from the above assessment are rounded to 0.5.

Table 7.13 shows the current, targeted (2025) and gap analysis for drivers of competitiveness for the Cape Coast Economy. Information and communications technology services rank as weak (1.5) and require significant improvement to support the commerce, tourism, government, and education services industries. Improvements to the operations maintenance of infrastructure are crucial, especially essential WASH services and improved roads. Geographic information system mapping and inventory for all infrastructure and public assets are needed to enhance asset management and maintenance to improve urban services.

Land and property markets are inefficient, with significant improvements in transparency and a proper formal and customary land and local property tax registration system needed. A much greater focus is required on technology, innovation in business and government, and more effective promotion and targeting of business and investment opportunities. Many of these weaknesses for divers of competitiveness can be addressed to lift the city economy's development and performance over the next 10 years.

TABLE 7.13 | Drivers of competitiveness for Cape Coast economy

Drivers of Competitiveness	2018 Driver Performance of Indicator	Future Targeted Performance of Indicator 2025	Gap in Capacity	% Improvement in Driver Performance need to Meet Targets
A. COST OF DOING BUSINESS	3.1	4	0.90	23
1. Business Taxes and Charges	3.0	4	1.00	25
2. Business Regulation Procedures	3.0	4	1.00	25
3. Informal Fees	3.0	4	1.00	25
4. Utilities (Water and Electricity costs)	3.0	4	1.00	25
5. Labour costs	3.5	4	0.50	13
B. DYNAMICS OF LOCAL ECONOMY	2.8	4	1.25	31
1. Business Growth and Performance	2.8	4	1.25	31
2. Access to Finance	3.1	4	0.90	23
3. Business Dynamics	2.7	4	1.33	33
4. Land and Property Markets	2.0	4	2.00	50
5. Technology and Innovation	2.0	4	2.00	50
C. HUMAN RESOURCES AND TRAINING	3.1	4	0.92	23
1. Workforce Skill base	2.5	4	1.50	38
2. Available Manpower	3.5	4	0.50	13
3. Skills-enhancement programs	2.5	4	1.50	38
4. Research and Development/ Knowledge Systems	3.5	4	0.50	13
5. Education Facilities and Services	4.0	4	0.00	0
D. INFRASTRUCTURE	2.4	4	1.64	41
1. Transportation	2.4	4	1.63	41
2. Urban Infrastructure Services	3.3	4	0.75	19
3. ICT Services	1.5	4	2.50	63
4. Waste Management	2.5	4	1.50	38
5. Operations Maintenance of Infrastructure	2.0	4	2.00	50

Drivers of Competitiveness	2018 Driver Performance of Indicator	Future Targeted Performance of Indicator 2025	Gap in Capacity	% Improvement in Driver Performance need to Meet Targets
E. RESPONSIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT TO BUSINESS NEEDS	2.6	4	1.44	36
1. City Government Regulation, Plans and Policies	2.5	4	1.50	38
2. Investment Promotion	2.0	4	2.00	50
3. Effectiveness of LGUs in its dealings with business	3.0	4	1.00	25
4. Legislative Reforms	2.5	4	1.50	38
5. City Political Leadership	3.0	4	1.00	25
6. City Administration Planning and Management	2.5	4	1.50	38
F. QUALITY OF LIFE	2.9	4	1.07	27
1. Public Amenities	3.0	4	1.00	25
2. Environment Sustainability	2.8	4	1.17	29
3. Housing	2.5	4	1.50	38
4. Peace and Security	2.8	4	1.25	31
5. Public Health	3.3	4	0.67	17
6. Civic Pride	2.5	4	1.50	38
OVERALL INDEX SCORE	2.76	4	1.24	31

Source: Competitiveness Survey Cape Coast, Local Economic Acceleration Programme, Ghana, Cities Alliance (2019).

FIGURE 7.12 | Graph Showing Drivers of Competitiveness Assessment of Cape Coast economy

Source: Competitiveness Survey Cape Coast, Local Economic Acceleration Programme, Ghana, Cities Alliance (2019).

7.3.8 Environmental Challenges facing Cape Coast

Like most other secondary cities in Ghana, Cape Coast faces significant environmental challenges affecting its development and management. These have adverse economic and public health impacts affecting Cape Coast's attractiveness as a place in which to visit and invest.

7.3.8.1 Uncontrolled Urban Sprawl

The rapid expansion of settlements resulting from poorly constructed single-storey buildings and weak urban development control systems has resulted in a high loss of forest cover and agricultural land within and outside the city. Urban development is having a significant negative impact on important environmental and tourism assets. National assets, such as Kakum National Park, a major tourist site in the city, are under significant threat of urban encroachment and other illegal development activities.

7.3.8.2 Coastal Erosion

Coastal erosion is becoming a significant emerging threat to livelihoods and infrastructure in Cape Coast (See Photo 7.2). A study on coastal erosion covering the Elmina, Cape Coast, and Moree shoreline (Jonah, 2015), indicates that coastal erosion occurs rapidly in the city, posing a significant threat to residential structures in Gegeano, a suburb of Cape Coast.

Other areas of the coastline are experiencing rapid coastal erosion and damage from vegetation clearing and mining activities. About 285,376 m^3 of beach sand is mined annually by commercial sand miners in Cape Coast (Jonah, 2014), impacting coastal hydrology. The adverse effect of sand mining construction material is not just a problem for Cape Coast. Most Ghanaian secondary cities are experiencing severe seaside or river erosion problems because of excessive sand and gravel extraction, which is unmanaged and illegal.

PHOTO 7.2
Coastal Communities are suffering from coastal erosion along the Cape Coastline

© Jonah (2015).

7.3.8.3 Degradation of the mangrove and Fosu Lagoon

The Kakum River estuary west of the city has extensive mangrove areas that are infringed upon, cleared, and filled to construct hostels for student accommodation as well as a cemetery. The Fosu Lagoon, a significant estuarine and bird habitat, has been highly polluted by the spill of oil liquid waste from auto repair and illegally constructed piggeries close to the lagoon (Eparque Urban Strategies, 2019). These problems are common to all secondary cities in Ghana. There has been a limited willingness of central and local government agencies to enforce environmental regulations and a lack of public funds to protect and restore important coastal and riverine habitats.

7.3.8.4 Flooding

Flooding is a significant concern for Cape Coast, particularly in the southern part of the city. Figure 7.13 shows low-lying areas that regularly flood in the residential areas of Amamoma, Adisadel, North Ola and Ameen Shangai areas (Nyabor, June 21, 2018 Citi Newsroom.) Like other secondary cities in Ghana, there are significant problems with the maintenance of drains and floodways and a lack of pride and responsibility in maintaining drainage channels and waterways.

Teaching the community to be more personally responsible for disposing of rubbish and other wastes and ensuring the local government budget has sufficient funds to build transfer stations and provide good waste management services has been a significant failure of urban management in Cape Coast. It is beyond the city government's capabilities and resources to provide all the services necessary to create a clean city. More community catchment plans and partnership arrangements are needed to ensure that drains and flood ways are regularly cleaned and maintained. The local government should resource these partnerships if flooding problems are to be reduced in future.

FIGURE 7.13 | Flood risk areas in Cape Coast City

Source: Eparque Urban Strategies, 2019.

7.3.8.5 Poor Waste Management in the City

Waste management in Cape Coast is poor. With an estimated waste generation rate of 165 tonnes per day, the Cape Coast Metropolis generated about 60,225 tonnes of solid waste in 2014 (CCMA 2015). Private companies try, as much as possible, to deliver on their contract requirements. Still, parts of the city are not accessible by motor vehicles, making it almost impossible to collect domestic waste. Private waste management companies' capacity is less than the city's waste and an engineered landfill site.

A growing management problem is increasing contaminants, especially plastics and toxic substances, in the city's waste stream. Little attempt is made by residents or businesses to separate domestic waste (Gyimah et al., 2019), and efforts in recycling and recovery by the local government have failed. There is an insufficient volume in the waste stream for the viable recycling of plastics, metals and paper. Recycling needs to be better organised and privatised, with incentives to encourage recycling support in the community.

7.4 Priority Interventions for the Development of CAPE Coast

Cape Coast faces many development and urban management challenges; however, many can be turned into opportunities if given priority and addressed. Weak and corrupt management within the municipality has, over many years, stripped Cape Coast of its capacity to enforce good governance practices that are essential to developing prosperous local economies and the efficient delivery of public and community services. Cape Coast has come to rely on central government grants and transfers and international development assistance to develop and maintain essential services. These revenues are not enough to support the growth and management of the city.

The city must become more self-reliant, self-sufficient, and efficient in generating revenues from local taxes, development and infrastructure charges, and income from the sale of public services. It should also become more innovative in leveraging resources and public assets to create wealth with spinoff benefits for residents, businesses, institutions, and investors in the city.

7.4.1 Key Interventions

Three critical areas of intervention are necessary to improve the city's management, planning, and development to make Cape Coast a more sustainable, liveable, and prosperous place to live and invest.

7.4.1.1 Municipal Financing System

Revenue mobilisation and management remain a challenge in Cape Coast. The over-reliance on intergovernmental transfer (District Assembly Common Fund) (which has been decreasing in recent years) and low internal revenue mobilisation[13] and management make it almost impossible for the city to undertake capital investments in infrastructure and service delivery[14] to support the development of the economy and community. The collected property taxes are below what should be possible to collect, and a system for land value capture is not operating. Cape Coast Municipal Assembly lacks a proper property tax collection system. This is due to out-of-date property records, out-of-date valuation of properties and poor record-keeping.

Given the rapid rise in Cape Coast land prices, action is needed to make taxation a vital source of internally generated funds for the assembly. Because of poor valuation and record-keeping practices, there are no effective land value capture mechanisms to capture some of the excessive land value increases in the assembly (Eparque Urban Strategies, 2019). Lastly, the Local Governance Act (Act 936, 2016) does not provide the assembly with the opportunity to borrow from the private market beyond the threshold of US $2,200, coupled with the poor financial status of the assembly.

These municipal finance challenges can be overcome, provided local governments are willing to reform and adopt modern municipal sector financial management practices. A functional municipal financing system for Cape Coast can be developed and administered effectively. Its municipal finance regime can be improved with a stronger emphasis on internally generated revenue. Measure that could help improve the financial status of the assembly to undertake transformative projects include strategies to implement land value capture that works with the local setting, engaging faith-based organisations (FBOs) to come together to fund specific projects, and updating the data for property rates using national service personnel and interns with oversight responsibility of the assembly and the Valuation Division of the Lands Commission.

7.4.1.2 Urban Planning and Management

The urban planning and management system in Cape Coast remains very weak. The planning system is prone to profiteering, and there has been an unwillingness for many years to enforce development control and building byelaws. The lack of various spatial plans, such as a structure plan to provide the vision and direction for the city's physical management, remains a problem. It contributes to the uncertainty over the urbanisation process being experienced. The city needs a well-resourced and staffed planning office with a financial commitment to facilitate spatial plans and development control enforcement. There must be a political willingness to commit to good urban planning and management, but this also calls for adopting a more inclusive and engaging approach to working with communities, businesses and institutions to develop workable and enforceable plans, with a role for the community to oversee their implementation. Two crucial areas of urban planning and management reform are:

- **Integrated Planning:** The Metropolitan Assembly lacks an integrated urban planning system that provides unity of purpose and drives the city's long-term development. The medium-term development plans prepared by the assembly only cover four years. The actions and strategies involved in the medium-term plan are not strategic and transformational enough to provide innovative, radical, and progressive development efforts. For instance, long-term developmental projects/programmes such as urban regeneration projects to revitalise the city's inner core are mostly missing.
- **Institutional Collaboration:** Moreover, the various departments and units of the assembly's plans are implemented in silos without strong participation and collaboration from other departments and units. Cross-sectoral integration, spatial integration, multilevel integration, and multi-stakeholder integration are mostly missing (Gonzalez et al., 2018). Despite these challenges, Cape Coast has significant opportunities that can be harnessed for its sustainable development.

7.4.1.3 Development Strategies

Strategies that can lead to sustainable and equitable economic growth include:

1. Develop an effective and participatory urban management system and plans for the city. The CCMA and the national government need to develop a more efficient and participatory urban planning and management system to manage the city effectively. The assembly has to prepare spatial plans, employ more spatial planners, and implement an effective development control mechanism involving the citizenry and implement permitting regimes that incentivise multi-storey residential or mixed-use apartments. Citizens must be continuously engaged in all these processes and made to understand the plans and strategies. Placing local plans in the communities and engaging the citizens can teach them to police their communities and prevent unauthorised physical developments in their neighbourhoods.

2. Develop a comprehensive plan for tourism development. The city has many historical sites, natural tourist attractions and well-known festivals to attract more tourists to create more jobs and revenue. Unfortunately, the tourism sector seems not well organised to harness opportunities in the industry. A comprehensive plan for the industry and linkages to the education sector can create many jobs. Moreover, other strategies such as developing proper sidewalks in Cape Coast with a Green Infrastructure network, creating theme parks, and more, can help boost the city's tourism sector. The sanitation issue, which remains a significant roadblock to the city retaining tourists, will have to be addressed quickly.

3. Undertake an inclusive urban regeneration programme. The city's southern core and the nature of housing stock in this area require a massive but inclusive and participatory urban regeneration programme to revive the city. This can be done by collaborative efforts of the assembly, landowners/landlords, traditional authorities, real estate developers, State Housing Company Ltd., FBOs, the citizenry and other relevant actors. A medium to long-term urban regeneration programme can be developed, with the assembly leading the process. This participatory engagement can lead to good quality housing stock with much improved built-up densities and amenity levels. A face-lift can improve the tourism sector in the long term and help solve its housing problem.

7.5 Enhancing Secondary Cities Development in GHANA

The central and local governments can begin addressing the challenges facing the development of secondary cities in Ghana by adopting a more systematic, collaborative, and multi-pronged approach to urban management and sustainable development. Strategies that could be adopted at the national and city level include:

7.5.1 Promote Endogenous Employment and Economic Growth

Local government authorities of secondary cities, Regional Coordinating Councils, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and other relevant actors need to ensure that local economic plans focus on a more endogenous development approach. Inland secondary or coastal secondary cities without good quality access to ports will continue to face economies of scale and high transaction costs. Prospects for export-orientated trade development will be limited to a few niche industries involving mining, agriculture, and tourism. With the world having reached peak trade, greater prospects of decoupling in developed economies and countries such as China seeking to adopt endogenous growth and boost domestic consumption and production, Ghana's secondary cities have little choice but to look at increased localisation of production of many goods and services, as countries like Rwanda are doing.

In developing local economic development plans, secondary cities will need to create decent jobs, specialised and niche industries, and value-adding processing and services. These plans must focus intensely on small and medium-sized enterprise manufacturing sector jobs and other high-income earning jobs in the medium to long term to reduce the ever-increasing low-income informal service sector jobs that characterise most secondary cities in Ghana.

A regional analysis of the economic roles secondary cities can play, with linkages into regional or global value chains, should be appropriately considered in developing and implementing policies, plans, and strategies to promote employment in secondary cities. This will help reduce the consumption and unproductive secondary cities. Strategies strongly linked to skills development in emerging sectors like computing could also be considered medium-term towards the structural transformation of secondary cities' economies. Lastly, economic development policies that seek to limit investments into the national capital area (Greater Accra Metropolitan Area) to the detriment of these secondary cities should be reconsidered in favour of more equitable and balanced development nationwide.

7.5.2 Promote the Development of Circular Economies

Adopting policies leading to a more circular economy is necessary to improve Ghanaian secondary cities' sustainability. Ghanaian secondary cities are poor at waste recovery, recycling, and reprocessing. One notable exception is the collection of metal scrap for recycling. Efforts need to be made to scale up recycling, but this requires creating incentives and markets for waste products. Some companies collect plastic waste and recycle it into other reusable products, but support by the local government involving collaboration and programmes to scale up these activities in secondary cities is needed. One way of achieving scale for recycling is using regional secondary cities and forming partnerships with surrounding local governments to construct transfer station facilities in all smaller urban agglomerations. This would help create sufficient critical mass for some materials, such as plastics and paper, to set up viable recycling and reprocessing industries.

7.5.3 Develop a network of Corridor and Clusters

The development of the corridor and regional cluster networks of industry and cities engaged in collaboration to support value-adding and information exchange will enhance the overall sustainable urban development of local economies in the country Figure 7.14). The National Spatial Development Framework of Ghana (2015–2035), which undertook a detailed analysis of the urbanisation trends and the various evolution of settlement size classes, set out a proposal for urban networks development.

FIGURE 7.14 | Secondary cities based on development corridors and regional clusters

Trans West African Economic Development Corridor - Lagos to Abidjan

Northern Economic Development Corridor - Takoradi to Ouagadougou

Northern Western Economic Development Corridor - Accra to Kumasi to Bouake

Eastern Economic Development Corridor - Lomé to Tamale

Western Scenic Economic Development Corridor Bolgatanga to Sunyani to Takoradi

Regional Clustered Cities Economic Development Network

Regional Secondary City Hubs

SP   Sea Port

IP   Inland Port

Source: Roberts, Ghana Urban Forum: Accra, January 2020.

A key focus of the initiative is the provision of infrastructure and transportation networks within these clusters to help increase yield economies of scale, provide the population threshold needed for the provision of certain types of infrastructure, and deliver all the requisite higher services that cannot be provided when the secondary cities or settlements are developed. The concept is based on balanced polycentric development to ensure equitable and balanced growth within the networks.

Moreover, the secondary cities/settlements cluster can be a more pragmatic approach to achieving a more balanced population distribution. Lastly, the secondary cities proved to be more resilient during the COVID-19 lockdown period than were Greater Accra and Greater Kumasi Metropolitan Areas.

7.5.4 Enhancing Connectivity of Secondary Cities and their Hinterlands

The national government has been developing a good transportation network throughout the country. The Ghanaian government named 2020 as the 'year of roads'. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, this initiative continued for 2021. Much of the effort has gone into the improvement of the national highway network. Efforts to revamp the railway sector are underway in secondary cities like Sekondi-Takoradi, which is now incorporated into the national railway network.

A significant gap in the road program is the development of the inter-secondary city network. This calls for the development of a regular network system of subregional connecting roads and air services. This needs to be coupled with a focus on developing good transportation networks, developing regional roads to link the secondary cities and their rural hinterlands and enhancing connections to metropolitan regions.

Building improved subnational connections within the national road network will help promote the quicker transfer of goods and services, trade, and passenger movement between secondary cities' systems. The development of broadband and 5G telecommunication services must become a high priority for the government to support secondary cities' development. This is a strategy that has been used successfully to support secondary city development in Rwanda (THINKING BIG – Broadband for Development in Rwanda, 2014).

7.5.5 Establish an Effective Participatory Urban Management System

Urban management remains problematic, even after many years of support from the national government and international development agencies and banks. Secondary cities do not have the resources to manage urbanisation, and the willingness to reform has been slowed by strong focuses within the political economy. Until there is a genuine commitment to urban management change, the many problems and challenges facing secondary cities' development will remain. This is not a problem unique to Ghana. Reform to local government urban management is a global problem.

Improved transparency and accentuality are fundamental to better urban management, planning, and budgeting in Ghana's local government. More progressive practices, such as participatory budgeting, are critical as they encourage citizens' trust and policing of development. Participatory engagement in spatial physical and economic plans, which are the blueprints that give vision and direction for managing secondary cities, are necessary, incorporating partnerships for co-implementation with government, business, and communities. Citizens should be continuously engaged in all these processes, understand the reasons behind the plans and strategies, and have some ownership during implementation. Placing greater responsibility for implementing local plans in the communities and engaging the citizens provides a strong rationale for communities to police them and prevent unauthorised physical developments from happening in their neighbourhoods.

7.5.6 Second Secondary Cities Support Programme

The current Secondary Cities Support Programme is being implemented in 25 municipal assemblies under the auspices of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development with funding from the World Bank. This programme has been a major step in recognising support for the development of secondary cities in Ghana. A second, more ambitious program is needed to support projects and programmes that encourage greater collaboration between secondary cities to address scale and soft infrastructure to improve connectivity and resource sharing. Initiatives include developing data and information sharing for asset and infrastructure planning and management, shared public enquiry call-centres and e-governance ICT platforms, and pooled use of skills and technologies.

7.6 A New Agenda REQUIRED For Secondary Cities in Ghana

Secondary cities have played a key role as centres of local government administration and providers of higher-level education and health services, trading, and markets to support Ghana's development. Unfortunately, they have been a neglected area of public economic and physical development policy and planning until recent years. As a result, the development of Ghana's regions and cities has become distorted and dominated by Accra and Kumasi's primacy. The continuation of this trend is a high risk to Ghana if either of these cities is struck by a catastrophic event that would have a crippling impact on the country's whole. The World Bank's support for the secondary cities program is essential in recognising the importance of developing a more robust and more diversified city system, especially secondary cities, in Ghana.

The case study of Cape Coast identifies situations common to the management and development of most secondary cities in Ghana. Establishing an effective participatory urban management system and preparing spatial plans for secondary cities must remain a significant government priority. Most secondary cities in Ghana have been developing without spatial plans (particularly structure plans) to guide their development. The general urban management system needs to be transformed into more participatory approaches to enhance citizen involvement in planning and development monitoring and control.

A new urban agenda is required for the development of secondary cities in Ghana. This agenda must consider the need for capacity building and improved local government revenue generation; find ways that the national system of cities can become better connected; and help secondary cities engage collaboratively in expanding inter-regional trade, value-adding and governance. This is crucial to support the development and growth of more robust regional domestic markets and use public resources more efficiently and effectively to deliver government services. These transformative measures are needed for Ghana to move forward towards more equitable economic growth and spatially balanced development.

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ENDNOTES

(1) In 2018, a number of regions were split creating new regions. This increased the number of administrative regions from 10 to 16. The Volta Region was split into Oti and Volta regions while the Western Region was split into the Western and Western North Regions. The Brong Ahafo Region was split into Ahafo, Bono and Bono East Regions. The Northern Region was divided into Northern, North-East and Savannah Regions.

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(3) In Ghana, the main local governance units are generally called Districts. However, based on population size, they are designated as Districts with a population of 75,000 or less, Municipality with a minimum population of 95,000 and a Metropolitan Area being the highest with a minimum population of 250,000 (see Government of Ghana, Local Governance Act of 2016).

(4) Available at http://www.ccma.gov.gh/documents

(5) Note that 2010–2018 is 2 years shorter than the 2000-2010 period, yet the gains made from 2010–2018 in terms of settlement expansion have been very substantial and exceed the 2000-2010 decadal period.

(6) The Ghana Statistical Service was due to conduct the Population and Housing Census for 2020, however, with the onset of COVID-19, this could not materialize, and hence, only older statistics are used here.

(7) Values are approximate based on the midpoint of rent ranges and prices are in GH₵ / month.

(8) The data were collected and analysed by the author from a real estate agent in Cape Coast for Eparque Urban Strategies as part of a consultancy service for Cities Alliance.

(9) According to the Regional Director of the Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority, who has been managing the Physical Planning Department of CCM, educational land use constitutes a substantial amount of the total land use in the city.

(10) This information was gathered through a field interview with a hotelier at Pempamsie hotel.

(11) This information was obtained from the Regional Director of LUSPA.

(12) Subnational data on Ghana's GDP at a regional level is not publicly available. The estimates for GDP are derived from Ghana Census Employment Data 2010, Ghana Living Standards Data, and employment updates.

(13) The sources of funds to the CCMA are transfers, internally generated funds (IGFs), and donations and grants. Moreover, the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) is also supposed to supplement these sources, but the framework is not working properly and budgetary allocation to planning bodies is inadequate.

(14) From 2006 to 2015, the funds transferred to the assembly have fluctuated considerably. While in earlier years, excess payments were made to the assembly, recent years have shown a drastic reduction in the receipts from the DACF compared to projections, which reached as low as 4% in 2014 (IEER 2017).In 2018, a number of regions were split creating new regions. This increased the number of administrative regions from 10 to 16. The Volta Region was split into Oti and Volta regions while the Western Region was split into the Western and Western North Regions. The Brong Ahafo Region was split into Ahafo, Bono and Bono East Regions. The Northern Region was divided into Northern, North-East and Savannah Regions.

8

DIRE-DAWA: ETHIOPIA

SAMSON KASSAHUN

Ethiopia is one of the oldest continuing civilisations in Africa. Located in the Horn of Africa, it is surrounded by six countries: Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Kenya. It occupies a total area of 1.1 million km². With over 110 million people, it has the second-highest population in Africa and is the most populated landlocked country globally. The population is highly diverse, both geographically and culturally, with over 80 different ethnic groups. It is also one of the least urbanised countries in Africa.

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a developing country with a GDP of US$107.6 billion (2019) and a per capita GDP of $936 (World Bank Database, 2021). It ranks 184 out of 213 countries in global GDP per capita. The country is composed of 10 national regional states: Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region; (SNNPR), Gambella and Harari, and Sidama; and two administrative cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

This chapter seeks to delve into the changes and opportunities for the development of secondary cities. It presents an overview of urbanisation in Ethiopia and conducts a case study investigation of the secondary city of Dire Dawa. The city has a population of 466,000 and is in the eastern part of the country on the Dechatu River and railway to Djibouti. It is the second-largest city in the country, after Addis Abba, the national capital (Central Statistics Agency, 2013), with a university and industrial centre. It was selected as the case study for the chapter because many of the urban management challenges it faces are common to other secondary cities in Ethiopia. The learning outcomes presented at the end of the chapter provide a basis for suggested urban policy initiatives and reforms to support the country's sustainable development and the management of its secondary cities.

8.1 Urbanisation and Secondary City Development in Ethiopia

8.1.1 History of Urbanisation

The pattern of urbanisation and the history of urban development in Ethiopia have significantly shaped the development of Ethiopian socio-economic, political, and cultural systems (Mammo, 1994; Akalu, 1973). Urban habitation in Ethiopia dates to the Axumite period around the 1st century AD. Axum and Lalibela Gondar (Solomon, 1996) were major symbolic politico-religious centres, which occupied a prominent place in the pre-twentieth century urbanisation. As the country's first political capital, Axum has symbolic importance in its urban history, with Dungur Palace being a place of great importance (Butzer, 1981).

PHOTO 8.1
Dungur Palace Axum

© Google Travel.

The eleventh and twelfth century towns such as Lalibela began flourishing, reflecting the magnificent architectural skills of that time and the establishment of Gondar as the national political capital. Small towns were an essential feature of the Ethiopian social and geographical landscape in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With such significant institutions as palaces, markets, and churches performing a central role in the development, smaller towns such as Adwa, Motta, Dima, Ankober, Debre Birhan, and Debre Tabor emerged as centres of diverse permanent populations and commercial activities. Traditional economic structures characterised the initial stage of the urbanisation process. The history of urban development in Ethiopia following the Axumite period was marked by the absence of fixed urban centres resulting from the 'political nomadism' that prevailed in the country until Addis Ababa was built as the permanent seat of the government by Emperor Menelik II at the end of the nineteenth century.

A combination of physical, socio-economic, and political factors acted as forces in the lack of permanency and development of urban centres in pre-twentieth century Ethiopia. The rugged terrain and mountainous nature of the country hindered urban development. The topography prohibited contact between people and encouraged regionalism and regional isolation due to transportation and communications challenges (Mesfin, 1965). Consequently, Ethiopia entered the twentieth century with an exceedingly poorly developed urban base. Only three urban centres, Addis Ababa, Harar, and Mekele, had more than 10,000 people at the beginning of the twentieth century (Mammo, 1994).

8.1.2 Municipal Government Arrangements in Ethiopia

Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have been established as 'Chartered Cities', accountable directly to the federal government, giving them status equivalent to regions. Addis Ababa is the country's only primate city of over 3 million; it is 10 times larger than Dire Dawa, considered the second-largest city (Central Statistics Agency, 2013). Addis Ababa contains about 25% of the country's urban population.

Ethiopia had a tradition of centralist authoritarian government until 1991 (Mongabay, 2022). Municipal structures were established in some cities, but the mayors were centrally appointed, and municipalities were treated as branches of the central government. When the current government came to power in 1991, it proclaimed a decentralised form of government. It developed a constitution that established the Federal Democratic Republic, consisting of nine regional states, the federal capital city of Addis Ababa, and the special administrative region of Dire Dawa. The government structure has four tiers — federal, regional, woreda (or city/municipal), and kebele (neighbourhood). The nine regional states have their constitutions. The country has introduced a dramatic change in terms of its traditions of governance. This legal framework has enabled increased participation of the regional states in matters that concern them.

Within the regions, cities and towns are classified either as urban administrations (accountable directly to the regional government) or woreda administrations (accountable to the woreda council). There are 925 urban settlements in Ethiopia, of which 84 have been granted status as urban administrations (as of February 2007). These generally have populations over 20,000. The vast majority (819 out of 925) of urban centres are classified as having a population of less than 20,000. There are 507 which have a population of less than 5,000. Figure 8.1 shows the agglomeration pattern of urban settlements in Ethiopia, most of which are located along valleys and ancient highways.

Some urban areas were governed by a parallel system of municipal government in which institutional structures, rights and responsibilities were assigned in legislation dating from 1945 (Federal Negarit Gazeta, 1945). Under the highly centralised Derg regime (1974-1991), Ethiopia's municipalities were marginalised and did not function as independent local authorities. Since 2000, national decentralisation policies have formed part of large-scale government reform, creating institutional and legal frameworks for urban local government authorities. The objective has been to create and strengthen urban local government to ensure public participation, democratisation, and decentralised service delivery through institutional reforms, capacity building, systems development, and training.

FIGURE 8.1 | Agglomeration pattern of urban settlement in Ethiopia

Source: Africapolis Database OECD(2020).

In most regions, the Bureaus of Works and Urban Development are responsible for the regional government's urban management and development issues. Most regions that have enacted legislation creating urban local government (or city) authorities have adopted an urban governance model that follows the elected council, elected mayor, mayor's committee, and city manager system.

At the federal government level, responsibility for urban development matters lies with the Ministry of Works and Urban Development (MUDC) and rural development with the Ministry of Agriculture.[1] Of the 925 urban settlements categorised as 'towns' by the Central Statistical Agency, 84 have been granted status as urban administrations, regarding the Regional City Proclamations referred to above (as of February 2007). As explained above, most others — mainly small settlements with populations less than 20,000 — have not. These smaller urban settlements function within and under the authority of woredas, pending their being granted separate formal status under the region's urban legislation.

The Ministry of Urban Development and Construction (MUDHCo) defines and describes urban centres of different sizes, types of activity, levels of service provision, and importance in the national urban hierarchy in the following manner (NCE, EDRI & GGGI, 2015):

- Metropolis (capital) city is the highest order settlement, including global cities with more than 5 million. In a national context, this refers to Addis Ababa, as it serves the highest order functions, such as the seat of government, the economic powerhouse, and the centre of culture.
- Regiopolis (primary) cities are defined as cities that have participated in CBDSD/UDF/ULGDP)[2] projects, excluding Addis Ababa, and including all nine regional capital cities and Dire Dawa. These cities may specialise or focus on a lower economic activity level and have a level of infrastructural organisation and complexity mainly focused within the urban core or 'downtown' area.
- Secondary cities are defined as the 18 cities that will only participate in the ULGDP capacity-building component. These cities are currently regionally important settlements, but in the future may evolve in size and prominence to regiopolis (primary) city status.

- Tertiary cities are those with a population of 20,000 or more. Tertiary cities function as access points to infrastructure and economic activities within zones and feature developed areas for commercial and light industrial activities, but most are designed around residential needs.

- Urban villages are settlements identified as towns or urban agglomerations in the 2007 Combined statistical area census with 19,999 or less (CSA, 2007). These areas may have no clear zoning and may be communities that have grown organically from previously rural areas.

8.1.3 Demographics of Primary and Secondary City Development

However, the urban population is increasing rapidly, with an average growth rate of 4% per annum. The national census, conducted in May 2007 (CSA,2007), has exhibited higher urban population figures and growth rates.

Ethiopia is approximately 22% urbanised, with 24.6 million people living in urban areas (CSA, 2007. Figure 8.2 Ethiopia urban, rural and total populations (1950-2050 projected). Ethiopia is expected to reach 40% urbanisation and an urban population of 50 million by 2050; compared to other African countries, Ethiopia's level of urbanisation is low, but the urbanisation growth rate for the country exceeds 4.6% per annum (World Bank, 2020). The current growth rate is expected to fall, with an urbanisation level and population level by 2050 of 40% and 75 million, respectively (World Bank Group, 2015). Addis Ababa, with more than 3 million inhabitants, dominates the hierarchy of the country's urban system. Much of the country's economy is based on agriculture, with coffee being the most significant export product.

FIGURE 8.2 | Ethiopia urban, rural and total populations (1950-2050 projected)

Source: UN Urbanisation Prospects (2018).

Migration plays a significant role in urban population growth in Ethiopia (see discussion, Chapter 5). Figure 8.3 shows factors contributing to urban growth in Ethiopia, 2008–2037 based on the Ethiopian Urbanisation Review estimates. The urban population is expected to reach 36 million by 2028. Rural-urban migration is likely to contribute to more than half the urban population growth rate by 2037 (UN, 2018) A significant proportion of this will involve migration to secondary cities.

FIGURE 8.3 | Decomposition of factors contributing to urban growth in Ethiopia, 2008–2037

Legend:
- Natural Increase
- Rural-Urban Migration
- Migration to Sugar Factories
- Migration to Irrigation Projects
- Upgrading of Rural Villages to Towns
- Expansion of Urban Areas

Source: Cities Alliance & World Bank (2015: p.130).

Figure 8.3 shows the percentage of the migrant population in regional capitals in 2007, the census year. Regional capital cities in Asosa, Harar, Semera and Logia are experiencing large increases in the growth rates of rural-urban migration. Some of this is associated with refugee movement. These cities are struggling to cope with rapid urbanisation (CSA, 2007)

The proportion of migrants in seven cities in 2007 ranged between 52% and 72% (Figure 8.4), indicating that more than half of the population are migrants in the majority of these cities. It is projected that by 2037, the major cities will house nearly a million people each. Migration remains a significant contributor to urban population growth (World Bank & GFDRR, 2017, p. 164). In these cities, more than half of the population are migrants. The migrant population in Jigjiga and Dire Dawa was a significantly smaller proportion of the population but rose more sharply. It is projected that by 2037, the population of the 10 major regional major cities will house nearly a million people each (CSA, 2007).

FIGURE 8.4 | Percentage of the migrant population in regional capitals in 2007

City	Percentage
Addis Ababa	47.6
Semera-Logia	71.6
Mekelle	52.4
Jigjiga	25.5
Hawassa	60
Harar	43.3
Gambella	58.8
Dire Dawa	29.6
Bahir Dar	55.6
Assosa	68.1
Adama	59.2

Source: Central Statistics Agency (2007).

The population estimates for 2020 and the urban administrative area for the 10 largest Ethiopian cities are summarised in the table in Figure 8.5 Ethiopia urban concentration of population (estimates 2020). Addis Adaba has the country's largest urban population. It is the only city in the country with a size of more than a million inhabitants. Figure 8.2 shows the location of these towns within regions, followed by a brief description of the 10 largest cities in order of population size.

Data and information on the growth and development of secondary cities in Ethiopia are poor. The last census was conducted in 2007, and 2019 was postponed. Figure 8.5 shows the current concentrations of urban population and 2020 estimates for the 10 largest cities. Most of Ethiopia's urban population is concentrated in Dire Dawa, Adama and Mekele, followed by Hawassa and Bahir Dar. Figure 8.5 shows estimated population projections in regional capitals 2017–2037.

FIGURE 8.5 | Ethiopia urban concentration of population (estimates 2020)

Name	Population
Addis Ababa	2,757,729
Dire Dawa	252,279
Mek'ele	215,546
Nazret	213,995
Bahir Dar	168,899
Gondar	153,914
Dese	136,056
Hawassa	133,097
Jimma	128,306
Bishoftu	104,215

Population
56K+ 100K+ 250K+ 500K+ 750K+ 1M+ 2.5M+

Ethiopia Area and Population Density

The surface area in Ethiopia is currently at 1,104.300km2 (or 426,372,6137 miles sqaure). Ethiopia has a population density of 83 people per square mile (214/square mile), which ranks 123rd in the world.

Source: World Population Review (2021).

FIGURE 8.6 | Population projections in regional capitals, 2017–2037

Source: Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency(2013) and World Bank (2017) estimates.

Table 8.1 shows the town and city size distribution in Ethiopia from 1960 to 2007. The 2007 census report recorded 927 urban centres in the country. In terms of size distribution, towns of lower order are numerous. For example, there were only 43 towns with a population size of 2,000 to 4,999 in 1960, and in 2007 there were 325 towns. On the other hand, there were only 5 towns with a population size of 20,000 to 49,999 in 1960, and the number had increased to 61 in 2007. A study on urbanisation and urban land-use efficiency in the regional secondary cities and Addis Ababa satellite cities provide a good insight into how many of these cities are growing (Koroso et al., 2021).

TABLE 8.1 | Town and city size distribution in Ethiopia, 1960–2008

		Year				
Settlement Hierarchy	Population size	1960	1975	1984	1994	2007
Large Cities	1,000,000+	0	1	1	1	1
Medium Size Cities	200,000-499,999	1	0	0	0	3
Medium Towns	100,000-199,999	0	0	0	3	8
	50,000-99,999	0	3	10	9	15
Medium Towns	20,000-49,999	5	8	13	30	61
	10,000-19,999	5	22	38	69	145
Small Towns	5,000-9,999	20	73	78	123	208
	2,000-4,999	43	107	198	294	325
	<2000	310	335	372	396	161
Total	All	384	549	710	925	927

Source: Computed from CSA survey of 1960 and 1975; CSA Census of 1984 and 2007.

8.1.4 City Profiles

The following provides a brief description of the 10 largest cities (see Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.7).

Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia, and it was established in 1886. In 2017 the population was estimated at 3,434,000. Addis Ababa is one of the older primate cities in Africa. At an average altitude of 2400 m above sea level, it is also one of Africa's highest placed cities. Addis Ababa hosts regional organisations such as the Organization of African Unity / African Union and the Economic Commission for Africa, contributing to African countries' decolonisation and bringing Africa together as a political entity.

Dire Dawa's population is estimated to be 466,000 (2017), making it the second-most populous city in Ethiopia. The city is home to a diverse set of ethnic groups, which gives it a cosmopolitan feel. The city is a major distribution point for goods and products transported from Djibouti's port, which is the only seaport that is open to Ethiopia. Private sector investment began in Dire Dawa in 1991; however, improvement in the city and municipal services is needed and is expected by the Dire Dawa City Administration for the investment to continue.

Hawasa is located in Ethiopia's southern part and currently serves as the capital city for the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region (SNNPR). It is located 270 km from Addis Ababa, with a population size of 455,658 (2017). It has a tourist site known as Lake Hawassa, which is part of the Great Rift Valley. Hawassa is witnessing dynamic growth in real estate and other economic activities. The public sector is a vital engine of growth for the urban economy. Hawassa houses the regional government, regional services, and a university. Municipal investment currently focuses on drainage construction, road rehabilitation, waste management, and access road construction. Most businesses in Hawassa are involved in trade and retail, catering to local and regional markets. Industrial activities include food processing, textiles, and ceramics production, flower farms, baking, and edible oil processing.

Bahir Dar is the capital of the Amhara National Regional State. It was established between 1928 and 1933 and transformed itself from a small village to a town. Beyond being the capital city, Bahir Dar is also an important manufacturing centre and tourist destination. It lies on the shore of Lake Tana and is not far from the Blue Nile Falls. Bahir Dar has a population of about 362,297 (2017), of which 42% are at or below the poverty line. The city is experiencing a 5.5% growth rate, which challenges the city administration and municipal services offices' service delivery capacity. Bahir Dar lies close to a fertile agricultural region of Ethiopia. Thus, part of its manufacturing base is related to agro-processing. It is home to Bahir Dar Textile Factory, Bahir Dar Edible Oil Factory, Youkuno Flour Factory, and several leather factories. The solid manufacturing base, in addition to the tourist trade, provides a sound base on which to form a strong city administration and the ability to provide municipal services.

FIGURE 8.7 | Ethiopia's 10 largest regional cities

Gondar city served as the capital of Ethiopia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the progress made during its history has reversed, as the federal agencies did not recognise it for a considerable period. Gondar was founded in 1635 and is one of the major tourist centres of the Amhara Region. Officials estimate that 40,000 visitors come to Gondar each year. Formal sector employment is found primarily in the distributive and service sectors, followed by civil service and large- and small-scale industries. Currently, the total population of Gondar city is 360,600 (2017). Many of the residents, however, work in the informal sector.

Mekele is the capital of the Tigray Regional Nation-State. It is attractive to federal, regional, and international organisations and migrants from many places. In 2003 the population was 165,858 people. According to the Central Statistics Agency projection in 2017, the total population of Mekele City was 358,529. It is home to approximately 713 grain mills, 474 food shops, and 123 public transport entities. It has an active urban-rural exchange of goods. The surrounding rural population receives veterinary services, fertilisers, pesticides, improved seed supplies, and agricultural research services. In turn, Mekele residents receive crops, livestock products, wood fuel, and construction wood and labour supply. Even though Mekele has 8,800 micro and small enterprises (MSE), many (65%) are in the informal sector. Further, it is estimated that 43% of the residents are below the absolute poverty line. The combination of poverty, high migration, and the significant informal sector challenge Mekele officials to provide good public services.

Adama is a city located in central Ethiopia, and it is one of the largest cities in the Oromia region. It is located around 99 km from Addis Ababa. Adama has a population of 355,485 (2017). It serves as an important transportation centre, as it is located along the road that connects Addis Ababa with Dire Dawa. Many trucks use this route to travel to and from the seaports of Djibouti.

"

Adama is a city located in central Ethiopia, and it is one of the largest cities in the Oromia region. It is located around 99 km from Addis Ababa.

Dessie city lies on a main north-south transportation route in Ethiopia. It is an important distribution centre for the northern and eastern parts of the country. With an elevation of 2,470 m, Dessie lies nearly 25 km from its twin city of Kombalcha. Its altitude and relative proximity to the industrial setting of Kombalcha have resulted in Dessie attracting more commercial than manufacturing economic growth. Dessie is the administrative authority for nine rural areas and two urban centres. Its economic opportunity lies in transforming the surrounding rural production modes from subsistence farming to food processing production levels.

Jimma has a population size of 195,223 (2017). The city is located 330 km from Addis Ababa to Ethiopia's western part, and it is a special zone in the Oromia region. Jimma city is at the heart of naturally blessed surroundings and with raw materials ideal for small and medium-scale enterprises and larger industries. Various investment opportunities include hotels, tourism, agro-processing and coffee, iron and steel, leather and chemicals, woodwork, and paper production. Micro and small enterprises are well-known change agents, and the city has been involving young people in different projects: agriculture, construction, livestock management, trade and industry, and service sectors.

Shashmene city has a population of 162,127 (2017). It is located 250 km from Addis Ababa. Shashmene has one of the best environments for agro-processing. The city is well suited for producing cash crops and food processing, with ample raw materials and fertile surroundings. It is expanding into animal husbandry, poultry, and related value chains. The city has good economic development opportunities, as it is situated at the junction of five major transport routes connecting the south and southeast of Ethiopia with the rest of the country.

8.1.5 Economic Geography of Secondary Cities in the Country

Ethiopia is a rapidly growing economy mainly dominated by its agricultural sector, which currently comprises 43% of GDP World Bank, 2011). The Government of Ethiopia has, over the last two decades, adopted a program of Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation (ADLI) which has resulted in a significant improvement in productivity. The ADLI program has seen growth in economic activities directly related to agriculture by creating demand for inputs, the processing of outputs, and the production of consumer goods. The impact of this, together with successful policies of the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP), the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), and the first phase of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), has been the reduction in rural poverty rates and improved average GDP growth of 9.25% over of the past four years (World Bank, 2021).

The focus of the Ethiopian economy over the next decade is to sustain an average of 10% annual growth in real GDP and restructure the economy. In this regard, reducing the proportion of the workforce currently employed in agriculture (78%), widening the export base of agricultural and non-agricultural products, and increasing the non-agricultural share of GDP by around 1% per year is the focus area.

Despite its rapid economic growth and diversification, Ethiopia's GDP per capita remains low due to its rapidly growing population. Ethiopia holds an ambition to reach low- and middle-income country (LMIC) status by 2025, defined as a GDP of US$1,045 per capita.

Economic data on regional economies is limited. Only a few studies have been conducted of regions to assess economic output and value-adding by industry sectors. The National Planning and Development Commission can prepare regional economic tables, but these are not publicly available.

8.1.6 Employment and Economic Development

Several of Ethiopia's secondary cities are performing well in attracting investment and employment (Gulelat Kebede & Paterson Gauntner, 2019). Manufacturing employment and other formal private sector employment growth rates are rising, but the informal sector in construction, transport, trading and domestic services remains the most significant and fastest-growing job sector. A paper on manufacturing growth in secondary cities found that nine cities (Adama, Asayita, Asosa, Bahir Dar, Bishoftu, Gondar, Hawassa, Jijiga and Mekele) were growing faster than the national average throughout 2011–2018 (see the cities in the upper right quadrant of Figure 8.8). The authors

note that "cities represented by smaller bubbles started with a smaller manufacturing base in 2011, whereas larger bubbles started with a larger base." The authors further note that Addis Ababa had not grown at the same fast pace as smaller cities, but still accounts for the highest level of employment growth, "having generated more than 40,000 net manufacturing jobs between 2011 and 2018" (Gulelat Kebede & Paterson Gauntner, 2019, pp. 1–2).

FIGURE 8.8 | Employment growth rates by city, 2011-2018

Source: Central Statistics Agency (2011a); Central Statistics Agency (2011b); Gulelat Kebede & Paterson Gauntner (2019, p. 2).

Several star-performing secondary cities, have outperformed Addis Ababa. Other secondary cities close to Addis Ababa (Bishoftu, Adama, and Hawassa), are not performing as well due to congestion, rising land and transaction costs. The efforts by the government to decentralise, has witnessed firms investing in regional economies, and cities such as Gonder becoming increasingly competitive. In the Ethiopian case, policies to promote secondary cities' industrialisation can have positive impacts if pursued alongside investments in existing large cities (Economic Commission for Africa, 2017).

Among urban centres, the contribution of Addis Ababa is significant. For those years for which complete data was available for all the regions (1995/96 to 1998/99), Addis Ababa's GDP share out of the total urban GDP stood at 35%. A key feature of the country's urban sector is the prevalence of the informal economy (World Bank, 2011). The informal sector has grown to such a proportion that in early 2000, it accounted for almost 40% of urban employment.

It isn't easy to estimate the contribution of the informal sector to total GDP. However, the gross value of income calculations in different informal industries indicate a significant rise in the informal sector share between 1996 and 2016. The unemployment rate is higher in Dire Dawa with 23.94%, followed by Dessie with 22.58% and Addis Ababa with 21.53% (Figure 8.9). On the other hand, the lower unemployment rate occurred in Gambella, Hara, and Asayita with 10.19%, 10.45%, and 11.70%, respectively. Ethiopia has not sustained growth rates close to this target in the past decade, due to its dependence on agriculture, subject to rainfall variability.

FIGURE 8.9 | Unemployment rates in Ethiopian cities (2016)

Source: Central Statistics Agency (2016).

8.1.7 National Policies on Urbanisation and Secondary City Development

The policy of decentralisation, made real by the City Proclamations and Federal Charters, has led to a review of the planning process and indicates that the plans' preparation is in the city administration's hands. Increased local autonomy to 'plan' has been accompanied by the introduction of strategic planning (as opposed to master planning) and the recognition that fast-growing towns require a more flexible approach to planning their spatial layout to adapt more quickly to the changing urban landscape.

Proclamation No. 574/2008 provides a framework for planning in the country. A series of detailed manuals have been prepared to support implementation of the proclamation, especially in the City-Wide Structure Plans and Local (neighbourhood) Development Plans. Both provide helpful tools that could enable the planning of cities to be taken down to a local level and encourage people's participation. They also identify the importance of considering how to develop rural-urban linkages. The internalisation and implementation of these approaches have been supported by significant investment in capacity building and training. The institutional division of responsibilities for planning between the federal and the regional urban planning institutes and cities also has been clarified, with a focus on the centrality of the urban administration's role in planning, and with the federal and regional bodies providing the policy, regulatory, advisory and technical support functions.

In this regard, the government of Ethiopia has set a medium-term development goal to eradicate poverty through broad-based, equitable, and sustainable economic growth. The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), overseen by the National Planning Commission (NPC), is the key economic planning instrument that outlines the government's key economic growth objectives over five years: GTP 1 covers 2010–2015 and GTP 2 covers 2015–2020. The current GTP seeks to eradicate poverty through strong economic growth and structural transformation of the economy. The national urban system supports many GTP building blocks, including social services, and consequently drives economic growth and poverty reduction that Ethiopia seeks.

Given the inequalities among the municipal authorities, there is a need to attract new investment and stimulate productivity and growth. At the same time, there is a need to ensure that growth and productivity reduce poverty and move towards sustainable development. In this regard, the land is essential for a productive urban economy, essential to house the urban population, and is a cultural resource. The land market for various activities (including housing, commerce, industry, infrastructure and services) needs to function efficiently and equitably. Effective urban land management presents challenges for policymakers and administrators because effective management requires increased financial and human resources.

8.1.8 Problems and Issues Affecting Secondary City Development

The urban system in Ethiopia is beset by problems, some of which were created due to misguided development policies of earlier times. One that can be considered a serious issue is 'primacy', which is the dominance of Addis Ababa. It is argued that primacy goes counter to promoting a balanced urban system and defused development to wider areas that aim to improve equity and reduce poverty. By tapping disproportionate material and enterprising human resources from many parts of the country, primacy leads to the deprivation of the rest of the urban system, especially if the degree of primacy is high, as has been Ethiopia's case. Counter to this are arguments for a concentrated pattern of urbanisation; however, which one best fits the Ethiopian context is a question that needs to be addressed with further investigation.

Although the extent of primacy has declined over the last 25 years, Addis Ababa is still the dominant and primate city of the country, accounting for about 23% of the urban population, according to the 2007 Population and Housing Census (CSA. 2008). For the same period, the Two-City Index, a ratio of the largest city in the country to the next largest, was about eight. In other words, in terms of population size, Addis Ababa is eight times larger than Dire Dawa, the second largest town. A value greater than three is regarded as an indication of primacy.

Another issue is the low level of urbanisation in the country. It is now widely acknowledged that cities are 'engines of growth' and enable rural development in their immediate hinterland and beyond, especially if properly guided and enabled. At only 22%, however, the scale of urbanisation is too low to meet developmental goals and bring the desired positive change. A higher level of urbanisation is associated with agglomeration and economies of scale, but it also provides markets and social services to rural and urban communities. It creates job opportunities for residents and seasonal migrants from rural areas, thereby augmenting their incomes and improving livelihood without moving from their locations. Evidence from many countries indicates that an increase in farmers' income directly impacts agricultural productivity and thus increases agrarian production, due to an increase in farm inputs to plots.

Moreover, most urban centres in Ethiopia are small towns that offer little choice to their residents and the rural communities in the hinterland, beyond markets and administrative services. Published and unpublished sources indicate that, in seeking a better life, rural migrants bypass such towns to eventually go to the few bigger ones or Addis Ababa, thereby hindering balanced population distribution and development.

Despite many other problems associated with Ethiopia's urban system, no conclusive study has been undertaken on the subject, especially on the problems and mechanisms to deal with urban systems crossing regional boundaries and with Addis Ababa's role in the national and regional systems. Tegegn Gebre-Egziabher (2002) examined the country's urban challenges, argued for an urbanisation policy, and indicated prospective policy areas. The same study also indicated that regions are independently leading the development of their respective urban centres without having a typical picture of how urban centres should functionally be structured at the national level (Gebre-Egziabher, 2002; MoFAD, 2005).

8.1.8.1 Governance

Applying the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), Ethiopia was rated 33 out of 52 African countries. It scored 46.7 points out of 100 in 2012, a rise of 0.7 points over the previous six years. Under safety and rule of law (Rule of Law, Accountability, Personal Safety, and National Safety), it scored 44.6; in participation and human rights (Participation, Rights, and Gender), the score was 36.3. For sustainable economic opportunity (Public Management, Business Environment, Infrastructure, and Rural Sector) the score was high, at 53.4 points, but this was a six-year decline of 1.8. Finally, in human development (Welfare, Education, and Health), the score was 52.6, an 8.0-point rise over the previous six years (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2012).

The Ethiopian government's policies are promoted as an 'Urban Good Governance Package', consisting of institutional development, systems reforms, and capacity building measures to promote good urban governance practices in urban centres in order to facilitate accelerated and sustained urban development. The package has seven sub-programs:

- Land development and administration systems improvement.
- Public participation.
- Urban planning improvement.

- Urban infrastructure and service improvement.
- Organisation and human resource management reform.
- Urban finance and financial management improvement.
- Justice reform.

Through these sub-programs, the federal and regional governments have provided support to cities in the form of technical assistance, capacity building and training, and development and enactment of relevant laws and proclamations necessary to achieve the goals that have been set.

8.1.8.2 Urban Finance

Africa Economic Outlook notes the recent current and immediate financial outlook for Ethiopia (Crypoinvest, 2022):

- High annual growth since 2004 was sustained in 2011, though it was predicted to be at a slower rate in 2012 and 2013. Nevertheless, Ethiopia would still be among the fastest-growing non-oil producing economies in Africa.
- Macroeconomic challenges have given rise to high and persistent inflation. An expansionary monetary policy has been one of the main culprits, and a tighter monetary policy represents a bid to bring inflation down to single digits.
- The five-year Growth and Transformation Plan, which aims to foster high and broad-based growth, was expected to expand employment opportunities by emphasising the development of small and medium-scale industries.
- Significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has nonetheless so far, failed to generate adequate employment opportunities for the youth.

Ethiopia's fiscal management efforts have improved the overall fiscal position, but this has declined since the COVID-19 pandemic. The fiscal deficit fell to 1.6% of GDP in 2010/11 from 1.7% in 2009/10. In 2011, the government introduced cash budgeting, which will obviate the central bank's direct advances to meet temporary liquidity shortfalls. Nevertheless, the fiscal deficit is projected to rise during the GTP period, owing to its ambitious public spending plans.

At the secondary city level, finance is a significant issue for local governments. All secondary cities lack the necessary capital to fund infrastructure in order to support the provision and delivery of services that will support the development of local economies and growing urban populations (Federal Government of Ethiopia, 2010). There is a significant lack of capital when the sector targets strategically planned secondary cities and transport corridors like the railway from Djibouti to Addis in order to exploit the national resource endowment, such as agriculture (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2017) and supporting manufacturing. The investment in development corridors is significant, but this has not been supplemented by crucial infrastructure investment to support value-adding and logistics, e.g., for cities like Dire Dawa and other cities along the route. Investments that help to create quality employment in urban areas, especially in secondary cities and towns, are critical for absorbing rural migrants and urban populations expanding from natural demographic growth(Unite Nation Economic Commission for Africa , 2017).

8.1.8.3 Infrastructure and Connectivity

Nosimilo Ramela of the business community captures some notion of the recent planned investments in Ethiopia's infrastructure in Retail News East Africa (2010). In July 2010, the Ethiopian government had approved spending a record 70% of its total annual budget on poverty and infrastructure development. This is the largest spending on these programs by any African country. The budget stood at R44-billion (US$5.6 billion) for 2010/11, which was up by 20% from R36.4-billion (US$4.7 billion) in 2009/10 and is the most significant budget ever passed by the country's parliament.

Although Ethiopia is one of Africa's poorest countries, it is one of the fastest-growing countries. Over the previous four years, the country's economy has grown by 11.2%, mainly due to improved infrastructure. The government says it is planning to attract more foreign investment in agriculture, mineral exploration, and hydropower. The breakdown of the budget was as follows:

- Ethiopia's nine federal regions would spend more than R13-billion (US$1.7 billion).
- R6.8-billion (US$879 million) will go to the country's road network.
- The rest of the development budget will be spent on electrification. Ethiopia has spent R27.8-billion (US$3.6 billion) on roads over the last decade.
- Domestic revenue accounts for R23-billion (US$3 billion) of the budget, while R8.5-billion (US$1.1 billion) comes from aid. Foreign loans and grants will pay for the R11.5-billion (US$1.5 billion) deficit.

Linkages between rural and urban areas remain weak due to poor roads, telecommunications, and knowledge management systems, limiting the scope for rural-urban transformation (OECD, 2020). Strengthening the national highway systems or roads and telecommunication between secondary cities, as Rwanda is doing, will be crucial to the development of a network system for cities. The development of stronger knowledge-base systems supporting the development of Ethiopia's secondary cities and towns will have a key role for rural development, and better coordination between rural and urban governance, policies and planning to promote an inclusive rural transformation of economies will lift regional output and trade.

8.1.8.4 Investment

The passing of the Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi in 2012 raised concerns about the country's economic continuity (Deloitte & Touche, 2014). The economic vision of Ethiopia comprises the following key objectives that inform on planned areas of investments:

- Achieving MDGs targets by 2015.
- Attracting large volumes of FDI.
- Doubling the agricultural output.
- Infrastructure development.
- Achieving middle-income country status by 2023.
- Industrial development through prioritisation of strategic sectors.

These objectives and the policies linked to them are the product of a broad consensus within the ruling party and beyond and are likely to remain at the top of Ethiopia's investment agenda. In 2011 (fiscal year [FY] 2010/11), the economy grew at 11.4%, marking the eighth consecutive year of rapid growth. Moreover, growth has continued to be broad-based, with industry, services, and agriculture growing by 15%, 12.5%, and 9%, respectively (African Development Bank, 2012). Hotels and restaurants, real estate, renting and business activities, and financial intermediation made the largest contributions to the services sector's growth. The services sector is expected to continue to grow rapidly, though at a slower pace than in previous years, at 7% and 7.6% in 2012 and 2013, respectively.

8.1.8.5 Human Capital Development

Since 1990 the UNDP has published the Human Development Index (HDI) in the Human Development Report for individual countries. From 2000 to the present, Ethiopia's HDI of 0.274 has risen, and in 2011 it was at 0.363, which gives the country a rank of 174 out of 187 countries with comparable data. As a Region, the HDI of Sub-Saharan Africa increased from 0.365 in 1980 to 0.463 in 2011, placing Ethiopia below the regional and global average. The world average in 2000 was 0.634 and in 2011 was 0.682(Ethiopia Country Profile Human Development Indicators, 2020).

8.1.8.6 Land Use

Since the radical land reforms in 1975, all land in Ethiopia has been public property (Gebreselassie, 2006). Politically the reform ended the exploitative type of relationship that existed between tenants and landlords. Under the reform, tenants became operators with user rights. However, they had no right to sell, mortgage, or exchange land. The change of government in 1991 did not usher in any significant changes in Ethiopia's land policy. A kind of 'free market economic policy' was adopted; government policy nevertheless decided to maintain all rural and urban land under public ownership. The December 1994 Constitution confirmed the status quo. In rural Ethiopia, the transfer of land through long-term lease or sales is not permitted (Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia1995).

FIGURE 8.10 | Proportion of land under informal settlement in regional capitals, 2015 (%)

Source: World Bank (2017).

The informal settlement of land remains a significant issue in Addis Adaba and the regional capital cities (Nega et al., 2003). Figure 8.9 shows World Bank estimates for the proportion of land under informal settlement occupation in regional capitals in 2015. A World Bank Report (World Bank & GFDRR, 2017, p. 56) notes:

"Informal settlements represent a challenge associated with urbanisation, particularly due to the higher vulnerability to fire and other hazards associated with the high density of housing. Informal settlements are present in all the capital cities, with Jigjiga (14.4%), Adama (11.6 %), and Harar (8%) each having a relatively higher proportion of their land area under informal settlements than the other cities [Figure 8.10]. Informal settlements are generally found on marginal lands, such as quarry sites, riverbanks, and hazardous areas and are highly vulnerable to disasters such as flooding."

The international development agencies and others have undertaken extensive work (Yehun, 2017; Cochrane & Hadis, 2019) to explore the potential of land administration reform in urban and regional development that addresses many issues associated with the sector. These have included:

- Population and migration informal settlement.
- Maintaining state ownership of land and facilitating agriculture-led growth, i.e., the 'China model'.
- Land privatisation and titling: Some policy commentators argue that the efficiency gains of land privatisation and formal titling in Ethiopia are potentially highly significant. This would allow agricultural entrepreneurs to consolidate land holdings and manage economically viable land units on a commercial basis.
- Encouraging land rental markets. The argument is that the full privatisation and titling model may have the consequences of rapid consolidation of farm areas and an increase in landlessness, which is politically unacceptable.

- Enhancing tenure security (Nega et al., 2003). Some argue that it is tenure security, not land ownership, that is the issue. The basis of this scenario is that perceived insecurity of tenure restricts people's incentives to invest in land improving technologies and management systems.

Issues of land in Ethiopia, both urban and rural, stem from the Constitution, which has seen significant shifts from the pre-1975 era. The challenges brought about by the current Constitution need to be dealt with to overcome the current challenges that lead to the disincentive to maximise the commercial output of land. To improve the security of tenure, ownership registration, tax mapping, and disputes resolution to improve the management of secondary cities in Ethiopia, especially in the fast-growing regional capitals, are needed.

8.1.8.7 Environmental Management

Ethiopian secondary cities face significant environmental challenges (Countries Quest, 2022; Bartel & Muller, 2007). In the highlands, soil erosion is a major environmental problem. Deforestation, overgrazing, and poor land management accelerated the rate of erosion during the 1970s and 1980s. Many farmers in Ethiopia's highlands cultivate sloped land, causing topsoil to wash away. Flooding and soil erosion is significant problem in places like Dire Dawa (World Bank & GFDRR, 2017).

The Ethiopian government, during the 1970s, began to implement environmental conservation programs in rural areas. Some areas were closed for agricultural development, but policing this has proved almost impossible. In 1997 approximately 5.5% of Ethiopia was officially protected. However, Ethiopia's national parks and reserves continue to be endangered from poaching, encroachment, livestock grazing and illegal logging (World Bank & GFDRR, 2017)This has created environmental and economic impacts, leading to rising levels of rural-urban migration.

Ethiopia has ratified agreements intended to protect biodiversity, endangered species, and the ozone layer in the international environmental realm. The country has also signed treaties limiting nuclear testing and chemical and biological weapons. Ethiopia is a party to the World Heritage Convention. However, resources remain a problem in enforcing local laws and policies to protect vital areas of biodiversity, endangered species, and natural beauty.

> ## "
> ## *In 1997 approximately 5.5% of Ethiopia was officially protected.*

A study by the World Bank on City Strength Diagnostics in Nine Regional Capitals and Dire Dawa City Administration (Dire Dawa City Administration, 2020) highlights the many environmental issues facing the management and development of secondary cities in Ethiopia (World Bank & GFDRR, 2017). The report briefly examines flooding, seismic, landslide, volcanic and drought hazards affecting regional capital secondary cities. It notes the problems of poor environmental planning and management, the inadequacy of building construction and design, and the poor quality of materials used in secondary cities, compared to the capital, Addis Ababa. Both emergency management and facilities for disaster management are inadequate, as are regional government and community knowledge about disaster management.

The report calls for measures to improve urban risk management, water and solid waste management to improve the quality of water runoff and soil contamination, better mapping of hazards and floods to prevent the development of high-risk areas, improved skills development of local government staff and contractors and community education. Many of these measures call for urgent action; however, funding, equipment, and management expertise are limited, making efforts to improve the safety and quality of urban and peri-urban environments in many of these secondary cities very difficult. The recent effects of civil war have made matters worse.

8.1.8.8 Social Issues

The social issues in Ethiopia cities arise from a long history of ethnic relationships, the rise of 'class', and linking these to occupations in order to determine one's standing in society. There is a significant level of social stratification related to social groupings: (i) 'high-ranking' family lineages and (ii) caste groups ascribed by birth and membership associated with concepts of culture and slaves, and the descendants of slaves are the lowest social group. The above is the traditional social stratum. In urban areas, the division of labour determines social class. Some jobs are esteemed more than others, such as pilots, lawyers, and federal government employees. However, some trades have negative associations, such as metal and leather workers and potters, and are considered low status and frequently isolated from the mainstream of society.

Symbols of social stratification in rural areas include the amount of grain and cattle a person possesses. In urban areas, the signs of social status are different. These include (i) wealth and high status, including car ownership (Every Culture, 2022), which is the chief criterion for social stratification; (ii) levels of education; (iii) neighbourhood; and (iv) type of employment or job.

8.2 Case Study Dira Dawa

PHOTO 8.2
Dire Dawa

© Facebook Ethiopian City Pictures.

Dire Dawa is Ethiopia's second-largest city, with a population of 466,000 (2017), located some 515 km east of Addis Ababa It is also 55 km north of the historic city of Harar and 311 km to the west of Port Djibouti. It was established as an urban centre in 1902 and owes its emergence to the Addis Adaba railway line. Dire Dawa is an important administrative city. It has grown as a commercial centre due to the railroad linking Addis Ababa with Djibouti, Ethiopia's principal port for imports and exports. It is one of 18 secondary cities in the country. Dire Dawa is located in the semi-arid regions of Ethiopia, which deal with drought. In past decades, the cities in the semi-arid region saw a decline in annual rainfall and a rise in rainfall variability.

The City of Dire Dawa has a state status and is accountable to the federal government and the Ministry of Federal Affairs. Dire Dawa has a two-tiered system: the city and kebele administration. There are nine urban kebeles in the city of Dire Dawa. Dire Dawa City, since its establishment, has been an important commercial and transport corridor linking the Ethiopian hinterland with the coast. The city is the second largest after Addis Ababa, although other regional capitals will surpass Dire Dawa's population in the future.

In 2008, UN-Habitat (Un-Habitat, 2008) studied Dire Dawa, outlining a range of issues affecting the city's development. A more recent study by the World Bank (2017) analysed a range of planning and development issues linked to safety and resilience in Ethiopian cities. Feyissa, 2018) has conducted more recent case studies. This case study draws extensively upon these and other research to explore critical issues related to the local governance, urban management, socio-demographic, economic development, and environmental management issues to be addressed to improve the city's planning and management of development. From the profile, key challenges facing Dire Dawa are outlined, and priority policy responses are needed for strategic intervention to enhance the management of urbanisation and the development of its economy.

Table 8.2, provides a broad profile and some basic indicators of Dire Dawa. Basic current socio-economic data on the city is difficult to obtain. More detailed studies are needed on urban development, stock and condition of infrastructure, population density. including night and day populations, economic, social, and environmental indicators. Without this information, it is not easy to plan for the city's development and to prepare programs for managing assets and services.

TABLE 8.2 | Development Indicator Profile of Dire Dawa

URBAN AREA	Indicator Measures	Measure
Demographics	What is the Estimated Urban Area in the City	137.7 km^2
	What was the Estimated Population 2017	466,000
	What Was the Population In 2000 or the Last Census	229,000
	Is the City's Share of The National Population Growing?	3.57%
	Estimated Density of Population	299 pp/km^2
Economic strength	Has Population Density in The City Increased or Decreased?	Highly increased
	What Is the City's Estimated GDP?	2,355.92 Bn Birr 2015/2016 World Bank
	How Fast is the Economy Estimated to Be Growing Per Annum?	Unknown
	What Is the Fastest-Growing Sector of The Economy?	Services, Agriculture, and Manufacturing
	What Does the City Mainly Export or Trade?	Agricultural and Industry Products
Income levels	What Does the City Mostly Import or Consume?	Agricultural and Industrial Products
	What Is the Estimated Average Income Per Month?	Unknown
Employment	How Much Higher Are Incomes in The Capital City Compared to the City?	Unknown
	How Many People Are Employed in The City by The Industry Sector?	12.5%
	How Big Is Informal Sector Employment?	27000
	What Is the Unemployment Rate?	14.2% (8.7% Male and 20.6% Female)
Poverty rate	Is There a Reliance on Remittances to Supplement Household Income?	Yes
	Estimate % of Households Living Below the Poverty Line	1999 (30%), 1999 (35%), 2004 (39%), 2010 (29%)
Public finances	What Is the Budget of The Municipality?	2015 (15%)
	What Is the Gin Coefficient	Unknown
	What Is the Budget of The Municipality?	Recurrent Budget 155,682,100birr

URBAN AREA	Indicator Measures	Measure
Infrastructure	What % Of the City Population Has Access to Potable Water?	Capital Budget also allocated from 481,604,178* from the Government & 162,000 from Matching Fund
	What Are the Primary Sources of Funds and Expenditure?	Federal Government & Revenue Collection
	How Much Money Does the Municipality Spend Per Capita?	1367birr
	What % of the City Population Has Access to Potable Water?	68% Pipeline at Home
	What Is the Distance and Travel Time To The Nearest Largest City?	32% from a Different Source
	What % of the City Population Has Good Sanitation?	88%
	What % of the City Population Has Waste Management Collection	46%
Housing and land	What is the Length of Urban Roads	620 km (paved 176.72 km and unpaved 443.28 km)
	What is the Distance and Travel Time to The Nearest Largest City?	515 km to Capital City with 7 Hours' Drive and 48 km to Harar Next City With 30 Minutes Drive
	How Many Intercity Flights or Buses are there a Day?	4 Flights to the Capital
	Does The Municipality have a GIS with An Inventory of Infrastructure	In the Process of Establishing GIS for the City Asset Management
Education	What % of the City's Residents Live in Slums?	8%
Health infrastructure	What % of Households Rent	Unknown
	What is the Cost of Land on The Fringe	It is a Lease Bid System, and it varies from time to time
Governance	How Rapid Has been the Development of Land and Housing	
	Number of Students Who Finish Primary Education	42,774 Primary Students

Sources: Computed from Dire Dawa City Administration (2020); Central Statistics Agency (2013); UN-Habitat(2008); NCE, EDRI & GGGI (2015). * 1US$ is equal to 38 Ethiopian Birr.

8.2.1 Profile of the City

8.2.1.1 Social-Demographics

The 2007 Ethiopian Census estimated the population of the Dire Dawa region at 342,827, with 228,856 or 66% living in the urban area (United Nations Population Fund, 2008). The rural area population of Dire Dawa is estimated in 2018 as 108,610, spread over 38 rural kebeles (smallest administrative unit) and is inhabited mainly by Oromo (73.5%) and Somali (26%) (United Nation Population Fund, 2008). The World Population Review (2018) estimated the population of the city in 2020 at 252,279. Africapolis (2015) estimated the urban population in 2015 at 277,000 using an urban settlement area density assessment method. Figure 8.11 shows World Bank estimates of the urban population of Dire Dawa in 2017 at 295,000, with projections through to 2037 when it is expected to reach 800,000 (World Bank, 2017).

The difference in estimates of the population is related to the problem that organisations use different definitions of what constitutes 'urban'. This difference is shown in estimates of the urban area by Africapolis at 34.8 km² in 2015 and the World Bank (2017), of 29.4 km² in 2016 (Figure 8.12). These discrepancies in estimates of population and area show the need for a consistent definition of what constitutes an urban area and population in Ethiopia.

Without this, it is a challenge for government and businesses to consistently assess demand for goods and services in the city and region.

The current population growth rate of the city is 3.8% but this may rise to over 5% in the next decade, depending on the impact of the new railway in creating significant opportunities for industrial investment, employment, and trade.

Dire Dawa has a cosmopolitan character due to its high level of cultural diversity. The ethnic composition of the city is: Oromo (33%), Amhara (29.5%), Somali (23.5%), Gurage (6.7%), Tigrayan (1.8%), Harari (1.2%), and people from southern Ethiopia, who have a long-associated history and culture as the result of migration (Dire Dawa Administration, 2020). Migrants and refugees constitute close to 30% of the city's population. Of these, 45% are rural-urban migrants (Dire Dawa Administration, 2020) 55% are inter-city or international migrants.

FIGURE 8.11 | Population growth in Dire Dawa

Source: World Bank (2017).

FIGURE 8.12 | Physical growth of Dire Dawa

Dire Dawa, Capital of Dire Dawa Region, 1973 - 2016

8.2.1.2 Governance

Dire Dawa city is organised under the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia "Dire Dawa Administration Charter Proclamation No. 416/2004". As noted, the city has two tiers of administration – the municipality responsible for efficient and effective service delivery and administration of the city – and kebeles are responsible for administering local issues, including organising and mobilising the community in development activities, social and security issues.

A major challenge of Ethiopia's ethno-federal political structure has been with contested identities and territorial disputes between the new regional states. Dire Dawa has been one of the most politically contested areas in post-1991 Ethiopia, as evidenced by a high turnover of its administrative structure and changes in political ownership of the city (Dire Dawa Administration, 2020). The political response to this instability, caused by the competition between Oromo and Somali political organisations over control of Dire Dawa, has been a power-sharing formula agreed to between the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) and the South Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDP), under the auspices of the federal government in 2006. The power-sharing formula, known as '40:40:20', divides regional political leadership equally between the Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO) and Ethiopian Somali People Democratic Party (ESPDP) (at 40% each) and the remaining 20 % for other remaining parties (Addis Standard, 2019). The constant tensions and uncertainty over governance arrangements have impeded attracting investment to the region's economy.

8.2.1.3 Urban Development

Dire Dawa City comes under the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia "Dire Dawa Administration Charter Proclamation No. 416/2004." Under this proclamation, the government confers self-government power and defines its legal, organisational structure and operations upon Dire Dawa.

The city is a major distribution point for goods and products being transported from the Port of Djibouti. Private sector investment in Dire Dawa began in 1991, after the change of the ruling regime. However, improvements in the execution of city and municipal services are needed and are expected if the investment is to continue.

Figure 8.12 shows the physical growth of Dire Dawa in 1973 and 2016. Significant growth has occurred in the northern part of the city with the development of the airport, and significant informal settlements have arisen to the west of the city. Africapolis data estimated the urban density of Dire Dawa at around 7,950 persons per km². This is higher than for any other Ethiopian secondary city; however, overall densities are falling due to the continuing spread of the city.

FIGURE 8.13 | Site suitability map for housing development in Dire Dawa City

Source: Weldu & Derribew (2016).

The land suitability for urban development in Dire Dawa has been mapped, and suitable building sites for housing development have been identified (Weldu & Derribew, 2016). Eleven factors such as land-use/land-covers, built-up, slope, flood sheets, road, aspect, airport, railway, soil, population density and proximity to the urban centre were evaluated. The research identified about 5.42km² (8.04%), 25.58 km² (37.90%), 10.68 km² (15.83%) of the total urban landscape as very highly suitable, highly suitable, and moderately suitable, respectively. The analysis results are shown in the Figure 8.13 Site suitability map for housing development in Dire Dawa City. This analysis suggests the city needs to develop in a westerly direction to avoid environmental problems in the future.

8.2.2 Infrastructure and Urban Services

One of the most important measures taken by the Dire Dawa City administration is the outstanding work done by allocating a large budget for infrastructural installation of roads, electricity, water supply lines, and telephone services required to establish manufacturing projects. Dire Dawa Airport is the second most important airport in Ethiopia. Table 8.3 below shows aircraft, passengers, and air freight movements with the latest data available. There has been a significant increase in all these figures over recent years.

TABLE 8.3 | Movements of aircraft, passengers, and air freight in Dire Dawa Airport

Year	Aircraft Movements	Passenger Movements	Airfreight Movements (Metric Tons)
2000	6,281	70,065	6,211
2002	7,027	69,611	7,001
2004	7,737	70,757	6,331
2006	7,119	69,177	6,178
2008	9,922	67,856	5,253
2015	18,025	213,621	6,352

Source: Ethiopian Airports Enterprise (2016).

The city's electricity is supplied mainly from the national electricity grid connected to its various hydroelectric power stations. Apart from periodical floods, there is a low supply of water in Dire Dawa. According to the Water Supply and Sewerage Authority, the current supply coverage meets only 56% of the city's needs.

Sanitation in Dire Dawa is a pressing issue. The problem is more pronounced in informal settlements and affects other residents, as drains fill with mud during flooding and are poorly maintained. Of all the houses in the city, 22% have no toilet facilities. Dry rivers, open ditches, and streets are being used as alternatives. Solid waste collection coverage is inadequate, with only 48% of solid waste collected. Sewerage and stormwater drainage systems are lacking and contribute to the worsening of the problem.

8.2.3 Human Capital

In education, an encouraging development has been the increased registration at national levels (from pre-primary to university) of Ethiopians wishing to go to school. Similar trends are observed in Dire Dawa. The gross enrolment ratio for primary education has increased by 22% in five years, and secondary school enrolment has increased by 62%. The other significant development aspect of Ethiopia and Dire Dawa's education sector is the technical and vocational education training (TVET) program. The main objective of the TVET program is to eradicate poverty and ultimately improve the urban economy by producing a more skilled workforce. The concept of creating jobs instead of more job seekers needs further structural support, enabling new graduates to apply their knowledge in the broadest possible areas. Twelve per cent of the unemployed 15–39-year-olds in Dire Dawa currently have access to TVET. However, teacher qualifications, working conditions, and salaries remain a challenge.

Dire Dawa City is in an area defined as malaria-prone, and epidemic-like conditions can break out during flooding, as in 1981, 1985, and 1999. Action taken by health personnel seems to have improved the situation. For instance, in 2002 and 2003, 49 people died due to the disease each year; in 2004, it was 7. In Dire Dawa, there is only one public hospital with 220 beds and four private hospitals with 233 beds. This implies one hospital bed for every 610 people and one doctor for every 33 000 people.

8.2.4 Economic Development

The Dire Dawa economy has grown strongly over recent years despite periods of tension and instability, the latest being the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. Dire Dawa is located close to Djibouti and Somalia. It became a favourable location for contraband goods and other forms of illegal trade. The city administration has struggled to build a post-contraband economy but has significantly improved tax collection. In 2015 the administration collected close to ETB 500 million (US$22.5 million) in taxes, rising to ETB 927 million (US$29 million) - a big step for a city once known for its minimal tax collection. The improved tax collection and its special administration status have allowed the city to use funds to improve infrastructure and services.

The economy of Dire Dawa is based primarily on rural agriculture, trade and construction. Sectors of the economy such as government services, transport, education, health and some small-scale manufacturing are growing and are expected to create more jobs in the future. The completion of the new electric railway between Dire Dawa and Djibouti in 2013 has significantly boosted the business sector, especially small-scale manufacturing, hotels, cafes, and other businesses along the railway route. It has been projected that the induced effect of rail could boost trade resulting from improved inter-regional communications, and that population growth will create more than 20,000 employment opportunities for Dire Dawa's small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The city administration has provided for more individual and association applicants. More than 16.7 ha of land has been set aside by the city government for SMEs. Since 2010, 6 market centres, more than 800 shops and 1,335 kiosks have also become operational in recent years.

Despite efforts over many years to boost industry development with regional manufacturing, the sector's overall contribution to the city's economy, the employment opportunities and foreign investment have been minimal. Figures for the industry are not generally available. The major manufacturing industries are textiles, cement, food, and beverage processing. Except for a handful of the above medium-scale State-controlled industries, most are privately owned and operated. The Dire Dawa population derives their livelihood from informal trade activities (UN-Habitat 2008)Central Statistics Agency, 2010). Much of the job growth is expected to occur in the trade, construction, and transport sectors

The current picture of trade and commerce has not been captured statistically. However, a study conducted by the city's Industry and Trade Team indicated that in 1994, there were 2,888 legally licensed businesses in the city, of which 36% were retailers, 35% were in the service industry, and 28% were engaged in wholesale trading. Many wholesale traders are involved in khat (a traditional socialising drug) trading, primarily exporting it to Gode and Djibouti. The retail trading activities include clothing, electronics, household utensils, and food items. Most electronics materials that are available in Dire Dawa retail markets are believed to be contraband goods. There are currently 12 market centres; in Dire Dawa, each centre specialises in a specific product or merchandise. Street vendors also sell various commodities, including electronics, without having a proper license or registration.

The city's Micro and Small Enterprise Development Agency (MSEDA) was established following the city administration's restructuring in the early 1990s. The agency assists with business skills training, business counselling, production, and market centre development activities. It also facilitates access to start-up and operating financial resources of up to 20,000 ETB. In addition to individual counselling, the agency assists in forming trade associations and cooperative businesses. Outsourcing small construction works, street parking, and garbage collection services to MSE are under consideration by the city.

The MSEDA office recruits participants for the program from the city's vocational and technical schools. So far, the program has provided business development training for 2,844 people; helped over 800 business operators access credit; and developed 79,056 m² of land for product preparation sites, two market centres with a business information centre, and banking service for 449 vendors engaged in the garment, food processing, fruit and vegetable, and small construction businesses. There is an attempt to link urban agriculture with MSE activities in the region.

Dire Dawa is a good stopover for tourists who wish to explore the nearby archaeological, historical, and cultural areas. The city is also home to a historic railway station, the Kefir Open Traditional Market, the Camel Market, and the nearby Italian Fort on Genda Gara Hill. Dire Dawa town is attractive and reflects a planned city; it has a grid and tree-lined avenues and unique Arab, French, and Italian architecture.

8.2.5 Development Challenges and Opportunities

Unemployment is one of Dire Dawa's most visible challenges, followed by informality, periodic floods, and sanitation. Moreover, the land-locked country faces many development challenges because of poor national road networks and communications systems. The following are some of the more significant challenges facing the development of the city:

8.2.5.1 Land Management and Development

Dire Dawa has adequate land for urban expansion west of the city. It has around 57 ha of vacant land held by 18 government bodies (Dire Dawa Administration, 2020). There is potential for this vacant and underused land to be redeployed for development, and some steps have been taken to make full use of this land. The land issue is one of the significant factors affecting Dire Dawa's development.

From an economic development policy point of view, Dire Dawa:

- Has no strategy or plan to provide a framework for developing the economy of the city.
- Lacks a strong and dynamic private sector.
- Appears not to have good networks to enhance the development of markets.

The main problems with and constraints to industrial development include:

- Insufficient market study for products that Dire Dawa can engage in.
- High cost of imported inputs.
- Shortage of quality local inputs.
- Shortage of machinery spare parts in the local market.

8.2.5.2 Trade and Commerce

There are opportunities for the development of trade and commerce in the city. There is adequate land for expansion (see discussion below on land and housing). However, the development of trade and commerce is constrained by:

- The high level of illegal and informal trade activities.
- The low regional level of incomes and available saving and income for households to spend.
- Most businesspeople lack the necessary education to adapt to modern-day business practices. (limited entrepreneurial skills and inability to use their creativity tends to lead businesses to focus on a limited line of trading, such as merchandise sales or electronics, or spare parts).
- Obtaining loans for start-up or expansion is difficult for many businesses because of the banks' high collateral requirements.

These issues are common to Ethiopian secondary cities. Still, the proximity to Djibouti City (population 600,000) creates significant twinning opportunities and cost advantages for local businesses to develop strategic trading partnerships with this urban centre and port with a GDP per capita in 2020 of US$3,425, compared to US$ 936 in Ethiopia.

8.2.5.3 Micro and Small Enterprise Development

Micro and small enterprise development problems and constraints include the lack of each of the following:

- Access to start-up and operating money.
- Awareness about the available resources.
- Essential managerial and business skills by small business operators.
- Marketing skills to promote their products.
- Entrepreneurial skills to develop a new type of business with high-profit potentials and better markets.

The challenges and constraints to attracting investment in Dire Dawa include:

- A weak enabling environment with inadequate infrastructure to support industrial development.
- Lack of a one-stop-shop the dealing with business approvals.
- Lack of business culture.
- Limited capacity of local government to support economic development initiatives.
- Lack of skills and marketing investment opportunities.

8.2.5.4 Human Capital Development

Unemployment is one of the most visible and critical threats to the continued growth of the economies of Ethiopia and Dire Dawa. The unemployment rate for Ethiopia was 19.16% in 2016. It was 23.94% in Dire Dawa (Central Statistics Agency, 2016), slightly higher than for Addis Ababa with 21.02%. Of the unemployed, women constitute 32.6% (Central Statistics Agency, 2016). Further desegregation of unemployment by age depicts another dimension of unemployment: the vast majority (83%) are in the age group 15–39 years, which is the most economically active segment of the society.

8.2.5.5 Development and Housing

Ethiopia's government recognises the rights of citizens to decent housing and commits itself to implementing international conventions and agreements, such as the UN-Habitat Agenda.[3] This has not had an immediate effect on Dire Dawa. There is a shortage of 24,000 houses, which is expected to grow annually by 2,900 houses. The vast gap between demand and supply increases informal settlements, with more than 200,000 people living in slums or sub-standard housing. The city administration is working to regularise these settlements and provide title deeds to the occupants. The number of people living in precarious sites such as in the mountains or on streambanks is another manifestation of the housing problem. Cognizant of this critical problem, Ethiopia and the Dire Dawa governments have put housing development and provision at the top of their priorities list.

The Dire Dawa administration employs lease auction mechanisms to supply land for those interested in investment purposes. Individuals can get land for housing through a lease auction or by organising themselves in cooperatives for residential purposes. However, the level of informal settlement remains high in Dire Dawa. Most of these areas are located around the city and have very limited access to basic services, as well as poor living conditions (Kaganova & Zenebe, 2014). In 2011, Dire Dawa had 10,040 informally constructed houses, and the city administration embarked on a program of pro-active regularisation, resulting in 7,000 houses being regularised. By 2014, however, the city still had more than 10,000 informal houses because new informal settlements had emerged (Cities Alliance & World Bank, 2014).

According to data featured in the(Dire Dawa Administration, 2020), Dire Dawa has the most extensive coverage of informal settlements (1,770.7 ha). The vast majority (80%) are located on hillsides, and some are located in wetlands. These informal houses do not have access to basic services such as water, power, roads, etc.

8.2.5.6 Environmental Management

Environmental management issues especially flooding (Photo 8.3), are a problem for Dire Dawa. Vegetation loss due to land clearance for farming and charcoal making is significant, with one study showing that only 36% of the plots had tree regeneration after clearance (Milkias & Toru, 2018). The Dire Dawa Administration urgently needs appropriate policy and a strategy to avert the ongoing undesirable land-use change and soil loss. Improved land cultivation practices with appropriate implementation of soil fertility management measures and afforestation and reforestation activities are necessary.

The report, *Safe and Resilient Cities in Ethiopia* (World Bank, 2017), summaries many other environmental problems related to fire, flooding and earthquakes (NCE, EDRI & GGGI, 2015). The problems and risks strongly argue the need for improved water catchment management and water use and security, a switch to sustainable energy sources to reduce vegetation lost, and improved warning of and response to disasters (world Bank, 2017). The city does not have a disaster management plan or the necessary skills, equipment and technology to manage the damaging impacts of disasters and the pending effects of climate change. The city has a climate change plan, developed in 2011, but it needs to be updated and resourced (DDAEPA, 2011).

PHOTO 8.3
Flooding in Dira Dawa

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8.2.6 Policy Agenda Needed for the Development of Secondary City Economies

Two levels of urban policy development are needed to support the development of Ethiopian secondary cities. At the national level, a clear set of policy directions is required. Many of the proposals developed by the New Climate Economy (NCE), Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI), and Global Green Growth Institute (GGCI) in the report, *Unlocking the Power of Ethiopia's Cities (NCE, EDRI & GGGI, 2015) indicate a need to focus at a national level on unlocking the growth potential of urban centres: fostering agglomeration or clustering of regional networks of towns and smaller cities, with secondary cities becoming economic and administrative hubs; and targeting the development of more compact, connected and resilient networks of cities (Figure* 8.14). The report advocated the development of the Dire Dawa-Jigjiga Economic Corridor and International Trading Cluster (NCE, EDRI & GGGI, 2015).

FIGURE 8.14 | Recommended spatial scenario for Ethiopia's urban development

Source: World Bank (2015).

At the subnational level, the following five policy agendas must be considered to boost the development of secondary cities:

1. Reduce urban unemployment.
2. Reduce slum areas.
3. Increase access to land and essential services.
4. Strengthen urban-rural and urban-urban linkages.
5. Adopt plans for climate change adaption in line with COP26.

To implement these, the existing policies and strategies of the Ethiopian federal government are focusing on measures to:

- Reduce urban unemployment to below 20% of the economically active population and thereby reduce urban poverty by increasing urban income levels and income equity: support MSE and accelerate the creation of urban-based employment, particularly where this complements rural linkages and delivery of housing and essential services.

- Reduce slum areas in Ethiopia's main cities by 50%[4] by launching a national integrated-housing development program that scales up Addis Ababa's initiative, based on lessons learned, and which integrates public and private sector investment with micro-enterprise development and provision of essential services.

- Increase access to land and basic services, ensuring that there is sufficient access to land for the poor, for SMEs, and formal private sector industrial and commercial investment.

- Strengthen urban-rural and urban-urban linkages by consolidating efforts in the larger towns and launching a small towns' development program.

Based on the national urban development policy and the objectives mentioned above, the government has developed two 'packages': the Urban Development Package and the Urban Good Governance Package, which secondary cities can use to improve their economy.

The Urban Development Package has five pillars: (i) a Micro and Small Enterprise Development Program; (ii) an integrated housing development program; (iii) a youth development program; (iv) provision of land, infrastructure, services, and facilities; and (v) support for rural-urban and urban-urban linkages (MoWUD, 2007).

The objectives of this package are to:

- Reduce unemployment and poverty through the creation of employment.
- Improve the capacity of the construction industry through the creation of small enterprises.
- Alleviate existing housing problems through the construction of houses.
- Promote urban areas as engines of economic growth.
- Improve urban social and economic infrastructure by providing serviced land for housing, MSE development, youth, and other development.

Initiatives started in Addis Ababa during 2003–2005, such as the integrated housing development program, MSE development, and technical and vocational education and training, are rolled out to the regions as part of this package.

The Urban Good Governance Package was developed to enable urban centres in Ethiopia to enhance sustainable urban development by employing and exercising good governance (MoWUD, 2007). The package has three sub-programs: (i) Land Development and administration systems reform sub-programs; (ii) Urban infrastructure and service reform sub-program; and (iii) Urban finance and financial management reform sub-program.

8.3 Enhancing the Development of Secondary Cities in Ethiopia

Effective governance of the implementation of the urbanisation vision is required to ensure that clear mandates exist for ownership of specific components of the strategy. This will help ensure that stakeholders can be coordinated in ways that make the best use of their skills and expertise and eliminate inefficient practices, such as divergent activities, process duplication and lack of overall coordination. Implementing the preferred option, therefore, needs a common or shared platform across government as a minimum. This will help take advantage of secondary cities' benefits for economic inputs, supply chains, market, and knowledge functions, and improve urban-rural linkages. Integrated planning can also enhance international trade and national transport and infrastructure.

In this regard, there should be national and regional plans to support the efforts of secondary cities to develop, focusing on infrastructure, shared assets, and resources that add value to national supply chains and production systems. Recognition of the balance between national and local autonomy in policy, finance, and planning is essential in enhancing secondary cities' development. The expected effects of devolution policies must be examined to determine whether and how they can enhance and strengthen regional growth poles. There should be a national framework whereby cities can be guided in land-use planning, user building and infra codes and regulation, transit-orientated development, density, sprawl, charging, utility provision, and public space.

Capacity building is another essential aspect to be considered, as it gives rise to a greater opportunity to manage urbanisation and bring economic development. The success of managing urbanisation requires building the capacity of professionals at both the federal and regional levels, urban and infrastructure planning practitioners, and relevant actors within the private sector. This creates a situation whereby the technical skills required for effective policy and understanding of complex urban development issues are improved.

The importance of critical infrastructure to boosting the economy of secondary cities should be acknowledged. Infrastructure is vital for driving development, as it facilitates access to transport, trade, and resources. Prioritisation of infrastructure is essential, as there are always limited resources to deliver it. Secondary cities need to be carefully linked to their actual demand and priority for their development objectives. Each secondary city has needs regarding the timing, capacity, and mode of transport required. Some prioritise movements of people and services, whilst others focus on manufactured goods and raw materials.

Ensuring municipal fiscal autonomy can help secondary cities grow. A city's ability to finance its infrastructure and development needs can be attractive for investments for development. Local control of financial management and revenue-generating activities is helpful if there is the capacity to manage such activities. However, creditworthiness is a significant challenge for many secondary cities that often run deficits and have weak public financial management (PFM). Hence, cities need to improve their PFM to become creditworthy and investable cities.

8.4 Learning Outcomes

Dire Dawa has a unique administrative status, as it is a chartered city, answerable directly to the federal government. Its administrative function has been determined through politics, as it lies strategically between the states of Somali and Oromia. On the other hand, the city is endowed with good economic growth prospects. It has numerous market centres as well as cement, food, textile, and steel manufacturing plants. The town has excellent growth potential, as it is in the vicinity of Djibouti, Somaliland, and Somalia.

Although Dire Dawa has attempted to deal with persistent challenges, such as informal settlements, they remain challenging. The problem of informal settlements is also accompanied by high unemployment, poverty, and a massive backlog in housing. To emerge from this dilemma, the city needs to combine economic growth, land-use management improvements, and transport connections. This intervention could help the city take advantage of future opportunities. Moreover, ensuring reliable connectivity to Djibouti's port will play a significant role in economic development.

There is a need to identify potential growth areas with adequate research into the environmental risks and minimize the impact on sensitive assets such as the water table. This research needs to be well-thought-out to reduce the effects of economic growth on the environment so that economic growth does not impend the city's identity and overall competitiveness. Improving the supply of essential services in Dire Dawa is vital, particularly in water supply, housing, electricity provision, waste management, and sewerage. Balancing the water demand for domestic, commercial, and industrial use needs to be addressed urgently.

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ENDNOTES

(1) The MWUD was created in October 2005. Previously the federal mandate for urban development matters lay with the Ministry of Federal Affairs.

(2) CBDSD - Capacity Building for Decentralized Service Delivery; UDF - Urban Development Fund; ULGDP - Urban Local Government Development Project.

(3) See, e.g., New Urban Agenda. UN-Habitat. https://unhabitat.org/about-us/new-urban-agenda

(4) The United Nations Millennium Goals Report states that an estimated 1 billion of the world's population lives in slums. The MDG target is, by 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers—i.e., 10% of the total.

9

GABÈS: TUNISIA

LAURE CRIQUI

> Tunisia is a small, compact nation in the Maghreb region of North Africa. It has a long history of urban settlement, dating back 5,000 years. In the 5th century BC, the ancient city of Carthage, now a seaside suburb of modern-day Tunis, rose to power to become one of the most dominant civilisations in the western Mediterranean.

In 1980, Tunisia was one of the first countries in Africa to become 50% urbanised. Urban settlements are confined mainly to the Mediterranean coastline. There are now 22 cities with populations over 50,000 located in this zone. Metropolitan Tunis, the capital city, is the largest, at 2.7 million. Most secondary cities are situated along the coast, with a few smaller ones, like Kairouan and Gafsa, located in more fertile areas inland.

PHOTO 9.1
Secondary city, Tunisia

© Hendrik von Schlieben Cities Alliance (2019).

The Ottomans and the French colonised Tunisia for more than 400 years before the country secured its independence, in 1956. The Jasmine Revolution of 2010-2011 saw the overthrow of the longstanding authoritarian government, spurring profound democratic and governance changes in Tunisia. Poverty levels have declined in recent years, but territorial inequalities persist and are decisive factors in bringing about further pressure for change (OECD, 2018). These pressures for change began in small inland cities before spreading to coastal urban centres.

The 2014 Tunisian Constitution[1] opened avenues to shift from centralisation towards democratisation and decentralisation. Inclusive and equitable territorial development appeared central to democratic renewal to address local social demands. The revolution, regional disparities, democratisation, and decentralisation strategies have all been intertwined deeply in Tunisia since 2010. On the one hand, a new logic of 'positive discrimination' towards less-developed regions aims to address and change a firmly embedded centralisation legacy. On the other hand, the regulatory framework, laws, management tools, and financial and human capital are still work in progress to support territorial development policies.

This chapter examines urbanisation and secondary cities development in Tunisia. It includes a case study of the secondary city of Gabès, the country's sixth-largest city and an important industrial centre. The chapter describes the emerging trends, patterns, and challenges of urbanisation of secondary cities in Tunisia; provides a profile of Gabès and its development challenges; and explores the policies and works in progress that support and enhance the development of secondary cities in the country, including the means for their implementation.

9.1 Urbanisation and Secondary City Development

Tunisia is 70% urbanised, with 12 million inhabitants living in urban areas (Figure 9.1 Urban settlement pattern, Tunisia). For the last 50 years, population and economic activity have been concentrated on the northern and eastern coastlines. More than half the national population, three-quarters of the urban population, and over 85% of national GDP is concentrated in Tunis and less than a dozen coastal cities – from Bizerte to Gabès. Centralisation and regional disparities in all local development fields – economic activity, social opportunities, administrative and political power – strongly influence secondary cities' development.

9.1.1 History of Territorial Organisation and Municipal Government Arrangements

Following independence from France in 1957, the Tunisian Constitution of 1959 contained only one reference to local authorities, and the national State favoured de-concentration, i.e., decentralisation of administrative functions without devolution of political power (Turki and Verdeil, 2014). Local territorial administration followed a three-tier system: 24 governorates (provinces), 264 delegations and 2063 sectors. These institutions were directed by representatives appointed by the Ministry of Interior to implement national policies locally.

Municipalities existed, but they did not have a strong political role at the local level. Administrative boundaries were disconnected from functional living areas, economic influence zones and agglomerations. Cities had no political status, and local authorities had little political, administrative, and financial means. In 2011, the local resources share represented only 4% of the State budget and 2% of the national GDP (OECD, 2017). Without fiscal autonomy, local authorities had no genuine political autonomy (Picard and Guidara, 2015), making them dependent on State transfers and hampering their capacity to invest in local projects (Turki and Verdeil, 2014).

The 2014 Constitution committed to effective and equitable decentralisation, autonomy, and responsibility of local authorities for proper democratic and more accountable local governance. It created a new two-tier territorial architecture, with 350 municipalities (among which 90 were newly created and about 100 saw their territory expanded) and 24 forthcoming elected regional councils (Figure 9.2). A Ministry for Local Affairs was created in 2016, followed by the adoption of a 'National Code for Local Authorities'[2] in May 2018. The first municipal elections took place in May 2018; since then, some mayors have denounced the lack of means, capacities, and autonomy to fulfil their missions and social demands, particularly in the context of COVID-19. Indeed, while financial decentralisation remains in progress, municipalities are now responsible for roads, rainwater management, public places, parks and green areas, solid waste management, public lighting, markets, and slaughterhouses. They share responsibilities with the State for local economic development and employment.

FIGURE 9.1 | Urban settlement pattern, Tunisia

A consultative process for designing a National Strategy for Decentralisation and implementation tools were launched in July 2020. However, multi-level governance arrangements between State, regions, and municipalities remain fragile and undecided. Meanwhile, a complete, coherent regulatory framework remains pending, particularly regarding the alignment between decentralisation and de-concentration; this has created fractions and misunderstandings between local State administrations and municipalities. Being new, municipalities are still in the phase of organising autonomous administration and processes; 5-year local development plans – required by the 2018 National Code – are expected to follow soon, depending on the financial and human capital resources they manage to mobilise.

9.1.2 Urbanisation and Demographics of Primary and Secondary City Development

With a fertile north-east coastline strategically oriented towards the Mediterranean Sea, on the one hand, and a more desertic southwest area, on the other, the Tunisian geography has strongly shaped urban, economic and political development (Belhedi, 2019). During the colonial period, the French administration concentrated its presence in cities on the fertile northern coast, around mining centres, colonial settlements, ports and administrative centres (Belhedi, 1993). Furthermore, the colonial State strongly favoured Tunis; regional centres were regarded as places to control the territory, with little local development perspective.

This tendency was reinforced in subsequent decades. After independence, a State-led socialist development strategy relied on the nationalisation of industrial assets. Rapid urban growth started in the 1960s, with an average growth rate of 4% per year. The combination of public investment in extensive infrastructure and the creation of governorates and their administrative offices – hence, public employment, social and educational services – led to rural-urban migration towards coastal cities.

FIGURE 9.2 | Territorial organisation following the 2014 Constitution

The shift towards a neoliberal economy in the 1980s did not change the trend much. Market-led development favoured territories with assets, infrastructure and openness to international trade. Export industries and tourism have benefited coastal cities, which had the comparative advantage of a strategic location for international exchanges (Belhedi, 2004). Meanwhile, the State compensated for the unequal development by investing in public and social amenities in small inland cities, with little success in promoting endogenous local development dynamics.

Nowadays, the traditional north vs. south imbalances and inequalities have shifted slightly to the eastern coastline vs. the western interior (Belhedi, 2019), without changing fundamental legacy and trends. Three patterns can therefore characterise urbanisation in Tunisia:

- A high level of primacy: Tunis and Sfax, and Sousse to a lesser extent, illustrate political-economic centralisation. Urban sprawl has engulfed neighbouring municipalities and agricultural land.
- Few medium-size cities: Today's secondary cities are the capital cities of regional governorates, set as administrative centres in the 1970s and economic poles in the 1980s.
- The proliferation of small inland towns that face relative demographic growth but lack administrative, economic and social services is also a source of interior migration (both from rural areas to towns and inland towns to coastal cities or abroad).

Even though precise data on the population in urban areas is not available, there is consensus on the large urban agglomerations in Tunisia. These are represented by eight regional capitals (Lamine, 2008): Tunis, Sfax and Sousse constitute the three large metropolises, followed by Nabeul, Bizerte, Gabès, Kairouan and Gafsa, and then by a series of small inland towns with less than 100,000 inhabitants. Figure 9.3 and Table 9.1 Population of Tunisia's primate and secondary cities show population change in these cities since 1990. The largest cities have had a more rapid growth than small towns due to economic attractivity and amenities (Lamine, 2008), resulting in a continuing concentration of the population in the northeast of Tunisia. Brief descriptions of these seven cities follow.

FIGURE 9.3 | Rural and urban population per settlement size (thousands)

Source: Africapolis (2018).

TABLE 9.1 | Population of Tunisia's primate and secondary cities

City	1990	2000	2010	Est 2015	Area	Density	Average Annual Growth (%)
Tunis	1,206,599	1,576,054	1,886,872	2,442,503	585	4,174	2.96
Sousse	154,034	296,946	482,905	567,802	179	3,180	4.42
Sfax	376,035	443,125	499,879	520,896	278	1,874	1.08
Nabeul	45,479	102,123	193,305	220,351	109	2,022	5.26
Moknine	78,358	103,535	174,391	190,787	63	3,017	4.16
Bizerte	88,104	140,936	166,726	182,031	63	2,887	1.72
Gabès	114,348	143,947	165,634	176,522	65	2,712	1.37
Jerba Houmet Souk	48,424	105,841	129,731	142,650	295	484	2.01
Kairouan	89,977	111,850	130,612	141,853	26	5,443	1.60
Monastir	51,947	71,911	109,994	136,171	31	4,395	4.35
Gafsa	67,122	107,427	123,183	128,930	22	4,466	0.92

Source: Africapolis (2018).

9.1.3 Brief Profile of National System of Cites

9.1.3.1 *Greater Tunis*

Tunis, the national capital of Tunisia, is the fourth largest city in the Maghreb region, with 2.5 million inhabitants. It comprises several adjoining administrative municipalities. The urban agglomeration expands along a gulf coast over 2,668 km². During the French colonial period, the city began rapid development at the end of the nineteenth century, introducing water, gas, electricity, roads, and street networks. Demographic growth accelerated after independence due to internal migration: new suburbs emerged either under the impetus of national housing programs or informal urbanisation. The latter now account for almost half the urbanised area beyond the historical city-centre. Tunis has a high political, administrative, and economic primacy and a natural demographic growth rate of 2.1%, which is higher than the national average. Tunis concentrates on Tunisian economic activity, with headquarters of major Tunisian companies, foreign investors' concentration, and a predominantly tertiary sector.

9.1.3.2 Sfax

Sfax's agglomeration consists of around 600,000 inhabitants and more than 220 km² of flat and accessible land, structured around radial communication roads. The centre encompasses the Old City (Medina), the modern city, built by the French colonial administration, and the port. Today, suburban municipalities account for 45% of the agglomeration's population; this growth began in the 1970s, but is now slowing. Urbanisation has occurred informally, with lower-middle income groups encroaching on peripheral land. Urban sprawl has occurred, with minimal public transport services between peripheries and the city centre. The national railroad connects Sfax with northern and southern cities, and the airport offers few international flights. An old and insufficient bus service highly constrains internal mobility; personal vehicles, taxis and informal transport are therefore dominant.

Sfax is the first port in Tunisia, and it is where maritime commercial activity and related industrial activities offer economic and employment opportunities. One-third of the national fish production comes from Sfax. The hinterland is an agricultural production territory, particularly for olive oil. The region of Sfax is one of Tunisia's most economically dynamic regions and accounts for around 20% of the national GDP (OECD, 2016).

9.1.3.3 Sousse

The urban agglomeration of Sousse represents around 400,000 people. It is still the Tunisian agglomeration with the highest growth rate, due to employment opportunities in the building sector, administration, education, and health, both in Sousse and neighbouring municipalities. Availability of affordable land and rents and a traditional industrial sector that still accounts for 30% of the workforce attract lower-income groups. Sousse is also a tourist destination due to the historical heritage in the old city. Like Sfax, Sousse is connected to other cities through an international airport and national railroad. At the agglomeration level, Sousse, Monastir, and Mahdia make up the 97 km² region connected by an omnibus train know as Metro du Sahel.

The economy of Sousse relies on industrial activity (transport machinery, textile, agribusiness) and tourism due to its proximity to seaside resorts and archaeological sites. However, since the revolution, the touristic sector has been fragile, and the COVID-19 crisis has worsened this revenue stream.

9.1.3.4 Nabeul

The urban area of Nabeul engulfs the agglomeration of Hammamet for a total of 155,000 inhabitants. Strategically situated between Sousse and Tunis, it benefits from its proximity to the Tunis economy, while offering new investment opportunities in the Gulf of Hammamet. The Gulf also constitutes an attractive destination for international tourism.

9.1.3.5 Bizerte

Bizerte's agglomeration encompasses several neighbouring municipalities of about 400,000 inhabitants, and it benefits from its proximity to Tunis. Due to its unique location on the northeast coast, Bizerte has long been a major commercial and military port. It is connected via the national railroad and highway to the capital and the international airport. It is the centre of a dense communication network with other neighbouring cities and ports.

Bizerte is an economic centre with commercial, fishery, shipyard and tourism facilities connected with processing and manufacturing inland zones. Its strategic location combines geographical advantages on the axis between Mediterranean traffic and inland regions and proximity with Tunis and infrastructure facilities to connect with international markets.

9.1.3.6 Gabès

Gabès is the southernmost secondary city in Tunisia, i.e., it is located at the end of the railroad relative to Tunis. It also has an airport and is otherwise connected to other Tunisian cities via highways. The urban area sprawls over 20 km along the Gulf and is fragmented by natural frontiers (oasis, rivers, and canals); discontinuous urban sprawl has progressively engulfed nearby villages. The urban agglomeration expands over peripheral areas and is estimated to host 235,000 inhabitants. Following a period of rapid growth during the 1970s and 1980s due to public investments in the industry sector, the city now suffers from a loss of attractiveness.

The Port of Gabès is the fourth largest in the country due to important national investments in the 1970s to make it an industrial pole. Since 1972, the industrial complex of Gabès has produced 1,300,000 tons/year of diammonium phosphate, 875,000 tons/year of phosphoric acid, 90,000 tons/year of calcium phosphate, and 330,000 tons/year of ammonium nitrate.[3] The local economy relies on industrial, chemical, and phosphate transformation, offshore oil exploitation and petrochemicals, electricity and gas production, and cement production. The region was also an intensive agricultural production area. Industrial pollution has significantly affected the environment and natural resources, threatening traditional agriculture, fishing, tourism and the region's overall attractiveness.

9.1.3.6 *Kairouan & Gafsa*

Unlike other Tunisian secondary cities, Kairouan and Gafsa are situated inland and are therefore much less attractive for growth. Their size is due mainly to public and administrative services and their status as regional centres. The lack of economic and employment opportunities has limited population growth and employment attraction, as many people who prefer to migrate to coastal cities.

9.1.4 The Economic Geography of Secondary Cities

Tunisia's economic development has been shaped strongly by national policies and national-territorial planning (Dhaher, 2010). In the early decades of independence, the socialist State nationalised industries, equipment, and ports. It created national public agencies and enterprises to deliver urban services, operate national transport systems, and exploit natural resources. As a result, the geography of economic development followed national decisions on creating industrial hubs, depending on the comparative advantages of just a few cities. This strategy led to a concentration and specialisation of economic activities in said cities at the expense of endogenous growth and distributed local markets.

The shift to neoliberalism in the 1980s opened the Tunisian economy to international trade and markets. The State promoted export-oriented industries, manufacturing, and tourism. As a result of these policies, cities located on the Mediterranean Coast benefitted significantly compared to inland towns and cities. The better infrastructure, resources, and skills, reinforced by international attractiveness and private investments, further entrenched the geographic concentration of economic development opportunities in the larger coastal cities. Subsequently, private enterprises, both industry and services, are now highly concentrated in the three larger agglomerations of Tunis, Sfax and Sousse (see Figure 9.4).

During the 2000s, the Tunisian economy suffered from global economic downturns, due to its dependence on foreign markets and international sectors like tourism, the threat of terrorism, and civil unrest. Priority was directed to the most productive, attractive and promising assets to mitigate the impact of the economic downturn. This resulted in a continuing competitive advantage for dynamic coastal areas, with some compensation measures and subsidies offered to inland territories (Labiadh, 2016).

"Since independence, Tunisia has given priority to the development of thriving cities, commercial openness, and industrial competitiveness. This policy was intended to meet the needs for public services and jobs generated by rapid growth in the major cities. As a result, Tunis and the central and northeast coastal regions occupy a dominant position in the country's economic activities. Despite the importance of public investment and strong incentives to private investment in the interior regions, this export-based development model has created a 'two-speed' economy where the offshore sector, located primarily in the coastal regions, has developed rapidly. In contrast, the onshore sector struggles to grow and create jobs." (OECD, 2018, p 114)

FIGURE 9.4 | Headquarters of private enterprises per region in 2015[4]

Source: OECD (2018).

National economic policies have focussed territorial development on industry sector development, rather than clustering, while spatial concerns for equitable and sustainable development have been neglected (Observatoire Tunisien de l'Economie, 2019). Medium-term economic planning has remained disconnected from spatial planning (Dhaher, 2010), leaving economic forces rather than public strategies to shape territorial development (Ben Jelloul, 2017).

9.1.5 National Policies on Urbanisation and Secondary City Development

Altogether, political, demographic, and economic trends have resulted in Tunisia being an administratively centralised and economically polarised country. Until 2011, the State remained the sole actor for national economic development at the expense of regional and local entities (Chabbi, 2012). Thus, the central government has historically provided little autonomy for secondary cities to realise opportunities to support the country's economic growth and the emergence of a well-developed network of regional competitive growth centres.

Subsequently, economic activities have become concentrated in the capital and secondary coastal cities. In contrast, small interior cities and regions lag in facilities, roads, healthcare, and leisure services due to low government investment and powerless local authorities (African Development Bank, OECD and United Nations Development Programme, 2016).

Concerns about regional development disparities emerged at the national level when the first national planning document was adopted in 1985 (Bennasr, 2012). Rather than promoting genuine political and economic regions, it subdivided the national territory into administrative entities with grants and transfers, doing little to encourage comparative advantage between cities and regions (Ben Jelloul, 2020). This economic regionalisation did not change either the overall top-down, centralised logic or geographical disparities.

Internal regions face substantial deficits in terms of employment, educational opportunities, and access to health services. At the same time, secondary cities on the coast have benefitted on the one hand from economic development, therefore employment opportunities and being connected to international markets, and on the other from public investment in critical sectors like health, education, and administrative services. For example, the Ministry of Development, Investment, and International Cooperation has developed the Regional Development Index, which is a national synthetic indicator based on four components: living conditions, social and geographic indicators, human capital, and labour market indicators. This index clearly shows the geographical disparities in terms of local development (Figure 9.5).

FIGURE 9.5 | Regional development index per governorate

■ Coastal governorates and Greater Tunis   ■ Interior governorates

Source: (OECD, 2018).

This polarisation of economic, social, and political opportunities within the country has created frustrations. These imbalances have fuelled internal migration from rural to urban inland areas and from inland cities to coastal cities (Lamine, 2008). Migrants have settled in informal, unplanned settlements on the peripheries of secondary cities, thereby contributing to discontinuous urban sprawl and encroachment on agricultural land.

Regional disparities were among the factors in the 2010-2011 Jasmine Revolution, with conflict in inland towns arising from the unemployed and under-employed young labour force. This issue has become so critical that 'positive discrimination' towards inland regions is now written into the Constitution, and a report on national spatial planning has been published (République Tunisienne, 2020). The design of new regions to ensure balanced socio-economic development has become politically strategic (Bennasr, 2012); however, the role of secondary cities in forthcoming national policies for economic development and planning is still to be determined.

Since 2011, some transfers have been made, and legislation now acknowledges local authorities' role in economic development, but transfer of political, financial and human resources to local authorities has been slow.

9.1.6 Issues Affecting Secondary City Development

Tunisia's secondary cities are mostly coastal cities and economic centres, but they are not the most deprived municipalities in Tunisia, and they remain attractive for rural populations in search of socio-economic opportunities. However, their economies' strong dependence on foreign and international sectors, including exports and tourism, creates a fundamental uncertainty for their ongoing development, considering the political, terrorist, and sanitary risks they face. Secondary cities' dependence on national policies has also prevented them from developing autonomous and endogenous local development strategies (Picard and Guidara, 2015). The inheritance of top-down State control and centralisation has also hampered possibilities and opportunities for city-to-city cooperation across the country. Three key issues developed hereunder are affecting the development of secondary cities in Tunisia: local governance, human capital development, spatial concentration.

9.1.6.1 Local Governance, Governments, and Administrations

Municipalities are only two years old, and still fragile. Even though Tunisia now has a good governance system to ensure transparency, accountability, and efficiency for public management, transferring such responsibilities and tools to the local level will take time.

Municipalities face the challenge of weak administrative, human capital, and financial means, and struggle with the inheritance of highly concentrated political power. Highly constrained capacities still limit the mandate and degree of autonomy they are entrusted with through the Constitution: most local budgets are dedicated to operating costs and wages rather than investing in local projects; local civil servants' positions are much less attractive than at the central level, resulting in many vacancies in management positions (Picard and Guidara, 2015).

Besides, mayors feel left alone to face and satisfy local social demands. Additionally, Municipal Councils were elected in 2018, with most newcomers not necessarily familiar with politico-administrative work. After a few months to get started, be trained, and take on appropriate local challenges, the COVID-19 crisis emerged and quickly slowed and constrained their activity, while also putting pressure in terms of social needs. Some municipalities have collaborated with local enterprises and civil society to design projects, vote for participatory budgets, and draft local development strategies to deal with this complex situation. Several international and bilateral development organisations have also played a significant role in supporting municipal projects and providing technical assistance to municipalities across the country. Reciprocally, some NGOs have consolidated and published data on public management and finances at the local level.

It is too early to evaluate the impacts of the national democratic changes at the local municipality level. The tension between people's aspirations and political will for better local governance and the actual capacity of local governments and administrations to deliver will remain a challenge in the coming years.

9.1.6.2 Human Capital Development and Unemployment

Unemployment was one of the critical drivers of the Revolution: the 'unemployed graduates', a well-educated and young workforce that had been neglected for decades, could not find economic opportunities. Quality education has improved overall human development, but related jobs in the service sector are heavily concentrated in Tunis and are not accessible to those in other regions. Figure 9.6 shows the unemployment rates per region. These are disproportionately high for inland secondary cities, towns and regions, leading to push-migration to coastal cities.

The industrial sector has not generated enough quality jobs in most secondary cities due to both its intrinsic needs and global downturns. Similarly, the tourism sector is highly uncertain and dependent on both national and international contexts. Over decades, the concentration of economic activities in a few industries has devastated some traditional agriculture, crafts, and local entrepreneurship. Very specialised local economies cannot offer a diversity of opportunities to a young and dynamic population.

The frustration and lack of employment opportunities for qualified youth have fuelled discontent as well as internal rural-urban migration. This situation presents a risk of further social unrest if the new urban migrants cannot find employment opportunities in the cities to which they have moved. Human capital continues to be under-exploited at the local level but could constitute a competitive advantage for the country (OECD, 2019).

FIGURE 9.6 | Unemployment rate per region

Unemployment rate between:

- 26% – 33%
- 19% – 26%
- 12% – 19%
- 5% – 12%

9.1.6.3 Spatial Issues: Migration, Urbanisation, and Agglomerations

As indicated earlier, even though Tunisia is already a highly urbanised country, with urbanisation at 70% and poverty rates continuing to decline, rural-urban migration continues. These internal migrations represent the country's deep inequalities and constitute a threat for small, medium, and large cities.

Small inland towns suffer from low economic development and therefore offer little attraction for investment and qualified workers. They face a vicious circle of underdevelopment that public investment has not been able to address in recent decades (Dhaher, 2010). The risk for these regions is that people will not stay in the small and medium towns/cities, causing them to remain dependent on larger urban agglomerations, which will be detrimental to their future (Foued, 2015).

Attractive secondary cities are continuing to experience high migration levels and do not have the capacity to offer adequate, reasonable accommodation. Consequently, dispersed urbanisation occurs unplanned in the peripheries, neighbouring municipalities and agricultural land in a discontinuous and low-density way. Such an urbanisation pattern threatens environmentally and socially sustainable urban development and is a drain on fiscal revenues that local authorities will face in the coming years. Even though the Tunisian government has implemented large-scale national housing programs (Chabbi, 2012), it is unclear who will be in charge in the new decentralised system.

Finally, growing demographic and economic concentration occurs in the three emerging metropolitan regions: Tunis, Sfax and Sousse. This has created significant urban management issues that have spread over municipal boundaries in uncontrolled residential developments. The emergence of conurbations like Nabeul-Hammamet on the north-eastern coast signifies the disconnection between local administrative structures and urbanisation patterns. Rather than creating unified and coherent urban agglomerations based on complementary advantage, these de facto absorptions may hamper the emergence of sustainable city development strategies.

9.2 Case Study of Gabès

Gabès is the smallest of the main secondary cities, and it demonstrates the challenges Tunisian cities face today after decades of State-led regional economic development. Even though good infrastructure and economic conditions supported development over recent decades, their disconnection from the regional context and the lack of localised strategies and capacities now threaten such a development model's sustainability. The history of Gabès is representative of the problems and tensions between national and local development concerns (Observatoire Tunisien de l'Economie, 2019).

9.2.1 City Profile

Gabès is an important city in the national and regional urban framework. Figure 9.7 shows Gabès municipality and territory. It is the southernmost city of the coastal corridor, a key hub between the northern and southern deserts; it is strategically located within the Gulf of Gabès and is a maritime oasis.

In the 1970s, the city of Gabès was the locus of a national policy to situate the Groupe Chimique Tunisien, which included a port complex and phosphate transformation industry facilities. In parallel, as the regional capital, it benefitted from public investment and services. These State-led decisions have fostered fundamental socio-economic changes: good connection with the northeast corridor, attractiveness and migration from surrounding regions, specialisation of economic activity and employment, significant health, educational and cultural amenities. It has also resulted in competition for natural resources, including land and water, and has caused environmental degradation (Carpentier, 2016).

FIGURE 9.7 | Gabès territory

Source: (Google Earth & author).

TABLE 9.2 | Profile of Gabès

Indicator	Details		Source
Urban Area	What is the estimated urban area in the city?	65.08 km²	Africapolis 2015
Demographics	What was the Estimate Population 2020?	176,522	Africapolis 2015
	What was population in 2000 or last census	128,539	Municipalité de Gabès 2014
	Is the city's share of the national population growing?	+3.36 %	Africapolis 2015
	Estimated Density of Population	2,712 pp km²	Africapolis 2015
	Has population density in the city increased or decreased?	26.8 / pp km² (1975) to 55 pp km² (2017)	
Economic Strength	What is the city's estimated GDP?	US$591 m $3,349.6 (2020)	
	Estimate of how fast is the economy-growing pa?	2.7% (2018) about the means national growth	
	What is fastest growing sector of the Economy?	Public sector	
	What does the city mostly export or trade?	Phosphate, oil, gas (manufacturing, textile)	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
Income Levels	What is the estimated average income per month?	Average Monthly After Tax 740.00 DT US$ 258.51	Numbeo data base_2021
	How much higher are incomes in the capital city compared to city?	9% below Tunis 810.42 DT (US$283.11)	Numbeo data base_2021
Employment	How many people are employed in the city by industry Sector?	Agriculture & fishing: 2,609	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
		Mining & energy: 2,251	
		Manufacturing industry: 13,566	
		Construction & public works: 8,195	
		Trade and commerce: 11,803	
		Transport: 3,899	
		Education, health, administrative services: 26,361	
		Other services: 7,485	
	How big is informal sector employment?	Unknown	
	What is the unemployment rate?	19.04 %	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
	Is there a reliance of remittances to supplement household income?	Unknown	
Poverty Rate	Estimate %of households living below the poverty line. Is there any Gini Coefficient data?	15.9% poverty rate	Municipalité de Gabès 2018
	What is the gin coefficient	Unknown	

Indicator	Details		Source
Public Finances	What is the budget of the municipality?	7 M$ est.	Portail des collectivités locales 2019
	What are the primary sources or funds and expenditure?	Local resources	Portail des collectivités locales 2019
	How much money does the municipality spend/ capita?	55 $ est.	Author's estimate
Infrastructure	What % of the city population has access to potable water?	98.7%	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
	What % of the city population has good sanitation?	88.6%	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
	What % of the city population has waste management collection	99%	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
	What is the distance and travel time to the nearest largest city?	325 km to Capital City	
	How many intercity flights or buses is there a day?	2 flights to Capital	
	Does the Municipality have a GIS with an inventory of infrastructure	Unknown	
Housing and Land	What % of the city's residents' lives in slums?	0.07%	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
	What % of households rent	17.85 %	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
	What is the cost of land on the fringe	Unknown	
	How rapid has been the development of land and housing	Unknown	
Education	Number of students who finish primary education	31.22%	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
	Number of students who complete secondary education	43.74%	
	Number of students who complete tertiary education	14.73%	
Health Infrastructure	Number of doctors per 10,000 people Doc/10,000	1.9 hospital bed per 1000 population	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
Attractiveness/ Tourism	Average n° of nights spent by tourists	1.6	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
	Quantity of phosphogypsum rejected in the sea	13 000 T/day	Municipalité de Gabès 2018
	Rate of green public places	10.77 m²/inhabitant	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018
	Share of individual "villas" within overall housing offer	83.35%	Office de Développement du Sud, 2018

Sources: Public documentation sources indicated in column 4.

Table 9.2[5] gives a profile of Gabès. It includes data collected from public sources on demography, economy, social indicators, governance, housing, and health. Some data is not available, nor is it disaggregated enough to prepare a complete profile of the city. There is a need for additional data to be gathered to enable the city to improve its planning and management of development and infrastructure and deliver social, community and environmental services. The difficulty of securing better information and data on Gabès is a problem shared with most other secondary cities of Tunisia and North Africa, as well. Without improved basic data and information on secondary cities, it becomes increasingly challenging to plan for their development.

9.2.1.1 Social-Demographics

Gabès is the regional capital of the governorate of Gabès, with an estimated population of 374,000 inhabitants in 2014. The city itself accounts for approximately one-third of the regional population; the nine other municipalities of the governorate have 40,000 inhabitants or less.

Even though Gabès still attracts migrants from neighbouring rural areas, its average annual growth rate of 1.24% between 2004 and 2014 is among the lowest in the country (Table 9.2). The lack of endogenous economic growth and alternative private investment beyond the port-industrial complex has slowed its momentum and natural demographic growth (Office de Développement du Sud, 2018).

The rapid industrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s and the large employment numbers in public services led to a relative homogeneity of the social structure, with the rise of a lower-middle and middle-income group (Carpentier, 2016), living in individual houses in the southern suburbs.

FIGURE 9.8 | Internal migration in the governorate of Gabès, 2004

Source: ST2I Groupe Studi (2011).

9.2.1.2 Governance

The municipality of Gabès extends over three delegations: Gabès Ville, Gabès Ouest and Gabès Sud, the more urbanised areas at the centre of the governorate. Early on, the new municipal council elected in 2018 launched a participatory budget exercise for 5% of its budget. With the European Union and Expertise France's support, it engaged with local enterprises in collaborative environmental governance processes to foster corporate social responsibility initiatives. It also conducted a diagnostic process and prepared a participatory City Development Strategy (CDS) for Gabès with support from MedCities, UNDP and Cities Alliance. This CDS to assess the strengths and opportunities for the territory and design adequate local projects indicates, a positive trend towards reappropriation of local issues and perspectives by the new local authority, in partnership with active local civil society.

9.2.1.3 Urban Development

The urban area of Gabès spreads over 20 km along the coast in fragmented urbanisation due to natural obstacles, including the oasis and river. Roads and a canal also separate the city from the coastline. The agglomeration encompasses:

- The old city, Medina (classified as part of historical heritage), which suffers from a poor road network and traffic congestion.
- The colonial centre, which has a concentration of administration, commerce, and tertiary activities.
- The residential extensions in Gabès South, which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s with industrial and administrative development, and where some services, such as the hospital, university, and sports complex, have been delocalised.
- Recent informal settlements, including engulfment of villages and encroachments on the oasis on the western side of the city, which threaten valuable natural land and are in proximity to dangerous industrial areas.
- The port-industrial complex halfway between Gabès and Ghannouch, which creates a rupture in the urban landscape.

Although Gabès is well-connected to other cities due to the railroad and highways, this same infrastructure constitutes obstacles to inner-city mobility. The city centre is increasingly congested by private vehicles, while public transport from residential peripheries to central workplaces is inadequate. The public and green space rate is estimated to be 10.77 m²/inhabitant, much less than the desired norm of 15 m²/inhabitant (Office de Développement du Sud, 2018). Housing is mainly privately owned and single buildings, with little urban planning and few collective buildings. While individual housing conditions are acceptable for most of the population, urban development problems of poor quality and quantity of public space and road remain. These are acknowledged signs of deficient public urban policies.

9.2.1.4 Infrastructure and Urban Services

Gabès is a well-serviced city due to public investment made to support industrial development and regional capital status. Most urban services are provided by national enterprises or offices and not by the local municipality. Currently, 98.7% of the population has access to piped water networks and 88.7% has access to sewage networks. Those lacking connections are informal developments in the oasis. All households are connected to electricity, and there are 107.2 mobile connections per 100 inhabitants. Whilst 99% of solid waste is collected, it is neither sorted nor recycled, and is instead buried or incinerated, further contributing to air pollution.

9.2.1.5 Human Capital

Gabès has convenient sanitary and health infrastructure and facilities for a city of its size, with 1.48 hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. However, considering the increasing health issues due to air, water and soil contamination, these facilities would not cope with large-scale public health issues that may arise. Though the situation is satisfactory for now, it may not be sustainable (Office de Développement du Sud, 2018).

Gabès is also an important regional academic centre with its university of 12 faculties, three public and more than 50 private, professional training centres. However, while superior education was one of the attractions for migrants until the 2000s, the number of students and professors decreased in recent years, and student drop-out rates have increased (Fig. 9.9). This trend can be explained by

- the decreasing quality of life in Gabès due to environmental pollution;
- and the lack of employment opportunities for young graduates in the city (Fig. 9.10).

FIGURE 9.9 | Numbers of students and professors in university and faculties

Source: (Office de Développement du Sud, 2018).

43.35% of the unemployed population has a university degree, and 30.09% of graduates are unemployed.

FIGURE 9.10 | Age of unemployed population

Source: Office de Développement du Sud (2018).

Gabès also has a theatre, three cultural centres, a museum, and hosts many festivals. It offers extensive youth centres and sports complexes, which are adequate and commensurate with its function as a regional capital.

9.2.1.6 Economic Development

Equipped with large scale infrastructure and well connected through roads, rail, and maritime networks, Gabès developed because of the chemical industries and export of phosphate and exploitation of natural gas and offshore oil in the 1980s.

The port and industrial complex of Gabès-Ghannouch has been the main driver of development during recent decades. Still, global recession and saturation of its capacity increasingly limit its contribution to local economic activity. Indeed, only a third of the industrial zone is developed, thus providing less than anticipated employment for the local population. Additionally, because it is a national project, revenues from the industrial zone are transferred to the national budget, hence do not directly contribute to local municipality revenues. The public sector has become the main employer in recent times while few economic alternatives have emerged (Figure 9.11). Agricultural production remains limited, and the craft industry is weak; tourism is limited due to the poor quality and attractiveness of the urban environment. Informal economic activity and unemployment rates are rising (Observatoire Tunisien de l'Economie, 2019). In recent years, the prospects for economic growth have been diminishing. A reorientation and diversification of the economic base is required to ensure sustainable local development.

FIGURE 9.11 | Occupation of the active population

Other services 8%

Unemployment 19%

Education, health,
administrative services 28%

Agriculture & fishing 3%

Mining & energy 2%

Manufacturing industry 14%

Transport 4%

Trade and commerce 13%

Construction & public works 9%

Source: Municipalité de Gabès et al. (2018).

9.2.1.7 Environmental Issues

Gabès is unfortunately known as one of the most polluted cities in Tunisia due to its industrial and chemical wastes, especially those associated with phosphate exports (Göbel, 2013). Environmental degradation has been the primary concern of both the municipality and civil society in recent years. Hence, it has become the leading political priority and driver for local development projects.

The phosphate refinery in Gabès (Photo 9.2) is also responsible for environmental degradation, causing harm to public health, including high rates of cancer and kidney disease. Fish resources and biodiversity have been impacted significantly in recent years due to rising water temperatures and run-off of industrial effluents into the sea. The phosphate industry consumes significant water resources from a minimal supply. Polluted air is also fast becoming a public health issue.

Lastly, informal urbanisation impinges upon the land's valuable oasis. Gabès is one of the largest maritime oases globally and is located in a gulf that could become a significant wetland environmental asset if pollution problems in the harbour area were addressed. Not only has Gabès not taken advantage of its local natural assets, but the industries established under national development policies are causing deterioration of the city's natural and urban environment.

PHOTO 9.2
Phosphate Contamination of Harbour Gabès Tunisia

© Nicholas Linn (2014).

9.2.2 Development Challenges and Opportunities

The situation of Gabès is symbolic of the paradoxical position of Tunisian secondary cities at the intersection of national, regional, and local issues:

- As a nationwide important industrial centre, it drives economic, political, and demographic growth, but it remains dependent on domestic and foreign investment and trade and is vulnerable to external influences, both domestic and international.

- As a regional centre offering good social amenities and services, Gabès is attractive to migrants, but it has limited capacity to accommodate them. With pollution and other negative impacts from industry, this adversely affects its attractiveness to foreign investors, firms, and a qualified workforce.

Gabès has long been considered primarily as an industrial economic centre. In the context of State led policies and planning, its regional and local assets and resources have been neglected and have become degraded. The city's image (i.e., as an industrial hub) is poor and adversely affects its sustainability model. Challenges unfold in all dimensions:

- Urban environment: Quality of life, air quality, green public places, street cleanliness, waste segregation, and oasis protection are significant issues. These issues are recognised and defended by the new Municipal Council and local civil society. Still, they must be addressed by local industries and public authorities because pollution and degradation threaten opportunities for alternative economic activities, such as agriculture, fishing, and tourism. The possible displacement of the industrial zone 60 km inland, to preserve the city from pollution, has also been considered.

- Social inclusion and identity: The image and attractiveness of Gabès must be redesigned to help it realise its economic potential: to promote tourism, value cultural heritage, promote higher tertiary functions, increase entrepreneurship, grow the craft industry, and diversify employment opportunities for a young and qualified workforce. Likewise, environmental, landscape and natural assets ought to be highlighted and valued to create appeal.

- These environmental and social challenges fundamentally rely on a change in the city's economic structure and model. The concentration of growth in the industrial and chemical sector has damaged social and environmental sustainability, and economic development has plateaued. Diversifying the economic base, reconversion, or re-localisation of polluting industries away from residential areas and promoting alternative entrepreneurship in the agricultural and touristic sectors are opportunities to reorient the development trajectory of employment and to recover and preserve the environment.

9.2.3 Policy Agenda to Boost the City and Local Economy

The new national political context provides opportunities for more equitable and sustainable development of the city. Indeed, the new municipal council has elaborated local development strategies to value endogenous regional development potential (Observatoire Tunisien de l'Economie, 2019). Nevertheless, in partnership with local civil society and with support from international expertise, the reappropriation of local assets requires rethinking the development model followed for the last five decades. To turn into an attractive regional hub, critical areas for action addressed by the new Municipal Council include the following:

9.2.3.1 Improve the Urban Environment and Attractiveness

Gabès has important natural assets – the oasis and beaches, its cultural heritage, the Medina – that have been undervalued and polluted, with pollution causing both environmental and public health problems. There are social and economic costs as well: tourists pass Gabès without visiting, and hostels and resorts are few. The development of a tourism sector would require improvements in inner-city mobility and connections with neighbouring cities: the governorate offers the diversity of coastal, Sahara, thermal and mountain tourism areas.

Based on these assets, Gabès is considering a development strategy in partnership and collaboration with other smaller cities in a 50 to 60 km perimeter. Such improvements would also improve the city's image and attractiveness to a qualified workforce, foreign investors, and entrepreneurs. A focus on a program of environmental restoration and containment of pollutants in the harbour area is essential to improving the city's degraded area. Action to restore the environment would not only help improve public health, marine life, and create new opportunities for leisure, tourism and environmental employment and investment, but also enable a better quality of life for its citizens.

9.2.3.2 Diversify Economic Opportunities

Economic diversification could benefit from implementing metropolitan clusters that combine economic and technological skills with the promotion of Research and Development by improving connections between the university and industries. It would both enhance the corporate social responsibility of local firms and increase employment opportunities for graduates. Creating a local business hub and gathering the region's entrepreneurs to develop joint visions for sustainable development and attractiveness could be fostered by more democratic and participatory political processes. To that end, Gabès has partnered with Bizerte in a a joint initiative for 'smart sustainable cities', oriented towards a 'smart oasis', to develop an eco-district.

Gabès remains an important agricultural centre, with 40% of its revenues from the wholesale food market; as such, it supplies the cities of Medenine, Djerba and other southern towns. The agricultural potential was the traditional economic sector in Gabès. It could be revived in partnership with inland rural areas, where projects for geothermal sources for agriculture are being tested. To promote endogenous economic development, the city of Gabès ought to foster and encourage the emergence of local businesses and entrepreneurship.

FIGURE 9.12 | Preliminary orientations of the Development and Territorial Planning document for Governorate of Gabès

Source : Office de Développement du Sud, 2018, p. 63.

9.2.3.3 Connect with the Hinterland and Small Towns

Opportunities to support regional clusters of towns and cities along with Al-Hammah, Medenine, and others could be encouraged so that they operate more as a network of trading and value-adding cities, together promoting the collaborative region's economic development. The spatial master plan at the governorate level is under review (Fig. 9.12). Its goal is to transform the region into an economic development pole. In that respect, the role and place of Gabès as the regional metropolis is crucial, both within the governorate and beyond, including with western governorates (Office de Développement du Sud, 2018) and as far as with southern Algeria.

It could fulfil a regional metropolis's role by taking advantage of its strategic location, rich heritage, and important amenities. It already has the necessary transport infrastructure to connect nationally and internationally (port, airport, railroad, highways), but reinforcement and connection with small inland towns must also be developed. This approach is slowly starting to take form, considering that municipal councils are only two years old and have spent one year dealing with the COVID-19 crisis.

9.3 Enhancing Development of Tunisia's Secondary Cities : An Action Agenda for Moving Forward

Although the primacy of Tunis is pronounced, secondary Tunisian cities are not deprived of assets. They are well connected along the northeast coastline; they have benefitted from private investment and public services and continue attracting a workforce. Critical issues in terms of regional disparities have arisen, however, mainly between coastal and inland regions. Since the Jasmine Revolution, balanced regional development strategies have been a national priority for inclusive concerns, employment objectives, and macroeconomic development.

The objective is to develop regions' competitive and collaborative advantages, capitalise on their assets, and improve competitiveness. To do so, regions must develop centres or clusters that would promote economies of agglomerations (OECD, 2018), i.e., regional metropolises that fulfil the functions of local markets and are engines for development (Belhedi, 2019).

Secondary cities in Tunisia have economic, social, and infrastructure assets to support this role. But they also face a legacy that has undermined their capacities, making them economically and politically dependent on national and international forces. To enhance their development as regional metropolises is crucial to the decentralisation strategy and therefore requires significant changes in national and local spatial planning logics. Some of these changes are iterated below.

- The emergence of genuine local political powers, combining actual decentralisation of administrative, financial, and human resources with functions and responsibilities: Municipalities do not yet have fiscal autonomy and must rely on uncertain State transfers, and they lack adequate revenue to finance strategic local development projects. The difficulties in providing appropriate waste management are signs of weak administrative and technical means at the local level that must be addressed to position municipalities as accountable and reliable service providers. This was an issue discussed at the consultative process initiated in July 2020.

- The promotion of endogenous economic development strategies beyond nationwide strategic sectors: Over past decades, sector-led economic policies and markets have led to high concentration and specialisation of economic structures and activities in each city. These economic activities were strongly dependent on either national or foreign investment and international demand for tourism. The global downturn, terrorism, and sanitary issues make these economic bases very uncertain and fragile. The promotion of local economic development strategies that rely on the diversity of local assets, entrepreneurship, and skills is critical to:
  - reducing uncertainty,
  - promoting employment,
  - increasing the economic and social sustainability of economic growth,
  - mobilising local investors and entrepreneurs at the regional level, which must be part of the new participatory governance promoted by the Constitution.

- A new national planning policy that incorporates regions around urban centres (Bennasr et al., 2015): Balanced regional development relies on compensation for disparities in inland areas and complementarity between secondary cities, regional metropolises, and smaller towns. These interdependencies benefit both medium and small cities and create functional economic and social territories. Connectivity infrastructure is critical to ensure efficient services delivery. The necessity for intercity cooperation, arrangements, and contracts will emerge around shared services, economic hubs, and social amenities.

Since the 2010-2011 Jasmine Revolution and the adoption of the 2014 Constitution and the 2018 Code for Local Authorities, Tunisia has been moving forward with its decentralisation and regional development agenda. The emergence of secondary cities as political powers and regional socio-economic centres is progressing; however, the tools and means to achieve such a transition must still be finetuned and consolidated.

While it is difficult to draft recommendations for a political process in progress, a few lessons can be drawn from the last 50 years, especially since this is the legacy within which the Tunisian State and cities must work. Ministries and national administrations had conveyed a centralised, top-down, and mono-sectorial vision of development, leading to regional and urban specialisations that neglected local assets and challenges and threatened the sustainability of development models.

> ## ...a few lessons can be drawn from the last 50 years, especially since this is the legacy within which the Tunisian State and cities must work

The future requires regional and secondary city development strategies to shift towards horizontal, collaborative, and diversified development strategies. Collaboration with local businesses and entrepreneurs, civil society, and neighbouring towns will initiate endogenous economic development. The territorial embeddedness of economic development must be at the centre of all diagnostics and strategies to ensure equitable, balanced, and sustainable growth. The newly elected municipal and forthcoming regional councils could play a critical role in promoting new local multi-stakeholder governance frameworks.

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[Note: for English lang. vers. transl. UNDP, reviewed by International IDEA, see https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014?lang=en]

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ENDNOTES

(1) See, Constitution de la Republique Tunisienne (2014): https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/constitution_tunisienne_-_27_janvier_2014.pdf

(2)   See, Code des collectivités locales (2018): http://www.collectiviteslocales.gov.tn/fr/code-des-collectivites-locales-2/

(3) Gabès Phosphate Fertilizers Plants of the Tunisian Chemical Group, Tunisia. https://ejatlas.org/print/gabes-phosphate-fertilizers-plants-of-the-tunisian-chemical-group

(4) NB: Ariana is a neighbouring city of Tunis, within the urban agglomeration; likewise, Nabeul is located halfway between Tunis and Sousse.

(5) NB: Since independence, local data had been collected at the level of governorates, disconnected from urban patterns (OECD, 2019). Since the 2014 redefinition of municipalities, it is acknowledged that municipal boundaries have the strongest correspondence with urban areas. However, some cities encompass several municipalities, and little disaggregated data is yet available at the city level. All data, except that from Africapolis, is limited to the administrative boundaries of the municipality, i.e., the most dense, old, and consolidated urban area within the actual urban agglomeration as per Africapolis.

10

HUAMBO: ANGOLA'S GREEN CITY

ALLAN CAIN

> Angola was a Portuguese colony that gained independence after a 14 year liberation war in 1975 having experienced over 400 years of colonial rule. It is one of the most fertile, mineral, and petroleum-rich countries in Africa. However, tragically, it suffered 27 years of destructive civil war between 1975 and 2002. As a result, almost 4 million people became internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the flight of many rural families to the cities.

Angola has shown remarkable resilience in recovering from war, ranking 10th in Africa in terms of nominal gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020 of US$2,021 per capita. However, wealth and prosperity have not been equitably distributed across the population or geographically within the country. Angola's Index of Multidimensional Poverty in 2021 was 48% and reached 58.3 in Huambo province (MPI 2021). Moreover, urban poverty has different characteristics than rural poverty and has risen sharply due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Angola has a population of over 33.8 million. It is 68% urbanised, with an annual urbanisation rate of 4.25%, slowing from the 6% to 8% rates of the conflict years before 2002 (World Bank, 2021). Luanda, the national capital and primate city, dominates urbanisation. Its secondary cities are also developing rapidly, especially in the petroleum-rich provinces. However, the ravages of the civil war have presented many Angolan secondary cities with unique circumstances that most other secondary cities in Africa have not had to face. Angola's post-war cities have had to deal with the clearance of mines, replacement of damaged buildings and infrastructure, and human capital loss.

The chapter begins by setting the historical context of urbanisation and secondary city development in Angola, leading to the case study of Huambo. The secondary city of Huambo, the capital of Huambo Province and the country's third-largest city is selected as the case study to explore in more detail some of these challenges and improvements made to the development of the city. Huambo was designed as Angola's first 'garden city' and has recently been designated as the country's 'Eco-Capital' (Adalberto, 2020). The civil war severely damaged it, but the city has shown remarkable resilience in rebuilding damaged infrastructure and buildings and the local economy in light of many challenges.

10.1 Historical Urbanisation and Development

Angola's armed struggle started in 1961, but its independence on November 11, 1975, also marked the beginning of a 27-year civil war that ended only in February 2002. A multi-party parliamentary constitution replaced a single-party regime in 1992. Constitutional changes were effected in early 2010 that increased the central power of the President of Angola, who is both the head of state and the government within a multi-party system. Under the Constitution, the president exercises executive power. Legislative power is shared between the president, the government, and Parliament.

After 2002, Angola experienced over a decade of sustained economic growth fuelled by revenues from their newly exploited oil deposits. The economy increased the rural migration of Angolans to the cities that had started during the war, with Luanda receiving a large part of this new urban population growth. The World Bank estimates that Angolan urbanisation rose from 57% in 2008 to 60% in 2012 and to 68% by 2021.

FIGURE 10.1 | Map of Angolan provinces and cities

Source: World Atlas.

Political analysts consider that the 2010 Constitution grants the president almost absolute power. The consequences of these changes on the general direction of development are that Angola remains largely a centralised state, where local authorities still hold limited power and continue to be directed from the centre. Another consequence of this process is the Integrated Municipal Poverty Reduction Programme, a top-down initiative crafted and coordinated by the presidency via the Casa Civil. This program has taken the lead in the decentralisation agenda and has transferred sizeable resources to the municipalities to improve social services delivery.

As a result of this war-induced migration to the urban areas, the Government of Angola in 1999 through Law 17/99 (a), which aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the provincial governments, embarked on a process of de-concentration and decentralisation of public service functions to the provincial, municipal and communal administrations. Angola is divided into 18 provinces, each headed by a governor, assisted by one or two vice-governors and provincial directors in charge of the various departments in the province. The country also has 163 municipalities headed by municipal administrators. At the local level, Angolans are organised into communes headed by a communal administrator. There are approximately 335 communes in Angola.

The demand for greater decentralisation has come from civil society and opposition politicians and, after the 2017 change of government, reforms including municipal elections were promised. A spate of legislation on decentralisation was subsequently introduced through Parliament. In early 2021 constitutional amendments were introduced to permit municipal elections to be held across the country simultaneously.

10.2 Demographics of Primary and Secondary City Development

Independence in Angola arrived in November 1975, ending a colonisation process that contributed to the development of cities and towns. Internal migration increased rapidly due to the country's outbreak of the civil war, which mainly affected rural areas and secondary settlements like Huambo in the Central Highlands. The Angolan civil war forced a considerable part of the population, composed mainly of people from those areas, to seek refuge in the coastal cities. As pointed out earlier, many cities experienced several decades of continuous population growth and high growth rates, especially the capital region and Luanda. In 2001, a year before the end of the war, Angola had one of the highest numbers of IDPs in sub-Saharan Africa, with 4 million or more displaced persons (IDMC, 2009).

FIGURE 10.2 | Graph showing estimates of urban and rural population growth in Angola (1955-2050)

Source: UNDESA 2013.

Of Angola's 18 provincial capitals, it had five cities (Luanda, Lubango, Huambo, Benguela, and Cabinda) with populations above 500,000 in 2014, the year of the last census. The capital city of Luanda and the metropolitan city/province have a population of over 8 million. Table 10.1 below shows estimated demographic and geographic information for cities.

TABLE 10.1 | Population, urban area, and densities for 14 leading Angolan cities

Name of City (Colonial Name)	Adm.	Population Census (C) 15/12/1970	Population Census (Cf) 16/05/2014	AA Growth Rate 1970–2014 (%)	Population Density* hab/km²	Area*
Luanda	LUA	475,328	6,759,313	6.22	7,233	964.85
Lubango	HUI	31,674	600,751	6.92	5,066	121.56
Huambo (Nova Lisboa)	HUA	61,885	595,304	5.28	6,226	96.36
Benguela	BGU	40,996	555,124	6.10	5,968	95.34
Cabinda (Tchiowa)	CAB	21,124	550,000	7.69	7,338	77.57
Malanje	MAL	31,599	455,000	6.25	8,763	53.52
Saurimo	LSU	12,901	393,000	8.07	10,077	40.14
Lobito	BGU	59,528	357,950	4.16	7,140	71.48
Kuito (Cuíto)	BIE	18,941	355,423	6.89	8,863	40.10
Uíge (Carmona)	UIG	11,972	322,531	7.77	8,720	37.91
Luena	MOX	2,539	273,675	11.22	4,968	56.46
Moçâmedes (Namibe)	NAM	12,076	255,000	7.18	9,098	28.93
Menongue	CCU	3,023	251,178	10.57	6,691	38.48
Sumbe (Novo Redondo)	CZS	7,911	205,832	7.69	8,426	25.04

Source: Government of Angola (1972; 2014), * Africapolis (2015).

FIGURE 10.3 | Primary and secondary cities in Angola agglomerations, population change (1990-2020)

Projected Population for 2020
Ranked by City Size

Source: Author using INE provincial urban growth estimates and 2014 Census projected to 2020.

There are 22 secondary cities in Angola with populations between 100,000 and 1 million (Table 10.2). Overall, secondary cities are growing at a significantly slower rate than the primary capital city of Luanda. Luanda contains around 44% of the country's urban population and over 25% of the national population. The country ranks 9th in Africa for primacy but has one of the fastest urbanisation rates for primate cities. The effect of primacy has created significant distortions in regional economic growth and development. In Luanda Province, GDP per capita is 10 times that of Zaire Province. Mineral-rich regions have high GDP per capita, but the profits and benefits tend to flow to the capital.

TABLE 10.2 | Number of urban agglomerations by size, Angola (2015)

Angola				Total	Population	% Urban		Total Area km²	Average Density (pp km²)
	1990	2000	2010	2015	2015				
5 to 10 million			1	1	6,979,211	44.0	6	965	7233
1 to 5 million	1	1							
500,000 to 1 million				5	2,864,294	18.1		462	6196
300,000 to 500,000			4	3	1,204,070	7.6		132	9152
100,000 to 300,000	5	7	9	14	2,440,808	15.4	3.5	296	8236
50,000 to 100,000	5	7	13	14	1,042,090	6.6	3.9	229	4555
10,000 to 50,000	5	7	13	59	1,332,285	8.4	3.9	259	5147
Total Urban	16	22	40	96	15,862,758	100.0	5.3	2,343	6771

Source: Africapolis Database (2018).

10.3 Challenges Affecting Secondary City Development

The main challenges facing the development of secondary cities in Angola and the consequences are discussed briefly below.

10.3.1 Governance

All levels of government below the elected national parliament are appointed. Participation and consultation in the local governance in Angola are very low. In secondary cities, local administrations tend to meet with traditional chiefs (sobas) within their administrative jurisdictions but rarely meet with any other actors. Church representatives, civil society organisations and notable businesspersons may be invited to Municipal Consultative Councils (CACS) at the discretion of the appointed administrators.

TABLE 10.3 | Enabling environment rating for cities and local authorities

Enabling Environment indicator	20/40
The Constitution makes explicit mention of local governments as spheres of governance, detailing their recognised roles and responsibilities.	4
All responsibilities and powers are clearly defined in accordance with the Constitution, but some relevant statutory laws and regulations are missing.	3
Local assemblies and executive bodies are appointed.	1
Resources are not transferred or are transferred erratically and irregularly.	1
Local governments have some latitude in determining existing tax base and rates, but the central government is responsible for setting new taxes and accessing loans and financial markets.	3
There is no national framework of reference defining the qualifications and responsibilities of local government staff and no national strategy for training and promoting human resources in local governments.	1
Only partial rules and legal provisions on transparency in the running of local governments exist, and they are not followed systematically.	2
National legislation on citizen participation exists but is not applied.	3
Local government performance is not assessed.	1
There is no national urban strategy.	1

Source: Cities Alliance & UCLG Africa (2018).

United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG Africa) conducted an assessment in 2018 of the institutional environments for local governments for all African countries. Table 10.3 shows the results of the assessment. Angola scored 20 out of 40 for institutional performance. A rating system was used to assess the strength of the enabling environment for 10factors. For example, on constitutional recognition of local government, the rating system assigns a grade of 4, the highest score, to countries where the responsibilities of local governments are precisely and relatively exhaustively defined in the constitution. Conversely, the lowest grade of 1 is given to countries whose constitutions implicitly or explicitly limit the role of local authorities.

The assessment results show a need for significant reform of local government organisation and management arrangements, especially the appointment of competent staff, fiscal transfer, improving the skills and competencies of staff, and monitoring and evaluating local government performance. While these are all significant features of weakness in secondary city local government, Angola began a wide-ranging legislative reform from 2018 through 2021, downloading many responsibilities from central and provincial governments to municipalities. This was accompanied by the transfer of authority to raise taxes and the introduction of a law on participatory budgeting that was to be implemented across all municipalities in the country. However, much anticipated elections for the first municipal councils were postponed in 2020, on the excuse provided by the COVID-19 pandemic.

10.3.2 Local Economic Development and Finance

Angola has suffered the effects of lower oil prices and production levels, which began to fall dramatically in late 2014. The 2010 price-adjusted GDP contracted from US$104.5 billion to around US$98.7 billion in 2019 and has subsequently deteriorated further due to COVID-19. The oil sector accounts for one-third of GDP and more than 90% of export earnings. The risk of dependency on oil has led the government toward greater diversification of the mining sector and the expansion of agriculture. With increasing numbers of people living in cities, there is a need to boost the development of service industry sectors, where most jobs will be created in the future. The challenge is to boost the provincial service sector employment in secondary cities, especially in health, education and business services. This will require substantial central and provincial government investment in regional education, skills and training programs.

The banking sector is structured mainly around the country's oil and fossil fuel resources sectors. In recent years, the development in Angola has slowed significantly against the backdrop of falling oil revenue, which has resulted in a significant reduction in real funds flows to local governments, especially the provincial capital secondary city.

In addition, with inflation at over 20%, the cost of capital has risen significantly, curtailing borrowing and capital investment in industry and business. The effect is extremely high unemployment rates, with youth unemployment exceeding 50% in many regional capitals.

Access to public finance has become a significant problem. In the post-civil war period, Angola borrowed and spent significant amounts on capital infrastructure recovery. Research has shown that public expenditure increases GDP, and public employees increased significantly at a regional level while oil prices remained high. However, the fall in oil prices has created an economic contraction, especially in inland provinces, showing that Angola needs, as one researcher notes, "a regional GDP growth policy that enables the country to adequately use the public debt in a period of crisis at the regional level but to decrease it during periods of growth" (Tvedten et al., 2018, p. 5). Moreover, with the regional economy being based on traditional agriculture, capital reserves and capacity to fund secondary city development have been severely curtailed.

10.3.3 Infrastructure

Most of Angola's infrastructure in cities outside Luanda was destroyed during the long civil war (Encyclopaedia of the Nations, 2022). Millions of land mines were laid, and programmes to remove them have begun to slow. The presence of dislodged land mines hampers not only the physical building of infrastructure (roads, rails, seaports, airports, etc.), but they continue to maim and kill civilians. In addition, bridges, town water supplies, and buildings were severely damaged or destroyed. The inability to maintain infrastructure during the civil war and inadequate reparation and maintenance has resulted in most towns and cities with inadequate water supply, sanitation, and waste management services, although much has been done to make improvements.

Intercity and local transportation is a challenge in Angola. The civil war impacted the serviceability of roads, railways, and bridges severely. The nation's ports were run-down, and some became obsolete. More than 60% of the paved road network needed repair. Fifteen years were needed, using international financing and contracting from countries such as China, to restore the road network to its pre-war standing.

10.3.4 Human Capital Development

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has observed that Angola's low level of human development is at odds with its potential for economic prosperity, evident in its wealth of natural resources. Much of this paradox is explained by the social disruption and physical destruction generated by the civil war (USAID, 2021). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Indicators (HDI) provide a composite measure of three basic health, education, and income dimensions. Angola's HDI value for 2019 was 0.581. As a region, the HDI of sub-Saharan Africa increased from 0.365 in 1980 to 0.547 today, placing Angola above the regional average (UNDP, 2020). The HDI trends inform the national and regional level and highlight the significant gaps in well-being and life chances.[1]

Angola, like the rest of Africa, faces the challenges of human capital flight. This began with the civil war when most essential workers left. Human capital flight has continued especially semi-skilled and labour migration to Luanda from the provinces. Among the challenges for Angola regions and secondary cities area severe skill deficit to support the development of local economies; they face the need for substantial local government capacity building through more local skills development and training. This requires a strong focus at the regional secondary city level on higher levels of tertiary training (Ndulu, 2004).

10.3.5 Land

Land issues in Angola that impact secondary cities' development are like those in any other African country. Further improvements in land management and administration are essential in resolving disputes and ownership and enabling the land to be used as collateral to support business investment and housing. However, one of the legacies of years of war on land in Angola in the post-war years was the number of landmines that littered the

country(BBC News Africa, 2012). Landmines and impassable roads that cut off large development areas remain a severe constraint in some parts of the country to efforts to manage growth in rural areas and develop land for settlement, agriculture, forestry and tourism.

The risk associated with land development on urban land in some secondary towns affected by landmines is still being addressed by the government with international humanitarian assistance. This is a legacy of war that will continue to hold back the development of some regions for decades to come.

Urban land-use management in secondary cities was the responsibility of the Provincial Departments of Urbanism and Environment (DPUA), the provincial representation of the Ministry of Public Works and Territorial Planning. A recent decentralisation reform has transferred responsibilities down to newly created municipal departments, however. Two national institutes continue to work through provincial delegations of the Institute for Regional and Urban Planning (INOTU) and the National Geographic and Cadastre Institute (IGCA): INOTU is responsible for providing assistance and guidance to cities on urban planning, and IGCA is responsible for the land cadastre. These institutions are acutely under-staffed and under-funded across the country. Municipal administrations do not yet have the capacity to comply with those new responsibilities attributed to them.

10.3.6 Environment

Angola's environmental problems are attributed to its rising population pressure and inadequacy of urban and rural infrastructure (Countries Quest, 2022). Examples of environmental challenges facing secondary cities in Angola include:

- Potable water is scarce for the urban poor, but more especially in drier climate areas.
- There is a net importation of food because Angola's food production has not kept pace with the country's rapid population growth.
- Traditional and unsustainable agricultural practices have led to widespread soil erosion and desertification. Siltation of rivers and dams is a problem related to uncontrolled soil erosion.
- Solid wastes have become a significant problem, with many secondary cities having insufficient or inadequate capacity to collect and dispose of waste.
- Deforestation, connected to the supply of the international commercial tropical timber market and firewood, is rapidly devastating the limited tropical forests in the north of Angola and dryland forest in other areas, with a severe biodiversity loss in peri-urban hinterlands of secondary cities.
- A national system of protected area parks and nature reserves exists, but lacks funding. As a result, in 1997, only about 6.6% of the land was significantly protected. With logging, poaching, and agricultural encroachment as continuing threats, Angola's rural and urban environments face serious challenges.

Most secondary cities face problems with the overloading of water, energy and sewage networks. The main environmental problems in Angolan cities are as follows:

- Deterioration of the basic sanitation system and the collapse of few existing sewage networks that were left over from colonial times. As a result, there are difficulties in draining wastewater (domestic or industrial) and rainwater, which causes accelerated degradation of public roads and makes the use of certain buildings impossible. In addition, in unfinished buildings and in those where the water system is inoperative, human excreta from buildings are exposed to the open air. In peri-urban areas not served by the public water supply network, its inhabitants make clandestine connections to pipelines. In addition to exposure to the danger of high water pressure carried in these pipelines, in some areas, the water withdrawn is sometimes untreated.
- A decline in surface and groundwater quality in many cities and towns located along the seacoast or on the banks of rivers. The water drained from the compact surfaces of urban areas and channelled through the drainage systems flows into the adjacent aquatic systems, negatively affecting them, causing malodorous gases and centres of reproduction for malaria vectors.
- Increase in household production of solid waste, leading to the growth of landfill areas in the vicinity of urban centres. Angola still does not have the technology for industrial treatment (recycling,

reuse) of solid waste, so the destination of almost all the waste landfills is in the open, with all the consequences of pollution and impacts on health.

- Unplanned expansion of the urban area, to the detriment of the traditional agricultural production zone around the city. The spaces previously destined to supply food to urban, horticultural, fruit and poultry centres are now heavily populated by informal settlements with poor environmental conditions, and no basic sanitation, drinking water, electricity and green spaces.

- Industrial production zones surrounded by suburban neighbourhoods, discharging all their industrial pollution into these neighbourhoods, where it directly impacts the inhabitants. Such are the cases of cement factories, oil refineries, workyards of civil construction companies and other production centres surrounded by residences.

10.3.7 Social Issues

Historically, Angola has been a socially stratified country. Before Portuguese colonialism, indigenous royalty and wealthy trading families formed local elites. Portuguese colonialism created an extremely hierarchical society in which Portuguese rulers gave some advantages to African *assimilados*, i.e., assimilated people, over the great majority of *indigenas* (indigenous people). As a result, Angolan society was divided, mainly on regional and religious lines, and during the fight for the country's independence, society was further divided along political lines linked with the three principal liberation movements. Wealth and expenditure have become significant class indicators, and patronage is also a status symbol in Angolan society (Neto 2012b). However, most Angolans live in poverty, while the elites are very wealthy and tend to live in gated communities in cities. The discontentment arising from these contrasts poses a potential threat for social conflict in Angola, not only in Luanda, but also in larger secondary cities.

10.3.8 Competitiveness, Economic Efficiency, and Sustainability of Secondary City Development

The above factors have seriously impacted the attraction of Angola and its regions as a place to invest. As a result, Angola ranked 136 out of 140 countries in the 2019 edition of the *Global Competitiveness Report* (World Economic Forum, 2019). The petroleum industry once provided an important political and economic leverage to effect development in whichever direction the Angolan government wished. However, with the COVID-19 pandemic and the accelerating switch to renewable energy generation to address the growing impact of climate change, Angola and its cities will need to look more to an endogenous development model. The lack of competitiveness and the need for economic diversification calls for a significant shift in national and regional development policies in light of a switch to non-fossil fuel energy use in the future.

Unfortunately, centralist government politics and policies have favoured the primacy of Luanda at the expense of the development of other cities in Angola. Subsequently, the country's development potential will require a greater focus on decentralisation. There is an urgent need to accelerate structural and geographic economic diversification and expand employment within the cities and regions of the country. This transformation is difficult, given that Angola and its city and regional economies remain heavily dependent on public investment, and the legacy of war adds substantially to risks and development cost of land outside the capital region. Much needs to be done to open up the potential for developing Angola's provinces and secondary cities. Under pressure from civil society and international financial institutions, the government is driving initiatives to try and create a more competitive business environment.

10.4 Case Study Huambo

PHOTO 10.1
Huambo showing the central administrative core 1952 (Nova Lisboa)

© UCCLA (2021). https://issuu.com/uccla/docs/urbanismos_catalogo_online/s/11149997

10.4.1 Context

The city of Huambo[2], shortly after independence in 1975, had an urban area of 5,322 ha. During the next more than two decades, Huambo suffered from armed conflict, so that by 2005 only 403 ha were added to the urban area of Huambo, that is, a growth of only 7.5%. Between 2005 and 2009, before the National Urban Development Program (PNUH) launch, the urban area began to grow, averaging 91.3 ha/year and accelerating every year, reaching 253.3 ha annually by 2016, when the city covered 7,681 ha. Huambo's post-war urban area growth from 2002 to 2016 was 44%, significantly less than other secondary cities[3]. The capital city of Luanda grew in area by 486% during the period from 1980 to 2014. In Huambo, the garden city, the expansion, to a large extent, filled in the existing voids and green spaces and resulted in densification within the old urban perimeter of the city.

Despite the rampages of war and COVID-19, Huambo has recovered to become an important and growing secondary city. Table 10.4 shows a range of urban indicators. The urban population is growing faster than the national rate of population growth, but slowing. The poverty rate is 32.9%, significantly below the national poverty rate at 41%. Angolans have a consumption level below the poverty line of 12,181 kwanzas (US$21) per month, according to the 2020 Poverty Report (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2019). Compared with other African secondary cities, the basic level of services and coverage is good, but connectivity regarding rail and air services to the rest of the country is poor, despite being an important station on the Benguela Railway. Literacy rates are slightly above the national average, but female rates are 10% lower than males. This is a significant barrier to women gaining access to better education and better-paid employment. Nevertheless, Angola's level of expenditure on education of 4.3%, as a percentage of GDP, is commensurate with that of the rest of Africa.

TABLE 10.4 | Urban indicators, Huambo

Indicator	Details	Unit Measure
Urban Area	What is the estimated urban area of the city?	2,711 km^2
Demographics	What was the estimated population (2020)?	766,915
	What was the population in the last census (2014)?	530,736
	Is the city's share of the national population growing?	National 4.67 % Huambo 5.28%
	Estimated density of population	6,226 ppkm^2
	How many people are employed in the city by industry sector?	34% practice agriculture
Employment	How big is informal sector employment?	70% (estimate)
	What is the unemployment rate for those over 15 years of age?	45.0% (estimate)
	Estimate % of households are living below the poverty line	31.9%
Poverty Rate	What is the Gini coefficient	Huambo Province = 0.5 National = 0.60
Public Finances	What are the primary sources or of funds and expenditures?	Central government budget
	What % of the city population has access to potable water?How much money does the municipality spend/capita?	75% have access to potable water through standposts and wells. But only 12% with piped water in the home
Infrastructure	What % of the city population has waste management collection? What % of the city population has adequate sanitation?	34% 39%
	What is the length of urban roads?	126 km
	How many intercity flights or buses arethere per day? What is the distance and travel time to the nearest largest city?	1 flight per day, 1.5 hrs to Luanda Buses every 5 hours to Capital
	What % of the city's residents lives in slums?	32% (estimate)
	What % of households rent?	20% (estimate)
	How rapid has been the development of land and housing	Estimated 3.5% per year
Education		Literacy rate 77.3% Secondary students Tertiary graduates 3.6%
Other facts about the city		44% have electrical connections 30.5% Cell phone access 8.9% Internet 7.6 Computer

Source: World Bank 2021.

10.4.2 Social Demographics

The 2014 census recorded a provincial population of 2,019,555, of which 713,134 lived in the municipality of Huambo, representing 35.1% of the total provincial population. At that time, 595,304 people lived in the city (Table 10.5). Many families from rural areas fled or were forcibly evicted from their homes to Huambo during the conflict. The reconstruction of Huambo has created more favourable socio-economic conditions than in other urban localities, causing the migratory flow of populations from the countryside to the city. However, because of the conflict and the damage it caused to infrastructure, especially roads, the rural sector is still not a regular functional part of the economic system. Thus, commercial relations with the urban economy and the rural hinterland have become fragile. Although there has been some investment directed at urban infrastructure, a significant part of the population has settled in unplanned areas, further expanding the informal city.

Households in Huambo are mainly headed by men (55%), with24% aged between 25 and 34 years. The average number of people per household in the city of Huambo is 5.1 people, with19% having 7 or more members, and 12% having only one. More than half (58%) of households accommodate more than just immediate family members.

TABLE 10.5 | Huambo population growth

	1960	1970	1991	2003	2010	2014	2020	2025
Provincial Population	598,545	858,178	1,524,000	1,598,734	2,355,454	2,019,555	2,437,000	2,836,400
City Population	38,745	61.885	300,000	390,000	530,736	595,304	766,915	893.389

Sources: Various including Neto (2012b), http://www.statoids.com/uao.html; INE (2014) Census projected to 2025.

10.4.3 Governance

Angola has two levels of subnational government, provinces and municipalities. The Constitution (Government of Angola, 2010) also recognises sub-municipalities, such as "traditional authorities" and undefined mechanisms for citizen participation. The institutions of traditional power in Huambo Province encompass the former kingdoms of Bailundo, Huambo, Chingolo, Chiaca and Sambo. The municipality of Huambo, including the city and its immediate hinterland, has a network of traditional authorities. Their traditional jurisdiction is based on both geography and hierarchy. Traditional authorities' legitimacy depends on the communities they represent and their capacity to dialogue with government representatives. Huambo traditionally has a king (*Rei*), 34 paramount chiefs (*Sobas Grande*), 148 chiefs (*Sobas*) and 46 subordinates (*Seculos*), for a total of 229 traditional authorities. The future role of traditional authorities in Angola has been discussed within the framework of decentralisation reforms.

After peace returned to Angola in 2002, policymakers initially considered decentralisation as a strategy to encourage national unity and reconciliation (de Oliveira, 2011). It is viewed as an instrument to promote participatory democracy and make governance more efficient. However, municipal governments in Angola, such as the one in Huambo, can still be described as deconcentrated state entities. There are no elected local councils, formal community participation, and representative bodies or mechanisms to express citizens' concerns.

At the municipal level, all rules and regulations relating to the local level are provided by the Ministry of Territorial Affairs (MAT). Subnational authorities at the commune level are not elected but are appointed by the MAT based on the suggestion of the provincial governor. Municipal finances are attributed from the state central budget based on annual proposals and project plans presented and screened by the provincial authorities. Local governments have little authority in determining the current tax base and rates. The central government collects 85% of total tax revenues in Angola, and the provincial governments collect the remaining 15%. Municipalities are still not fiscal entities. Some of the revenues are to finance municipalities, such as 70% of property and real estate tax, 30% of license fees and 90% of the value of fines for administrative transgressions (SNG-WOFI, 2019).

The decentralisation program and the commitment to hold elections for municipal councils is widely supported by civil society and political parties, despite some provincial and central government authorities' resistance to the dilution of their powers. The creation of a new level of local governance, '*Autarquias*', will transfer real authority with 'legal statutes' that will give elected representatives the power to levy some taxes and implement their own municipal development plans. In May 2015, Parliament approved a plan to prepare local elections, but the 2022 schedule was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

10.4.4 Urban Development

The city of Huambo, being formally planned, differs from other cities in Angola that evolved over time. Huambo's urban structure demonstrates both a utopian and an authoritarian vision of a city founded on modernist twentieth-century planning ideas influenced by the garden city concept.

While the Portuguese occupation of Angola was claimed to have lasted 500 years, the occupation of the area covered by the Province of Huambo only lasted for 72 years (Neto, 2012a). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Central Plateau had the highest level of education and colonial culturalization of all the regions of Angola. The region is the historical centre of the Ovimbundu people. The colonial administration was more active there than elsewhere, and much of the commerce came to be dominated by Portuguese 'bush' traders replacing Ovimbundu merchants, who were increasingly excluded from commercial activities (Pacheco,2001, p.60).

The city of Huambo was founded in 1912 at a staging point and maintenance station on the Benguela Railway (CFB) as part of an envisaged project of large-scale white settlement, with ambitions of being a 'modern' European city (Figure 10.4). The kings of Bailundu and Wambu (particularly Ekuikui II and Katiavala I) opposed the penetration of the railway by ambushing workers and settlers. The Portuguese Army eventually subdued them, allowing expansion of the railway(James, 2018, p. 167).`

The CFB has a significant influence in Huambo, where from 1921, under the guidance of the governor, Norton de Matos, the city benefited from investments, qualified labour, and importation of modern construction materials. The lower part of the city was built with a focus on the station; the upper part was planned for administrative and residential functions. In 1923, a new Huambo plan was approved to transform the city into the capital of the colony, from 1928 to 1950, and to change its name to Nova Lisboa (dos Santos, 2017, p.45).

FIGURE 10.4 | Original Preliminary Plan for the city of Huambo by Eng. Carlos Roma Machado, 1912

Source: Fonte (Neto 2012a, p.171).

The city was supposed to grow inside well-defined limits, keeping its primarily white and 'native' populations apart. Racial segregation, however, was subverted in some neighbourhoods that were rather divided by wealth and social class. The preliminary design of the engineer Carlos Roma Machado (Figure 10.5) appears as the first graphic material that demonstrates the initial steps of the layout of a city with long avenues and some areas destined for housing, commerce and leisure. The railway line was located to the north and limited the growth of the city in that direction. At that time, the city was already functionally distributed with commercial, housing, and public administration spaces, with a place reserved for the construction of the governor's palace (Neto, 2012a).

The garden city concept that influenced the design of Huambo grew out of a reaction to the effects of the Industrial Revolution on nineteenth-century European cities. Originally, the vision of the urbanist Ebenezer Howard (1850–1928) consisted of creating a central nucleus connected to satellite cities using highways, all of which were surrounded by green spaces, to control urban dispersion. Since its foundation, the city of Huambo has undergone several changes. The concept of the garden city was incorporated into the plan for Nova Lisboa (Huambo) in 1928 (Figure 10.5).

After the Second World War, Huambo grew well beyond its successive urban plans, stretching along the railway and the main roads and blurring its town limits. In the 1950s, Huambo fully developed its main urban features: a centre of administrative power ruling over a constellation of smaller settlements; an economic centre based on agriculture and trade, served by several roads and the Benguela Railway. It was on its way to becoming, by the end of colonial rule in 1975, Angola's second-largest city and second industrial pole, after the capital Luanda (Neto, 2012b). The city kept its rural-urban solid interface, and urbanisation was moderated by the importance of agriculture and petty trade. A municipal market was added in 1953, near downtown, but urban commerce was dominated by the many (male) street vendors.

Despite some intensive agriculture and ranching projects, production mainly came from African peasant agriculture, while European settlers or corporations controlled commerce and transportation. Settlement by Europeans increased pressure for land that had belonged to peasants for centuries, and huge concessions were transferred gradually to the Portuguese for cattle ranching, plantations, or just for property speculation. Consequently, soils became degraded, and the extensive forest turned into a savannah (Pacheco, 2001, p.63–64).

FIGURE 10.5 | Urban plan of Nova Lisboa

Source: Ingeniero Roma Machado (1928).

Industrialisation in Huambo was incipient except for the impressive CFB Central Workshops and the opening of a beer factory in 1959. Waged employment increased, but Huambo district's economy relied on trade based on peasant agriculture; however, most peasants had to look for work outside of Huambo to create income for paying their taxes. Huambo suffered both coercive and inductive labour recruitment. Enticement to job opportunities presented the possibility of escaping control from both state agents and village elders in the countryside.

In Huambo, labour recruitment responded to the demands from mines, public works, and coffee plantations in other parts of the country. Large numbers of 'contract' workers from Huambo were sent to the northern regions of Angola. Labour extraction meant the over-exploitation of villagers, which were, at least in central Angola, the backbone of agriculture. Small-scale farms were cultivated mainly by women. On the town outskirts, they were threatened by European urban expansion. Huambo supplied more than 46% of all 'contract workers' (*contratados*) in Angola in the 1960s. By the early 1970s, about 120,000 workers left the Central Plateau every year to the northern coffee plantations and mines. Huambo still attracted more people than it lost, but the city was for many a temporary stopping place between the village and the next big city (Luanda or Lobito).

In 1948 a new law on 'native wards' was passed by the colonial government and implemented after 1956 (Diploma Legislativo n° 2.097,17 November 1948, 1948). The problem of 'native housing' became a political issue in the 1950s when apartheid was rising in South Africa. Native wards were justified on both sanitary and police concerns. It was feared that masses of 'natives' would overcome their internal ethnic differences and become aware of their collective power. The Overseas Urbanisation Office defended a clear divide between the native community and the European city. Therefore, 'native wards' were created at a distance from the 'white city' but connected to workplaces by rapid transport systems.

FIGURE 10.6 | Huambo urbanisation plan, 1972

Source: Overseas Historical Archive Lisbon 2021.

In Huambo, the prohibition of 'native' pockets inside town existed initially, but there was enough land in the periphery to avoid crowded slums. More impoverished Portuguese families also migrated to peripheral neighbourhoods, and those areas developed a mixed population shaped more by their income rather than by 'race'. Overcrowded slums that characterised other Angolan cities were absent because the plateau topography allowed peri-urban space for self-building houses, often in village-like patterns with ill-defined city limits.

In 1947 an urban plan for Huambo was approved. However, the area under the plan's jurisdiction had to be extended in 1959 to accommodate new *bairros*. Planners advocated apartment blocks and abandoned large gardens, backyards, and empty spaces around each house, which complicated essential municipal services; however, Huambo was, until 1960, a city of bungalows, detached and semi-detached houses with one or two floors and a few terraces. After the 1961 nationalist uprisings in Angola, and the reformist wave that followed, Portuguese citizenship was formally extended, and all former 'natives' were integrated into the Portuguese system of municipal councils in Huambo and other cities.

The Portuguese response to the armed struggle for national liberation in 1961 involved political reform, increased economic investment and expanding white immigration. Huambo grew rapidly, with two industrial zones developing on its outskirts, which finally challenged the urban economy's predominance. By 1970, Huambo was an industrial centre of 62,000 inhabitants, second in size only to Luanda. A new plan for the city was prepared in 1972 (Figure 10.6). The rapid urban expansion resulted in diminishing land availability, and soil exhaustion affected agriculture, resulting in the flow of migrant workers to the northern and coastal regions of Angola reaching unprecedented levels.

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The Portuguese response to the armed struggle for national liberation in 1961 involved political reform, increased economic investment and expanding white immigration.

In April 1974, a coup d'état in Lisbon led to negotiations for the independence of each of the Portuguese colonies'. Between 1974 and 1975, most of the white population left Huambo and, in turn, Angola. Many Angolan residents left the city temporarily, owing to the escalating military conflict between the rival Angolan nationalist movements. In February 1976, the forces of the MPLA *(Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola / Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)* government expelled UNITA *(União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola / National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)*, which had occupied Huambo since August 1975. The growth of support to UNITA from the United States and South Africa had significant effects from 1981 onwards. While UNITA gradually took control of the rural areas of Huambo Province, the government was left with little more than the capitals of districts and some comunas, which became like fortresses.

Initially unable to take the city of Huambo, UNITA destroyed railway and road bridges and targeted many buildings, including the CFB premises, with explosive devices. Most of the conflict was focused on the Benguela Corridor — a narrow strip of land covering about 20 km on each side of the railway. The government forces compelled people to concentrate around the district towns to protect them and remove them from contact with the guerrillas. The small towns were destroyed, and populations took refuge in Huambo, living as displaced people left to their own devices and removed from their rural livelihoods (Pacheco, 2001, pp.65–68). The rural area around the city of Huambo for about 3 to 5 km had been depopulated due to the fear of landmines, leading to the population being concentrated in the high-density peri-urban areas (Sambongo, 2016, p.3).

Peace negotiations in 1991, followed by the first general elections in 1992, did not bring peace, since Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, rejected the electoral results. After 55 days of intensive fighting, UNITA gained control and occupied the city of Huambo from early 1993 to late 1994, when government forces retook it. During and between the periods of intense conflict and reoccupation of the city, all that could be looted, including zinc sheets, bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles, household utensils — everything possible was taken so that many people were left with almost nothing" (Pacheco, 2001, p.69). After a second short-lived peace agreement, the civil war resumed, and conditions in Huambo deteriorated, as many thousands sought shelter in the city from the war ravaging the surrounding countryside, despite the shelling of the city from UNITA positions nearby. Large camps of internally displaced people were installed at the city's periphery under the auspices of international humanitarian organisations. There were 325,300 IDPs in the various settlements around the Province of Huambo by the end of the war (Relief Web, 2002).

The decades of war had inflicted extensive damage on the city's material and social fabric. Huambo was one of the cities most affected by the civil war, which destroyed much of its infrastructure, such as the industrial sector in metal mechanics, textiles, building materials, leather, food, beverages, tobacco, wood, and the furniture sector. In 2002, the war ended, and the rebuilding of roads, bridges, and the railway began, with investments from Angola's increasing income from the booming oil industry. Gradually, Huambo struggled to return to its former position as Angola's second city. Commercial activity was slow to recover. In 1973, before independence, Huambo had 4,121 commercial establishments, but by 2012, 10years after the war's end, there were only 407 formally registered (da Costa, 2013, p.36). However, during the post-war period, the city grew geographically in an uncontrolled manner, the population and peripheral neighbourhoods (musseque settlements) increased, which today represent the majority of the urban area.

PHOTO 10.2
Casa de Cultura in Huambo before (at the end of the war in 2002) and now

© Matthias Offodile, 2014.

In 2003, shortly after the end of the war, an international consultancy firm proposed to the government to prepare structure and master plans of several provincial capitals, including Huambo. For the elaboration of the plan, the consultant team paid a short visit to Huambo, drew up the plan, and then 'offered' it to the provincial government. There was little local involvement from the provincial government and its departments responsible for urban planning (DPUA, INOTU, and IGCA) in elaborating the city's urban plan (Weber, 2007).The approach to urban planning demonstrated an intention to promote growth with predominantly apartment living and the expansion of local services. The plan (Figure 10.7) made the over-optimistic projection that by 2025 Huambo would have

around 128,000 dwellings and need an expansion area of 3,500 hectares, assuming an average occupancy of 7 persons per dwelling. The projected densities are low by international standards of 103 persons per hectare. The Huambo master plan had not yet been approved at the time of writing in 2021.

In 2002, the Provincial Government of Huambo also began developing a program for land allocation for housing. As part of the post-war urban development program, the National Reconstruction Office (GRN) allocated 10,000 housing units to the Province of Huambo. The areas targeted by this process are mostly greenfield sites in peripheral expansion areas. This program constructed the Housing Centrality of Lossambo on the outskirts of Huambo (Photo 10.2), beyond the airport aimed at serving middle-class civil servants. The provincial government expected private investment to continue to expand the project beyond the limits of the already constructed core.

10.4.5 Infrastructure, Urban Services, and Settlement Typologies

The author developed a typology of urban settlement areas with different physical infrastructure and socio-economic characteristics in Huambo, based on local knowledge and examination of remote-sensing images. The characteristics used in developing this typology were the history of each settlement, the distance from the city centre, service levels, street patterns, and type of housing. The location of each type of settlement was identified from urban images and mapped. Typologies, rather than administrative boundaries, were used because administrative boundaries in the city of Huambo cut across settlement types, and each administrative area includes all three settlement types. This analysis enables comparisons of the data with other cities. However, a typology will change when new urban areas are developed or upgraded, or their residents make changes or move to other areas.

FIGURE 10.7 | Huambo Structural Plan, 2003

Source: Odebrecht et al., 2003.

PHOTO 10.3
Aerial view of the Lossambo Urbanisation in Huambo, 2016

© dos Santos (2017, p.78).

Remote sensing was used to identify the settlement types. All areas were mapped into different zones based on satellite images. Experts who are familiar with the city's urban layout were then requested to identify and categorise each type of development. The typology was based on urban form and types of housing, which reflect different socio-economic conditions and population density, tenure security, and access to urban infrastructure and public services, such as piped water and sewage system (Development Workshop, 2011a).

Even in colonial times, urban water supplies and sanitation services have been serious problems for Huambo, except for the downtown urban centre. Socio-spatial inequalities between the urban centre and the informal peri-urban areas of Huambo are significant, as they are in all Angolan cities. In peri-urban bairros, water was either carried by women and youngsters from watercourses and sources or bought from water carriers *(aguadeiros)* pulling and rolling barrels. Many people dug wells *(cacimbas)* in urban and suburban areas that provided families' basic needs most of the year.

Four different settlement types were defined in Huambo (Figure 10.8):

1. Formal settlement. Housing made of durable building materials laid out according to an urban plan. Infrastructure for water and other services, though operation in practice may be erratic. This includes the old colonial city.
2. The newly built suburban 'Centralidades' constructed in the post-war period by the State or private sector developers.
3. Informal settlements. Unplanned housing areas without services, with various building materials (often adobe), referred to colloquially as 'musseques'.
4. Semi-formal upgradeable settlement areas. An intermediate category, including lower-density land on the urban periphery where space remains for installing service lines and older housing dating from the colonial era consisting of houses in durable materials with some limited basic service infrastructure, although the operation of services in practice may be erratic. More recently, from the post-war era, new areas in this category have appeared. Plots have been made available by the State on which plot-holders can build their own house. There is better security of tenure and more likelihood of services provided in the future than in informal settlements.

FIGURE 10.8 | Distribution of settlement types in Huambo

Source: Development Workshop (2019).

TABLE 10.6 | Geographical distribution of these settlement types in Huambo

Huambo Population Estimates 2019 (Roof-top counting using 2018 satellite imagery)			% Population per Typology	
Settlement Typology	% Units	Occupation per House	Pop per Typology	Proportion (%)
Urbanised	4.43	6	22,758	3.68
New urbanisation	2.17	6	11,124	1.80
Upgradable	64.27	7	385,196	62.27
Musseque	29.13	8	199,528	32.25
Total			618,606	100.00

Source: Development Workshop (2019).

Table 10.6 shows the geographical distribution of these settlement types in Huambo. The central, urbanised part of the city has had a piped water system since the 1940s. Peri-urban areas of informal housing surround the city centre. A few small informal housing areas have received essential services, including a piped water system, but most informal peri-urban areas did not have piped water.

In 2008, a Chinese-built project, financed by oil-backed loans, expanded the area covered by piped water and provided 21 standposts in peri-urban areas. By 2014, only 12% of the dwellings in the city of Huambo had piped water connections. At present, the primary source of water in many areas of Huambo is still from traditional wells. The high rainfall and geological conditions mean that hand-digging of wells is possible, except in the city's northern area, where groundwater is more than 20 m below the surface. Figure 10.8 shows the geographical distribution of these settlement types in Huambo.

Even the households in the central, urbanised area have invested in hand-dug wells, so the most common water source in many formal and informal housing areas is hand-dug wells. In the northern part of the city, the primary water sources are rivers and protected deep boreholes (constructed by NGOs and, more recently, by the provincial government). Some hand-dug wells do not have water in the dry season, although the extent of this varies from year to year. Instead, households seek water at the wells of other households or from wells and boreholes with hand-pumps.

Most families live in self-built housing (80%), 11% live in privately rented houses, and only 3% live in purchased houses (with a quarter of those still paying off the purchase). The average dwelling has three rooms, with half of the rooms for sleeping and with three people sleeping per room (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2016).

Almost three-quarters of the urban homes in Huambo are built with adobe, and only 22.7% are made from brick or concrete blocks. Roofing for 90% of the houses is corrugated sheets, and 44% of the houses have earth floors.

10.4.6 Logistics

Minibus-taxi is the most common means of transport for those living in semi-formal settlement types, where roads in the interior of the bairros are generally in poor condition and are often impassable in the rainy season. Residents in the city centre use private cars and public buses as their primary modes of transport. The average time taken to reach work is usually less than 30 minutes. Nevertheless, those living in the formal housing areas have much shorter journey times than those in other areas, because they live closer to the main employment areas in the centre of the city, have better quality roads, and are more likely to use a private car (Development Workshop, 2011a, p.49).

The regional road network to Huambo remains poor, affecting the quality of rural-urban physical, emergency, and economic linkages. Half of the population in rural areas lives further than 2km from any road. The road density (Benmaamar, 2020 p.43) in the province is below the national average of 3.3 km per 100 km^2.

In well-serviced formal areas of the city of Huambo, the price of land is US\$100–150/m^2; in less well-served formal areas, it is US\$30–70/m^2. The average price of land in the more accessible parts of informal areas is US\$9/m^2, with a rangeofUS\$4–13/m^2, while in less accessible parts of informal areas of Huambo, the value of land is about US\$5/m^2.

10.4.7 Human Capital

Huambo traditionally has had one of Angola's best-educated populations. However, in 2014, only 8% of the population aged 18 and over had completed the second cycle of secondary education (i.e., completed the 12th or 13th grade). On the other hand, 19% of the population aged 18 and over had completed primary education (had completed grade 6). The analysis by age groups shows that only 8% of the population aged 18–24 completed the second cycle of secondary education, whereas for the population aged 25–64, it is 9%, and for the population aged 65 and over, 2%. Of the population aged 5-18 years, 18% was outside of the education system. The proportion of the population in Huambo aged 24 or over with completed higher education represented only 4%. Men hold the lead, with about 2%, compared with 1% of women. One of the constraints to accessing the formal school system is the need for children to be documented with birth certificates or identity cards. In Huambo, only 68% of people had formal documentation, which is a barrier to certain citizenship rights, such as registering property deeds.

The decades of the conflict took a heavy toll on Huambo's citizens, not only to combatants, but also to the civilian population (usually women) who suffered as victims of antipersonnel mines. The 2014 census registered 14,688 disabled persons in Huambo and 55,712 in the province, one of the most severely impacted by the war.

10.4.8 Economic Development

Huambo's position on the railroad crossing the country from west to east is one of the potentials of this city. The Benguela Railway (CFB) connects Huambo to one of Africa's principal ports, Lobito, about 220 km to the west and then connects other cities east to the Republic of Congo and Zambia. The city of Huambo can become a strategic national and international centre once more, contributing to the enhancement of Angola's geo-strategic position in the region. The railway line was rehabilitated in 2012, giving the city the possibility of returning to exporting agricultural commodities grown in the central highlands; however, CFB's original function of transporting Katangan and Zambian copper may never be resumed. The railway still may have future potential for stimulating Angola's central provinces' economic and territorial development.

10.4.9 Environmental

Since colonial times Huambo has envisioned itself as the national leader in environmental matters. It has been the home to the country's Institute of Agricultural Research, which was considered in the 1960s as Africa's leading centre for innovation and crop studies. The Faculty of Agricultural Science host the Institute in Huambo.

The city of Huambo was built on the watershed that traverses the central plateau and is near the headwaters of several important rivers. The CFB railway runs along the crestline that divides the watershed of Cunene, towards the south-west, and the watershed Keve, running towards the north-west (in the city of Huambo). Flooding is not a risk in Huambo City, as rainwater drains away rapidly from its highland location, and there are no areas where water accumulates. On the other hand, erosion risk is high due to sloping ground and high rainfall, some of it occurring in short, heavy storms. The growth of the city has brought the occupied area close to the steep slopes. The removal of vegetation for urban development leaves bare soil surfaces, on which erosion can occur. Earth roads and paths that run down slopes allow sheets of water to gain momentum on a bare surface, and erosion often occurs where roads approach the edge of an existing gully or streambed.

The lack of piped water supply in most informal housing areas means that there is usually a significant movement of people going down to the valleys to collect water, and the paths formed in this way become erosion areas. Deforestation, another risk factor, occurred around Huambo City, particularly during the war, when access to the city was cut off and wood was used as fuel. Risk has also increased by the recent extraction of sand from streambeds close to the town. The removal of material from the streambed increases the speed of streamflow and thus increases erosion risk upstream and sedimentation downstream. Onaka (vegetable gardens) established along the stream have also been damaged or vegetation removed, causing severe erosion.

The increased demand for sand and gravel is due to the building boom in Huambo that started in 2002, with new houses built and older ones repaired with cement. The people who extract sand and gravel receive very low pay, but have very few options for livelihood strategies. The municipal administration has a low capacity to control this kind of extraction. Local people are aware that these short-term livelihood strategies negatively affect longer-term livelihood strategies (for example, destroying vegetable gardens), but they also understand that extreme poverty drives some families to these strategies (Development Workshop, 2011b, p. 41).

The production and sale of charcoal are one of the causes of deforestation. In the absence of employment in rural areas and little income from small-scale agriculture, this is an alternative source of income. The demand for coal comes almost exclusively from the city of Huambo. As long as there is demand for charcoal in urban centres, it will be challenging to reduce charcoal production and its impact on deforestation. This problem could be addressed by urban policies that promote access to alternative energy sources for cooking to reduce the use of charcoal.

PHOTO 10.4
Aerial view of one of the rehabilitated green corridors, Huambo

© dos Santos (2017, p.82).

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The production and sale of charcoal are one of the causes of deforestation.

Erosion damage is another important aspect, especially in the case of Huambo City. In many peri-urban areas of the city, cutting trees and shrubs causes gullies to form due to erosion, threatening homes and limiting future housing development. Therefore, the protection of urban vegetation is of great importance, as it can potentially contribute to more sustainable urban development (Weber, 2017, p.28, 39).

Much of the greenbelt around Huambo and inner-city green spaces and parks were stripped for firewood and fuel during the war and the city's siege. As part of the plan to restore the original garden city, the Angolan Government has designated Huambo to be the 'Ecological capital' of Angola. To accelerate Huambo's environmental recovery, the government is piloting a project aimed at reducing land degradation. In partnership with the Global Environment Facility and with input from the United Nations, the scheme aims to reduce unsustainable land use, stop deforestation, and promote better environmental practices. The Ecological House (*Casa Ecológica*) was built to host environmental projects, and later the CETAC (Centre of Tropical Ecology and Climate Change) was installed in the city by the Ministry of the Environment for the same purpose. Photo 10.3 shows an aerial view of one of the rehabilitated green corridors of Huambo.

The provincial government has invested resources in programs to protect the ecosystem and gradually reforest the city, making it cleaner, greener and environmentally self-sustainable. The park in the city centre, with its greenhouse, is being developed and expanded to become a base for researching and preserving indigenous plants. In addition, the existing green corridors in the city are being protected and reinforced. Green corridors were planned originally to serve as transition elements between the city's upper residential and lower commercial-industrial areas. Figure 10.9 is a diagram showing a cross-section of the green corridor between Huambo's high and low parts.

FIGURE 10.9 | Cross section diagram of the green corridor between the high to the low part of Huambo

Source: dos Santos (2017, p.81).

10.5 Development Challenges and Opportunities

Source: Development Workshop (2013).

From 2005, the provincial government of Huambo, the local municipal administrations, and the communities started to implement a series of participatory planning projects in the periphery of the city of Huambo. A pilot land readjustment project was initiated in Bairro Fatima, located south of Huambo city. The DPUA (Direcção Provincial do Urbanismo do Huambo or Provincial Direction of Urbanism in Huambo) and the Institute for Territorial Planning and Urban Development (INOTU) were actively involved in this project. Figure 10.10 shows the Huambo Land Readjustment Plan in Bairro Camussamba developed by the author's organisation, Development Workshop, in 2008 but published by UN-Habitat in 2013. The organisation's staff and the directors of DPUA and INOTU met regularly during the project's implementation phase, making all major decisions together.

The concept of land readjustment is to assemble small peri-urban or peri-rural land parcels into a large land parcel, provide it with infrastructure in a planned manner, and return a portion of the reconstituted land to the original owners. This was achieved after deducting the cost of providing infrastructure and public spaces from selling a portion of then-serviced land. In Angola, small landholders on the urban periphery rarely have title documents and are often considered informal occupiers. Hence the 'model' developed by the Huambo project team recognised their occupation of the land in 'good faith' and employed the land readjustment process to help formalise their occupation of the land and, at the same time, to provide them with the security of tenure.

Land readjustment or land pooling has been used in various countries (UN-ESCAP, 1998). It is an appropriate solution to land distribution in areas located on the margins of existing urban areas, where there is scattered settlement, and where large tracts of land are unavailable for private sector subdivision-type land development. Since many peripheral settlement plots are not for sale, it is often difficult to find enough plots next to each other to develop a rational building development plan. Land readjustment is also appropriate in older urban settlement areas that need to be reorganised to access infrastructure and services.

Land readjustment provides an opportunity for planned development of land and infrastructure installation where plots in the urban fringe are small, irregularly shaped, and lack access to public roads. Land readjustment

has become an attractive alternative because the costly methods of forcibly acquiring land (i.e., creating land reserves or outright expropriation of land) have become increasingly unpopular with the public. Land-occupiers or claimant-owners can gain some considerable advantages and even profit by participating in land-readjustment projects. Unlike expropriation, land readjustment will return a significant part of the land to the original occupants, proportionate to each occupied area. Ideally, a partnership for development should be formed between the public and previous occupants and claimants - close links between these sectors needed to be established during community consultation and participatory planning. In Huambo, the project team explained the project's objectives to the community leaders and the population. Land tenure is an extremely sensitive issue. People were aware of forced removals in other parts of the country, and many feared losing their land and homes.

A land readjustment scheme is initiated when a municipality or government department designates an area about to be converted from agricultural to urban land use. A subdivision plan is developed as a unified plan for the area. The provision of infrastructure and services is financed by selling some of the plots within the area designated for commercial activities. The original landowners were provided with plots of land within the dimensioned area, which, although smaller in size than their original landholdings, now have provisions for infrastructure and services. Most importantly, they now have formal and legal documents that provide tenure security. With these improvements, the value of these new plots of land has significantly increased, and the plots of land now command much higher prices in the real estate market.

> **" A land readjustment scheme is initiated when a municipality or government department designates an area about to be converted from agricultural to urban land use.**

The costs of basic infrastructure and services were recovered by selling surplus plots created through the land redistribution plan. The creation of these new plots provides an opportunity for distributing land more equitably and at the same time providing access to land for low-income housing. Land readjustment requires that the land ownership situation be clarified, and an accurate land cadastre registration system be implemented. In registering land, gender issues can be addressed, bringing women's rights to co-ownership of family property into the legal domain.

For the Huambo project, an urbanisation plan was developed in collaboration with DPUA, INOTU, and the local administration. The program demonstrated how stakeholder co-participation of government and communities could be implemented using basic planning techniques, inexpensive hand-held GPS units, and satellite imagery.

All partners involved in this planning process showed a simple and effective way to issue land tenure documents and prevent new slums and informal settlements. The application of the land readjustment technique is based on private-public cooperation and negotiation; it requires a significant investment in human resources and the training of local administrators and technicians. In particular, skilled negotiators must be trained.

While land readjustment provides an opportunity for both formal and informal landowners and occupiers to develop their land on the urban periphery, the system is not necessarily appropriate for large-scale city-wide planning. Master plans with strategic visions for developing large land tracts or legislatively designated changes in land use require different tools. It is common for large-scale formal or informal landowners/occupiers to use their land as a savings and investment instrument, contributing to increases in land values and land speculation. Therefore, there is little incentive for large-scale landowners to participate in land readjustment schemes, i.e., to maintain low land prices or support inexpensive social housing.

The land readjustment model and accompanying participatory planning methodologies are appropriate today for many peri-urban and urban-perimeter situations around Angola's cities. In these city-margin situations, the growth of informal musseque settlements is the dominant pattern; the conversion of peasant agricultural plots into scattered owner-built homesteads is common. Land readjustment provides a market framework for regularising these informal settlements and providing sustainable and affordable infrastructure and services while enhancing the land tenure rights and protecting the property assets of the poor (Ministério do Urbanismo e Habitação, 2016, pp.120–123).

10.6 Enhancing the Development of Secondary Cities

This chapter has sought to focus on the development of secondary cities in Angola. The development of Angola's secondary cities has many similarities to that of other sub-Saharan countries. However, there is one significant difference: for more than half its period of independence from Portugal, it has suffered from a long period of civil war, which destroyed its infrastructure and cities and caused thousands to flee from the countryside to the cities outside the country. Rebuilding the country since 2002 has been a monumental effort, and Angola has been lucky to have been petroleum-rich to have helped support this.

Angola now faces a new set of problems, however. With the severe impacts of COVID-19 and a world moving away from a dependence on fossil fuels, the country must reshape and diversify its national and regional economies. Its secondary cities will become crucial to supporting the development of provincial economies and ensuring more widespread benefits to the population living outside the capital city region. With one of the highest primacy rates in Africa, this has led to a significant distortion and inequities in the spatial distribution of wealth, prosperity and population. The country needs to create new opportunities for endogenous economic growth and ensure the benefits are distributed more equitably to cities and regions throughout Angola.

The 2010 Angolan Constitution already prescribes that local autonomy be exercised through local authorities. Municipalities are to be given the ability to collect local revenues and taxes. They will also be given the responsibility for spatial planning, housing, transport, environment and basic sanitation, energy, water, rural and urban infrastructure, leisure and sports and the promotion of economic and social development. More than two decades ago, elected councils and municipal autonomy were envisioned as strategies for promoting post-war national reconciliation. However, local elections have been promised and repeatedly delayed.

A key to municipalisation will entail decentralising the management of land. It will be necessary to build the capacity of local administrations and local communities to strengthen family land tenure and protect women's rights. Current Angolan municipalisation reforms present a unique opportunity to affect local practice on how community and individual family land tenure is administered and protected. Local administrations and elected municipal councils will have new powers to plan and manage lands in peri-urban districts up to 5 ha and rural concessions of up to 1,000 ha. Elected municipal councils will provide, for the first time, democratic oversight to land allocation and management. Legislation published in 2019 will permit local municipalities to raise finance and invest in providing basic urban services through real-estate taxation. New legislation, when implemented, will give municipalities the means of capturing, for the public good, the increased value of land in their jurisdiction once it is registered and its management regularised. Municipalities will only be able to finance themselves if land development within their boundaries can produce a regular income. Due to the lack of registered and legalised land and houses, taxes are paid on less than 5% of existing properties. Municipalities will need to exercise their new responsibilities to cadastre properties and, in turn, regularise their constituents' tenure in order to build a viable tax base. The new land law will need to facilitate and simplify the legalisation and registration of Angola's approximately 5 million urban properties, of which half are in secondary cities. In May of 2021, the Justice Ministry announced its commitment to register almost 3 million of these by 2025. To meet the fiscal, legal and democratic objectives of Angola's governance reforms, the new Land Law must be revised to re-introduce the right of secure tenure through occupation in 'good faith'. The legislation must be further reformed to de-criminalise the millions of poor and other urban residents who have been denied the opportunity to legalise their land and housing.

There is an urgent need to advance on the policy agenda for decentralisation and urbanisation in the country. Spatial land use This is fundamental to accelerating the country's economic diversification, considering that economic diversification and the harmonious development of the territory are national aspirations identified in the Long-Term Development Strategy for Angola–2025 (Angolan Government - 2007) to reduce fiscal dependence on and vulnerability to oil prices. Furthermore, the productive chain that involves urbanisation and housing will play a key role in economic diversification, since civil construction is a sector with high demand for labour, therefore generating employment, and whose inputs can be produced quickly in the country, developing the economy nationally and locally.

Angola's 2009 housing strategy is unsustainable with its high level of subsidies for middle-class civil servants within the National Urbanism and Housing Program (PBUH). The government must cut and restructure some subsidy programs and ensure that these subsidies are targeted better to the population that needs them most (Cain, 2020). Instead, cities should provide serviced land and finance housing loans to owner-builders and entrepreneurs (Ministério do Urbanismo e Habitação, 2016, p.101).

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> *There is an urgent need to advance on the policy agenda for decentralisation and urbanisation in the country. Spatial land use and economic planning must be related better to the use of local resources and potential.*

The growth and improvement of the transport, water, sanitation and electric energy infrastructure was considered an essential condition for the country's continued development and economic diversification. Allotted areas for directed self-construction offer affordable lots for low-income families as well. In many ways, this approach is the most effective for guiding urban sprawl, as demonstrated in a project in an allotted area (Sassonde) in Huambo in 2006 , under a partnership with the provincial government, INOTU, and Development Workshop. Under the municipal administration's auspices, a 'land readjustment' methodology was implemented with the participatory demarcation of subdivisions, contributing considerably to the orderly expansion of the city.

Angola's secondary cities are important to building strong national and local economies. They play a crucial role as catalysts in provincial development and act as the logistics centres for a wide range of business, government, transportation and social transactions and transfers. They are resilient places, many of which have rebuilt themselves from the ravages and destruction of war. As Angola works its way out of the COVID-19 pandemic and economic crises, secondary cities need to be given the autonomy, capacity and resources to ensure they can make a significant contribution to the country's economic recovery and a more prosperous future.

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ENDNOTES

(1)   National HDI figures can be misleading, as there are significant provincial differences. Subnational HDI data is not available for Angola. However, other indicators such as regional GDP, income and poverty suggest that inland – especially eastern – areas and cities of the country would have a significantly lower HDI level than coastal regions and cities (UNDP, 2020).

(2)   Huambo receives its name from Wambu, one of the Ovimbundu kingdoms of the central Angolan plateau that was hierarchically under the king of Bailundu.

(3)   Lubango grew 90%, Benguela-Lobito agglomeration by 347% between 1980-2016,and Cabinda 691% between 1991-2012.

DICKSON AJAYI

11

IBADAN: NIGERIA

DICKSON AJAYI

> Nigeria is the most populated country and has the largest GDP (US$448 billion in 2019) in Africa: GDP per capita in 2019 was about US$2,230 (World Bank Database, 2019) compared to US$1,484 for sub-Saharan Africa. It is a country of many contrasts, cultures, and religions. It has a long history of urban development, with cities like Benin, Ibadan, Ifẹ , Kano and Sokoto dating to the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It is also one of the fastest urbanising countries in Africa.

This chapter on Nigeria examines the current state of urbanisation, urban policy, and development issues as they affect the management and development of secondary cities. The focus of the case study is the City of Ibadan, a very large secondary city. Ibadan is an example of a very large polycentric secondary-city urban agglomeration. This development pattern is becoming synonymous in other parts of Nigeria and Africa (see Chapter 12, on Kenya). The case study draws upon research from the recently completed Ibadan City Masterplan (Bruce, 2019). The chapter's findings have relevance to the planning, management and development of other secondary cities in Nigeria experiencing rapid growth and dispersed agglomeration cluster patterns of urban development.

11.1 Urbanisation and Secondary City Development in Nigeria

Nigeria has a very long history of urbanisation, dating back many centuries (Bloch et al., 2015). Since the end of the colonial era, however, urbanisation has been rapid due to high rural-urban migration, growing employment opportunities in many cities, and development on the back of an oil-rich economy. Nigeria is almost 51.5% urbanised, which is expected to rise to 70% by 2050. Urbanisation has brought significant but unequal regional development benefits and inequities. Many northern and eastern parts of the country have not benefited as much as the south, which has better access to services and major transport hubs. These areas are experiencing civil unrest.

Nigeria has a dense network of cities, over 80 of which have populations over 100,000. Lagos is the largest city in the country and the second-largest city in Africa, with a population of 14,862,000 (World Urbanisation Prospects Update, 2020). It is the eighth fastest-growing city in Africa. It consists of a polycentric cluster of secondary cities that surround the original urban centre. Other state capitals such as Kano, Kaduna, and Ibadan and secondary cities also are experiencing high levels of urbanisation. Many of these also have become polycentric urban agglomerations (Moriconi-Ebrard et al., 2020) comprised of the old city surrounded by a cluster of rapidly growing cities. Many of these urban agglomerations have several million, but they continue to operate as secondary cities in the main. Smaller cities of less than 100,000 are also urbanising rapidly.

FIGURE 11.1 | Map of Nigeria and location of Ibadan

Source: African Development Bank (2004).

The rapid urbanisation rate has given rise to significant urban development and management challenges, with severe shortages of housing, land, essential urban services, and jobs. In the secondary cities, poor urban governance, weak public-sector finances, the inability to attract investment, and the unwillingness to manage peri-urban land development has resulted in inefficient land management and property markets. More than 70% of the adult population is engaged in informal sector employment in many secondary cities (UN-Habitat-Cities Alliance, 2006).

11.1.1 History of Urbanisation and Municipal Government in Nigeria

The urbanisation process in Nigeria has three distinct phases: pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial. Nigeria has some different regions and urbanisation processes in those regions. In the northern region, the natural urban population increases through higher fertility rates, while in the southern region, urban population growth is driven primarily by rural-urban migration (Bloch et al., 2015). The focus of this section is to examine the history of urbanisation and municipal government in Nigeria.

The evolution of municipal or local government in Nigeria also has passed through the same three phases. The British government leveraged the existing traditional administrative processes in different regions of Nigeria to implement the indirect rule. This indirect rule influenced the process of urban growth evident in the urban structure of the various regions in the country (Obi-Ani & Isiani, 2020). Since 1976, there have been deliberate efforts by the Nigerian government to reform local government (Adeyemi, 2019).

11.1.2 Federalism and Urbanisation

Federalism has played a crucial role in the structure, function, and development of Nigerian secondary cities. At the time of negotiations for independence in the 1950s, Nigerian leaders favoured the federal government system, which was adopted at independence in 1960. There were three federal states at independence, which were subsequently disaggregated into 36 states plus Abuja, the federal capital territory. There are 774 local government areas that function as the third tier of government. Abuja was promulgated by a decree in 1976 as the federal capital to unify the nation, with a detailed master plan prepared in 1976 (Figure 11.2).

Nigeria has gone through numerous transformations of the federal, state and local governments since independence in 1960. However, during civilian and military governments, the federal government has always been the locus of power in Nigeria, with federalism perceived as an essential binding force. The state governments consist of governors, cabinets, the civil service, and the state judiciary. In most policy matters and matters of finance; the state governments abide by federal directives. In the early government structures, the regions (states) were powerful and had constitutions, foreign missions, and independent revenue bases. These came to an end with federal militarism. The third tier has been that of the local government. Some civilian and military governments

FIGURE 11.2 | Abuja: A Federal Capital for National Unity

Source: Nduul, (2009)..

made constitutional provisions to strengthen local governments, but state governments that refused to permit local government autonomy thwarted these efforts. Nigeria, therefore, has been characterised by a seesaw of power struggles, and the devolution of decision-making has been overly complex, with little continuity in any particular direction.

Because military federalism had been more common than civilian federalism in post-1960 Nigeria, the model of a single supreme decision-making level made the federal government the 'master' in relation to the 'dependent' state governments. The federal government controlled the national economy and possessed emergency powers

to intervene in any region to 'establish order'. By 1990, for example, the federal military government expanded its control over the economy to the extent that states depended on it for up to 90% of their revenues. Only during periods of civilian federalism have attempts been made to devolve power from the centre.

The failure of local governments in service delivery has caused Nigerians to lose trust in government. Many Nigerians desire change in the local government system as presently constituted, not only to conform with present-day realities but also to meet the expectations of people who have been yearning for grassroots development. Further changes, however, would require constitutional amendments, contributions from the civil society and a change of mindset from Nigerians.

11.1.3 Spatial Hierarchy of Cities

Historically, compared to many African countries, Nigeria has exhibited a balanced urban system (Bloch et al., 2015). This is due to its being a relatively fertile country, with river systems and adequate rainfall to maintain subsistence agriculture.

Historically, urban systems in northern and western Nigeria have been different from the central region because they were based on trade (Mabogunje, 1968). By the beginning of the colonial period, an order of importance had evolved among the urban systems. This order was based on the favourability of location for international and interregional trade, political pre-eminence levels, or both. The various kingdoms in the country had their metropolitan centres and their subsidiary towns, which were organised in descending order of importance. Urban economic function and north-south differences in the urbanisation processes emerged, based on this order.

Colonial urban development began with the European partition of Africa, when Nigeria fell into the hands of the British. The pursuit of British interests meant the introduction of a new spatial order oriented towards service development of the colonial administration, and the rapid development of old, pre-colonial towns such as Ibadan, Osogbo, and Kano and the decline of pre-colonial towns such as Ile-Ife, Benin City, Maiduguri and Sokoto, which were not situated on the main transportation corridors. New towns such as Enugu, Aba, Kafanchan and Kaduna emerged as significant nodes in the new spatial order (CIA World Factbook, 2011).

Urban development in the post-colonial era emphasised the patterns inherited from the British for a brief period. The creation of the mid-west region was a significant development that brought about a change in the spatial configuration of the cities. This development ushered in the transformation of the ancient city of Benin to a modern metropolis. The Nigerian civil war, from 1967 to 1970, was the first major factor that changed the sociological composition of the country's towns and cities. It led to large-scale forced movements of people from all parts of the country, especially to the eastern states.

The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) adopted by the government in the 1980s also affected the spatial configuration of Nigerian cities. This period saw a reduction in the federal budget allocation to social expenditure because of the global economic recession that resulted in a fall in crude oil revenue. This forced urban dwellers to seek essential public services like housing, water supply or security from informal organisations or networks. Consequently, housing construction and/or maintenance costs increased, resulting in an escalation of house rents (Nnonyelu, 2013).

In response to this, the government launched the National Housing Policy (NHP) to reduce the housing deficit in urban areas. However, the scheme failed to benefit the low-income earners, who were the policy targets, as they lacked reliable collateral security required by mortgage institutions set up to on-lend funds (Braimoh & Onishi, 2007). As a result, there has been marked socio-spatial fragmentation between high- and low-income earners in the country's urban system. Indeed, since the 1980s, the provision of urban housing has become more individual and informal. This has resulted in uncontrolled urban development in most urban centres and has become a significant feature of urban centres in Nigeria (Nnaemeka-Okeke, 2016).

11.1.4 Demographics of Primary and Secondary City Development

Nigeria's urban population growth rate for 2015 to 2020 was 4.23%, compared to 3.58% for Africa as a whole (UN DESA, 2018). Nigeria has experienced a quadrupling of its population over the last 50 years due to very high fertility rates.[1] Figure 1.13 shows the decline in Nigeria's rural population and a rise in urban population from 1950 estimated to 2025. Over the years, the percentage of the urban population has increased, although the average annual rate of change to the urban population has fluctuated. The continuous increase in Nigeria's urbanisation level and the number of agglomerations from 1950 to 2015 are illustrated in Table 11.1 The share of the metropolitan population has increased from 8% in 1950 to 16% in 2015.

FIGURE 11.3 | Average annual rate of change of population: Nigeria, 1950-2020

Source: UN DESA-United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2018). World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2018 Revision, Online Edition.

TABLE 11.1 | Urban centres information in Nigeria

Variables	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015
Urban population (million)	3.63	8.41	12.44	20.20	32.71	48.61	76.94	98.95
Urbanisation level (%)	0.11	0.21	0.25	0.31	0.38	0.42	0.48	0.53
Number of agglomerations	99	210	310	478	583	784	1017	1236
Metropolitan population (million)	0.08	0.10	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16
Distance between agglomerations (km)	39	29	24	20	19	16	14	13.6

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2018). World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2018 Revision, Online Edition.

Figure 11.4 shows the number of Nigerian cities by size 2000–2030 (estimate). The number of secondary cities with populations between 500,000 and 1 million has been growing and is expected to increase by nine by 2030, with a similar increase in cities with populations between 1 and 5 million. Urbanisation growth rates in secondary cities are still expected to remain the highest of all urban settlements.

FIGURE 11.4 | Number of Nigerian cities by size, 2000–2030 estimate

Source: Urbanisation Prospects, plus Author's estimates 2030.

The distribution of some of the largest secondary cities in Nigeria is shown in Table 11.2 Population of some of the largest cities in Nigeria. The populations of those cities have been increasing over the years.

TABLE 11.2 | Population of some of the largest cities in Nigeria

Agglomeration Name	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015
Onitsha	392,000	620,000	1,450,000	6,351,000	8,530,514
Kano	715,000	1,311,000	2,052,000	3,211,000	3,888,582
Ibadan	1,117,000	1,624,000	2,013,000	2,494,000	3,088,477
Kaduna	407,000	785,000	882,000	990,000	1,447,250
Ilorin	361,000	526,000	638,000	774,000	891,330
Jos	237,000	455,000	575,000	684,000	870,424
Aba	300,000	464,000	688,000	1,019,000	1,687,158
Benin	382,000	733,000	907,000	1,122,000	1,569,977
Maiduguri	287,000	499,000	582,000	679,000	1,012,148
Enugu	240,000	363,000	471,000	611,000	905,042

Source: OECD/SWAC (2020), Africapolis (database), www.africapolis.org (accessed 29 April 2020).

The following provides a brief profile of Nigeria's 10 largest secondary cities.

Kano's population in 2006 was 3,888,582. It is an ancient settlement and the second largest Nigerian city after Lagos. Kano is a major centre for producing textiles, leather, grains, and other agricultural products such as peanuts and cotton. It has an international airport that links it with Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere in Africa. It is also a major commercial hub serving neighbouring Niger.

Maiduguri's population in 2015 was 1,012,148. Maiduguri is home to several markets and is the principal trading hub for north-eastern Nigeria. Its economy is based mainly on services and trade, with a small share of manufacturing. It has a renowned teaching hospital. It is connected with the rest of Nigeria via roads, railway and airways.

Ibadan's population in 2015 was 3,088,477. It is the third-largest metropolitan area by population. Ibadan is located in south-western Nigeria. It is a centre for learning, with many specialised tertiary institutions. It is also a centre for trade in agricultural products and agricultural processing. Ibadan is connected by road and rail and has an airport.

Benin City's population in 2015 was 1,569,977. It is the centre of Nigeria's rubber industry. It has a palm oil industry and research centre. Benin is a leading cultural centre and has tertiary educational facilities.

Jos: The population in 2015 was 870,424. It is an important national administrative, commercial, and tourist centre. Jos a cosmopolitan city, primarily due to the influx of migrants attracted to work in the tin industry.

Ilorin's population in 2015 was 891,330. Ilorin is an important agricultural processing centre and has a domestic airport. Its location at the crossroads of several cultural groups has made Ilorin an important cultural centre.

Kaduna's population in 2015 was 1,447,250. It is a trade centre and major transportation hub for the surrounding agricultural areas with its rail and road junction. Kaduna is a learning centre, with several tertiary institutions and a military academy, and specialised research centres. It is a key industrial centre of northern Nigeria, manufacturing textiles, machinery, steel, aluminium, petroleum products and bearings. Kaduna has a large market, good recreational facilities and two airports. Kaduna pottery is highly prized.

Enugu's population in 2015 was 905,042. It was a major coal mining area, but this has declined, and by 2005 was of minimal economic significance. Enugu suffered during the civil war of the Biafra Republic movement in the 1960s. Industries in the city currently include urban markets and bottling, and it has become a filming location for the rapidly growing Nigerian movie industry. Enugu has an airport and a university.

Aba's population in 2015 was 1,687,158. It is a pre-colonial settlement and a major regional trading centre of southern Nigeria. A railway connects Aba to Port Harcourt on the Atlantic Ocean, making it an agricultural collecting centre.

Onitsha's population in 2015 was 8,530,514. It is the economic nerve centre of the country and the gateway to eastern Nigeria. About 20% of the workforce is engaged in the secondary sector (industry and manufacturing), while nearly 80% are engaged in the tertiary sector (sales and distribution). The primary sector's contribution to the economy (agriculture, fishing, and mining) is almost non-existent. Onitsha has the largest agglomeration of industries in its state. It has a large market and is one of a few secondary cities in Nigeria without an airport.

11.1.5 The Economic Geography of Secondary Cities in Nigeria

The different phases of Nigeria's urban development have significantly influenced the cities' spatial patterns. Many of the larger cities are characterised by a dual structure (i.e., traditional and Western), while many have retained the traditional pre-colonial outlook. These important factors have led to what Ayeni refers to as 'elective planning' in different parts of the same city (Ayeni, 1998). This partially explains why introducing modern forms of transport into Nigerian cities has proved physically and financially challenging, especially if it involves demolishing family houses and structures. These factors account for the difficulty of exercising a uniform land-tenure system in the cities and are critical elements of urbanisation problems in Nigeria today.

At present, most urban residents live in squalid and congested environmental conditions (Afolayan, 1978). Poverty is widespread, and underemployment and unemployment are high (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Many urban inhabitants lack access to adequate health services, potable water, good roads, and electricity. Crime rates are high, and personal safety and property security are of significant concern. The continued rapid growth of cities makes it increasingly difficult to provide adequate social services and infrastructure for the urban populace.

The spatial pattern of development in Nigeria today reflects the existing pattern of population distribution and natural resources. Afolayan (1978) shows that the heavy concentration of people in cities is associated with both physical and historical factors. The metropolises of pre-colonial politics formed nodes for dense population concentrations, especially among the Yoruba people of the southwest and the Hausas in the north (IIAG, 2012). The 'republican' type of government and the fissiparous tendency among the Igbo people in the pre-colonial times promoted compound-type settlements, which, among other factors, resulted in high rural population density in the area. Major industrial and commercial activities are concentrated in Lagos, Onitsha, Aba, Kano, Port Harcourt and Ibadan. These centres serve as important internal and international markets, handling agricultural products and imported semi-finished or manufactured goods.

11.1.6 National Policies on Nigeria's Urbanisation and Secondary City Development

Fifty-two per cent of Nigeria's population live in urban areas (UN DESA, 2018). The average annual rate of population change in urban areas is more than 4% compared to rural areas, which is less than 1%.[2] This rapid growth rate has overwhelmed urban management agencies' capacity, compounded by a cumbersome land allocation system, inappropriate planning techniques, and low resource allocations to provide and maintain infrastructure. Urban centres in Nigeria have become chaotic, and government efforts at managing them appear inadequate (Nigeria Vision 2010 Committee, 1997).

Nigeria Vision 2010 was an economic plan to support and guide the country's economic development (Nigeria Vision 2010 Committee, 1997). On urban development, the plan states: "Nigeria should attain a controlled and manageable urban growth, and an improved urban economy to support poverty alleviation and create employment". It recommended establishing the Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning Commission in line with Decree 88 of 1990. This edict w-as premised on the excessive pressure placed on available urban resources, infrastructure, and space evident in Lagos, Port Harcourt, Ibadan, Umuahia, Kano, Kaduna Maiduguri, and Abuja-FCT and its satellite towns.

Municipal solid waste heaps dot Nigerian cities, blocking motorways and making movement along alleys and pavements difficult. Municipal waste disposal and sewage problems are serious in all urban centres. These wastes are characterised by various non-biodegradable household petrochemical products, such as polythene bags, plastic containers, Styrofoam packages and tyres, which litter Nigerian cities, and about 80 million litres of crankcase oil from mechanics workshops, industries, power stations and commercial houses that are discharged carelessly into drains and ground surfaces in the cities (African Development Bank Group, 2021).

In 1984, the government introduced a monthly Environmental Sanitation Day, and, in 1988, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) was established. In 1992, the FEPA mandate was expanded by Decree 59 to cover the conservation of natural resources and biological diversity. This agency has been replicated at all levels of government through FEPA's capacity building initiatives. The initiatives include assistance to all federation states to establish and strengthen State Environmental Protection Agencies (SEPAs) to initiate and coordinate the State Environmental Action Plan (SEAPs).

In addition, environmental capacity building has been pursued through several initiatives involving public awareness and training, institutional strengthening, and infrastructure development by establishing non-governmental and community-based organisations concerned with the environment. One per cent of the Federation account is set aside to ameliorate ecological problems such as soil erosion and flood control, desertification, drought, and general environmental control, including refuse, solid waste, water hyacinth infestation, and industrial waste.

11.2 Problems and Issues Affecting Secondary City Development

The primary problems and issues facing the development of Nigerian secondary cities and how these matters affect the country's competitiveness, economic efficiency and sustainability are described briefly below (Foster & Pushak, 2011).

11.2.1 Governance

From a governance point of view, Nigeria has room for improvement. Of the 52 countries surveyed for the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG, 2012), Nigeria was ranked 43rd, with an overall score of 42. The African average is 51.2, with Mauritius leading at 82.8. Nigeria did, however, improve by 0.2 points in the past six years. In safety and rule of law (Rule of Law, Accountability, Personal Safety and National Safety), Nigeria scored 40.6. In participation and human rights (Participation, Rights and Gender), the score was 38.5. In sustainable economic opportunity (Public Management, Business Environment, Infrastructure and Rural Sector), Nigeria scored 41.1. Finally, in human development (Welfare, Education and Health), the score was 47.8[3]

11.2.2 Finance

The African Development Bank Group's Report on the economic outlook for Nigeria indicates that in 2011, growth in the Nigerian economy was robust (Uzonwanne, 2011). This growth was driven mainly by telecommunications, construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurant services, manufacturing and agriculture. The report noted that the outlook for the mid-term remained positive. To mitigate the negative impacts of the global economic crisis, the government pursued an expansionary fiscal policy to maintain growth and social sector spending that led to pressure on consumer prices.

The report highlighted the dilapidated state of infrastructure, particularly power, road transport and railways, and the overdependence of the economy on the oil and gas industry – a significant challenge to increasing the Nigerian economy's absorptive capacity. These issues are priorities for the current administration's transformation agenda. They are being addressed by creating an enabling environment for private sector participation in infrastructure development and the development of the non-oil sector. Despite the dominance of the oil sector, agriculture plays a significant role in the national economy, accounting for the largest single share of GDP. Sustainable agricultural sector growth is a principal factor in promoting inclusive economic growth, reducing poverty, and ensuring national food security.

Finally, the report notes that, despite its robust growth, the Nigerian economy has failed to generate employment opportunities and alleviate widespread poverty. The unemployment rate has increased and is currently 23.9%, compared to 21.1% in 2010. The unemployment rate among the young is 37.7%, one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty is also very high and persistent. Social indicators in health and education remain weak.

11.2.3 Infrastructure

The African Development Bank Group (2010) provides a perspective on Nigeria's infrastructure. It estimates that infrastructure has made a net contribution of around one percentage point to Nigeria's improved per capita growth performance in recent years, despite its unreliable power supply.

Nigeria made improvements in its infrastructure, such as power, road, rail, and information and communications technology (ICT). In recent years, it has conducted important infrastructure sector reforms that include:

- The ports sector has a 'landlord model'', and concessions now attract private investment on a scale unprecedented for Africa.

- The power sector is undergoing restructuring for performance improvements and raising tariffs to recover a larger share of costs.
- Liberalisation in the ICT sector has resulted in widespread, low-cost mobile services.
- A mushrooming domestic air-transport sector has emerged, with private carriers that have rapidly attained regional significance.

The power sector is the cause of most concern, with social costs conservatively estimated at 3.7% of GDP. The challenges include inoperative generation capacity, lack of investment, an extremely unreliable supply, power users being charged a fraction of the actual cost of production, and utility operational efficiency among the worst in Africa. While Nigeria is seeking to address these problems, there is a need for more localised solutions, such as using solar and wind technologies to develop local area networks in secondary and smaller regional cities. Countries like India (Gent, 2016) have demonstrated that these are feasible and cost-effective, when compared to developing large-scale generation and transmission facilities.

The water and sanitation sector problems result from poor planning, development control and funds for infrastructure investment. Most cities only have a fraction of their urban area with reticulated or piped water network. Water utility agencies are underfunded, corrupt, or fail to collect revenue, and water theft is high. Due to a lack of funds to construct infrastructure in advance of development, the lack of control over land development, and the rent-seeking opportunities from land sales, especially by chiefs, makes it challenging to provide services. There is no mechanism for value capture that arises from land conversions, and infrastructure corridors for both roads and urban utilities are not acquired or protected.

The national road network between cities is poor but improving; however, the lack of maintenance, increased traffic, and poor driving reduces the efficiencies gained by improving the inter-regional city road network system. The inter-regional air and rail are poor, and road transport safety record is of concern. Poor location of public transport services and bus stations creates significant congestion problems in secondary cities, with an evident lack of traffic management and organised parking and drop off facilities.

Meeting Nigeria's infrastructure challenges requires a sustained expenditure of almost US$14.2 billion. Nigeria already spends US$5.9 billion per year on federal infrastructure, the equivalent to about 5% of GDP. Existing spending patterns are skewed heavily toward investment, with little provision for operations and maintenance. At the federal level, US$2.5 billion a year is lost due to inefficiencies of various kinds, most of them associated with the power sector. The under-pricing of electricity is by far the single largest source of inefficiency, even though cost-recovery tariffs would be affordable for most of the population. Low capital budget execution is also an issue across the infrastructure sector. With its significant oil revenues, Nigeria is well placed to raise additional public finance for infrastructure in the domestic and international markets.

11.2.4 Human Capital Development

Human capital development is essential to a nation's development. It can teach people how to utilise the power of diverse thinking styles, e.g., analytical and intuitive, so that holistic and best practice solutions can be attained (Enyekit et al., 2011).

Nigerian educationalists have argued that the challenge of developing human capital in Nigeria, with global comparability and competitiveness, remains far from appreciable, despite successive government's weak attempts to address this problem (Ugal & Betiang, 2009). They argue that the most crucial avenue for training and developing human capital is in the educational sector; however, Nigeria's education system has been unable to harness the different aspects of training that includes the vocational, the practical, the cognitive and the productive, to prepare recipients for competition in the global market. Developing Nigeria's human capital to enable the country to catch up technologically and at the same time compete favourably with their counterparts around the world is therefore challenging.

The key to developing Nigeria's human capital is for the government to provide an all-embracing education for Nigerians through a comprehensive and exhaustive education and training, with an educationally competitive curriculum that caters to local and global needs.

The UNDP Human Development Indicators (HDI) for 2019 indicates that there has been increase in the Nigeria's HDI value from 0.465 in 2005 to 0.539 in 2019 which represent 15.9% increase although the HDI value of Nigeria in 2019 put the country among the low human development category in the world. Whereas, Nigeria's 2019 HDI value of 0.539 is below the average of 0.547 of the Sub-Saharan Africa, countries like Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia have HDIs ranked 175 and 173, respectively and Nigeria is ranked 161 the Nigeria's 2019 HDI value of 0.539 is below the average of 0.547 for the region. These figures are considered as low and are consistent with sub-Saharan African countries (UNDP, 2020).

11.2.5 Land Management and Administration

Land and its use as a productive asset require establishing a legal and institutional framework for land management. In Nigeria, that framework has exercised very little influence on the way property rights have developed over the years (Otubu, 2018). The reasons for this include:

- The supply of land is finite.
- Land is required and used for a range of purposes – to provide security (productive, investment or both) in several forms (food, shelter) – and serve as a basis for the rapid transformation of the Nigerian economy.
- Land management in Nigeria comprises many irregular units in the ownership, use and management by different stakeholders (individuals, corporate bodies and even the state). The major decisions taken by any stakeholder have implications not only for the other groups but also for society.
- Land is the focus of wealth, power and status. Indeed, the current concern in using land as a vehicle for investment gain and a hedge against inflation, under conditions of economic turbulence, points to the centrality of land in present-day Nigeria and, more importantly, how it is managed.

The management of land in Nigeria is no less complex than in any modern society. The following is a short outline (Oluwatayo et al., *2019). After independence in 1960, the Government of Northern Nigeria enacted the Northern Nigeria Land Tenure Law 1962. That law bestowed all lands in northern Nigeria, under the control and subject to the governor's disposition, to be held and administered for the use and common benefit of the natives of northern Nigeria. This led to titled lands being recognised by issuing occupancy certificates for up to 99 years for a specific purpose.*

The Land Tenure Law evolved into the Land Use Act of 1978. Before that, private individuals and the government increasingly faced difficulties in acquiring land for development purposes. Demand for land increased due to increasing urbanisation and growth of the national economy, due mainly to revenues derived from oil. Although legislation exists empowering governments to acquire land compulsorily for public purposes, it has become challenging to do so at a reasonable cost in some of Nigeria's urban centres. Several projects in the Second Development Plan (1970–1974) failed to take off because of the difficulty of obtaining land in major urban centres. Where land was readily available, the prices were often prohibitive, and compensation claimed and paid by governments generally had been much higher than the actual opportunity cost of the land. Land speculators have aggravated the situation.

Military and civilian governments have made many attempts to set up commissions and a panel of experts to recommend ways to overcome these difficulties. Despite these attempts, the acquisition of land for development has remained problematic. There have been radical suggestions such as the nationalisation of land, streamlining tenure systems, and the pursuit of 'one fits all' policies. The report, Land Reform in Nigeria, *describes the latest situation of land viz investment (Bashar, 2011); the World Bank Report,* Doing Business in Nigeria 2010, *reveals that Nigeria rates low out of the 183 countries included in the census (World Bank, 2010). This shows the real difficulty in having access to land for business (investment) in Nigeria. The report describes the obstacles a developer would face in Nigeria and makes three key recommendations:*

- Long bureaucratic processes involved in allocating land should be streamlined to ensure timely approval of land allocation, and subsequent transactions in the land should be faster.
- The (transaction) costs incurred should be reduced to a minimum amount.
- Experts and high technical skilled workforce should be employed to minimise the problems of double allocation.

11.2.6 Environment

In a large country like Nigeria, the landscape and ecology vary from tropical forest in the south to dry savanna in the far north, yielding a diversity of flora and fauna. Human population and development pressures pose severe threats to both the ecological and human environments (Countries Quest, 2022a).

Nigeria has a range of nature preserves, game reserves, and national parks, and a forest management system. However, management is carried on at the state and not the local level. Legal enforcement and protection infrastructure are lacking, and abuses of protected land are common.

Several Nigerian environmental groups have campaigned for environmental causes but with little success. The government established FEPA to address desertification, oil pollution, and land degradation, but the agency has had minimal impact. In other parts of Nigeria, farmers have practised indigenous environmental protection for centuries.

Nigeria is a party to the World Heritage Convention, although no sites have been recognised. One biosphere reserve has been designated under the UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program. Nigeria has ratified international agreements concerning biodiversity, climate change, endangered species, hazardous wastes, the law of the sea, marine dumping, marine life conservation, nuclear test ban, ozone layer protection, whaling, etc. There is also regional cooperation with neighbouring countries for the joint management of environmental resources.

11.2.7 Social Development

With a population of over 160 million, Nigeria has a full spectrum of social issues. The People of Nigeria, Social Issues Quest report, summarises some of the critical social issues that divide the country 37 (Countries Quest, 2022b). In Nigerian society, wealth and power are distributed very unevenly demographically and spatially. Most Nigerians are focused on daily survival, have limited resources, and have little chance of improving their lives. Meanwhile, members of the elite often accumulate and flaunt massive wealth. The elite maintains power through networks of patronage and political support.

This economic inequality has many impacts, particularly its severe impact on health, and especially the health of Nigerian children: 20% of children die before the age of five, primarily from treatable diseases that can be controlled. Adult Nigerians are also affected. Only 20% of rural Nigerians and 52% of urban Nigerians have access to safe water, and 30% have no access to healthcare due to living too far from clinics or because they cannot afford the clinic fees.

Compounding the social situation is the urban-rural divide. Average urban incomes are higher, which is a significant factor driving rural-urban migration. Urban poverty is as inescapable as rural poverty. Crime is also at the centre of social issues and pressures in Nigeria. Since the mid-1990s, crime has risen, due to growing unemployment and economic decline – a situation compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic. Social inequality has been fuelled by inefficient and corrupt police and customs agencies. Nigeria is a major conduit for international drugs moving from suppliers to consumers, many of these entering and leaving via secondary cities located on or near the nation's borders. Large-scale Nigerian fraud rings have developed, targeting businesses and individuals in other parts of the world. Periodic campaigns to root out corrupt politicians and attack crime have had little lasting effect. Crime is a significant issue affecting business confidence, not just in the large cities, but also in the secondary cities.

11.2.8 Competitiveness of Nigerian cities

As reported by World Economic Forum, the Global Competitiveness Index for 2012/2013 ranks Nigeria 148 out of 196 countries. The country maintained a score of 3.50, unchanged, from 2011/2012 and lagged behind other sub-Saharan African countries, such as South Africa, at 4.34; Kenya, at 3.82; Benin, at 3.78; Ghana, at 3.65; and Cameroon, at 3.61 (World Economic Forum, 2012). The ranking was based on basic requirements (institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health and primary education); efficiency enhancers (higher education and training, goods market efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological readiness, and market size); and innovation and sophistication factors (business sophistication and innovation), which currently fall short of standard parameters (Ni et al, 2018).

Nigeria's score shows low performance compared to other countries. This situation results from the decline in the country's basic macroeconomic stability, health, and educational outcomes. Nigeria displays weak public institutions and governance indicators compared to other African countries. The country's financial markets are not well-developed. Educational levels continue to lag international standards at all levels, whilst the country's labour market continues to be characterised by inefficiencies. New technologies for productivity enhancement, such as ICT, are not being harnessed. The nation has struggled with fixing critical infrastructure, such as power and transportation networks that have suffered decades of neglect. Given this scenario, Nigeria has lost critical investment opportunities to other African countries. Although efforts are currently being made towards improving the situation, there remains considerable room for improvement.

11.2.9 International Development Assistance

In general, international development assistance to Nigeria's urban sector projects is ad hoc, using different instruments such as grants, soft loans, and other modalities. Except for World Bank and African Development Bank loans, there has been little direct government management of donor funds into the urban sector. Until recently, outside of the international development banks, official development assistance agencies have argued that off-budget support has been the most practical approach, given accountability weaknesses, the absence of effective financial management and inconsistencies in the integration and implementation of policies, plans, and budgets and subsequent releases and expenditures (Eldon & Waddington, 2007).

In 2005, DFID (the former Department for International Development of the United Kingdom) and the World Bank developed a new Country Partnership Strategy for Nigeria, which involved a three-level approach to development aid: investment lending at the federal level, SWAP type arrangements in 'good performing' states, and highly focussed community issue-based project approaches in poorly performing states. It did not include instruments to use the fiscal transfer system more effectively to introduce better incentives for state and local government service delivery, system strengthening and greater accountability.

> **"**
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> *... international development assistance to Nigeria's urban sector projects is ad hoc, using different instruments such as grants, soft loans, and other modalities.*

Much of the aid and development to the urban is sector grants and loans directed at improving water supply, sanitation, roads, and major public facilities. There have been few attempts to support integrated cross-sectoral investment to develop hard and soft infrastructure to support economic and social development or improved urban and financial management. The lack of coordination in the aid program by international agencies and government has resulted in a patchwork of projects at the secondary city level that are poorly planned, located and inadequately funded and do not bring significant benefits or new investment into local economies. A more holistic approach to integrated city land use and financial planning, investment prioritisation, infrastructure, long-term budgeting is needed.

11.3 Case Study of Ibadan

Ibadan in southern Nigeria is the state capital of Oyo Province and the capital of the Yoruba nation. It is a city famous for rusted roof scape (Photo 11.1). It has a long urban history as an urban trading centre and has been an important secondary city since colonial times. The 2006 Census-estimated Ibadan's population was 2,550,593. However, the Ibadan City Masterplan research, which included the Ibadan agglomerations, used population figures consistent with the Africapolis database, which estimated the population at 6,018,000. Ibadan is a metropolis. However, it functions very much as a secondary city. It does not have many primate city features and has not developed significant depth and specialisation in its economy, which continues to be influenced by consumption.

PHOTO 11.1
Ibadan City's famous rusted roofscape

© World Bank (2019).

Ibadan was selected for this case study because the city's development challenges have been documented well in background documents and studies used to prepare the recent Ibadan City Masterplan. The available information enables a good profile and analysis of many of the common problems and complex issues facing the development and management of secondary cities in Nigeria. The city also demonstrates what can happen to the future urban development of other secondary cities in Nigeria if they are not well-managed. The case study shows the need for significantly improved urban management, governance, support for localised economic development, and climate change policies to ensure more secondary cities in Nigeria become more sustainable, equitable, and inclusive in urban development approaches in the future.

11.3.1 General Profile of Ibadan

Ibadan is the largest indigenous city in West Africa and is located about 145 km northeast of Lagos. Its population includes 11 local government areas. The population of central Ibadan, including five local government areas (LGA), is 1,338,659 (see Table 11.3).

TABLE 11.3 | A summary profile of the City of Ibadan

Indicator	Details	Unit Measure
Urban Area	What is the estimated urban area in the City?	463.33 km²
Demographics	What was the Estimated Population in 2010?	2,835,000
	What was the population in 2000 or the last census?	2,550,593
	Is the city's share of the national population growing?	Yes @ 2.35%
	Estimated density of population	455.7 pp /km²
	Has population density in the city increased or decreased?	Increased
Economic Strength	What is the city's estimated GDP?	US$2,010
	Estimate of how fast is the economy growing pa?	11.1%
	What is the fastest-growing sector of the economy?	Trade (Commerce) and Craft
	What does it export?	Agricultural produce
Income Levels	What is the estimated average income per month?	US$ estimated
	How much higher are incomes in the capital city compared to the city?	%
Employment	How many people are employed in the city by industry sector?	No (000)
	How big is informal sector employment?	Trading 70%, Craft 39%, Agriculture 2%
	What is the unemployment rate?	8.6%
	Is there a reliance on remittances to supplement household income?	Yes
Poverty Rate	Estimate % of households are living below the poverty line. Is there any Gini Coefficient data?	78.1%
	What is the Gini coefficient?	0.43
Public Finances	What is the budget of the Municipality?	US$ estimated
	What are the primary sources or funds and expenditure?	State Allocation and Internally Generated Revenue (IGR)
	How much money does the municipality spend/ capita?	N32.33 billion capita
	What % of the city population has access to potable water?	94.5%
	What % of the city population has good sanitation?	70.8%
	What % of the city population has waste management collection	24.4%
	What is the length of urban roads?	515.99 km
	What is the distance and travel time to the nearest largest city?	145km/1 Hour
	How many intercity flights or buses iare there a day?	3 aAirlines
	Does the municipality have a GIS with an inventory of infrastructure?	No

Indicator	Details	Unit Measure
Other facts about the city	Presents additional indicators that say something useful about the city.	Access to electricity in the city is 89.6%
Governance	How competent is local government? Very competent = 5 not Competent = 1	1
	Transparency of Local Government: Very transparent = 5 not transparent = 1	Not transparent
Housing and Land	What is the cost of land on the fringe?	N400,000 (US$2,564) per 1 Plot of land
Health Infrastructure	Number of doctors per 10,000 people Number of Public Hospitals Number of Private Hospitals Number of beds in Public Hospitals Number of beds in Private Hospitals	= 2.3:10,000 entire Ibadan region. = 16 = 237 = 4038 = 1434

Source: World Bank, UN-Habitat, National Statistical Office.

11.3.2 Urban Development and Growth Management

Ibadan faces significant urban development issues and growth management problems. Many of these have been documented extensively during background studies for the Ibadan City Masterplan (Dar Al-Handasah et al., 2018). The following describes recent trends associated with the city's development and some of the city's current development challenges.

13.3.2.1 Social-Demographics

The city growth of Ibadan has been mainly driven by transport development and the establishment of several educational and research institutions. The passage of the Lagos-Kano railway through Ibadan in 1901 contributed significantly to the city's development (Onibokun & Kumuyi, 1999), while the convergence of the two major trade routes through Ijebu and Abeokuta encouraged the migration of large numbers of people, who established trading activities in the city in the 1950s and 1960s. Table 11.4 shows the population characteristics of Ibadan Metropolis, 1991–2006.

Ibadan became a commercial focus of the entire western region. Many new developments took place after 1973, which initiated the city's outward growth in all directions (Areola, 1994). A significant development was the construction of the Ibadan-Lagos expressway, which generated the greatest urban sprawl, east and north of the city, in the 1980s. The Eleyele expressway in the west of the city also significantly expanded this part of the city. Since then, the city has extended further into the neighbouring local government areas of Akinyele and Egbeda (Fourchard, 2003).

TABLE 11.4 | Population Characteristics of Ibadan Metropolis, 1991-2006.

LGA	Area (km²)	1991 Population	2006 Population	Population Increase (%)	Growth Rate (%)
URBAN Local Government Area					
Ibadan North	145.58	302,271	306,795	1.5	0.1
Ibadan NE	81.45	275,627	330,399	19.9	1.2
Ibadan NW	31.38	147,918	152,834	3.3	0.2
Ibadan SE	80.45	225,800	266,046	17.8	1.1
Ibadan SW	124.55	227,047	282,585	2.0	0.1
Sub-total	463.33	1,178,663	1,338,659		

LGA	Area (km²)	1991 Population	2006 Population	Population Increase (%)	Growth Rate (%)
PERI-URBAN Local Government Area					
Akinyele	427.26	140,118	211,359	50.8	2.8
Egbeda	136.83	129,461	281,573	117.5	5.3
Ido	865.49	53,582	103,261	92.7	4.5
Lagelu	283.92	68,901	147,957	114.7	5.2
Ona-Ara	369.37	123,048	202,725	121.5	5.4
Oluyole	577.10	91,527	265,059	115.4	5.3
Sub-total	2,659.97	606,637	1,211,934		

Source: National Population Commission (2007), Survey Department Ministry of Lands, Housing and Survey, Ibadan.

13.3.2.2 Urban Governance

There are 774 LGAs (the third tier of government) in Nigeria. The local government council administrates each LGA. The council consists of both executive and legislative arms. The executive arm is headed by the chairman, who is the chief executive. The legislative arm consists of councillors, which are representative of wards. The number of wards in each LGA varies from 10 to 20. All the LGAs have offices regarded as local government headquarters, and the majority of the headquarters are usually in urban areas. This means the local council is also part of the urban governance.

The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria clearly stated the functions of local governments (Edo State Judiciary, 2016). These include an economic recommendation to the state, collecting taxes and fees, naming roads and streets and numbering of houses, registration of births, deaths and marriages, and provision and maintenance of public transportation and refuse disposal (Awotokun, 2005). Local government council involvement in urban governance is mandated by law. In short, all three tiers of government in urban governance are clearly stated in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.

Despite the different levels of government involvement, urban governance in Nigeria is still a problem. This is because the rapid urbanisation in spatial and demographic terms has not been met with effective urban planning (Omar, 2013). Most urban dwellers live in slums without access to essential services and amenities such as housing, hospitals, electricity, and pipe-borne water.

Ibadan metropolis consists of the city of Ibadan and its immediate suburban districts. The city-serving or non-basic activities concerned with meeting the needs of the city population take place within this area, sometimes referred to as the 'Ibadan metropolitan district'. The urban sphere of influence of Ibadan city, however, covers a much more extensive territorial area. Ibadan city extends for about 70 km, from Iroko in the north to Mamu in the south; half of the population live in Ibadan City and characterise the territory that looks to Ibadan as the centre for its cultural, administrative, and commercial activities. The area comprises Akinyele, Egbeda, Ibadan Northwest, Ido, Lagelu, Oluyole, Ona-Ara, Ibadan Northeast, Ibadan South East, Ibadan West, Ibadan North (Areola & Akintola, 1994), each of which is a local government area Ibadan has grown tremendously in size and area over the years. In line with the Federal Government of Nigeria, these LGAs are financed mainly by the federal government.

13.3.2.3 Urban Planning, Urban Development and Land-use

The location and spatial distribution of major industrial concerns in Ibadan do not follow any organised pattern, although a few significant industrial estates exist, e.g., Oluyole, Lagelu, and Oke'badan. Subsequent major industrial units came up in Onireke, Apata-Ganga, Oke-Bola, Oke-Ado, Eleiyele, Challenge and other newly developed areas. Industries have sprung up in the urban periphery along the major highways connecting Ibadan with other towns like Lagos, Abeokuta, Ife, Iwo and Oyo, in more recent times. Oluyole Industrial Estate, located in the metropolis, consists of different industries, including food and beverage processing, organic chemicals manufacturing, basic steel production, agricultural produce processing and production, auto repair workshops, concrete production, pharmaceuticals, agro-allied chemicals and manufacturing.

Ibadan has grown to become a large sprawling city with no discernible pattern of development. Developed land increased from only 100 ha in 1830 to 12.5 km² in 1931, 30 km² in 1963, 112 km² in 1973, 136 km² in 1981, and 214 km² in 1988 (Areola & Akintola, 1994). A recent examination of the city's actual extent from satellite imagery indicates that urban development has extended significantly in the last three decades. The developed land area for the city in 2012 had reached 401 km² (Figure 11.5).

As a result of the rapid population growth and urban expansion in Ibadan, a new Ibadan City Masterplan was designed. The plan consists of three main categories: growth centres, urban expansion, and infill areas. The growth centres are at the outskirts of the city where urban sprawl presently takes place. In the new Masterplan, land-use types: industry, agriculture and rural communities, open space and recreation, and transport networks are considered. For industrial use, an additional four new industrial areas are proposed.

Two out of the four industrial areas are for agricultural processing, while the remaining two are for heavy industry and warehousing. The open space is designed to prevent flooding in the city. Space will be used for sport, playgrounds, recreation, natural open space, and urban agriculture.

Ibadan has many buildings of historical and cultural value in the city (see Figure 11.6). The new Ibadan City Masterplan (2018) identified and proposed retaining of many of those buildings with their original structures. The Masterplan proposed the implementation of a circular road and an inner ring road for the road network. This would enable connectivity of all parts of Ibadan.

The aim of urban agriculture in the new Masterplan is to reduce flood disaster risk in the city. A series of flooding has occurred in Ibadan in the past.[4] Urban agriculture is planned to reduce runoff and keep flood plains free from construction in response to this. There is already a blueprint of urban development and land use in Ibadan, and its reality depends on how effective the Masterplan is when implemented.

FIGURE 11.5 | Ibadan urban agglomeration

Source: Ibadan City Masterplan (2018).

FIGURE 11.6 | Building of Historical and Cultural Value (Ibadan)

Source: Ibadan City Masterplan (2018).

11.3.3 Economic Development

Little detailed public information is available on the Ibadan or Oyo state economies (Adelekan, 2016). Ibadan's economy is dominated by the agricultural, trading, food and beverage industries, textile, and apparel, chemical and pharmaceutical products, with small but significant contributions made by the information and communication, education, professional, scientific, and technical services (Table 11.5). The economy of Ibadan and Oyo State is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), many of which are informal sector enterprises involved in small-scale manufacturing, trading, and transport logistics. There are an estimated 1.9 million micro and small businesses in Oyo State, of which almost 1 million are in Ibadan. The ratio of average enterprise density is 0.28 businesses per capita compared to 0.30 for Lagos and 0.24 for all Nigeria. Oyo hosts the second-largest micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) population in the country after Lagos, many of which are concentrated heavily in the Ibadan central city area. The largest employment sector is in sales and related activities, accounting for approximately 40% of total employment compared to 24% at the national level (Dar Al-Handasah, 2018).

TABLE 11.5 | Contribution of industry sector GDP to National and Oyo State Economies (2016)

	The proportion of National Economy (%)	Percentage Contribution to Oyo Economy	Percentage Contribution to National Economy
Agriculture	21.1	24.2	8.6
Mining And Quarrying	28.7	0.1	0.0
Manufacturing	10.2	16.0	
Electricity, Gas, Steam & Air Conditioning Supply	0.8		
Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management	0.1	0.1	6.7
Construction	1.9	0.8	3.3
Trade	7.0	11.4	12.3
Accommodation And Food Services	0.4	0.4	7.1
Transportation And Storage	1.5	3.0	
Information And Communication	12.1	18.5	11.5
Arts, Entertainment And Recreation	0.1	0.1	7.4
Financial And Insurance	2.0	2.6	9.9
Real Estate	1.8	2.8	11.5
Professional, Scientific And Technical Services	5.3	13.0%	18.4
Administrative & Support Services	0.0	0.0	11.1
Public Administration	2.0	2.1	8.0
Education	2.2	3.1	10.8
Human Health and Social Services	0.6	0.2	2.1
Other Services	2.1	1.4	4.9

Source: National Bureau of Statistics: States Nominal Gross Domestic Product (2016).

Oyo State and Ibadan do not have well developed economic development plans or policies. Economic development is driven by development programs formulated by ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) of the state government. After the elections in 2018, the government launched the "Oyo State Roadmap for Accelerated Development, 2019-2023" (Makinde, 2018) (OYSRP). This document proposed a state-wide framework with programs designed to include all the units in Oyo State, including the Ibadan municipal area. The agenda is anchored on eight major areas: agriculture and food security, health care, infrastructure, domestic resource flows,

education, ease of doing business, youth empowerment, social inclusion and protection, and security. However, the plan lacks a long-term financial strategy detailing estimated costs, budgeting, funding arrangements, and sequencing of critical infrastructure and social development projects and initiatives. There is an expectation that many of these will be funded by the central government.

Significant challenges are facing the development of the Ibadan economy. It lacks competitiveness and a framework to support the growth and development of a more sustainable economy. An economic development strategy is needed to guide and support the investment and development of industry clusters in the food, textiles, education, and ICT clusters to enable the aggregation of SMEs into medium and large-scale industries. These sectors offer the best opportunities to boost the city's economy and boost employment opportunities for more than 2 million people living in surrounding urban centres that form part of the larger Iban region.

Ibadan needs to plan for investment in building new, rehabilitating and maintaining strategic infrastructure, strengthening its economic governance arrangements and the enabling environment to support the sustainable development and growth of new industries and enterprises in the city (Dar Al-Handasah et al., 2018). This requires strengthening local governments' capacity, tax revenue-raising, and better integrated regional planning, infrastructure and policy cooperation between the city and surrounding spill-over urban growth areas. The city's economy is not competitive, and there must be a focus to reduce public and private transaction costs of services delivery and doing business (Bruce, 2019). More detailed economic research is needed to guide policy and planning to underpin the development of the region's economy.

Connectivity and collaboration between government, business, communities, education, and research institutions are weak. Enhancing connectivity is crucial to developing trade between regional cities and developing industry clusters (Bloch et al., 2015); a skilled, entrepreneurial, and competitive workforce, along with business leadership, networks, and knowledge sharing are necessary to strengthen industry sectors and supply chains. The city needs to work with its adjacent local governments to create critical mass, scale, and collaborative advantage rather than continually competing for limited resources. Finally, the city needs to focus on its image as an attractive place for investment and living by giving a socio-economic focus to liveability and security (Bruce, 2019). This focus should help attract more skilled workers and managers to Ibadan to help boost the development of the economy. Action on these matters is needed to develop a more sustainable city and a more robust economy and to create decent jobs in the future.

11.3.4 Social Development

Ibadan has experienced a phenomenal population increase over the years, extending rapidly to the peri-urban areas. While the metropolis's average annual population growth rate was a mere 0.5% between 1991 and 2006, the average growth rate for the peri-urban areas was 4.8% during the same period. This large number of people in a confined area causes significant social stress (Mabogunje, 1974).

11.3.4.1 Housing

Delivery of formal housing has been limited, with few public or formal private sector developments initiated in the last 20 years. Access to affordable quality housing remains acute (Photo 11.2). Aside from their failure to be an important contributor to urban growth, the existing formal processes, which can provide high standard of development and security of tenure, tend to follow cumbersome, drawn-out, costly, unrealistic, and unaffordable development standards that are unfamiliar to many sections of the population. The dominance of urban development by informal processes, most of which have a degree of legitimacy under customary/traditional practices, is almost a mirror image of the formal processes: informal processes cover provide most of the land. They largely proceed on a willing buyer/willing seller principle, and they have procedures that are generally understood by both.

Although limited, several projects improved the building conditions in existing high-density areas completed in the 1990s with World Bank support and finance. This included upgrading three districts of the core area, namely Agugu, Mokola and Yemetu. The main components were roads and drainage, but the projects also included sanitation, health, and education facilities. Since 2000, there have been no other similar upgrade projects in the

city. Infrastructure is deficient throughout Ibadan, with conditions being worst in the traditional city core, due to the poor state of many buildings and very low levels of vehicle accessibility.

Multi-occupation and high occupancy rates dominate in all medium and high-density areas, as do high renting levels. These are indicators of a considerable gap between housing supply and demand – although there is little to suggest that Ibadan differs significantly in this regard from other Nigerian cities. These areas are fully built-up, with little potential for significant new development in the future.

The peripheral areas have quite different characteristics – substantial new construction, much higher levels of owner-occupation and much less multi-occupation/renting. However, these characteristics are likely to change over time, as these areas develop and gradually take on the characteristics of adjacent medium-density areas. In the short and medium terms, they will be Ibadan's main development areas. In the longer term, growth will increasingly be in the city's outer rural areas, as today's peripheral areas become fully developed.

The high-density areas are predominantly within the defined Core Areas of the city. Within these areas, housing quality is at its lowest, with 49% considered to be in 'poor' condition. Inner Ibadan has the highest access to 'improved sources' of water and 'improved toilet facilities', although this generally applies to the medium-density rather than high-density areas; and 72% of households within inner Ibadan have an electricity supply. The high-density areas have the highest number of households per residential building. They are also the locations for a few identified slum areas.

PHOTO 11.2
Housing Remains an Acute Problem in Ibadan

© S.aderogba 2017 Wikimedia Commons.

Housing quality within the medium-density areas is significantly higher than in the high-density areas, with only 18% considered to be in 'poor' condition. As mentioned above, the medium-density areas within inner Ibadan have the highest access to 'improved sources' of water and 'improved toilet facilities'. The medium-density areas within inner Ibadan have higher access to a household electrical supply than those areas within outer Ibadan (72% compared to 52%). The number of households per residential building is slightly lower in the medium-density areas than the high-density areas. The medium-density areas are the locations also in slum areas.

Housing quality is highest within the low-density areas, with only 9% considered to be in 'poor' condition. Outer Ibadan has the lowest access to 'improved sources' of water and 'improved toilet facilities'. Access to a household electrical supply is lowest in outer Ibadan. In the low-density areas, the number of households per residential building is significantly lower than elsewhere, at 1.7. There are no identified slum areas within the low-density areas.

A concise overview of the housing market characteristics in Ibadan, reflecting contexts specific to the city, Oyo State and Nigeria, is more generally provided in this section. Factors affecting key market variables such as the supply of land/housing, demand, access to finance and affordability, and other relevant market behaviours are considered here. Many homes in Nigeria (especially in Ibadan) are being developed informally by the homeowners themselves and more marginally by cooperative societies providing building construction services. Formal providers (Makinde, 2014) comprise:

- Private developers that target mainly middle to high incomes, due to the complexity and high cost of purchasing land for housing delivery.
- Housing corporations, active at the State level and operating privately, that received their primary funding from government allocations. The State housing corporations target mainly middle incomes, requiring payment in cash or instalments during construction.
- Non-governmental organisations that target the informal sector and low-income groups.

Like the housing provision system, housing finance for homeowners in Ibadan is dominated by the informal sector, which is consistent with UNCHS /Habitat (2011) which claims thatexcept for South Africa and Botswana, less than 40% of people have access to formal finance sources (Odunjo & Ayoride, 2016). Informal financing can take many forms, such as thrift, money lenders, and village development schemes, and it is mostly uncoordinated and scattered (Adedeji & Abiodun, 2012). In Ibadan, however, Odunjo & Ayoride (2016) note that informal housing finance mainly refers to cooperative societies, personal savings, and to a lesser extent, inheritance. No less than 190 cooperative societies in Ibadan registered with the State government list housing provision as their main priority (Adeboyejo & Oderinde, 2013). These cooperatives use the granting of small loans (usually up to ₦900,000 – US$2,500) as their preferred strategy, helping members to finance parts of the housebuilding process, such as the roofing or ceiling. These small societies are funded by a mixture of loans, interest, members' savings, investment revenues and development levies.

> "
> *Access to a household electrical supply is lowest in outer Ibadan.*

Formal housing finance comprises several institutional sources such as commercial banks, insurance companies, State housing corporations, the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria, and mortgage institutions (Odunjo & Ayoride, 2016) . In addition, the National Housing Fund (NHF), established in 1992, called for 2.5% of every worker's earnings to be mandatorily placed into the Fund, which would, in turn, be mobilised to provide loans and affordable homes. In Ibadan, as stated by Odunjo & Ayoride (2016), homeowners using formal housing finance turn their priority towards workplace loans and more marginally towards financial institutions and mortgage loans.

One of the main challenges associated with housing and affordable housing provision in Ibadan, but more widely in Nigeria, is the lack, or inadequacy of, transparent, implemented and monitored guidelines at the national, state and municipal levels. The 1978 Nigerian Land Use Law, by vesting the land in the governor of each state and assigning him or her the duty to grant 'rights of occupancy' has partly prevented or slowed down opportunities to establish consistent and long-term urban plans (Adelekan, 2016). The Land Use Law has made titling and land registration processes increasingly bureaucratic; they are often subject to delays, very costly, and contribute to increased land prices on the formal market (Odunjo & Ayoride, 2016) . High land prices, the complex registration

process, and limited land availability areas have deterred private developers from delivering affordable housing, despite receiving many government incentives.

Similarly, although the 2011 National Housing Policy has, on paper, adopted the idea of mass housing as a solution to tackle the housing crisis, and to construct no less than 1 million homes per year, implementation has yet to be seen (Akinyode & Khan, 2016). The National Housing Fund (NHF) had also produced disappointing results, as in 2004, when the ratio of beneficiaries to contributors barely reached 0.12% (Akinyode & Khan, 2016) . (Sources suggest that conditions for loans offered through the NHF are too restrictive, preventing a large share of potential beneficiaries from accessing them. Duplication of the layers involved in the decision-making of housing provision is another key issue. In Ibadan, 16 institutions, 3 state agencies and 2 federal agencies are involved in the housing market processes at various stages.

Lack of coordination between those bodies and frequent duplication of their responsibilities results in mismanagement and adversely impacts the housing market and urban development (Akinyode & Khan, 2016). The creation of the LGAs in Ibadan has complicated the decision-making and slum management processes at the local scale, since some slums are spread across boundaries and require the focus of two or more relevant LGAs to agree on their management. As a result of those challenges, the provision of new housing has become more difficult, and planning regulations are often not enforced, reinforcing most of the urban problems that the policies were designed initially to solve. The situation creates for residents a sense of 'disdain' and 'apathy' towards planning institutions (Arimah & Adeagbo, 2000).

Low-income residents of Ibadan struggle to access housing finance. As mentioned previously, the formal financial system is restricted and provides mainly for wealthier populations. Although informal finance is understood to be available in Ibadan for these low-income groups, research suggests that bodies such as cooperatives are likely to be used by the most educated of the low-income groups, who understand the added value and importance of these mechanisms (Arimah & Adeagbo, 2000). This means that access to finance remains a crucial issue in terms of a housing strategy for some population segments, despite a plurality of informal systems in the local area.

The Ibadan housing market makes it difficult for residents to become homeowners. When coupled with the low income of the households and the lack of access to finance, the cost of building materials creates barriers to home ownership. In addition, is the requirement to buy the land through 'intermediaries', and costs associated with getting an occupancy certificate signed by the state governor are too high (Adeyeni et al., 2016). The limited opportunities for home ownership have two main implications:

Owner-occupiers are generally older (mostly over 40 years old) and long-term residents of Ibadan. The younger and poorer populations are generally catered for by the rental market (Jaiyeoba & Amole, 2013).

11.3.4.2 Limited Home Ownership is Putting Greater Pressure on the Demand for the Rental Market.

Increased pressure on the demand for rental housing contributes to the imbalance between demand and supply of rented units. Owing to strong migration from within Oyo state and other parts of the country, the demand for rental housing has increased with rising land prices (Adeyeni et al., 2016). Consequently, low-income households are struggling to find decent rental housing, especially given the growing poverty levels. This is especially true in the city centre, as proximity to main job opportunity locations attracts a large share of young, low skilled labour. This, in turn, allows for opportunistic behaviours to develop on the supply side of the housing market (Jaiyeoba & Amole, 2013). In particular, landlords in Lagos tend to protect the rental value of their Ibadan property according to their situation and needs or sell them to be converted for commercial activities. This restricts the housing supply in the city even further. In addition, some indigenous populations, inheritors of the central core land plots, rely on rent collection as a means of subsistence. They also tend to increase rental values according to their own needs.

11.3.5 Health Care

The distribution of healthcare facilities across Ibadan is uneven, with pockets of unserved areas in Ibadan north, north-west, and south-east and southwest LGAs. In the rural areas, the spread is sparse, and there are areas with little or no provision. The poor road network also impedes access to facilities. In isolated settlements, the provision of new permanent health facilities may not be justified on a cost basis. Improved infrastructure and road access to major towns or commercial centres will improve access to health facilities for all residents of Ibadan. Information about healthcare facilities has been sourced from the Oyo State Bureau of Statistics (OSBS) and the Oyo Ministry of Health (MOH). Primary, secondary, and tertiary level health facilities across the 11 LGAs, based on the MOH and OSBS data, do not always correlate. Data provided by MOH also include one military and one police hospital, which are operated by the federal government and cannot be accessed by the public – it is unknown whether the OSBS data includes these hospitals. Insufficient information is available to identify the distribution of and map all existing healthcare facilities.

There are 517 primary and 15 secondary health facilities in Ibadan. About half of the primary health facilities are owned by the private sector. According to Ibadan City Masterplan, an additional 237 primary health facilities will be needed in the city.

11.3.6 Infrastructure and Urban Services

Ibadan faces a multitude of infrastructure challenges. These include power supply, road conditions, housing deficits, and sanitation infrastructure (Fourchard, 2003). A significant problem facing Ibadan is its water supply infrastructure. Areola & Akintola (1994) submitted that the problems with Ibadan's water supply could be viewed from two perspectives: the Water Corporation mandated to supply water; and that of the consumers, the public and end-users (Areola & Akintola, 1994). Key water infrastructure problems include:

- Incessant power failures and fluctuations at the waterworks and booster stations which, apart from causing frequent interruptions in water supply, lead to pipe bursts when subjected to frequent alternating stoppages and gushes of water flow.
- Inefficient plumbing by contractors who connect water pipes crudely and tap water illegally.
- Frequent damage to water pipes by road construction companies.
- Overseas manufacturers give long delivery dates for water pumping and treatment equipment, and other essential materials.
- Demand that increasingly exceeds supply, especially in the newly developing parts of the city.

The preceding suggests inefficiency on the part of support services: irresponsibility on some professionals and lack of adequate forward planning on the part of Water Corporation itself.

Within Ibadan, the existing 2,350 primary and 547 primary and secondary schools, respectively, are insufficient to meet demand (see Table 11.6). The existing number of primary schools in the city are not enough. If the ratio of 1:3,000 people is applied, 1,421 primary schools will be required on or before 2036. An additional 584 secondary schools are needed on or before 2036, based on a ratio of one school per 10,000 people.

TABLE 11.6 | Social-demographics of Ibadan Metropolis

		Number
Education	Primary schools	2,350
	Secondary schools	547
Health	Primary health facilities	517
	Secondary health facilities	15
Fire stations		7
Police stations		23

Source: Ibadan City Masterplan (2018).

11.3.7 Employment and Human Capital

Increased employment in the informal economic sector of the city since the 1980s, especially petty trading and petty craft activities, was the first consequence of the economic crisis and the development of urban poverty in Nigeria (Fourchard, 2003). Over the years, the number of people engaged in agriculture practices has been declining. In 1953, about 35% of the region's population was engaged in agriculture. By 2006 the population of those engaged in farming living in Ibadan had further declined to 2.3% (Oyejide, 2006).

Trading is the primary economic activity in the Ibadan Metropolitan Area. More than 70% of active women are involved in trading activities, while the craft and industry sectors have become the major employment sectors for men. This is the consequence of small-scale craft and trade development since the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986. These two activities have driven the development of the informal sector.

The Ibadan City Masterplan highlights what the state government needs to achieve regarding future employment in Ibadan. Table 11.7 summarises projected changes in employment by economic activity: the commercial land-use sector is projected to contribute to 55.5% of employment opportunities in Ibadan by 2036, followed by the industrial land-use sector. It is projected that the institutional sector will provide the least employment opportunities.

TABLE 11.7 | Projected change in employment by economic activity in Ibadan

Land-use sector	Employment classification	2016-2036	% share
Commercial	Wholesale, retail; restaurants & hotels, communications, financing, insurance, real estate & business services, other services	1,294,670	55.5
Social	Education and human health	151,628	6.5
Institutional	Public administration & defence	6,998	0.3
Industrial	Mining & quarrying, manufacturing, construction, energy & utilities, transport and storage	879,422	37.7
Total		2,332,738	100

Source: Ibadan City Masterplan (2018).

11.3.8 Land Management, Property and Land Markets

Before 1970, Ibadan city was surrounded by rural villages with virtually no peri-urban development around the city limits. Since the oil boom era of the 1970s, the growth in national revenues and economic development has significantly influenced the city's urbanisation processes. Ibadan has grown both in physical size and population. Extensive areas characterised by rural features have either been incorporated into the city or transformed into its peri-urban areas, transitioning between predominantly rural and urban features. Former rural areas such as Lalupon, Alakia, Olodo, Ogbere, Odo-Ona, Bode-Igbo and Moniya, are now part of peri-urban Ibadan. Extensive peri-urban developments have taken place along the major roads and highways leading to major towns.

11.3.9 Environment

The impact of the human population on the environment of Ibadan varies, with the highest intensity being in the city, where population density is highest. Human needs for clean air, food, water, shelter, and other life necessities are greatest in the city.

A variety of human activities in Ibadan has contributed to a noticeable modification of the natural environment. There is a distinct 'urban climate' over the city, compared to the prevailing climate in surrounding rural regions, especially in temperature, humidity, and air pollution. The impact has largely been harmful and undesirable. It has varied in intensity according to the degree of population concentration and urbanisation.

11.3.10 Future Urban Growth Management Issues

Despite being a vibrant city with a strong sense of identity, Ibadan faces many challenges. This section summarises the existing conditions and the main conclusions drawn from the baseline findings of the Ibadan City Diagnostic Report (Adelekan, 2016). Ibadan's built-up area has expanded rapidly over the past 16 years. Physical urban growth has been along the main highways, with infill development as communities become established. The limited amount of land occupied by industrial and commercial uses indicates that the informal economy is small and creates insufficient jobs for the population.

The city's core area suffers from the pressures of inadequate infrastructure provision to support the high population density. The houses generally are in poor condition, and the provision of community facilities and utilities is low. Numerous older buildings have historical importance, but many are in a poor state of repair. In the inner built-up areas of Ibadan, the mix of land-uses is more varied and includes large institutional and educational facilities. Several industrial facilities are located primarily along the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway. In addition, numerous markets are distributed in and around the core area, where there is maximum connectivity and accessibility. Many residential areas have been developed informally, with inadequate supporting infrastructure to meet their needs. Large forest and agricultural land areas are outside the built-up area, although high-grade agricultural soil is limited to the city's southern parts. The surrounding vegetation and the varying topography of the city provides an attractive setting that helps improve residents' quality of life. They are assets that should be used to attract investment.

There is a shortage of formal recreational facilities, both indoor and outdoor, within the built-up area. Uncontrolled growth to the periphery of Ibadan is affecting the dense vegetation and forestry – this related deforestation adversely impacts the ground's ability to absorb water and is the leading cause of flooding in the city. A land-use classification, sourced from the "Space Standards for Physical Development in Oyo State" prepared by the Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban Development in December 2014, has been incorporated into the new Ibadan City Masterplan.

The Ibadan City Masterplan sets out the planning strategy for Ibadan and provides the direction for future growth and development to 2036 (Figure 11.7). It identifies key interventions and development areas and aims to streamline the planning process through a flexible and proactive approach.

FIGURE 11.7 | Ibadan City Final Masterplan

Source: Ibadan City Masterplan (2018).

The objectives of the planning strategy are to:

- Guide urban expansion to accommodate future population growth.
- Designate areas for protection and promotion.
- Provide a framework for development.
- Guide developers and investors towards investment opportunities.
- Integrate the proposed expansion areas with the existing built-up areas within the city.
- Integrate the social, economic, institutional, and physical aspects of land development.
- Promote economic development and create employment opportunities.
- Provide an adequate provision of housing and promote a diverse mix of land uses.
- Create a safe and healthy environment and better quality of life.

The key elements of the Ibadan City Masterplan focus on spatial development strategy, land-use distribution, social infrastructure, provision of culture, tourism and heritage facilities, implementation, and phasing strategy, and addressing flood risk. The master plan project won the acclaimed International Award for the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) Awards for Planning Excellence 2019.

The Spatial Development Strategy sets out a vision for the sustainable development and regeneration of Ibadan. It presents a physical representation of the Ibadan City Masterplan and delineates specific boundaries within which policies are applicable. It also sets the basis for future development and ensures that it integrates with the existing urban areas. It is based around a series of guiding principles and provides a comprehensive, physical urban expansion plan. While taking into consideration future demands, it also caters for the needs of the existing community. The Spatial Development Strategy is structured as follows:

11.3.10.1 Connectivity of Urban Systems

Many elements of the urban fabric and systems in Ibadan are poorly connected. This relates not only to transportation, urban services, and land use but also elements of soft infrastructure, including linking education to industries and the economy's skills and training needs. There is very weak connectivity in planning and policy implementation, especially linking policy implementation, budgeting and financing between city levels of government and the central government. Connectivity in e-based business and public services is weak, with an evident lack of policy in the development of e-systems, which could improve the productivity and management of the city. Collaborative governance arrangements between Ibadan and surrounding LGAs would help to improve connectivity and cooperation and reduce costs on maintenance and environmental management, especially of the stream catchment and waste management.

11.3.10.2 Climate Change

Climate change is having a significant environmental impact on Ibadan, especially on flooding. The Ibadan City Masterplan seeks to mitigate the effects of climate change and be resistant to future shocks. This is informed by an understanding of baseline climatic conditions and future predictions. The Masterplan provides a framework for responding to the main issues presented to Ibadan by climate change. These include thermal discomfort, flooding due to increased rainfall, ecosystem loss, and greenhouse gas emissions. Suggested policies, metrics and Masterplan impacts are included in the framework to demonstrate relevant sustainability measures.

11.3.11 Lessons Gained from the Ibadan Case Study

Urbanisation is now a prominent issue on the agenda of national and provincial governments in Nigeria and there is a genuine commitment to addressing urbanisation problems. However, many challenges remain. Recent civil disturbances in the country's north have impacted investment and are likely to exacerbate the differences in regional development patterns throughout the country.

The development of Abuja in the 1980s, as the new national capital, was a significant step in fostering greater decentralisation and support for developing the country's northern provinces. Decentralisation and devolution of administrative, finance and economic development functions are stronger in Nigeria than in other sub-Saharan African countries except for South Africa. However, provincial, and local governments, are still slow to embrace reforms. Central ministries still take much of the responsibility for planning, economic and land development, and the political reform processes have not led to a significant increase in the capacity of secondary cities and regional towns to provide effective essential public services and manage the pressure of urbanisation – especially informal land settlement and economies.

Weak enforcement of development regulations and administrative capacity of government agencies has not led to significant improvement in the quality of the built environment and the quality of life in cities like Ibadan. Land and property markets are not transparent nor efficient – due to the weak land administration systems, where less than 5% of property is formally registered. Efficient and equitable land markets are a prerequisite to well-functioning cities. However, Nigerian cities suffer from severe land market distortions caused by poor land development and management policies, including the slow provision of infrastructure and services, poor land information systems, and cumbersome and slow land transaction procedures. Market prices are distorted severely by expatriate purchases of property, making land and housing unaffordable to all but a few wealthy locals. Urban dwellers need secure access to land on which to develop houses, live and be productive. Addressing distortions in inland markets will be a considerable challenge for the government in stabilising land values and providing land for affordable development.

The lessons from the Ibadan case study demonstrates the informality-formality in governance, economic, labour and land market systems operating in the city and highlight the need for the city to become more self-sufficient, efficient, and competitive. This will require the central government to formulate national urban policies that incorporate basic principles to foster greater competition for investment practices, especially with planning and land administration processes, and regularise informal land transactions. Reforms to land, public sector financing and revenue collection systems are also essential for Ibadan to raise the capital necessary to improve and extend infrastructure to the growing peri-urban and existing informal settlement areas around the city. Through policies and laws that promote a more equitable society, policymakers are responsible for legitimising good practices of working with communities to benefit the poor and marginalised sections of the population.

Informality will, for some time, continue to be a feature of Nigeria's land, labour, and capital markets. Hence, the boundaries between the formal and informal systems need to be understood. Hybrid systems need to be developed to support developing the country's system of cities to affect an accelerated transition from informal to more formal planning, economic development and governance systems.

11.3.12 Enhancing the Development of Ibadan

The overall framework in the National Development Plan for Nigeria prioritises economic development, infrastructure, and investment and enhances governance systems' competitiveness (Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning, 2020). Rebuilding destroyed infrastructure as well as competent corporate governance and leadership in the public and private sectors are high priorities for creating a stable and open business environment to attract investment and win the trust of communities, which the provincial and city governments will have to rely upon to continue rebuilding and repairing many of the city's essential services. With much of Ibadan's employment being informal and based on local trade and commerce, the city does not have a strong wealth base to raise the capital needed to develop, restore, and maintain essential infrastructure and public services.

Several actions are needed to strengthen the capacity and capability of Ibadan to develop its economy, enhance its competitiveness, plan, and improve its population's wellbeing. Some recommendations are listed below – in no order of priority. They draw upon the findings of the case study. A new city development strategy is needed to guide the development of Ibadan. It needs to be realistic in what can be achieved by the city in addressing matters such as formalising the informal sector economy and urban settlements and reforming local governance, especially measures to enhance the city's limited financial and human resources capital base. The recommendations include:

- Prepare an economic development strategy for the city and region.
- Establish an urban governance arrangement to develop and implement an integrated development strategic plan for Ibadan, incorporating physical development, social, economic, environmental planning, and governance arrangements. Such a plan must include engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, especially the informal and business sectors, in setting the vision and strategic directions for the city's development. If necessary, this may require international development agency technical and capacity-building support.
- Improve the urban information systems and data needed to support the planning, management, and monitoring of development and support investment and development.
- Improve the land management and administration systems, including improvements to planning, land registration, building and construction approvals and standards, property valuation and taxation mapping. This is essential to ensure clarity and certainty of land tenure, stability and transparency of the local property market, and properly regulated and managed land and housing development.
- Focus on developing comprehensive urban services and upgrading informal settlements areas, especially improving housing and access.
- Improve urban financial systems, including local tax revenue collection systems, participatory budgeting, public asset evaluation, auditing and financial management practices at the city and provincial level.

- Establish business partnerships between government and the private sector to focus on improving the city's urban systems – to create efficiency and productivity gains to drive down externality costs to business and government and make Ibadan more competitive and attractive to local and external investors. This is needed to:
  - Transition and transform the informal employment and the economy to a formal base;
  - Increase the income, levels of production and wealth base of the economy to grow the city's prosperity and address the growing problem of urban poverty.

11.4 Secondary Cities: The Missing Piece of the Nigerian Urban Systems Jigsaw puzzle

The call for changes in urban planning and development is not new in Nigeria (Yari, 2012). It is apparent from the preceding discussion that urban policy reform is needed that recognises the need to develop a national system of competitive and collaborating cities, and integrated networks of trading cities and infrastructure. Greater recognition of the need for better urban planning would contribute significantly to good urban governance and management. To do this, town planners need to push forward with the reforms initiated under the State of Urban and Regional Planning Report in Nigeria. Specifically, attention must be paid to initiatives and policies to support secondary city development in Nigeria. These include:

- Ensure all cities have integrated urban and regional development and financial plans to guide their growth and development.
- Integrate land use, infrastructure, financial and long-terms budgeting arrangements for the coordinated and program delivery of urban services and infrastructure.
- Introduce participatory planning. All plans and planning schemes should engage in participatory and all-inclusive processes.
- Be inclusive. Planning should include supporting, guiding, and protecting the informal sector, the poor, and their economic activities.
- Develop methods to raise and leverage additional resources through stakeholders, as demonstrated by the Sustainable City Program
- Identify ways to achieve access to affordable serviced land and decent housing.

A new national urban development policy and strategy are needed to direct Nigeria cities and towns on a more sustainable development pathway. Such a document must focus on developing a framework that leads to a strong, dynamic, and integrated national system of cities, recognizing the role of secondary cities as key intermediary centres in value-adding and industry supply chains and national economic development.

Nigeria's national system of cities and secondary cities need to become more competitive, efficient, sustainable, and engaged in inter-regional trade, knowledge, and information sharing. Local government areas need to recognize that they must become more self-sufficient and self-organizing. Many of the resources needed to develop and improve the economic and social wellbeing of the nation's secondary and smaller cities can be secured through more collaborative rather than competitive approaches to governance, financing and development. Greater collaboration and partnering of government and business could help significantly reduce transaction costs, create networks of cities to achieve industry scale, critical mass and competitiveness in industry and export development, and improve access to and quality of urban services.

These are pieces of the urban 'jigsaw puzzle' that are missing in Nigeria. They are needed in order to complete the puzzle: to progressively develop a more sustainable and prosperous, and competitive system of secondary cities.

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ENDNOTES

(1)   According to Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS), the fertility rate over the years (1900 to 2018) on average has been 5.6 children per woman. For details see; https://dhsprogram.com/publications/index.cfm

(2)   See Table 11.3.

(3)   Information on the infrastructure spending of state and local governments was not available, and so could not be assessed (see Foster & Pushak, 2011).

(4)   For example, see Agbola et al. (2012) The August 2011 Flood in Ibadan, Nigeria: Anthropogenic Causes and Consequences, International Journal of disaster risk science 3(4): 207-217.

12

MOMBASA: REPUBLIC OF KENYA

LIBIN G. MWACHARO,
GODFREY O ANYUMBA

> The Republic of Kenya has undergone a period of significant local government reform in the last decade. In the early 2000s, the Ministry of Devolution and Planning began a bold program of reforms involving the decentralisation of planning and policy formulation and implementation. In 2010, a new Constitution designed to decentralise authority and promote local citizen participation was overwhelmingly approved. Municipal elections were held in 2013, which began a process of transition to more decentralised governance. Consequently, many secondary and smaller intermediary cities have taken on a key role in Kenya's 47 counties in providing a wide range of public services and driving local economic and infrastructure development.

This chapter analyses urbanisation trends and challenges that significantly influence the development of Kenyan secondary cities. The chapter includes a case study of the City of Mombasa: a pre-colonial trading centre with a tragic past. It is Kenya's main port on the Indian Ocean, servicing the trade needs of Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan. It is also an important education, logistics and tourism centre for the country. The chapter analyses some of the development and urban governance challenges facing the city and suggests ways to enhance its development as a secondary city. The final section of the chapter examines pathways forward for an agenda for Kenya to support the development of a strong network of secondary cities in the country.

12.1 Urbanisation and Secondary City Development

The Republic of Kenya, with an area of 581,309 km², on the East African Coast is bordered by five countries: Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Kenya's urban population growth increased from 8.8% in 1960–1970 to 20.9% in 2000–2010 and is projected to exceed 36% of the national population by 2030–2040. The implication here is that by 2030–2040, 1 out of every 3 people will live in urban areas, compared to the current 1 in 5, or 1 of 12 in the 1960s.

Kenya has diverse ecological landscapes and is renowned for its long-distance athletes, wildlife, national parks, and varied tourism offerings. The Kenya-Uganda Railway Project built between 1896 and 1901 formed the first towns' economic backbone. Major railway towns and cities include Mombasa, which hosts the biggest seaport in East Africa; Nairobi, Kenya's primate and capital city and site of a United Nations global headquarters; and Nakuru, Eldoret and Kisumu, which are all county headquarters (Figure 12.1).

The British Colonial administration barred rural Africans from moving freely into towns, so urban populations were artificially controlled. However, after independence

FIGURE 12.1 | Map of Kenya - Cities and towns in Kenya - 2015

Source: eLimu eLearning Company Limited Open Commons.

in 1963, the harsh colonial laws were scrapped, and uncontrolled rural-urban migration started. Initially, this was slow because of the smallness of regional towns, the poor transport networks servicing them and the low level of industrialisation, minimal municipal services and non-agricultural employment and investment opportunities.

The recently completed Standard Gauge Railway infrastructure between Mombasa and Nairobi, financed by the Chinese government, more or less followed the old railway line route. Its effect is to increase turnover speed, productivity and urbanisation in existing railway cities and secondary towns (Ogollah et al., 2019). Thus, Kenya is urbanising rapidly with many challenges in managing productive growth and development of secondary towns. According to the KNBS 2019 Census, Kenya had 47.5 million people, 27.51% or 13 million living in secondary

towns and cities (Urban population in Kenya in 1999 and 2009). The World Bank Report (2016a), on the collection of development indicators revealed that about 46.5% of the urban population of 6 million Kenyans live in undignified informal settlements. The informal settlements result from the urbanisation process that has not delivered economic transformation and reasonable living standards. Consequently, the Kenya Government created Vision 2030 (Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2007) as an economic blueprint to address the challenges of rapid urbanisation in secondary towns.

Kenya Vision 2030 (2007)is the country's development blueprint from 2008 to 2030. Its goal is to transform Kenya into a middle-income country with improved quality of life for all its citizens. It recognised rapid urbanisation as one of the main challenges and opportunities facing the country. The Second Medium Term Plan (MTP) of 2013-17 aimed at facilitating sustainable urbanisation process of secondary towns (Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013). Further, the MTP identified a series of development programs to enhance infrastructure, connectivity and accessibility, safety and security in secondary towns under the National Urban Development Policy (NUDP) created in 2016 (Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2016). The Urban Areas and Cities Act 2016 (Laws of Kenya, 2012) was part of the 2010 Constitutional Devolution Legal Framework, defining towns and cities and their governance systems. The sections on National Policies on Urbanisation and Secondary City Development and Infrastructure explain the proposed economic interventions in detail.

12.1.1 Urbanisation and Municipal Government Arrangements in Kenya

Urbanisation in Kenya is a remnant of a colonial past — urbanisation caused by Arabs and British colonisation led to a shift in the balance between the urban and rural economies, which have been the key driver of urbanisation in Kenya for centuries. This movement to urban areas is connected to economic growth and the changing patterns of demand for and supply of employment opportunities, i.e., to the urban bias of urban primacy of cities and secondary towns. The Arabs focused on colonising the 10-mile coastal strip (Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu Stone towns) while the British developed a railway and road network between Mombasa and Kisumu that became the driver of urbanisation in Kenya in the twentieth century.

The railway and road network unleashed economic growth and the formation of urban areas such as Naivasha, Nakuru, and Eldoret, Kenya's secondary cities today. Machakos, Embu, Thika, Ruiru, Kakamega, Meru, Nyeri, Kikuyu and Athi River are other medium-sized secondary towns. After Kenya's independence in 1963, local authorities of secondary towns were administered using the Local Government Act Cap. 265 without any urban masterplans. Unlike the latter secondary cities that grew haphazardly without formal urban planning, Nairobi and Mombasa benefited from orderly development anchored on colonial urban masterplans. Up to 1978, secondary towns prospered reasonably under the first independence government, but not under the second administration (Hope, 2012; Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2006).

After Kenya's independence in 1963, these secondary cities became the focal point of political expression, economic growth, and urbanisation, dominated by Nairobi's capital city. In 1992, Kenya became a multi-party state; however, this situation ushered in an era of political instability, violence and economic stagnation in every 5-year election cycle. The worst post-election violence (PEV) happened in 2007, and secondary towns were disturbance flashpoints (Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, 2008). It is the 2007 PEV that led to the clamour for a new constitution as a political framework for putting political violence to an end, giving birth to the 2010 Constitution (Government of Kenya, 2010).

The new constitution did not stop PEV in the 2017 elections, leading to the ongoing Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), which is assumed to be a long-term solution to PEV and economic stagnation. The main goal of BBI is for the government to engage the opposition party and the public to find out their pain points, prepare a report and bills for submission to Parliament and Senate for debate and inclusion to the current constitution. Its expected impact on the development of secondary cities is appropriating more resources for county governments (from the current 15% of national revenues to 35%), preventing corruption, improving governance and performance, embedding social and economic inclusion, especially vulnerable youth members (Government of Kenya, 2020).

Between 1975–1990, the migrant share of urban growth in Kenya was estimated at 64%. Between 1989 and 1999, in-migration contributed 17% of the Nairobi population and 16% of the Mombasa population. Currently, rural migration accounts for about 25% of urban growth (NCPD, 2013). Secondary city urbanisation and development in Kenya has become somewhat dysfunctional — leading to regional poverty, income inequality, unemployment, underemployment, inadequate housing and access to public services, traffic congestion, and environmental degradation (Collier, 2016). According to Nairobi Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (NAMATA), traffic congestion in cost Kenya approximately US$1 billion per year, making Nairobi City the world's fourth most congested urban area (Ombok, 2019). Further, Nairobi and Mombasa have some of the biggest informal settlements in Africa (Hutt, 2016).

Secondary cities play an important role in economic growth and development in Kenya. This was not always so, however. They have become more connected physically through roads, railways, air, and information and communications technology (ICT) – unfortunately, this did not happen before 2010, the era of political and economic devolution. The growth of Kenya's secondary cities has been unleashed by the process of devolution introduced in 2013. It divided Kenya into 47 counties, each with its local government and county headquarters. The county headquarters towns have experienced rural population migration leading to moderate commercial activity and economic growth. Also, former Nairobi City dormitory residential neighbourhoods, such as Thika, Ruiru, Karuri and Kikuyu, have developed into vibrant secondary satellite cities after Kiambu became a county (Cities Alliance Conference, 2019; PwC, 2016).

12.1.2 Demographics of Primary and Secondary City Development

Kenya's system of cities has developed around these three hubs, which have among the fastest-growing urban populations and generate a substantial share of GDP (World Bank, 2016a). The Nairobi metropolitan area is the largest of these hubs and the fastest growing. Nairobi is projected to have a population of 6 million by 2030 (Figure 12.2), up from its estimated 4.5 million. Nairobi is well connected to its satellite towns and by road and rail to Mombasa, its main port. It remains the main driver of population and economic growth in the country, generating almost 25% of the national GDP.

Of the 25 largest urban areas in Kenya, 10 are located within the Greater Nairobi metropolitan area. These 10 cities are home to about 6.1 million people and nearly 40% of Kenya's urban population. A second large agglomeration of cities is occurring around Kisumu and Kisii. These areas had a projected urban population in 2015 of 3,682,500 and 2,369,600, respectively (OECD/SWAC, 2020). The third area is Mombasa, with a population of just over 1 million in 2015.

There are 126 urban agglomerations in Kenya with populations over 50,000. Table 12.1 shows the change in the number of urban agglomerations since 1990. The pattern shows a very significant growth in secondary cities between 100,000 and 300,000. This is reflected in the high levels of migration contributing to the population

FIGURE 12.2 | Concentration of urban population, Kenya

Source: World Bank (2016).

growth of cities shown in Table 12.2 shows urban population growth for the census periods 1999–2019.There were discrepancies between the 2009 and 2019 census that were due to political interference in the 2009 census. As a result, a detailed analytical census and population projection of 2009 was not released (Wikipedia, 2021). Kenya used inaccurate data for the economic and development planning of secondary towns. This situation worsened poverty and economic inequalities in Kenya and led to dysfunctional urbanisation. The KNBS 2019 population census was more transparent, and unlike 2009, was never contested.

According to the 2019 census, the population of Ruiru population is larger than that of Eldoret and Kisumu county headquarters. Ruirui's phenomenal population growth was fuelled by its proximity to Nairobi City and Nairobi-Thika Highway. Ruiru Town is 26 km from Nairobi City.

Figure 12.3 Many migrants prefer to settle in secondary cities due to their accessibility and affordability, although Nairobi is the most powerful magnate of migration. Compared to Nairobi, however, population migration to secondary cities has had a positive impact in bridging economic inequalities, assuming a culture of good governance.

TABLE 12.1 | Urban agglomerations, Kenya

Kenya				Total Urban Agglomerations
Urban Population	1990	2000	2010	2015
10 million or more				
5 to 10 million				2
1 to 5 million	1	1	4	3
500,000 to 1 million		1		4
300,000 to 500,000	1	2	2	3
100,000 to 300,000	4	11	10	20
50,000 to 100,000	5	13	12	20
10,000 to 50,000	5	13	12	74
Total Urban	16	41	40	126

Source: UN DESA African Cities Data Sheets (2020).

Table 12.2 shows urban population growth for the census periods 1999–2019.There were discrepancies between the 2009 and 2019 census that were due to political interference in the 2009 census. As a result, a detailed analytical census and population projection of 2009 was not released (Wikipedia, 2021). Kenya used inaccurate data for the economic and development planning of secondary towns. This situation worsened poverty and economic inequalities in Kenya and led to dysfunctional urbanisation. The KNBS 2019 population census was more transparent, and unlike 2009, was never contested. According to the 2019 census, the population of Ruiru population is larger than that of Eldoret and Kisumu county headquarters. Ruirui's phenomenal population growth was fuelled by its proximity to Nairobi City and Nairobi-Thika Highway. Ruiru Town is 26 km from Nairobi City.

FIGURE 12.3 | Population change, Kenyan cities, 1990-2015

Population Change City Size 1990-2015

UN DESA, African Cities Data Sheets (2020).

TABLE 12.2 | Urban population in Kenya in 1999 and 2019

Item	Urban Centre	1999	2009	Population 2019
1	Nairobi	2,143,254	3,133,518	4,397,073
2	Mombasa	665,018	938,131	1,208,333
3	Nakuru	322,734	409,928	570,674
4	Ruiru	231,262	307,990	490,120
5	Eldoret			475,716
6	Kisumu			397,957
7	Kikuyu			323,881
8	Thika			251,407
9	Naivasha			198,444
10	Karuri			194,342
		6,614,723	7,697,707	
		9,996,991	12,487,375	

Source: K'Akumu, (2013), for 1999 & 2009 and Census 2019 KNBS - Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.

12.1.3 Contributions of Cities to National Economy

In 2019 the Kenya National Bureau Statistics (KNBS) published the first gross county product (GCP) report covering county governments. It provided official statistics on the economic size of counties and the structure of county economics, and it estimated the economic potential of the various counties in different sectors. Nairobi and Mombasa are cities or urban counties with no rural economies, while Nakuru and Kiambu counties have the advantage of mixed rural and urban economies. Only 21 counties, led by Bungoma, Tharaka Nithi, Nyandarua, Elgeyo Markwet, Siaya, and Nyeri beat the average growth in GCP, arising from their respective County primacy positions. Investors and migrants prefer Nairobi City County because of its high economic returns and potential job opportunities (KNBS, 2019).

TABLE 12.3 | Gross county product (GCP): Cities as a percentage of the national gross domestic product (NGDP)

Item	County	Population	Primacy Factor	% NGDP	CGDP (USD Billions)	As Nairobi's GCP Ratio
1	Nairobi	4,397,073	1	21.7	19.53	1
2	Nakuru	2,162,202	2.03	6.1	5.49	3.56
3	Kiambu	2,417,735	1.82	5.5	4.95	3.96
4	Mombasa	1,208,333	3.64	4.7	4.23	5.13

Source: KNBS.

Table 1.23 shows the 2019 data from KNBS on the first GCP as a percentage of the national gross domestic product (GDP) of about US$90 billion. Table 1.24 shows the contribution of the 10 largest cities to national GDP and the economic base of each city economy. These 10 cities contribute more than 54% of the national GDP. Based on PPP in 2020, GDP per capita for Nairobi was $US27,798 compared to $US 6, 632 for Mombasa. National GDP per capita in 2018 was $1,817. Kenya has one of the most significant divides between GDP by regional local government in Africa and regional to primate city income. This disparity is widening due to the economic pulling power of Nairobi to attract much of the country's foreign direct investment (FDI) in industry development.

TABLE 12.4 | Percentage contribution of the 10 largest cities to national GDP

Economy		GDP per capita (PPP) 2019 (US$ billions to Ksh 100)
	National	90
	Nairobi City County	19.53
	Mombasa County	4.23
The GDP contribution of the largest 10 cities and counties		
City or County	Percentage GDP contribution (%)	Status
Nairobi	21.7	100% urban, primate city, central transport, financial, industrial and logistics hub
Nakuru	6.1	Agricultural /industrial economy, and county headquarters and Naivasha Town are major railway towns close to Nairobi
Kiambu	5.5	Rural agricultural and urban/industrial, and county within Nairobi Metropolitan Region
Mombasa	4.7	100% urban, major tourism, railway, road and seaport logistics hub
Machakos	3.2	Agricultural /industrial economy, and county within Nairobi Metropolitan Region.
Meru	2.9	Agricultural /industrial economy
Kisumu	2.9	Agricultural /industrial economy and a significant railway town
Nyandarua	2.6	Agricultural /industrial economy
Kakamega	2.4	Agricultural /industrial economy
Uasin Gishu	2.3	Agricultural /industrial economy and county headquarters is a significant railway town

Source: KNBS.

12.1.4 National Policies on Urbanisation and Secondary City Development

The Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1961 formed the basis of the Local Government Bill of 1962 (KIPPRA Public Policy Repository, 1961). The new law established the Local Government Regulations (1963) and created municipal, county, urban and local councils (Republic of Kenya, The Local Government Regulations 1963). There were two governance structures in each local authority; one was the political decision-making structure headed by the mayor or chairperson, and the other was the administrative team headed by the town/county clerk.

Between 1978–2002, local authority governance structures were thoroughly weakened, especially those of Nairobi City. In 1984 the Nairobi City Council was dissolved and replaced with the unelected and unaccountable Nairobi City Commission. The Commission did not practice good governance and opened doors to corruption, especially land grabbing and deterioration of municipal services (Owuor, 2009). The Commission system governed the city up to 1992, when the Nairobi City Council was reconstituted and elected the first multi-party mayor. The mayoral system continued up to 2010 when devolution was adopted. The 2010 Constitution created two tiers of governance: the national government headed by the president and county governments headed by governors. It provides for appointed urban area and city board units of decentralisation to run secondary town local authorities under the governor's leadership. However, this requirement is not mandatory. It is confusing, as the Local Government Act (Cap. 265) has never been replaced and the Urban Areas and Cities Act 2011 is in force (Government of Kenya, 2011; Mboga, 2009).

At the county level, devolution comprises elected county governments without elected local authority representatives, thus posing urban and rural governance and administrative challenges. By doing away with one of the oldest, tested, and continuous systems of local municipal government on the African continent (Cap. 265 Laws of Kenya or local authority legislation) without providing a satisfactory replacement, devolution created an urban and rural governance gap. Though the 2010 Constitution recognised the need to continue administering urban areas using Cap. 265 Laws of Kenya, county governments do not follow this law. County governments are essentially and directly responsible for urban and rural development with a devolution system without local government administrative structures.

The Urban Areas and Cities Act (UACA) (2011, amended in 2016) partially addresses this urban governance gap by providing procedures for chartering cities and municipalities and establishing urban boards; however, rural areas were not considered. Such urban boards, appointed by county governments, would have delegated responsibilities to manage cities and municipalities and remain accountable to their respective county governments. However, except for Kitui and Kisumu county governments, 45 other counties have not established urban boards. The lack of clarity in the UACA regarding the urban hierarchy and the absence of regulations to give it effect has discouraged most county governments from issuing charters and establishing urban boards (World Bank, 2017).

12.2 Problems and Issues Affecting Secondary City Development

12.2.1 COVID-19 and its Impact

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Kenya has strained the healthcare system, resulting in massive job losses and livelihoods and economic disruption, due to temporary lockdown to contain the virus spread. Secondary cities have been the hardest hit. Consequently, the Central Bank of Kenya revised its economic growth estimate for 2020 from the initial 6.2% to an ambitious 3.4%. Counties faced a potential USD$144 billion budgetary impact through FY2021 due to COVID-19 impacting the development of secondary cities negatively (Government of Kenya, 2020).

12.2.2 Urban Development

As discussed, Kenya's urban population growth increased 8.8% between 1960–70 to 20.9% for 2000–2010 and is projected to exceed 36% of the national population by 2030–2040. The British colonial administration constrained rural-urban migration, while the independent Kenya government guaranteed free movement of people and unleashed a wave of migration to towns. For example, in 1962, there were 34 urban centres; by 1979, they had grown to 91, a growth of 268% in 17 years. Further, Kenya experienced a high rate of urbanisation between 1989 and 1999. During this period, the number of urban centres rose from 139 to 276, a growth of 200% — twice that of 1962–1979 (Pelling and Wisner 2009, p.89.)

In Kenya where the smaller urban centres (with a population less than 10,000) declined from 32 to 23 during 1989–1999, was probably due to dysfunctional urbanisation. However, in just about three decades, the urban population had increased by about 250%, indicating that Kenya was generally urbanising rapidly. Only Mombasa and Nairobi had urban development master plans; other secondary cities did not. Even with urban master plans, local governments failed to provide municipal services to keep up with the rates of urbanisation and population growth. Consequently, secondary towns experienced deteriorating and inadequate urban infrastructure and environmental benefits. Most urban growth occurred mainly outside the development control areas, leading to significant and unsanitary informal settlements in all urban centres (Mireri, 2006).

12.2.3 Regional City Economic Development

Agriculture and services account for the largest share of economic activity in most counties and secondary cities. Forty counties are heavily reliant on a rain-fed agricultural economy, with only seven counties having significant manufacturing activities. Counties experienced robust growth, with actual GCP and real GCP per capita growth averaging 5.6% and 2.8%, respectively, between 2014 and 2017. However, huge disparities exist across counties, with poverty rates at 16.7% for Nairobi County and 79.4% for Turkana County. Financial inclusion was identified as a significant opportunity in Kenya Vision 2030. Thanks to the MPesa (mobile banking service that allows users to store and transfer money through their mobile phones) service, a pre-Vision 2030 revolution, national access to financial inclusion is 82.9%, an improvement from 26.7% over the past decade. About 17.0% of the population is still excluded from formal financial services and cannot participate effectively in informal economic activities.

An average of US$132,485,377 was transacted on mobile phones daily between January and December 2020 (Business Daily, 2021). Mobile money agents of Safaricom's M-Pesa, Airtel Money and Telkom's Tkash handled Sh3.98 trillion in 2018 — underlining the rapid growth in the value of transactions over three years.

The third edition of *Doing Business in Kenya* published by the World Bank (2016b) measured 11 counties; Nairobi, Busia, Isiolo, Kakamega, Kiambu, Kisumu, Machakos, Mombasa, Narok, Nyeri and Uasin Gishu. It is assumed that the report indirectly measured the competitiveness and ease of doing business in secondary towns located in the respective counties. The Doing Business report studied regulations from the perspective of small and medium-sized firms. It focused on whether a county economy had in place the rules and processes that led to good outcomes for entrepreneurs and, in turn, increased economic activity and productivity. The report found that it was easier to start a business in Uasin Gishu (Eldoret), deal with construction permits in Kisumu, register a property in Nairobi and enforce a contract in Busia (Malaba). The counties were ranked from the first to tenth in terms of doing business: Uasin Gishu (Eldoret), Busia, Kisumu, Nairobi, Mombasa, Kiambu, Nyeri, Machakos, Isiolo, Narok Kakamega, (Kakamega). No single county or secondary city excelled on all measurement parameters of doing business (World Bank, 2016b).

12.2.4 Governance

Article 184 of the Constitution makes provision for county governments to appoint urban boards, and the respective principal laws are the County Governments Act 2012 and the Urban Areas and Cities Act 2011. The Urban Areas and Cities Act provides for a three-tiered system of city and municipal boards and town committees (Figure 1.24). The County Governments Act provided for existing local councils to be abolished, and new county governments were elected. In some counties, as many as 12 former local authorities were amalgamated into one county.

FIGURE 12.4 | System of governance and management of urban areas

Source: Authors.

In the County Governance Status Report (CGSR) launched in October 2020 by Transparency International Kenya (TIKenya), the national performance of senators and women representatives was rated as poor, and governors, Members of Parliament (MPs) and members of county assemblies was rated as average (CGSR, 2019). Regarding access to information, more than half of the respondents, or 56%, stated that they had not received any information from their counties and did not know where to find it. In terms of service delivery, road infrastructure and transport remained a top and persistent challenge.

On the challenges the county executive experienced while delivering services to the people, 36% of the respondents from the county executive mentioned inadequate funds as the main challenge. Two-thirds of the respondents felt that corruption had increased in 2019, with 56% stating that corruption is likely to increase in 2020. Of the respondents, 38% felt that the government is committed to fighting corruption, stating that intensification of arrests and prosecution of perpetrators as evidence of government commitment to fighting poor governance and abuse of public resources.

Regarding integrity management offices, the study found out that 12 counties out of the 16 assessed had established audit committees in their county executive, while 11 out of 16 had established corruption reporting mechanisms, asset registers, and complaints and feedback mechanisms. Only 3 out of 16 county assemblies had recruited integrity assurance officers. It is reasonable to assume that commitment to fighting corruption at the county level is weak. Bad governance denies secondary towns development resources meant to promote economic growth, deliver jobs and improve living standards.

The Urban Areas and Cities (UAC) Act (2011) partly addresses an existing urban governance gap by providing appointment by county governments of urban boards to manage secondary cities. However, it is not mandatory for county governments to establish these boards. To date, only two counties are on record as having set up urban boards: Kitui and Kisumu counties. There is the real risk that this urban governance deficit will result in dysfunctional urbanisation – weak economic growth and unliveable secondary city environments (CGSR, 2020).

While amalgamations into countries were intended to achieve efficiencies, the designations into city counties many have experienced relatively less change in governance arrangements due to devolution. Weaknesses remain in the new governance arrangements, particularly in the capacity of weaker counties to plan and administer multiple urban centres and achieve a more equitable distribution of local government services.

12.2.5 Finance

Before the 2010 Constitution (Government of Kenya, 2010), Kenyan local authorities had several revenue sources such as Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF), Roads Maintenance Levy Fund (RMLF), contribution in lieu of Rates (CILOR), property rates, single business permit, and vehicle parking. Their primary source of revenue was LATF. The Local Authorities Transfer Fund Act (No. 8 of 1998) came into effect in June 1999 and provided the transfer of 5% of the national income tax (Kenya Law Reports, 2012). The Fund was managed by two ministries (Ministry of Finance and that of Local Government). Between 1978 and 2002, local authorities saw a gradual transfer of their functions to central government ministries and departments, as they were unable to deliver essential services – it weakened the performance of secondary cities. The 2010 Constitution devolved local authority financial management to counties, removing financial control from the national government and empowering secondary cities without effective legal and urban planning frameworks.

Good progress has been made in increasing the share of development expenditure in total spending at the national level, but recurrent spending pressures erode the gains. County government revenues are from three main sources: equitable share allocation from the national government (unconditional), conditional grants, and own-source revenue. Equitable share comprises at least 15% of the nationally collected revenue based on the last audited accounts. Own source revenues are generated through user and license fees levied on property titles, single business permits, and other rates and penalties.

County Budget Implementation Review Reports (Republic of Kenya, (2018), 2017; Otieno et al., 2014; Institute of Economic Affairs, 2014) by the Controller of Budget since the financial year 2013/14 show revenue collection still falling below targets. Embu County managed to achieve the collection of 78.6% of the target revenue. Wajir

County was the worst-performing county, having collected only 31.9%. Nairobi City County led by collecting US$70.7 million, followed by Mombasa and Narok at US$24.4 and US$21.8 million, respectively. While Narok, Isiolo, West Pokot, Taita Taveta, and Kiambu counties surpassed their targets in 2018/19, Kisii, Meru, Wajir, Bungoma, and Garissa failed to meet theirs. During the 2019/20 financial year, county governments generated Sh35.7 billion, which represents 65.2% of their set annual target of Sh54.9 billion – this situation makes counties rely heavily on equitable share allocation from the national government.

12.2.6 Infrastructure

Access to essential municipal services is critical for secondary cities to grow and be liveable. Urban infrastructure and services—primarily transport, water supply and sanitation, electricity and solid waste management—are critical to thriving cities for attracting and retaining satisfied and productive investors and residents. In Kenya's two major cities—Nairobi and Mombasa, current water demand exceeds supply by more than 150,000 and 100,000 cubic metres per day, respectively. A sewer system covers only about 18% of the urban population, 70% rely on septic tanks and pit latrines, and 12% have no access to sanitation services at all. Expanded investment in urban infrastructure and essential services will be fundamental to Kenya's growth prospects and social outcomes. Inadequate sanitation infrastructure costs the country about US$324 million annually—roughly 1.0% of GDP. Similarly, investments in transport infrastructure (especial rapid bus transport in secondary cities) and affordable housing can generate considerable savings in the long run. The creation of Kenya Mortgage Refinancing Corporation and the Bomayangu Affordable Housing Program has addressed the demand side of housing; however, there are serious delivery risks to the supply side (World Bank, 2016c).

Kenya Secondary Cities Services Improvement Program sponsored by the World Bank and Government of Kenya aimed to improve secondary cities service delivery. The goal was to establish and strengthen urban institutions and systems to deliver improved infrastructure and services in participating secondary cities. The government's response to Kenya's secondary city infrastructure development challenge is creating the National Urban Development Policy (NUDP). This policy provides a framework within which urban areas and cities contribute to realising the broad goals of Vision 2030. Without addressing the urban governance, human resource and funding gap, this policy is not likely to deliver expected results (Government of Kenya, 2016; Government of Kenya, 2008).

12.2.7 Connectivity

Counties have formed regional blocs driven by their shared historical, political and economic interests. The following six blocs are established:

- Frontier Counties Development Council (FCDC) comprises seven counties: Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Isiolo, Marsabit, Tana River, and Lamu.
- North Rift Economic Bloc (NOREB) comprises eight counties, namely Uasin Gishu, Trans-Nzoia, Nandi, Elgeyo Marakwet, West Pokot, Baringo, and Samburu and Turkana.
- Lake Region Economic Bloc (LREB) comprises 14 counties, namely Migori, Nyamira, Siaya, Vihiga, Bomet, Bungoma, Busia, Homa Bay, Kakamega, Kisii, Kisumu, Nandi, Trans Nzoia and Kericho.
- Jumuia ya Kaunti za Pwani comprises six counties, namely, Tana River, Taita Taveta, Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale and Mombasa.
- South Eastern Kenya Economic Bloc comprises three counties, namely Kitui, Machakos and Makueni.
- Mt. Kenya and Aberdares Region Economic Bloc comprises 10 counties, namely Nyeri, Nyandarua, Meru, Tharaka Nithi, Embu, Kirinyaga, Murang'a, Laikipia, Nakuru and Kiambu.

However, the national government will not allow county governments to transfer funds to their various regional blocs to undertake joint projects until a new legislative framework is made law. The legislative framework is expected to clarify the nature of cooperation instruments, the powers of the regional economic blocs and their financing models (KIPPRA, 2019).

The ICT Road Maps were stipulated in the National ICT Master Plan for 2008-2018 (Ministry of ICT, 2014). The plan encompasses a link between county governments and the national government in matters regarding key flagship projects, such as National Optical Fibre Backbone Infrastructure (NOFBI), County Connectivity Project (CCP), Presidential Digital Talent Programme (PDTP) and the Ajira Digital Programme (ADP). The County Connectivity Project, a communication infrastructure programme, aims to ensure that county government offices are connected to the internet and promote online services using telephones, emails, and teleconferencing.

In Phase I of the project, 28 counties were fully connected to the Government Common Core Network (GCCN), and the sites are monitored and supported at the Network Operating Centre (NOC) at the National Treasury. In Phase II, the 19 remaining counties and two sites (Kilifi and Laikipia) are in the process of being connected to the NOFBI. Training of the staff and commissioning of the site was expected by December 2016. In Phase III, connectivity will be expanded to other departments in the counties and secure the CCP infrastructure (ICT Authority, 2013).

The County Connectivity Project (ICT Authority, 2013) aims to ensure that county government offices are connected to the internet and promote online services using telephones, emails, and teleconferencing. With increased connectivity in the counties, there is faster delivery of services and documents such as birth certificates and national identification cards. In addition, the public has equal access to high-quality public services both from the central and county offices. The project specifically aims to connect county commissioners offices, treasury departments, civil registration departments, the National Registry Bureau, education department offices, and governors offices.

The Standard Gauge Railway operated by Kenya Railways has dramatically reduced logistics and passenger travel costs and significantly boosted regional connectivity, integration and economic growth of Kenya's inland and counties. Recent rehabilitation of the old colonial railway line between Nairobi and Nanyuki has reduced freight transport costs.

The Vision 2030 Roads Expansion Programme aimed to grow domestic and regional trade by upgrading the national and county roads network. The target is to construct and rehabilitate approximately 5,500 km of roads comprising 3,825 km of national trunk roads and 1,675 km of county roads. About 1,700 km for Non-Motorized Transport (NMT), including paths and walkways, will be constructed. About 800 km of roads will be designed, and 4,257 km and 1,735 km of national trunk roads and county roads will be periodically maintained. In addition, approximately 200,000 km will be routinely maintained.

12.3 Case Study of Mombasa

Mombasa is the second-largest city in Kenya. Mombasa County's 2019 population was 1.208 million. The town has an area of 229.9 km² excluding 65 km² of water mass, which is 200 nautical miles into the Indian Ocean. It borders Kilifi County to the north, Kwale County to the southwest and the Indian Ocean to the east. Its history is tied to Arab, Portuguese, and British influence. Arab control of the East African region, from Lamu in Kenya to Kipini in Tanzania, took place from 1698 to 1886 (Britannica, 2022). To protect their commercial interests, the Portuguese built Fort Jesus from 1593 to 1596, which served as their headquarters. They ruled from Mombasa for the next 100 years, from 1596 to 1698. Fort Jesus temporarily changed hands several times throughout its history until it came under Omani Arab control in 1698. For the next 142 years, they used the fort as their administrative and commercial centre, until they moved it into Zanzibar in 1840. The British took over Mombasa in 1895 and it became the capital of the British East Africa Protectorate (Britannica, 2022). Mombasa is the capital city of the Coast Province.

PHOTO 12.1
Container Port, Mombasa

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TABLE 12.5 | Summary sheet

Indicator	Details	Unit Measure
Urban Area	What is the estimated urban area in the city?	229.9 km^2 excluding 65 km^2 of water mass
Demographics	What was the estimate population 2020?	1,296,000, a 3.35% increase from 2019
	What was population in 2000 or last census?	2000: 683,000 @ 3.33% growth
		2010: 940,000 @ 3.18% growth
	Is the city's share of the national population growing?	2.52%
	Estimated Density of Population	5,500 pp/km^2
	Has population density in the city increased or decreased?	Increased
Economic Strength	What is the city's estimated GDP?	2019: US$4.3 billion
	Estimate of how fast is the economy-growing pa?	2013–2018: averaged 5.7%, in 2019: 5.6%
		2020: was projected at 6.1% but shrank to 1% due to the COVID-19 pandemic
	What is the fastest-growing sector of the economy?	Port and transport logistics
	What does the city mostly export or trade?	Tea for upcountry, Rwanda and Uganda
	What does the city mostly import or consume?	Fossil fuel (oil) and used cars from Japan
Household Income Levels	What is the estimated average income per month?	US$640
	How much higher are incomes in the capital city compared to the city?	Mombasa average: US$640
		Nairobi average: US$1750

Indicator	Details	Unit Measure
Employment	In 2019 how many people are employed in the city by industry sector?	Total labour force: 679,717
		Rural informal sector: 6,791
		Urban informal sector: 165,857
		Agricultural economy: 13,594
		Salaried employment: 408,830 (public and private sector)
	How big is informal sector employment?	25% of the total labour force.
	What is the unemployment rate?	13.50%
Housing and Land	What % of the city's residents' lives in slums?	60%
	What % of households rent?	95%
	What is the cost of land on the fringe?	US$92,600 per acre, 11 km from CBD. Only 30% of residents have title deeds
	How rapid has been the development of land and housing	2019: Average rental yields and price appreciation of 6.2% and 7.2%, respectively. Residential and office achieved yields of 5.3% and 5.1%, respectively
Education	Number of students who finish primary education.......No	Primary School Age (6-13) years: 202,992
	Number of students who complete secondary education...No	Secondary School Age (14-17) years: 90,296
	Number of students who complete tertiary education. No	Higher education (15-35) years: 629,749
	Number of people enrolled/ participating in adult education. No	Labour Force Age (15-64) years: 904,066 Aged population (65+) years: 21,936.
	What is the total public spending on education	US$8.44 million
	How much is spent per student (all education)	70
Health Infrastructure	Number of doctors per 10,000 people........	One doctor/10,000 people.
	Number of Public Hospitals ....3.............No	The county hosts the Coast Level Five Hospital, which is a referral facility serving the entire coast region. Level four (4) public hospitals include the Port Reitz, Tudor, Likoni and the Kenya Navy.
	Number of beds in Public Hospitals ...664 beds	There are 11 health centres and 26 public dispensaries. Private hospitals; Aga Khan Hospital, Mombasa Hospital, Pandya Memorial Hospital, Nursing homes and private health clinics.
	Number of Private Hospitals	3
	Number of beds in Private Hospitals..........	502 beds
	Primary health care spending per person	US$2,760 per person
		One clinical officer for 21,000 and one nurse for every 1,600
Other facts about the city	Presents additional indicators that say something useful about the city.	The county has gained from large public investments meant to grow the economy and create jobs to counter the effects of high youth unemployment, radicalisation, terrorism attacks and years of neglect by previous governments
Governance	How competent is local government? Very competent = 5 not Competent = 1	2
	Transparency of Local Government: Very transparent = 5 not transparent = 1	2

Source: Kenya Harmonized health facility survey 2019, Kenya Healthcare Federation Survey (2020); KNBS (2013).

12.3.1 Governance

Functions and powers of Mombasa County governments are explained in County Governments Act No. 17 of 2012 (National Council for Law Reporting, 2012). The county political structure consists of a governor, deputy governor and committee executive members, with the county civil service headed by a county secretary. The county legislature consists of the county assembly, members of the county assembly (MCAs or ward representatives), and the county assembly speaker. The law requires the governor to provide leadership in the county's governance and development; promote democracy, good governance, unity and cohesion within; promote peace and order within the county; promote the county's competitiveness; and be accountable for the management and use of the county. In failing to appoint an urban board of management, clamp down on corruption, manage municipal waste, or provide adequate fresh water and sanitation services, and by promoting nepotism in the recruitment of county human resources, the governor has failed to provide leadership in governance and development.

Though Mombasa is the second county, its competitiveness and performance in facilitating the creation of jobs and wealth, and contributing to the national GDP are low compared to smaller urban areas of Nakuru and Kiambu. It is reasonable to assume that this situation is caused by poor governance. Urban growth spilling over occurring outside the city's boundaries, without urban services, is not adequately managed. There is a need for greater coordination on metropolitan and regional planning if Mombasa is not to experience Nairobi's future problems.

12.3.2 Social Demographics

Table 12.6 shows the population change from 1980 to 2020 for Mombasa. It also has a population density of over 5,500 pp km^2 and up to 8,000 pp km^2 in the inner urban areas. The total population of Mombasa County in 2009 was 939,501 and it is projected to increase to 1.4 million by the year 2030 and to 1.6 million by 2050, if the current fertility and mortality levels persist. The county has a high proportion of the population (33%) below age 15 years. This population is projected to decrease to 28% and 23% in 2030 and 2050, respectively. In education, the primary school net enrolment rate is 69%. About 31% of primary-school-age children have no access to education. The secondary school net enrolment rate is much lower (28%) than for primary school. Mombasa County has a low primary to secondary transition rate, weakening the city's human capital skill base and productive capacity. In 2015, it was estimated that 56,798 primary school age and 52,227 secondary schools were not attending school. If this situation continues, the county might not get the productivity benefits of an educated population, which can lead to dysfunctional urbanisation.

TABLE 12.6 | Mombasa Population 1950-2020

Date	Population	Percentage Annual Change
31/12/1980	350,000	
31/12/1990	476,000	2.94
31/12/2000	683,000	3.48
31/12/2010	940,000	3.33
31/12/2020	1,296,000	3.18

Source: United Nations – World Population Prospects https://www.macrotrends.net/cities/21708/mombasa/population.

12.4 Urban Development

Mombasa's population growth increased from 160,000 in 1960 to 254,000 in 1970, and to 350,000 in 1980. Mombasa urbanised at an average rate of 3.6% in the last seven decades. At independence, only Mombasa and Nairobi had urban development master plans; other secondary cities did not. Even under devolution, Mombasa local authority leadership did not perform well enough to provide municipal services to keep pace with the rate of urbanisation. As a result, Mombasa continues to experience deteriorating municipal services, causing water-borne diseases, high unemployment and poverty rates, including the growth of slums. Deadly dengue fever, a mosquito-borne viral infection, is widespread throughout the tropics. The environment that causes dengue fever is flooding, high temperatures, relative humidity, and crowded slums in unplanned urbanising secondary cities like Mombasa.

12.4.1 Infrastructure and Urban Services

Adequate water, sanitation and waste management services are vital in promoting sustainable urban development. Mombasa gets water from Baricho Dam in Kilifi, Mzima Springs in Taita-Taveta and Marere Springs in Kwale. The county plans to invest in an expensive and impractical desalination plant to end the perennial water shortage – however, the proposal lacks a source of funds. Most water supply infrastructure was built more than half a century ago and has suffered from poor maintenance (Table 12.7). Consequently, about 40% of water is lost due to broken pipes and leakages. The current erratic installed water supply capacity is 149,200 cubic metres against demand in 2020 of 333,171 cubic metres. Water demand is projected to almost double by 2050 (Table 1.28). Existing water supply infrastructure meets only 44.78% of the Coast Province counties' water needs, leading to poor economic performance, water-borne diseases and dysfunctional urbanisation (World Bank, 2013).

TABLE 12.7 | Current Water Supply Capacity and Future Potential Yield

Water source	Installed capacity (m³/d)	Potential yield (m³/d)
Mzima Springs	35,000	105,000
Marere Springs	8,000	12,000
Baricho Well field	90,000	N/A
Tiwi Aquifer	13,000	N/A
Njoro Kubwa Springs	3,000	N/A
Tana River	1,400	N/A
Shella Aquifer	1,800	N/A
Total	149,200	

Source: World Bank (2013) - WaSSIP.

In the medium term, the government plans to invest Ksh 35 billion (US$320.4 million) to upgrade Mzima Springs to supply an additional 100,000 m³ of clean water to Coast counties. About 74% of the county population is low-income; they cannot afford to pay commercial rates. Consequently, water and sewerage services in Mombasa are delivered as a social good (at subsidised cost), a situation that is not financially sustainable. If anything, operational and development cost recoveries are inadequate, leading to inferior institutional performance, poor infrastructure maintenance, and inferior customer service. Groundwater (wells) quality is below safety levels for drinking water. Over 50% of all the public health diseases in Mombasa are water-borne illnesses, such as cholera, diarrhoea, and dysentery, and dengue fever and malaria are commonplace, especially in slums.

TABLE 12.8 | Water Demand Projections (cubic metres) for the Target Urban Centres (by county),

County	2012	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
Mombasa	140,999	155,840	188,236	243,288	280,501	317,715
Kwale	23,396	25,764	31,096	39,775	48,956	58,136
Kilifi	37,723	41,516	51,616	65,090	79,823	94,555
Lamu	14,778	16,615	19,554	23,494	28,261	33,028
Tana River	4,300	18,568	37,462	62,068	89,314	116,560
Taita Taveta	3,597	4,340	5,207	6,036	7,629	9,222
Total Demand (m^3)	224,793	262,643	333,171	439,751	534,483	629,216

Source: Tahal Group, 2013.

The economic activities that have a high generation of solid waste in the county are tourism and industry. A 2018 report by Woima Corporation of Finland stated that the island city of Mombasa generates over 1,000 tons of waste daily and the county up to 2,200 tons (Woima Corporation, 2018). Less than half of it is collected and mostly dumped at Kibarani within the city and Mwakirunge at least 20 km away. There are over 40 private firms that collect garbage from residential areas. They dump waste at unofficial sites in the city centre and road reserves in residential areas posing health hazards.

Kibarani dumpsite was closed and moved to Mwakirunge about 16 km to the north of Mombasa. The Mwakirunge dumpsite site will likely create new challenges as waste transportation requires additional resources that Mombasa does not have. It is located on the flight path of the Moi International Airport, posing a danger from birds scavenging at the landfill, threatening aircraft take-offs and landings. To mitigate the situation, in June 2019, the county government issued the Mombasa County Sessional Paper No 01 of 2019 on Solid Waste Management, but without indicating how it will manage Mwakirunge dumpsite risks (Mombasa County Solid Waste Management Policy, 2019).

12.4.2 Logistics

In 2018, Kenya was ranked 68th in the International Logistic Performance Index (2019b). Kenya was ranked 56th in the Ease of Doing Business Ranking, (World Bank Group, 2020, p.4). Logistics and transport are essential to productive and profitable international trade relations. The Logistics Performance Index (LPI) analyses differences between countries regarding customs procedures, logistics costs, and the infrastructure's quality for overland and maritime transport. The roads, airports and railways network are key drivers accelerating growth in Kenya's logistics sector and are estimated to hit US$5 billion (Sh500 billion) by 2023.

Mombasa Port at Kilindini Harbour is the largest port in the eastern Africa region with strategic importance far beyond the borders of Kenya. Any inefficiency of port operations and constraints on capacity threaten and hamper Kenya's socio-economic and political growth and that of its neighbours. The Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), a government agency, has been undertaking several projects to upgrade the port to deliver superior results and give it a competitive advantage. The development of the Kipevu Terminal in 2016 expanded the port's container handling capacity by 550,000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent unit), thus upgrading the port's annual capacity from 1.05 million TEUs to 1.6 million TEUs. These facilities have attracted an influx of mega vessels (from 4,500 to 9,000 TEUs) hitherto unseen in the East African maritime waters.

Kenya Railways, Kenya Ports Authority and Moi International Airport are critical infrastructures and major employers in Mombasa. According to the Kenya Airports Authority data in 2018, (Mbogoh, 2018).states that Mombasa, Dubai and Entebbe were the top three destinations for passengers out of Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Nairobi. At the Moi International Airport in Mombasa, passenger movement increased by 16% to 120,949, while cargo dropped by 18% in the period

Initially, the old Kenya Railways freight service was intended to share freight cargo with roads on a 70:30 ratio in favour of the railways; however, the railway service deteriorated badly due to lack of maintenance and poor governance. A maximum of 36 TEUs was transported on the old line per day in 2011 amid erratic train service, derailments and many other logistical challenges. This situation led to shared freight cargo of 90:10 in favour of road transport. This situation led to overloading and damaging the Mombasa-Nairobi highway. Port statistics indicate that cargo transported by rail was at its worst performance level in 2011, accounting for a paltry 4.9% of freight transport.

However, the recently launched Kenya Railways SGR (standard gauge railway) freight service has considerably reversed this trend. The shifting of more cargo to Kenya Railways SGR has eased traffic pressure on roads, reducing road accidents and deaths, as well as export and import costs related to prolonged and expensive transit times. Between January and September 2020, 3,069 freight trains carrying 293,747 TEU containers operated between the Port of Mombasa and the Inland Container Depot in Nairobi. This has improved cargo and ship turnaround time, thus decongesting and improving the operational and financial performance of the Port of Mombasa considerably (World Bank Publications, 2019a; World Bank Publications, 2019b; Sunguh, 2020; UN-Habitat & ITDP, 2020).

Kenya Bus Services (Mombasa) Ltd, as subsidiarity of Overseas Transport Company of London, operated scheduled public road and ferry transport in Mombasa from 1934 to 1989, when the government took over under the Transport Licensing Act (Kenya Law Reports, 2012). Under this Act, public transport remained a private-sector affair with no government support (no subsidy), no policy framework, legal framework or institutional framework. It operated with no rules of entry and no capacity building in human capital. These gaps were felt when the government allowed informal, unsafe, uncomfortable and disorganised public transport known as 'Matatus' and Kenya Ports Authority (as Kenya Ferry Services) to fill in the gap left by Kenya Bus Services. Just like the Matatus, ferry transport services have been disorganised, overcrowded, inefficient and unsafe (Kenyan National Assembly, 2019).

In partnership with the Mombasa County Government, the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP) began developing a mass public transport service plan. Also, due to the ongoing pandemic, to mitigate overcrowding and spread of COVID-19 at Likoni Ferry, the government is building a pedestrian floating bridge from Liwatoni across the Kilindini Habour to Mombasa Island (Laws of Kenya, 2012). This development will ease pedestrian flow between the mainland to the south and Mombasa Island

12.4.3 Human Capital

In early 2020, Mombasa County was the first county to flatten the COVID-19 curve after being the hotspot for months. The county had already prepared an effective County Health Strategy and Investment Plan (CHSIP) and a County Human Resource for Health (HRH) Strategic Plan July 2015-June 2018 (County Government of Mombasa, 2015). The HRH Strategic Plan is aligned to health sector and County HRH priorities and supports the CHSIP. Strategic objectives include eliminating communicable conditions; halting and reversing the rising burden of non-communicable illnesses; reducing the burden of violence and injuries; providing essential health care; minimising exposure to health risk factors and strengthening collaboration with health-related stakeholders. County unemployment rates remain very high, especially amongst youth (Table 1.29).

TABLE 12.9 | County unemployment Rates 2019

National unemployment	National youth unemployment	Mombasa County unemployment	Mombasa County youth unemployment
11.3%	22.8%	13.1%	49%

Source: KNBS and SID (2013) Exploring Kenya's Inequality.

This called for training, availability, and equitable distribution of skilled health workers. There was no evidence that this initiative was replicated in other departments, especially in research and data collection or urban development control sections – skills shortage and poor performance are a big risk in achieving superior urbanisation. Nepotism, tribalism and other considerations during the recruitment and selection process that are prevalent should be eschewed. The hiring of county staff should be clear, transparent, and based on competency (Ombanda, 2018).

Labour force data is not readily available for Mombasa. A report by the KNBS and SID suggests that Mombasa is failing to create jobs fast enough, with an unemployment rate of 13.1%, which is well above the national unemployment rate. However, the youth unemployment rate is 49% compared to a national rate of 22.8%. This should concern the county government as it impacts household disposable income, housing affordability, and crime statistics.

12.4.4 Economic Development

12.4.4.1 Mombasa Economy

Mombasa is the Coast Province regional cultural and economic hub; it has a large port and an international airport and is an important regional tourism centre. The base of economic activities is industrial and trade, tourism, port and shipping, industry and fishing. Mombasa hosts several well-known international beach hotels and conference facilities, e.g., Serena Hotel, Whitesands, Intercontinental, etc. The Mombasa County Investment Authority Bill, 2019, established a body to promote investments within the county. Its most significant business success was to attract funding from Safaricom Foundation and the United Arab Emirates to modernise Coast General Hospital (Safaricom Foundation, 2019).

The national government has championed massive infrastructure and transport investments in the county, such as the SGR Project, funded by China and the Kenyan Government to the tune of US$4 billion (Taylor, 2020); road upgrades to mitigate traffic jams between Changamwe and the island; Dong Kundu Bypass connecting Mombasa-Nairobi with Kwale County via the SGR Terminus (funded by the World Bank); port improvement, funded by Japan (JICA, 2015); second Mzima Springs water supply pipeline project (funded by the European Union); the floating Liwatoni Pedestrian Bridge (funded by China) to reduce human traffic congestion at Likoni Ferry; and the Blue Ocean Economy Project (Ouma et al., 2020).

Mombasa is also an important education centre as it hosts several leading colleges and universities, e.g., Kenya Medical Training University, Shanzu Teachers Training College, Kenyatta University, Bandari College, etc. However, primary and secondary education does not perform well. The manufacturing industry is an important economy in Mombasa. Bamburi Portland Cement Factory, owned by Lafarge, is the biggest in East Africa. According to the 2019 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Census (KNBS), 5,341,182 or 38.9% of the 13,777,600 young Kenyans are jobless, further widening the gap between the rich and the poor. In 2019 nearly half or 49% of youth in Mombasa had no jobs compared to 43% and 41% in Nairobi and Kisumu, respectively. High employment exposes youth to easy radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist sympathisers.

12.4.4.2 Gross Domestic Product

TABLE 12.10 | GDP and Location Quotient (LQ) County Kenya, Nairobi and Mombasa by Economic Activity, 2017

	Total GVA Kenya	Nairobi City	Mombasa	National % GDP	Nairobi City % GDP	Mombasa City % GDP	LQ Nairobi	LQ Mombasa
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	2,838,993	4,102	1,459	37.7	0.3	0.4	0.01	0.01
Mining and quarrying	58,474	755	1,158	0.8	0.1	0.3	0.07	0.45
Manufacturing	647,143	374,527	47,348	8.6	25.1	14.3	2.92	1.66
Electricity supply	140,721	26,878	20,546	1.9	1.8	6.2	0.96	3.31
Water supply and waste collection	55,993	10,819	1,078	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.97	0.44
Construction	452,439	175,437	37,168	6.0	11.8	11.2	1.96	1.86
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of vehicles	619,762	294,302	36,912	8.2	19.7	11.1	2.39	1.35
Transport and storage	600,248	184,845	88,308	8.0	12.4	26.6	1.55	3.33
Accommodation food services	58,126	14,041	12,780	0.8	0.9	3.8	1.22	4.98
Information and communication	109,457	53,074	5,413	1.5	3.6	1.6	2.44	1.12
Financial and insurance activities	606,167	142,765	31,155	8.1	9.6	9.4	1.19	1.16
Real estate activities	575,360	176,281	35,526	7.6	11.8	10.7	1.54	1.40
Professional, technical and support services	137,254	122,335	7,124	1.8	8.2	2.1	4.49	1.18
Public administration and defence	330,529	40,051	12,024	4.4	2.7	3.6	0.61	0.82
Education	320,211	13,762	4,229	4.3	0.9	1.3	0.22	0.30
Human health and social work activities	126,731	17,841	4,539	1.7	1.2	1.4	0.71	0.81
Other service activities	91,720	8,791	2,379	1.2	0.6	0.7	0.48	0.59
FISIM[1]	-244,617	-168,283	-17,026	-3.3	-11.3	-5.1	3.47	1.58
Total	7,524,710	1,492,323	332,122	100.0	100.0	100.0	1.00	1.00

Source: KNBS. 2019. "Kenya Economic Survey.Current Prices, KSh Million.

Kenya is fortunate to have a good National Bureau of Statistics, a wealth of information, and a recent census and other data to the sub-county level. Table 12.10 shows the GDP breakdown by industry sectors of the national, Nairobi and Mombasa economies. The two right-hand columns show a breakdown of the location quotient (LQ) for industry sectors for the two cities. Location quotient ratios greater than 1.5 suggest economies have a competitive advantage when compared to the national economy. Mombasa enjoys a competitive advantage in the manufacturing, electricity supply, construction, accommodation and food services industries, transport and storage sectors. The economy shows significant weaknesses in the financial, information services, public services and especially the health and education sectors.

The dominant transport and storage sectors are not surprising, given that Mombasa is the country's principal port. The importance of tourism to the economy is reflected in the size and importance of the wholesale and retail and accommodation services sectors. The effect of COVID-19 on the sectors has been significant because of the reliance on international visitors to coastal resorts, explaining why the city is experiencing high levels of unemployment, and the slowdown in migration and growth in other sectors of the economy.

12.4.4.2 Public Finance

Collections of revenues seemed erratic, with the lowest being US$604,506 and the highest at Ksh 61,207,595 (see Table 12.11). It could be an indication of revenue leakage due to bad governance. The big difference between planned budgets and actual collection is a lack of planning and budgetary skills.

Kenya has suffered many terrorist attacks under Al-Shabaab, from the Norfolk Hotel attacks in 1980, the US Embassy in 1998, the 2002 November attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, and Westgate Mall and Garissa University College in 2013 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2015). Terrorism affected businesses such as tourism, disrupted higher education, and caused post-traumatic stress disorder in society. The most affected towns were Nairobi and Mombasa. To mitigate terrorist attack risks, Kenya enacted an anti-terrorism law, the Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014 and sent troops to Somalia on the 16 October 2011 (Government of Kenya, 2014). Since then, there was a lull in terrorist attacks until the 15–16 January 2019 attack of The DusitD2 complex in Nairobi, leaving 20 people dead and several injured. Although Mombasa was the centre of youth radicalisation, there has not been a terrorist attack since 2002. Travel advisories issued by Western countries due to terrorist attacks elsewhere in Kenya caused a severe downturn in the tourism economy of Mombasa and scared investors away (Momanyi, 2015).

TABLE 12.11 | Local Revenue Realized Figures ($US) Mombasa County Treasury

Month	2013/1014	2014/1015	2015/1016	2016/1017
Actual Revenues	17,158,688	24,926,001	29,435,207	31,662,410
Budgeted	78,469,000	51,216,080	41,481,996	52,897,470
Shortfalls	61,310,312	26,290,078	12,046,789	21,235,060
	(78%)	(51%)	(29%)	(40%)

Source: Mombasa County Treasury.

12.4.5 Environment

Perennial flooding caused by heavy rains and inadequate drainage systems, climate change and poor waste management are key environmental risks. Around 17% of Mombasa's area could be submerged by a sea-level rise of 0.3 metres, with a larger area rendered uninhabitable or unusable for agriculture because of waterlogging and salt stress. Tourism is an integral part of the city's economy. Thus, sandy beaches, historical and cultural monuments and several hotels, industries and port facilities would be negatively affected. Effective and timely early warning systems are needed to deal with climate-related disasters. There is a need for the county to work with meteorological/maritime, relevant government ministries and other stakeholders to facilitate coordinated efforts and effective climate mitigation strategies.

Through the Unintentionally Produced Organic Pollutants (UPOPS) project, the national government partnered with Mombasa County Government to address waste management issues in the county. The project's goal was to help the county mitigate waste management risks such as open waste burning. This process emits harmful toxins into the atmosphere, causing health complications like cancer, bronchitis, brain damage and heart problems (Awuor et al., 2008).

12.5 Development Challenges and Opportunities

12.5.1 Governance

Without urban management boards and with missing regulations, the County Government Act means that the Mombasa County Government cannot administer its local authority effectively and productively. It is suggested that the governor appoint a competent committee executive member (CEC) in charge of county local government (instead of devolution) and a professional urban management board that shall work under the CEC.

12.5.2 Logistics

According to the 2019 population census, Mombasa has about 5,500 persons per square kilometre. This high density can make investments in mass public transport system feasible. Since the county government has no financial capacity to invest in one, they should consider developing one under a public-private partnership business model, i.e., former Kenya Bus Services.

12.5.3 Human Capital

Mombasa county government has a shortage of skilled professionals, especially in urban and financial planning sections. This situation is complicated further by nepotism and corruption. The ongoing Building Bridges Initiative promises to deal with nepotism and corruption, hopefully opening possibilities of employing competent professionals, including foreign nationals. There is a need to create a robust anti-corruption policy and regulations to encourage competent employees to work for the county.

12.5.4 Technology

Current efforts to collect local revenues are inefficient, erratic and unpredictable. There is a need to improve local revenue collections by Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK) recommendations and paying suppliers on time to build county financial credibility and collaborate with the Kenya Revenue Authority to train personnel (Njoka, 2020).

12.5.5 New Policy Agenda Needed to Boost Development of City and Local Economy

There are several ways that Mombasa County can take action to boost development for the city and surrounding regional economies.

12.5.5.1 Mombasa County Performance Improvement Programme

The neglect of municipal infrastructure and poor quality of urban services calls for a program of improvements, Mombasa County Performance Improvement Programme as a vehicle for attracting funding and implementing projects. This could have three components:

- Strengthening intercity business and employment node inter-connectivity,
- Local area energy, waste and water networks and,
- Building local communities of interest.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has indicated that the blue economy has a great potential to contribute to higher and faster GDP growth in Kenya. Innovation and growth in the coastal, marine and maritime sectors could deliver food, energy, transport, and other products and services and serve as a foundation for sustainable development. Kenya can leverage the blue economy's forward and backward linkages with the various sectors of the economy (UNDP, 2018).

Old Town Mombasa, also known earlier as 'Stone Town', is a Swahili settlement developed during the nineteenth century Sultanate Rule of Zanzibar. Sister Swahili Settlements are Lamu and Zanzibar Stone Towns, which are classified as UNESCO World Heritage Sites, but Mombasa is not. Old Town Mombasa endowments include direct access to the Indian Ocean, old port, Fort Jesus Museum, MacKinnon Food Market, beach hotels nearby, substantial residential and business district, fish market and connectivity to Mombasa Central Business District.

As Mombasa suffers from high youth unemployment, domestic tourism investments through the blue economy programme can create jobs and wealth. In collaboration with the National Government of Kenya, Ministry of Tourism, Mombasa County, Lamu County, Zanzibar Government and local hotels, a regular local cultural boat-cruise tourism circuit can be created as part of the blue economy. Cruise boats would take tourists between the three stone towns to sample local culture, foods, and hospitality. Revenues from domestic tourism will revitalise the stone towns, create jobs, build wealth, and mitigate youth radicalisation – which is still a security risk to the economies of Mombasa and Lamu Counties (Hoyle, 2001).

12.5.5.2 Local Area Energy, Waste and Water Networks

Energy efficiency is one of the safest financial investments any country can make. Its return on investment is almost guaranteed and can be predicted based on engineering calculations, rather than stock market estimates. Mombasa needs to prepare an Energy Management Strategy. A discussion between energy specialists and the county can be used to identify opportunities for energy efficiency. Opportunities and challenges in developing the Energy Management Plan can help establish the energy efficiency priorities of Mombasa County. Priority examples could include buildings of most significant concern, cost savings, the comfort of buildings, or engaging communities in focusing renewable energy development, especially solar. This exercise can collaborate with the Energy Regulatory Commission of Kenya and the Ministry of Energy.

Waste and water challenges affects all Coast counties. The current business model for supplying water does not generate sufficient revenues to maintain and upgrade water and sanitation infrastructure. There is a need for counties to adopt a commercial business model based on best practice, high volumes of water users, smart meters and local economic conditions. Counties should register a Coast County Infrastructure Forum with governors as champions. This Forum will work alongside the national government, water undertakers, and donors to upgrade and improve water supply services in the three counties.

12.5.5.3 Building Local Communities of Interest

Performance in primary and secondary school national examinations in Mombasa County has been declining for some time. Stakeholders in the sector are currently brainstorming on ways to remedy this situation. Although from early 2020, the county government started investing in early childhood development to improve education standards, it is doing so without any strategy or plan. The county allocates fewer resources each financial year and more on activities with low social and economic returns than education. For example, Singapore's prosperity was anchored on investing heavily in quality education; 20% of Singapore's national budget was dedicated to education. Mombasa has to learn from Singapore and double its investments in education and skills development. However, the county has to be lobbied through local community of interest groups for this to happen. Hakijamii, a Mombasa-based economic and social rights non-governmental organisation, is suited for this assignment. It should be used to lobby the county government to invest more in education and set up an Education Performance Improvement Fund that investors and well-wishers can invest in.

12.6 A New Agenda for Secondary Cities in Kenya

Kenya's level of urbanisation, at 27.51%, is low compared to other countries in Africa. The country is urbanising rapidly at a rate of over 4% per annum. Nairobi, the national capital, has been urbanising at 3.87% per annum. Many secondary cities in the western part of the country are urbanising at much faster rates. While Nairobi and Mombasa will continue to absorb increasing levels of rural-urban migrants, the secondary cities between 100,000 and 300,000 are expected to grow fastest over the next 20 years.

Kenya has been promoting equitable urban and regional development for many years. However, the lack of a formulated national urban policy or an urban and regional development policy has increased inequity in development, investment and access to essential urban services, especially in more remote parts of the country. If these imbalances are not addressed through a change of policy directions, the population of Kenya's largest cities will continue to grow, leading to increased regional poverty levels, limited development, and accelerated migration.

A vital element of the country's equitable urban and regional development effort must be on promoting the development of secondary cities. This would, to quote one researcher (Otiso, 2005, p.117), "relieve population pressure in rural-regional areas, help better to integrate the country's rural and urban economies, help to reduce congestion and improve the quality of life in the metropolitan cities of Nairobi and Mombasa, and help increase the modernisation spin-off which urban centres provide to the surrounding rural areas." A new focus on secondary cities would help Kenya develop a more sustainable approach to urbanisation, national redistribution of regional development and a reduction in regional imbalances of growth in the country in recent decades.

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ENDNOTES

(1)   Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured.

13

GQEBERHA/ PORT ELIZABETH: SOUTH AFRICA

GODFREY O ANYUMBA

13.1 Introduction

South Africa was called the 'Rainbow Nation' by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and President Nelson Mandela. It is a nation with a rich mix of people, cultures, landscapes, and cities, and it is the wealthiest nation in Africa (Credit Suisse, 2017). It is a nation with a dispersed population of 60 million (Figure 13.1), of which two-thirds live in urban areas. It is also a nation with a troubled history of colonial suppression, racism and apartheid, which officially ended in 1994.

Despite these troubles, South Africans enjoy one of the continent's highest standards of living, education and incomes. However, it faces significant urbanisation, economic and social development problems, especially in its secondary cities (Donaldson et al., 2020) and regional areas. The secondary cities are falling behind in the development race, as more internal and international migrants head to the large cities of Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban searching for employment and better quality of life.

FIGURE 13.1 | Map showing location of major cities, South Africa

Source: City Population (2020).

This chapter provides a brief overview of urbanisation development, trends and challenges in South Africa and its secondary cities; and it presents a case study of Nelson Mandela Bay's secondary city (Gqeberha). It suggests ways of enhancing the sustainable development of Nelson Mandela Bay and other secondary cities in the country. The final section of the chapter examines pathways for supporting the development of secondary systems of cities in South Africa.

13.2 Urbanisation and Secondary City Development in South Africa

13.2.1 A Brief History of Urbanisation

There is evidence of pre-European 'proto-towns' in southern Africa (South Africa History Online, 2022); however, urbanisation began with Dutch colonial urban settlements and local government, with the founding of the 'Mother City' of Kaapstad /Cape Town in 1652 (Cavendish, 2002). Under the Dutch East India Company, the nucleus of competition between different interests and race groups was a pointer to the increasingly complex and segregationist municipal arrangements that would characterise South Africa for the next 300 years (Thomson, 2000).

From this initial cape settlement, new Dutch and English rural farm settlements arose in the eighteenth century. The 'Great Trek' migration was progressively in a northern and easterly direction into present South Africa's interior. Race-based political power and land ownership rights, anchored on a differentiation between the Dutch, the English and the African natives, gradually emerged (*History Today*, 2002). From the arrival of whites in the Transvaal in the late 1830s until the late 1860s, the political situation was fluid.

The founding of the rich mineral wealth of South Africa triggered European prospectors from Britain, continental Europe, North America and Australia. Africans, too, were attracted to the mines from as far north as present-day Tanzania. A system of migrant labour evolved, and, over the next 100 years, resource-based settlements were formed (*History Today*, 2007). With this came the proclamations of towns based on Dutch and English models. By the end of the nineteenth century, southern Africa was considered a significant contributor to the world economy (Thomson, 2000).

The South African economy expanded between 1800 and 1945. The period is noted for the struggles primarily between the British, Jews, and Afrikaners for control of the economic opportunities in agriculture, mining, industry and financial services in southern Africa. Opportunities for Indians and indigenous peoples were limited by evolving race-based franchise laws. Between 1900 and 1930, South Africa had increasingly become more urbanised. Those carrying the burden of South Africa's rapid development were poor blacks, mixed races, and whites in smaller towns and rural areas. Urbanisation saw an exodus of people from rural areas to urban settlements. In 1911 only 10% of the black population was urbanised; by 1960, this had grown to 30%. By 1936 the historically rural Afrikaners had also urbanised rapidly to 50% of that population. Urbanisation hastened between 1900 and 1950, especially between 1939 and 1945. By 1946 there were more black Africans than whites in South Africa's cities (Koeller, 2003).

Urbanisation then slowed until the 1990s. During the first half of the twentieth century, industrialisation drove many people to migrate to the cities, searching for enhanced livelihoods. However, the increasing urban black African population in the cities and towns provoked a confrontational reaction from the white population that deepened state controls in order to restrict further black urbanisation. These controls slowed rural-urban migration during the peak of apartheid between the late 1950s and early 1980s.

Racial segregation has played a significant role in South Africa's development. Urban race separation was evident in Cape Town from the 1860s (Deacon, 1996). Segregation evolved in a localised, haphazard and piecemeal manner, as European settlers penetrated and conquered southern Africa's interior. However, the separation of the races that hitherto had varied from place to place was formalised after the Nationalist Party's electoral victory of 1948 (Williams, 2000). Apartheid or 'separate development' impacted the lives and livelihoods of all South Africans irrespective of where they lived (Maylam, 1995).

Apartheid gave rise to many institutions attached to specific races and geographical localities that regulated the local government. These institutions were at times merged or done away with, depending on the prevailing political circumstances. Apartheid institutions included: (i) 'Bantustans'; (ii) 'R293 towns', i.e., small rural townships; (iii) 'Coloured' and 'Indian' management committees; (iv) administration boards; (v) community councils; and (vi) black local authorities.

"

Apartheid gave rise to many institutions attached to specific races and geographical localities that regulated the local government.

The constitutional arrangements gave rise to one of the most complicated spatial municipal arrangements ever implemented by a modern government. All the institutions that governed South Africa's non-white population were characterised by a lack of significant revenue base and were perceived as politically illegitimate by their intended recipients (South African Government, 1998). By the mid-1980s, the wide range of apartheid policies aimed at containing race groups had broken down under the pressure of the political struggle from the African and non-white minorities (Todes et al., 2010).

Since the end of apartheid in 1994, significant improvements have been made in service delivery and quality of life conditions for previously disenfranchised South Africans. Much of the transformation has taken place within non-white areas, i.e., the former Bantustan areas that were dismantled in 1994. However, those areas remain more or less as segregated economically and spatially today as they were during the apartheid period. Post-apartheid South Africa presented a historic opportunity to restructure a new South Africa.

The new overarching and unitary 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (South African Government, 1996) provided a platform for significant change. This need for change was recognised in the White Paper on Local Government (South African Government, 1998), which stated that:

"Apartheid has fundamentally damaged the spatial, social and economic environments in which people live, work, raise families, and seek to fulfil their aspirations Local government has a critical role to play in rebuilding local communities and environments, as the basis for a democratic, integrated, prosperous and truly non-racial society" (South African Government, 1998, p. 8).

13.2.2 Urbanisation and Municipal Government

The new South African Constitution defined the roles and responsibilities of national and provincial governments for local government. The White Paper addressed new local government institutions, including metropolitan government systems, district governments, and local municipalities in non-metropolitan areas. It also addressed the relationship between traditional leadership and rural local government and the demarcation of new municipal institutions' boundaries. National and provincial governments were allocated new responsibilities (South African Government, 1998).

An assessment of South Africa's local government in 2004 (Mgweb, 2004) noted that, for cities, the constitutional and legal frameworks obliged municipalities to ensure uniform policy obligations. These included:

- provide a democratic and accountable government for local communities;
- be responsive to the needs of the local community;
- encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government;
- ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;
- assign clear responsibilities for the management and coordination of these administrative tasks;
- facilitate a culture of public service and accountability amongst its staff;
- promote social and economic development, and
- promote a safe and healthy environment.

A South African high court recently passed a landmark ruling that has far-reaching implications for municipalities that fail to carry out their constitutional duty to citizens (Kotze, 2020). Twenty years into the new municipality systems, the Auditor-General of South Africa's reports present a continued unsatisfactory performance level. 'Local government is not inherently more democratic or accountable than the other spheres, but its proximity to citizens creates expectations of answerability and responsiveness. The local government's electoral system contributes to political centralisation, as 50% of seats are ward-based, and the remainder is allocated according to proportional representation from a party list. This, "has centralised enormous power in the hands of party leaders", with mayors and councillors owing their position to party bosses, not the voters (Cameron, 2014, p. 588). This trend may shift as local elections become more strongly contested; however, ward councillors often lack the motivation (and/or capacity) to challenge the council on behalf of local communities while the executive is busy dealing with macro challenges.

Based on the scrutiny of the Auditor-General of South Africa reports for the financial years 2012–2013, 2013–2014 and 2014–2015 and focused on monitoring and evaluating financial systems, Mello (2018) noted: (i) the gloomy performance of local government; (ii) that there were weaknesses in municipal monitoring and evaluation systems;(iii) and that qualifications of councillors, training, time and remuneration were contributing factors to poor oversight by councillors and political structures (Mello, 2018).

Over a decade ago, Jaap de Visser (2009) raised concerns regarding South Africa's local government characteristics that are still valid today. The issues raised are divisible into three, the progressive gains, the emerging negatives and questions around institutional size and complexity.

The positive features realised in local government include the headway made towards realising the new vision of 'developmental local government'. Noted were the unprecedented gains, as epitomised by the extension of municipal infrastructure country wide. Secondly, the new local government system offered great potential for the realisation of a better life for all citizens.

The emerging negatives in municipalities included multiple administrative-management areas that impeded service delivery and development. Major obstacles were municipal governance and community participation. Furthermore, it is noted that municipal service delivery was not (and is still not) at the requisite level of institutional coherence and predictability. Therefore, the capacity constraints in critical areas of municipal governance and administration are debilitating to service delivery.

Given the above, questions arose as to the desired configuration of institutional accommodation of different spatial and economic realities that are obtained in big cities as opposed to those in smaller cities. Regarding the IDP (a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to planning), a pertinent question was whether the insistence on comprehensive policy alignment should not be substituted with a policy of selective alignment around national key priority areas (de Visser, 2009).

Zondi et al. (2019) convincingly argue that these failures in municipal governance have resulted in regular service delivery backlogs, protests and boycotts throughout South Africa. These shortcomings apply to district municipalities, primary cities, secondary cities and small rural settlements. The above characterisation of municipality challenges noted almost 15 years ago have intensified in their magnitude. Although the new local government system is already in its second decade, there are still signs and trends indicating that most municipalities are failing to deliver on their mandate (Zondi et al., 2019).

In recent years, the central government has responded by considering the various obstacles that have halted development growth in many municipalities. A framework known as the Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS) was published in November 2009. The LGTAS was introduced because of the poor performance of South Africa's municipalities. Although it is regarded as well-formulated and integrated within municipalities, practical implementation of LGTAS remains a challenge (Meyer & Venter, 2014; Mathane, 2013). The Department of Cooperative Governance (COGTA) is responsible for the management of 'Turn-Around-Strategies' in municipalities.

In their study, Meyer and Venter (2014) state that "the poor performances of municipalities have continued, and the situation has even worsened since the introduction of the LGTAS. [That] LGTAS has not achieved its goals regarding the turn-around and transformation of local government, especially regarding service delivery, capacity building, and LED implementation" (p 91). Updating the COGTA 2020 Report, amongst other issues, presents a picture of its internal situation that is not endearing. It is reported (i) of ` COGTA's weaknesses' that needed address and (ii) having `received two consecutive disclaimer audit opinions'. Reference is made to `a concrete time frame for the turnaround strategy that has had been developed'. There is also the Department's observation that it `consciously calculated interventions to close the growing social distance between citizens, communities, their public institutions, and civil services' (Department of Cooperative Governance, 2020).

13.2.3 Demographics of Primary and Secondary City Development

Figure 13.2 shows the urban and regional population in South Africa since 1950, with a projection to 2050. South Africa is 67% urbanised; however, the urban settlement spatial pattern around many metropolitan and secondary cities indicates a higher figure. OECD (2020) estimates that South Africa is already more than 70% urbanised. As explained in the introduction chapter, the United Nations and Africapolis data differ because the United Nations' definition of 'urban' relates to administrative areas. In contrast, the latter relates to built-up areas of spill-over urban settlement. By 2050, South Africa is predicted to be almost 80% urbanised, with more than half the urban population living in cities with more than 500,000.

FIGURE 13.2 | Rural and urban population, South Africa, 1950-2050

Source: UN Urbanisation Prospectus (2018).

Table 13.1 shows the change in urban agglomerations and demographic change since 1990, using Africapolis data and estimates for 2020 based on long-term trends. Data for Pretoria and Johannesburg metropolitan regions are merged in the table, as they have become effectively dual metropolises and are heading to megacity status within the decade. There are 97 urban agglomerations in South Africa with populations of more than 50,000. An estimated 46 cities have populations between 100,000 and 1 million. Many of these are regional, linear or metropolitan region clustered secondary cities. Overall, urban population density (3,000 pp km²) in South African cities is low compared to the rest of Africa due, in part, to the dispersed nature of housing settlement and smaller household size. The urban population density in some regional secondary cities in Gauteng, Western Cape, Mpumalanga, and Northwest provinces tend to be higher, as these are experiencing net growth from migration (Statistics South Africa, 2019).

TABLE 13.1 | Urban agglomerations and demographic change

South Africa	Agglomerations				Population								AAGR	Total Area	Average Density (pp km²)
Urban pop. (millions)	1900	2000	2010	2015	2000	(%)	2010	(%)	2015	(%)	2020				
5 to 10			1*	1*			7,180,906	21.3%	8,314,220	21.8%	9,638,460		3.0%	2,214	3755
1 to 5	3	3	3	3	8,857,227	35.9%	7,258,098	21.6%	8,044,052	21.1%	9,101,106		2.3%	1,799	4471
0.5 to 1.0	1	1	3	3	666,949	2.7%	2,008,530	6.0%	2,185,633	5.7%	2,378,353		1.7%	542	4031
0.3 to 0.5	2	2	2	4	666,949	2.7%	813,694	2.4%	1,534,519	4.0%	1,742,753		2.6%	421	3648
0.1 to 0.3	13	20	33	39	3,365,038	13.6%	5,200,667	15.5%	6,032,329	15.8%	6,816,674		2.5%	1,933	3121
0.05 to 0.1	15	22	35	57	3,492,819	14.2%	3,606,185	10.7%	3,781,481	9.9%	4,288,173		2.5%	1,291	2929
0.01 to 0.05	15	22	35	395	7,628,091	30.9%	7,583,673	22.5%	8,308,517	21.7%	9,735,190		3.2%	4,130	2012
Total	49	70	112	502	24,677,072	100.0%	33,651,752	100.0%	38,200,751	100.0%	44,163,034		2.9%	12,330	3098

South Africa	Agglomerations				Population							AAGR	Total Area	Average Density (pp km²)
Urban pop. (millions)	1900	2000	2010	2015	2000	(%)	2010	(%)	2015	(%)	2020			
Rural					21,051,243		17,932,911		17,090,474		15,145,656			
Total Pop.					45,728,315		51,584,663		55,291,225		59,308,690			
Urbanized					54.0%		65.2%		69.1%		74.5%			

Source: Africapolis (2020) * includes Johannesburg and Pretoria joint urban agglomerations ^ 2020 estimates based on AA growth rates.

13.3 Systems of Secondary Cities in South Africa

Figure 13.3 shows the pattern of urban agglomeration for South African cities. Table 13.2 shows the mid-year population estimates by province for 2018. There are three distinct polycentric clusters of urbanisations (South Cape, the North, Natal), where most of South Africa's population lives and cities are located. Within these clusters, one large urban metropolis acts as a primate city, and there is a tight network of interconnected secondary and smaller cities. There is a high level of connectivity and interconnectedness between these urban settlements compared with the country's less densely populated parts. Poor connectivity between urban systems, access to employment and urban services in the Eastern Cape are significant factors in contributing to migration loss in this part of the country.

FIGURE 13.3 | Patterns of urban agglomeration for South African cities

Source: Africapolis (2018).

TABLE13.2 | Mid-year population estimates by province (2018)

Province	Population (Est.)	%
Eastern Cape	6,522,700	11.3
Free State	2,954,300	5.1
Gauteng	14,717,000	25.5
KwaZulu-Natal	11,384,700	19.7
Limpopo	5,797,300	10.0
Mpumalanga	4,523,900	7.8
Northern Cape	1,225,600	2.1
Northwest	3,979,000	6.9
Western Cape	6,621,100	11.5
Total	57,725,600	100.0

Source: Statistics South Africa (2019) Mid-year population estimates.

The removal of the apartheid-era constraints on black South Africans led to free movement, especially permanent moves to cities. South African cities have grown as a consequence. City size has risen rapidly through both natural growth and internal migration from rural areas, city to city, and neighbouring countries. Between 2001 and 2011, the metro population is estimated to grow by more than 26%, compared to 10% in the rest of the country (Turok & Borel-Saladin, 2014). Former black townships and informal settlements have grown the fastest because they are "the first recipients of rural (and foreign) migrants searching for work" (Mahajan, 2014, p. 8) There is strong evidence showing some smaller and secondary cities are growing faster than metropolitan regions (SACN, 2016, p. 416). This trend may be explained by migrants having greater ease of access to housing, lower crime rates and, more recently, COVID-19.

TABLE 13.3 | The leading functional settlement typologies in South Africa, 2016

Category Descriptions			Related Case Study Secondary Cities
Area nomenclature & profile	Population	Government & economic service index	
City region area There are two types of city regions: (i) Global city region, such as Gauteng. (ii) Coastal City regions that include Cape Town City Region, eThekwini (Durban) City Region, Nelson Mandela Bay City Region (Gqeberha)	More than 1 million	Index > 7	Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (Gqeberha)
City area that includes metropolitan and secondary city areas	500,000 to 1 million	Index 2-5	Polokwane (Petersburg), Mbombela (Nelspruit), Msunduzi (Pietermaritzburg), Buffalo City (East London), Mangaung (Bloemfontein)
Regional Service Centres 1 Noted as bigger and medium-sized towns with key roles in the surrounding hinterland. Profiled as high population numbers and high economic activity	300,000 to 500,000	Index 1-2	Rustenburg and uMhlathuze (Richards Bay)

Source: Van Huyssteen et al., (2016).

The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has developed a typology profile for South African's urban settlement system (Van Huyssteen et al., 2016). The purpose of the referred undertaking was to provide spatial planning analysis, modelling and a basis for support for informed government planning in many spheres related to economic service provision and migration. The functional settlement typology provides a mechanism to profile, identify, calculate and analyse a set of development information and trends on the range of towns and cities and high-density rural settlements across South Africa. Eight functional settlement typologies are identified, but only four are relevant to secondary cities (refer to Table 13.3).

Furthermore, the functional settlement typology provides easy comprehension and analysis of networks of human settlements from cities to small towns, including their hierarchical and functional relationships. Figure 13.4 conveys a graphical depiction of town and settlement functions (city region, city, regional service centres, and local and nodal town), hierarchy, and distribution within South Africa. It conveys the descriptions in Figure 13.4.

FIGURE 13.4 | CSIR/SACN functional settlement system

Distribution and significance of South African settlements (Data source: CSIR/SACN 2014)

Only Gqeberha/ Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) belong to coastal city regions for secondary cities. In the next lower tier are Polokwane, Mbombela, Msunduzi (Pietermaritzburg), Buffalo City (East London) and Mangaung (Bloemfontein).

13.3.1 Profile of South African Secondary Cities

There are 6 metropolitan cities and 22 secondary cities in South Africa (John, 2012, p. 73) (see Figure 13.5). Three of these cities, Buffalo, Nelson Mandela Bay, and Mangaung, strictly function as secondary cities. Table 13.4 shows the population and spatial attributes of ten of the largest secondary cities over 400,000, followed by a brief description of each.

FIGURE 13.5 | Location of metropolitan and secondary cities, South Africa

Source: John (2012).

TABLE 13.4 | Attributes of 10 the largest secondary cities in South Africa

Rank by City Size	City	Old Name	Population		Average Annual Growth rate 2010-2020	Area (km²)	Coverage (km²)*	Net Density (pp km²)*
			2010	2020				
6	Nelson Mandela Bay/ Gqeberha	Port Elizabeth		1,254,000	Calculate	1,959	136.04	640
7	Mbombela	Nelspruit		729,000		7,139	72.63	100
8	Emfuleni	Vanderbijpark		774,000		996	177.84	777
9	Buffalo City	East London		709,000		2,536	168.86	280
10	Msunduzi	Pietermaritzburg		527,000		634	219.5	831
11	Rustenburg	Rustenburg		509,000		3,423	282.42	148
12	Mangaung	Bloemfontein		508,000		9,899	6,284	51
13	Polokwane	Pietersburg		426,000		3,776	3,766	113
14	uMhlathuze	Richards Bay		410,000		1,233	142.78	333
15	Matlosana	Klerksdrop		438,000		3,561	106	123

Source: South Africa Metro Population Trends 1950-2020 & Municipality IDPs * Africapolis data (2018).

Compared to other parts of Africa, there are an extensive range of data, planning studies and development plans prepared for secondary cities in South Africa; however, some of this material is becoming dated and needs revision and updating. The continuing problems with structural adjustments in the country's economy and the difficulty in creating new industries; tensions within the country; corruption, and the loss of professional capital have made it difficult for many secondary cities and middle-size towns to get ahead ⮽ especially those in the Gauteng and the Southeast Coast regions.

13.3.1.1 Gqeberha/Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality

Gqeberha is the seat of Nelson Mandela Bay, with a population of 1.2 million (2020 estimate). It is an Indian Ocean seaside city located in Eastern Cape Province. The city is home to South Africa's motor vehicle industry and allied support industries. It is also a major seaport, with the most significant ore loading facilities in the southern hemisphere. Nelson Mandela Bay is recognised as one of the four national and regional hubs in South Africa (State of South African Cities, 2016). However, in recent year, the economy has performed poorly (Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality, 2017), and its industrial base is at risk from volatile global and domestic economic forces. The case study provides a more detailed analysis of the city and its economy. The latest edition of NMBM's integrated development plan (IDP)[1] is from May 2017 (NMBM, 2017a).

PHOTO 13.1
Aerial view of Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth) with Nelson Mandela Stadium in Centre

© Vukuzenzele Stevedoring Services.

13.3.1.2 Mbombela Local Municipality

Formerly Nelspruit, Mbombela, with a population of 700,000 (2020 estimate), is the capital city of Mpumalanga Province; its jurisdiction has been enlarged by its absorption of a failed adjacent municipality (The City of Mbombela Local Municipality, 2018). The city is a centre of commercial fruit farming, agricultural processing, and wood products manufacturing. Mbombela has an international airport that makes the city a gateway to Kruger National Park, the prime tourist destination in South Africa. Situated 340 km from Johannesburg, 300 km from Polokwane (capital of Limpopo Province), 204 km from Maputo (capital of Mozambique), and 185 km from Mbabane (capital of Eswatini, formerly Swaziland), internal and cross-border trade stimulates its economy. Mbombela's wealth of agriculture, tourism, forestry, and manufacturing, as well as its new University of Mpumalanga (founded in 2014) and favourable connectivity may work positively as the basis of future growth. The City of Mbombela Development Plan, i.e., its IDP, has been approved for up to 2021 (City of Mbombela, 2020).

13.3.1.3 Emfuleni Local Municipality

Formerly Vereeniging, Emfuleni, with a population of 750,000 (2020 estimate), is located in the southern extremes of Gauteng Province. Tourism spending indicates an increase in the growth of tourism, which is the largest contributor to spending in the local municipality (Sedibeng, 2020:39). The evidence from Meyer and Meyer (2016) indicates that tourism spending in Emfuleni Local Municipality has been rising above the global rates. Furthermore, their model shows that tourism spending has grown due to the sector's emergence from a low base, while the weakening exchange rates also make South Africa and the study region more attractive as a tourism destination (Meyer & Mayer, 2016). Emfuleni is the former 'Vaal Triangle' that was significant for South Africa's iron and steel industry. Disinvestment by the major steel industries at the time of a global economic crisis had an adverse impact on Emfuleni's steel production (Emfuleni IDP, 2016/17, pp.64, 105, 165). The Emfuleni Local Municipality is among those identified by the Auditor-General of South Africa with governance and auditing issues (referred to earlier in this chapter); as a result, it has experienced sporadic interruptions of municipality functions (Emfuleni Local Municipality, 2020). In 2020, an administrator was appointed (for the second time) to address the challenges that have been evident for several years. The Emfuleni Local Municipality IDP appears to have been last prepared for 2016/2017 (Emfuleni Local Municipality, 2016).

13.3.1.4 Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality

Formerly East London, Buffalo City, with a population of 700,000 (2020 estimate), is located on the Indian Ocean coast in Eastern Cape. The municipality's economic sectors include mining, agriculture, manufacturing, trade, transport, finance and community services. Although economic trends over time have been in decline, Buffalo City serves as the primary node and is the dominant economic hub in the region (Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality, 2018). The latest Buffalo City Metropolitan IDP is the Third Review of the 2016-2021 IDP (Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality, 2016).

13.3.1.5 Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality

Formerly Bloemfontein, Mangaung, with a population of 500,000 (2020 estimate), is the capital of the Free State. Its municipal boundaries were extended due to the absorption of a dysfunctional neighbouring municipality. Bloemfontein, part of the municipality, is the sixth-largest city in South Africa that serves as the administrative headquarters of the province. It also represents the economic hub of the local economy (Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, 2020). As a relatively isolated city, and like Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, Mangaung is exposed to volatile global and domestic economic forces that have affected its economic performance of late. Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality's latest IDP is that of 2020/2021 (Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, 2020).

13.3.1.6 Msunduzi Local Municipality

Formerly Pietermaritzburg, with a population of almost 530,000 (2020 estimate), Msunduzi is located at the junction of an industrial and agro-industrial corridor in KwaZulu-Natal. In 2017, it contributed 1.19% of the national GDP (Msunduzi, 2019, pp. 12, 16). Msunduzi Local Municipality has been determined as one of the collective four smaller cities that serve as distant northern coastal regional hubs (Cities Network, 2016). The Draft Msunduzi Local Municipality IDP 2020-21 is the latest IDP for this municipality (Msunduzi, 2020).

13.3.1.7 Rustenburg Local Municipality

Rustenburg, with a population of 500,000 (2020 estimate) is located in the North West Province, adjacent to Botswana. The municipality is connected to the regional, South African and global economies (Rustenburg Local Municipality, 2018). South Africa produces approximately 70% of the world's platinum, of which 97% is from mines within Rustenburg municipality. Rustenburg has historically had a successful commercial agriculture industry; however, this is in decline. The municipality's latest IDP is that of 2020/2021 (Rusenburg Local Municipality, 2020).

13.3.1.8 Polokwane Local Municipality

Formerly Pietersburg, Polokwane has a population of 425,000 (2020 estimate). The city's future was assured by its designation as the provincial capital city. Polokwane had the highest growth rate for the period 2005-2010 at 5.5% per annum. Polokwane is a gateway to tourism for this part of northern South Africa. It also houses a soft drink factory and brewery. Per capita earning, however, is low at R 27,556 per year. Polokwane's current IDP is the draft plan of 2020-2021 (City of Polokwane, 2020).

13.3.1.9 uMhlathuze Local Municipality

Formerly Richards Bay, the municipality of UMhlathuze, with a population of 410,000 (2020 estimate), lies on the Indian Ocean coastline of KwaZulu-Natal. The prospects for the municipality are promising. It is a city with growing global economic significance. The economic base is a deep-water harbour; the Richards Bay Coal Terminal is the largest coal export facility in the world, with oil and gas pipelines to Johannesburg. It is a centre of small specialist business tourism. The current IDP for uMhlathuze Local Municipality is for 2019/2020 (City of uMhlathuze, 2019).

13.3.1.10 Matlosana Local Municipality

Formerly the City of Klerksdorp, Matlosana has a population of 438,000 (2020 estimate). It contributes less than 1% of the national GDP, making it one of the lower-ranked secondary cities. Historically, Matlosana has been a commercial agricultural centre and gold mining town, and it is expected to mine uranium in the future. The economy has been heavily reliant on the mining industry, which, unfortunately has been in decline over the last decade, resulting in mine closures (Matlosana Local Municipality, 2017). Matlosana Municipality's latest IDP is that of the Draft IDP Amendments for the 2020/21 Financial Year (City of Matlosana, 2017).

13.3.2 Description of the Economic Geography of Secondary Cities in the Country

FIGURE 13.6 | South African Provinces GDP per Capita

Source: Statistics South Africa (2019) Mid-year population estimates.

TABLE13.5 | Provincial economies

Provinces	Economic Growth 2017	GDP/Capita 2017
Eastern Cape	0.8%	55,094
Free State	1.4%	79,877
Gauteng	1.1%	111,171
KwaZulu-Natal	1.8%	66,254
Limpopo	2.1%	59,287
Mpumalanga	1.9%	78,462
Northern Cape	2.8%	79,719
North West	2.0%	77,089
Western Cape	1.2%	97,664
RSA	1.4%	81,875

Source: STAT SA (2017).

There are significant differences in the economic geography of South African cities and regions. Table 13.5 and Figure 13.6 South African Provinces GDP per Capita show the GDP and GDP per capita for the provinces. The GDP per capita for East Cape is half that of Gauteng and 50% less than the national figure, whereas the province of Gauteng, particularly with Johannesburg, has one of Africa's highest city wealth concentrations (Credit Suisse, 2017). The inequitable spread of wealth and economic opportunities places enormous stress on secondary cities in the poorer provinces, particularly their capacity to diversify the economic base and create competitive advantage.

Figure 13.7 Industries driving provincial secondary city economies shows a breakdown of the industry drivers for the provinces of South Africa. Only five economies, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal, have a significant manufacturing industrial base underpinning the development of the economies of cities in these provinces. Mining is a significant driver of economic development in five provinces, but the economic spin-off and profits tend to benefit corporations headquartered in Johannesburg and elsewhere. The inability to create more value-adding activities in more impoverished regional secondary-city local economies, especially those with high population growth rates, has given rise to significant growth of informal-sector trading activities, with flow effects into the domestic services, construction and transport sectors.

A significant challenge for secondary cities in the provinces is the issue of competitiveness. Most secondary cities have not been able to create a competitive advantage, partly because the maintenance of strategic infrastructure has been lacking; creative and social capital have been lost as a result of skills, interregional and international migration; reform of local government and replacement capital capacity buying have been slow; and corruption has become problematic. Overcoming these challenges at the city level is crucial, but it also requires clear policy direction and support from the central government. It also requires a more significant effort by all levels of government in the development of the domestic market to replace jobs lost in export-orientated industries. Collaborative governance in the development of shared systems of knowledge, information, and policy, and pooling resource between local governments through the development of city networks is crucial to create scale and critical mass in order to overcome the competitive position enjoyed by the country's primate cities.

FIGURE 13.7 | Industries driving provincial secondary city economies

Source: Provincial Breakdown STATS SA (2018).

13.3.3 National Policies on Urbanisation and Secondary City Development

Post-apartheid, South Africa adopted several policies to guide its urbanisation. While these include a wide array of legislation and policies that govern planning, there are no specific secondary-city development policies. All new policies have their roots in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996. Of interest is the layered approach to these urbanisation policies. Those relating to local and district government were consolidated first, with provincial and national development policies following soon after.

The Constitution of 1996 assigns municipal planning responsibility to municipalities. The Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000 sets municipalities' requirements to adopt the integrated development plan or IDP. Other no lesser significant legislation includes the earlier Development Facilitation Act No. 67 of 1995 (DFA), the Less Formal Township Establishment Act No. 113 of 1991, Planning Acts and Ordinances in the provinces (Forbey, 2011, pp. 5-6). More recent planning acts include the Spatial Planning and Land Use Act (SPLUMA) Act 16 of 2013 and the Integrated Urban Development Framework of 2016 (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2016).

In terms of unitary urbanisation policies, the transformations were initiated by adopting the IDP that was introduced in its first guise in 1996 in local, district and metropolitan municipalities. The IDP has been described as "the centrepiece of planning, intended to provide strategic guidance to newly constructed municipalities and link and coordinate the many different sectoral plans and planning processes. The IDP was the product of international trends and influences, and the specific South African context" (Harrison, 2001, pp. 175-193). The IDP over the past two decades has been amended, with several crucial policies added.

"

The NSDP was a framework to encourage interaction and coordination between departments and spheres of government.

While South Africa does not have a secondary cities policy framework, other mechanisms that support decentralisation and devolution of national development have been incorporated into policy frameworks for secondary cities. South Africa's National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP) of 2006 is the national level's predominant urbanisation policy. Its policy pronouncements may impact the country's secondary cities.

The NSDP was a framework to encourage interaction and coordination between departments and spheres of government. Its aim was "to eradicate the damage wrought by decades of colonial and apartheid manipulation of settlement patterns and economic activity in South Africa." (National Spatial Development Perspective, 2006:i) The NSDP provides a framework for a far more focused intervention by the central government in equitable and sustainable development especially to drive local economic growth, buoyant and sustained job creation, and eradicating poverty.

Furthermore, the NSDP perspective identifies key localities throughout the country whose growth and development performance are crucial to attaining national objectives. In essence, the NSDP 2006 provides the methodological tools and principles to focus on government decisions on infrastructure-investment and development spending. The NSDP 2006 provided a framework for deliberating the future development of the 'national space economy' and recommends "mechanisms to bring about optimum alignment between infrastructure investment and development programs within localities".

The NSDP is not a national development plan: nor does it predetermine what should happen where, when and how. Instead, it introduced principles and the notions of need and potential as a common backdrop against which investment and spending decisions should be considered and made. The NSDP notes that "while the

NSDP provides an initial interpretation of the potential of different localities and sectors, this is not a definitive measure. Provincial Growth and Development strategies (PGDSs) and Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) will need to provide more rigorous assessments of potential by combining the NSDP's initial interpretation with local knowledge and research" (NSDP, p.i). Through interaction and discourse, these provincial and municipal planning instruments define each locality's development potential.

Unfortunately, the NSDP has not been effective in achieving the outcomes it sought to achieve. The global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have had very damaging and long-term impacts on the planning system's ability to achieve sustainable development outcomes. There is a need to review the framework and set a new pathway for development in South Africa. There are calls for greater differentiation in national development policy and programmes that support metros, secondary cities and small towns in different, more targeted ways (SACN, 2016, p. 416).

The progressions towards national spatial development policies were introduced in parallel with those adopted by IDP, including the Provincial Growth and Development Strategies (PGDS) (2007). The PGDS was a policy confined explicitly to how each of the new nine provinces would align the national developmental agenda with provincial planning to exploit their respective resources and potential economic spaces.

There is growing debate about the effectiveness of past policy interventions on development at the local, district, and provincial levels. There has been criticism of the IDP, with an assessment that a utilitarian delivery of goods and services perspective from a practical viewpoint has been disappointing. Another research outcome pointed to the IDP" losing the battle for sustainable development" (Hlongwane, 2011). What Hlongwane (2011) is trying to convey is that the IDP process speaks of desired developmental values, but faces challenges in its interpretation and implementation — 282 the failure of the IDP is due to the lack of in-depth participation and management of local developments from the viewpoint of all stakeholders. In other words, change for the poor will not see the light of day if the IDP is not more inclusive and better managed professionally. A review conducted in 2017 found "municipalities are continuing to perform poorly" (Adonis & van der Walt, 2017). However, this is not a blanket indictment of all municipalities: some are performing well, whilst many others are not accomplishing much.

Like the IDPs, Provincial Growth and Development Strategies (PGDS) has been criticised with regards to its policies. The roles and intended contribution of PGDS to provincial resource planning outcomes linked to local economic development is not self-evident (Anyumba, 2009). The NSDP role in decision-making has become obsolete and detached from the realities of a much-changed economic and social situation in South Africa. South Africa's planning policies are not focused on secondary cities, but rather on local and district municipalities, provinces and the national space economy. Secondary cities' importance as intermediaries in supply chains, logistics systems, and economic hubs seems to have been overlooked in national spatial and economic development policy. What is needed is a better-aligned framework for developing a stronger national system or network of cities.

13.4 Issues and Challenges Affecting Secondary City Development

Many issues and challenges are affecting the development of secondary cities in South Africa. Various studies and reports have documented these. (Marais et al., 2014, Van Huyssteen et al, 2016) However, several critical issues facing the current management and development of secondary cities are the COVID-19 pandemic and its recovery and urban governance, connectivity, and human capital development.

13.4.1 COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a devastating impact on South African cities, resulting in the continent's highest infection and death rates. The country response to combatting the disease was hampered by the poor capacity of health services, lack of protective gear and access to vaccines. The large cities have been most affected due to the concentration of urban development and the high levels of commuting using public transport in Gauteng

and Cape Town. The spreading direction in South Africa has been based mainly on adjacent areas to neighbours (Arashi et al., 2020). In secondary cities, those clustered around the country's largest cities have been hit hardest by the disease. Regional secondary cities and towns have tended to be impacted less severely because of interstate and intercity travel restrictions.

While secondary cities have been less affected than large cities, economic recovery may prove difficult. Holiday and weekend-getaway cities, commuter, mining and large cities and towns situated on roads such as the N1 and N3 are likely to be impacted by reduced traffic and less spending on everything from food retail to accommodation (Ramalepe, 2020). Few of these cities have the funds or capacity to support economic and social recovery. This gap needs to be filled by the state and national governments — as most secondary cities and towns are not in the financial position to absorb any increase in local taxes. Many years of under-investment in infrastructure maintenance and upgrading make it challenging to restore and expand urban services' capacity. Urban governance in secondary cities is also weak. And the parochial nature of local governments wanting to 'go it alone' makes the idea of collaborative governance and resource sharing hard to introduce. There is a need to introduce new governance, education, and employment-creation arrangements and mechanisms to support post-COVID-19 recovery. These measures are crucial to developing more diverse, self-reliant and risk-responsive economies in the post-recovery response to the crisis (Roberts & Drake, 2021).

13.4.2 Governance

Urban management, planning and consultation, and governance of municipal jurisdictions have received considerable attention from the South African Auditor-General's office (attention to poor governance) and other reports. During 1996–2016, there were notable improvements in service delivery, and cities had good strategies to facilitate economic growth and social development. However, many municipalities in South Africa are not performing as expected because of problems including weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation systems; lack of consistent quality political engagement, administrative and management leadership; poor interdepartmental and intergovernmental linkages; and coordination problems. Lack of qualifications of councillors' qualifications, training, time, and remuneration contributes to poor oversight by councillors and political structures.

The 2016 State of South African Cities Report (McLennan et al., 2016) finds a mixed performance on the way "agreements, procedures, conventions or policies that define who gets power, how decisions are taken and how accountability is rendered" (Graham et al., 2003, p.3). South African cities have generally adhered to laid down structures and governance processes, i.e., municipalities hold timely and regular elections and have representative committees. The requirements for public participation were adhered to, plan-making through the IDPs were systematic, and municipal audits were executed. However, there are often violent confrontational exchanges during municipal processes. Questions have been raised about the performance of governance indicators, such as overlapping intergovernmental responsibilities, the ward system's failure as a vehicle of participation, and competent people's appointment to authority positions.

A report in 2018 on the monitoring and evaluating of South African municipalities found that local governments with clean audits showed robust oversight systems and leadership (Mello, 2018). Other local governance good practices identified in the report were as follows: improving civic education in the nomination and election of councillors, pairing underperforming municipalities with best-performing municipalities, improving continuing education for councillors, and improving the monitoring of interventions and the transitions after interventions. These are all good practices that have been identified in well run local governments of secondary cities. Many of these best practices have not been implemented, however, in part due to the interruption of COVID-19.

In another study of local government in South Africa, a picture of partial success and systemic failure of municipalities was identified (Siddle & Koeller, 2016). The findings point to challenges around the governance of large cities and small municipalities. Many smaller municipalities are not capable of executing their developmental duties. Citing the Department of Cooperative Governance, Siddle and Koeller state that "only one-third of South African municipalities are performing their functions 'at least adequately'; one-third are 'fairly functional'; and the remaining third are 'frankly dysfunctional'. Financial management is inadequate, service delivery is poor, and corruption is rife. There is a general perception that local government has, to a significant extent, not delivered on its constitutional developmental mandate" (Siddle and Koeller (2016, p. iii). Without radical reform, the present

framework for local government, and thus governance, cannot deliver its developmental mandates. There is a need to focus specifically on municipal administrations' strategic, organisational and political challenges and the obstacles to effective interaction between key actors in developing an effective municipal data-technology ecosystem (Ranchod, 2020). These measures are crucial to improving urban governance in all South African cities, not just secondary cities.

13.4.3 Connectivity and Logistics

Connectivity is generally associated with transport, logistics and telecommunications, although there is no unanimity in meaning (Topolšek et al., 2019). The significance of connectivity is that seamless functioning logistics, both within a country and internationally, is necessary for national and implicitly regional competitiveness (Ojala, 2016). Connectivity is also reliant on good business connections, knowledge networks, and governance systems, ensuring the information can be widely disseminated efficiently and quickly.

13.4.3.1 Connectivity

South Africa still has one of Africa's best-connected transport and communications infrastructure networks in infrastructure connectivity. Figure 13.8 shows South Africa's major road, railway, airports and seaport infrastructure systems to neighbouring countries, national cities and towns. Within cities like Johannesburg, there are well-developed local commuter rail and privately run transport systems.

FIGURE 13.8 | South Africa's connectivity infrastructure

Source: Pretorius (2018).

Unfortunately, over the past two decades, South Africa's transport systems have been neglected, impacting both national and regional competitiveness and services quality. Its railway system once constituted approximately 80% of Africa's total railway network. Rail has been in decline, with almost all the once-thriving branch lines closed. According to African Railway Systems, a railway supplier, "The country's rolling stock is aged and in poor conditions"(Oosthuizen, 2018).[2] South African Airways, the national airline services, were one of the best in Africa, but it has faced severe difficulties. The government first bailed it out in 1994, and it has not returned a profit since 2011. The COVID-19 pandemic has added to its challenges. Many regional airline services are no longer offered or have reduced their services. Durban (eThekwini), South Africa's leading maritime port, is losing clients to other South African ports. The decline in transport services networks is having a significant effect on national competitiveness and productivity performance (Kock & Petersen, 2016). The 2015 Master Card African Cities Growth Index shows that all major cities in South Africa have had a marked decline in their competitiveness and performance rankings, falling to the bottom of the medium to low growth cities: for example, Gqeberha is at low growth levels (Angelopulo, 2015, p. 38).

Compared to other parts of the continent, secondary cities in South Africa have the advantage of location (Marais, et al, 2014) and relatively good connections. Key components of location include:

- transportation and communication networks linking to rural hinterlands and larger urban areas,
- good access markets, transport and logistics services,
- trade and cooperation with regional towns and cities, which many secondary cities in the country have had.

Re-building locational advantage and nationwide transport infrastructure, in light of long-term economic structural decline and transformation to a post-apartheid economy, is crucially important to South Africa's long-term economic recovery and to the recovery of the nation's entire network system of cities.

South Africa's Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (GSA, 2020, p. 37) places a strong emphasis on "promoting greater private sector participation in rail, including granting third-party access to the core rail network and the revitalisation of branch lines". However, the plan has little about connectivity, other than about the national broadband network. The role of connectivity between the national systems of cities in enhancing trade development, investment, and travel as well as the roles of cities (especially secondary cities) as the regional economic drivers of development are areas the national recovery plan needs to address as the plan is implemented and revised.

One strategic advantage South African cities and businesses have had is business connectivity. South Africa had the leading and most sophisticated business and economic connections in Africa, with global links to the United Kingdom, the United States, Europe and Middle Eastern countries. It still has good networks and business connections in gold, diamonds and financial industries, but these are declining. Unfortunately, there has been substantial skill and human capital loss through emigration in the post-apartheid era. South Africa still has a well-developed diaspora network and has seen some human capital loss made up by professionals and other skills migration from other parts of Africa. Subsequently, the loss of skills and business connectivity in the World Bank ranking of countries for ease of doing business (based on the 2019 scores) has seen Nigeria overtake South Africa with Rwanda closing the competitive gap. Egypt, Botswana and Namibia have higher rankings than South Africa (World Bank (n.d.)

In terms of connectivity of trade and cooperation between regional towns and cities, South Africa's government has a local economic development (LED) 'chapter' as part of its municipal based *IDPs. For over 20 years, the 'LEDs' have had mixed success, arising from the complexity of visions, programs, management execution and the concentration of effort on larger South African cities. These LEDs are specific to a given municipal jurisdiction, inward-focused and generally not shared across municipality boundaries. However, a hybrid form of LED strategy is in the process of emerging to support regional and local economic development (RLED) (Houghton, 2017).*

13.4.3.2 Logistics

Before the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup, South Africa's transport and logistics were rated as highly favourable and assessed as the best performer in Africa for trade facilitation logistics. However, over the past decade, transport and logistics services have declined. The decline has substantially impacted secondary cities outside the Gauteng city conurbation, which generally has good transport and logistical support systems. The impact of this decline has been significant to the development of secondary cities in that (Ittmann & King, 2010):

- Up to 2004, there was no country-wide measure of logistic costs.
- The basic structure of logistic services in South Africa was focused on the Gauteng cities. The country's main economic activities are located in coastal port cities of Cape Town, Gqeberha, East London, Durban, and Richards Bay, which advantages these cities over inland secondary cities.
- The country's poor economic state, especially in rural municipalities, adds to logistics costs, which will rise in the future unless more innovative and more intelligent systems are adopted.
- Specific freight types on the long-distance corridors should be encouraged to move from road to rail, accompanied by the feasibility of re-introducing the abandoned railway network that serviced secondary cities.

The failure of South Africa's freight railway to capture the freight market was due to the absence of government policy related to road and rail modes of freight transportation and the lack of market intelligence to inform policy (Havenga et al., 2014). The result is that hundreds of small railway towns, including most secondary cities, lost not only their links but their relative competitiveness regionally and nationally. For example, in the Western Cape Province, stakeholders have become concerned about the need for spatially wider/trans-municipality jurisdictions (Western Cape Government Transport and Public Works, 2019). There is a need to create synergies between regional and local economic development partnerships. This overdue acknowledgement of the significance of economic development on a sub-national level serves as a starting point for consideration of inter-local and intra-regional planning.

In the northern part of the country at Polokwane, in keeping with the standard LED format, concerns have been raised about the disconnect between service providers and youth seeking to go into enterprise. This has resulted in innovative conceptualisations, which are still in their formative stages, but hold the prospect of connecting small towns and cities, exploring trade between them and the larger regional economic space.

13.4.4 Human Capital Development

A well-developed and diversified pool of human capital is a crucial element of soft infrastructure needed to support and maintain competitive and well-functioning cities and regions. The loss or 'brain drain' of human capital resulting from emigration is a significant challenge for South Africa's future development (SAMP, 2000). South Africa is suffering a debilitating skills shortage (Rasool & Botha, 2011). Many of these skills and the knowledge base and networks that go with these emigrants cannot be replaced easily or readily. It takes many years to fill corporate capital and knowledge loss in public and private sector organisations. The problem is not a new one. Official figures dating back to 2001 indicate that South Africa had lost six times more professionals and technicians than it had gained. Since then, it has lost approximately 20% of its skills through emigration, and 70% of skilled South Africans consider emigrating ((Rasool & Botha, 2011)). More than 23,000 net losses, primarily skilled people, have been leaving the country annually (Stats SA, 2019).

For secondary cities, the human capital loss is even more challenging because of skills losses in the major cities and the difficulty of recruiting skilled people away for larger cities. Many secondary cities in South Africa are facing very severe skills shortages. Many of these skills need to be replaced by more innovative governance systems and virtual technology as fast as possible. Smart governance calls for improving urban management through enhanced data-informed decision-making and the commensurate inclusion and participation of civic actors in this process (Ranchod, R. (2020).

A key element in the post-COVID-19 recovery is the need for central government special funding to support technologies to enhance data-informed decision-making and upgrade e-governance. Collaborative governance arrangements are needed to overcome human capital losses in the public sector and encourage collaborative business partnerships in order to build a critical mass of skills in the private sector. This message is a finding from Rwanda's World Bank Group study on human capital development in that country (World Bank, 2019), which can be applied in South African cities and municipalities. The report also confirms the prominent role of human capital in any future development strategy for cities and regions in providing basic equality of opportunity for people, as well as the importance of education in building robust social protection systems for its most vulnerable citizens. The provision of health infrastructure and public services is also an essential means of raising productivity and inclusion, as is empowering the female gender through education and the base of human capital.

13.5 Case Study Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (Gqeberha)

Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (Gqeberha) is South Africa's sixth most populous city. It is a major seaport and South Africa's second-oldest city. The city's economy is underpinned by the automotive assembly, manufacturing and rural export industries. It is a city undergoing significant structural adjustment and stress, with the collapse of the automotive parts and assembly industry. Restructuring and rebuilding the economy and prosperity is a challenge, with problems and issues not dissimilar to those facing the United States and the United Kingdom in the late twentieth century. The case study provides an excellent example of cities facing a dual challenge: middle-income countries dealing with structural adjustment change and growing population pressure caused by rural-urban migration. In this respect, it is unique to Africa, but many of its challenges are not dissimilar to those experienced in Latin American countries (Roberts, 2020).

PHOTO 13.2
Dock Intermodal Terminal – Gqeberha

© Vukuzenzele Stevedoring Services.

The case study begins with a profile of Gqeberha/Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, including socio-demographics, governance, urban development, infrastructure and urban services, logistics, human capital, economic development and environmental features and development challenges. Table 13.6 is a profile of urban indicators related to its management and development. The case study then outlines some policy initiatives for the city's development, which resonate with the needs of other secondary cities in South Africa.

TABLE 13.6 | City profile

Indicator	Details	Unit Measure
Urban Area	What is the estimated urban area of the city?	1,959 km^2 built-up area 136 km^2 (Africapolis)
Demographics	What was the estimated population 2020?	1,271,776 (STATS SA 2017)
	What was the population in 2000 or the last census	1,176,079 (2010)
	Is the city's share of the national population growing?	2.3% (2017)
	Estimated density of population	1,190 pp km^2 to 470 pp km^2 – Average density is 646 pp km^2 (2017)
	Has population density in the city increased or decreased?	Varies with areas. Overall feeling that there is the need to increase population densities (2017)
Economic Strength	What is the city's estimated GDP?	R 128 billion (2018)
	An estimate of how fast is the economy-growing pa?	Peaked at 4.32% (2010) down to 1.03% (2018). Average at 1.49% per annum
	What is the fastest-growing sector of the economy?	Manufacturing – 23.2% GVA (2018)
	What does the city mostly export or trade?	Motor vehicle industry
	What does the city mostly import or consume?	Motor vehicle assembly parts
Income Levels	What is the estimated average income per month?	R 43,580 (2010).
	How much higher are incomes in the capital city compared to the city?	Highest earners R 2,457,601 per month. (0.3% of pop); Middle earners, R19,601-38,200 pm (15% pop) & No income 15.8% of pop)
Employment	How many people are employed in the city by industry sector?	No data
	How big is informal sector employment?	66,000 or 25.485% est.
	What is the unemployment rate?	36.6% est. (2011)
	Is there a reliance on remittances to supplement household income?	Not registered in documents
Poverty Rate	Estimate % of households that are living below the poverty line. Is there any Gini Coefficient data?	No Gini Coefficient data
	What is the Gini coefficient	0.628
Public Finances	What is the budget of the municipality?	Est. Capital Budget US$285,052,513 Operational Budget US$2,074,552,859
	What are the primary sources of funds and expenditure?	Government grants – 66.16% (2020/21) Internal funds – 30.64% (2020/21)
Infrastructure	What % of the city population has access to potable water?	97.68% of households in formal human settlements
	What % of the city population has good sanitation?	97.29% of households in formal human settlements
	What % of the city population has waste management collection	87.8% of households within the urban edge

Indicator	Details	Unit Measure
	What is the length of urban roads	Unknown
	What is the distance and travel time to the nearest largest city?	658 km/409.76 miles as the crow flies to Cape Town in 1hr & 25 mins The flight is 1 hr 45 mins, and distance is 1,117 km/ 694 miles to Capital City Pretoria
	How many intercity flights or buses are there per day?	Unknown
	Does the municipality have a GIS with an inventory of infrastructure	NMBM GISCorp executes GIS tasks for the municipality.
Housing and Land	What % of the city's residents lives in slums?	20.88% (2017)
	What % of households rent?	17% (2018)
	How rapid has been the development of land and housing?	Not determined
Health Infrastructure	Number of doctors per 10,000 people Doc/10,000 Number of Public Hospitals Number of beds in Public Hospitals	Unknown 8 1250
Governance	How competent is local government? Very competent = 5 not competent = 1	Unknown
	Transparency of Local Government: Very transparent = 5 not transparent = 1	Unknown

13.5.1 Land Use

Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality covers 1,959 km², of which 136 km² in 2015 was a built-up urban area. Around 60% of the municipality remains in its natural state. Figure 13.9 shows the land-use pattern of the city. The city's developed area is a mix of low-medium density (5794 km²). Its layout takes the shape of two urban development fingers moving inland and one development north along the coastline. The port forms the primary focus of the city and its historical centre. There is an extensive area of farming land under cultivation to the west of the city.

13.5.2 Social-Demographics

The Socio-Economic Review and Outlook (2017) provides a social-demographic profile of NMBM and provides insightful information. However, much of the information is more than 5 years old (Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality, 2017). The most recent South African census was scheduled to be conducted in 2021. However, die to the Covid pandemic, it was postponed to February 2022.

13.5.2.21 Population

FIGURE 13.9 | Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality land use

Source: NMBM Bio-Regional Plan.

Table 13.7 shows the estimated population for NMBM 2009–2019. The estimated population in 2019 was 1.334 million (NMBM, 2020a. Between 2009 and 2019, population growth averaged 1.47% per annum, which is very similar to South Africa's growth rate as a whole (1.61%) and double that of Eastern Cape Province. However, of interest was the peak of annual population growth in 2011 and a subsequent decline in the population growth rate up to 2019.

TABLE 13.7 | Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality 2009–2019 Population

	Population	Increase (%)
2009	1,157,431	1.5
2010	1,175,283	1.5
2011	1,194,911	1.7
2012	1,214,601	1.6
2013	1,233,583	1.6
2014	1,252,054	1.5
2015	1,270,048	1.4
2016	1,287,100	1.3
2017	1,303,901	1.3
2018	1,319,631	1.2
2019	1,334,883	1.2

Source: NMBM (2020).

13.5.2.2 Age Profile

The population of Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality is predominantly youthful, with an average age of 26 years old (Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality, 2020b). Figure 13.10 shows the age population pyramid. The younger age groups make up a larger portion of the population, with the 0–9 year old group making up 20% of the total population, followed by the 10–19 year old age group at 18%. Only 1% of the population are over 80 years of age (Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality, 2020b). The female population is higher than that of males, 51% to 49%. The population by groups is 60% of Black Africans, 24% Coloureds, 15% White and 1% Indian or Asian. The household numbers in NMBA increased from 297,000 in 2006 to 353,000 in 2016, an annual growth rate of 1.76%. The average household size was 3.65 compared to 3.9 for Eastern Cape and 3.3 for South Africa as a whole.

FIGURE 13.10 | Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Population structure of 2016 and 2021

Source: Nelson Mandel Bay Metro Municipality Socio-Economic Review and Outlook (2017).

13.5.2.3 Public Health

Two diseases that have hit Nelson Mandel Bay Metro Municipality hard are HIV/AIDS and COVID-19. The extent of the population with HIV/AIDS is high, although it is extremely difficult to determine the rates, due to the secrecy of voluntary disclosure and cultural viewpoints involving those affected. Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality has been very proactive in supporting programs to combat HIV/AIDS. It has introduced measures to assess adult HIV prevalence rates, the speed at which the virus progresses, age distribution of the virus, mother-to-child transmission, child treatment, adult treatment, ARV treatment, etc. Estimates for the municipality provided by the Actuarial Society of Southern Africa (ASSA-2008) HIV/AIDS model showed HIV and AIDS numbers growing at 2.01% per annum between 2006 and 2016. The figure shows a rising number of people infected by HIV in the municipality. However, the AIDS-related deaths have declined from a peak of approximately 5,300 in 2008 to about 2,100 in 2020.

The COVID-19 pandemic coincided with a severe drought that significantly affected the municipality in late May 2019. The impact on the municipality's business and especially tourism-related services such as hotels has been very severe, as the city is a popular holiday destination. The municipality's revenue services have had a very negative impact on the city's finances. The city is estimated to have lost 75,000 jobs as a result of the pandemic.

The principal reason for the rapid spread of the disease in the municipality was minimal compliance with COVID-19 safety protocols. Livingstone Hospital, a leading medical institution in NMBM, had only 10 doctors. Most cases were from the active 20–64 year-old population cohorts.

The Disaster Management Joint Operations Centre (JOC) establishment was one of the municipality's responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. `Work streams' of the JOC included the City-Wide COVID-19 Readiness Plan and the COVID-19 Economic Recovery Strategy for the city (see below). The city was also innovative in establishing a COVID vulnerability index used as a predictor of localised hot spot activities. As noted earlier in the chapter, neighbours' proximity has been a significant factor in the spread of the disease. The municipality has developed a comprehensive set of integrated strategies in a recent development plan, the City-Wide COVID-19 Readiness Plan and COVID-19 Economic Recovery Strategy, which contains a series of measures designed to minimise the impacts and support the economic recovery from the pandemic (NMBM, 2020a, p. 304).

13.5.3 Governance

Governance in the South African municipality system takes on a multiplicity of facets. Goverance is regarded as an arena of internal institutional challenges, it relates to issues of quality of decision-making by local government councillors, the quality of appointments, the lack of transparency, dysfunctional procurement systems, poor financial management and accountability and others (Jakoet-Salie, 2014) The municipal 'Turnaround Strategy' was a means of re-addressing municipalities that were essentially dysfunctional. In addressing the challenges, the department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs noted that forces undermining the local government system included the following; (i) systemic factors, i.e. linked to model of local government, (ii) policy and legislative factors, (iii). Political factors, (iv). Weaknesses in the accountability systems,(v). Capacity and skills constraints, (vi) Weak intergovernmental support and oversight; and (vii). issues associated with the inter-governmental fiscal system. (CoGTA (2009, p.3). The objectives of Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS) were to restore people's confidence in municipalities as the primary machine of the developmental state at a local level and, re-build and improve basic requirements for a functional, accountable, responsive, efficient developmental local government' (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010).

The concerns and weaknesses in the LGTAS in the municipalities in which it has been executed included:

- the dire leadership and governance challenges in municipalities that include weak responsiveness and accountability to communities.
- the financial mismanagement of many municipalities is attested by the Auditor General's annual reports.
- many municipalities are unable to deliver basic services or grow their economies as required by the law;
- the impacts of the legacy of apartheid spatial development patterns and inequity continues to manifest in municipalities.
- municipalities' human resource capital is inadequate to ensure professionalism in services offered and
- positive relations between labour, management and councils. The result is the poor or non-support or encouragement of municipal structures, e.g., ward committees and community development workers, to enhance community participation.
- poor generic work ethics amongst certain government officials.
- intolerance of opposition by certain local municipalities, which impacted negatively on proposed strategies
- leadership and bureaucratic insecurity and the inexperience of many public functionaries, which posed a severe threat to its effective implementation
- inadequate capacity enhancement programs at the sphere of local government the lack of a dedicated resource base and adequate capacity-building programs.

The conclusion then was that the strategy's implementation requires resources, flexibility and innovative thinking, which many municipalities lack (Kienast, (2010), Kroukamp, (2016) and Tshishonga, (2019).

In 2015/2016, the administration of NMBM was dysfunctional, resulting in marked underperformance in service delivery. Forensic audits confirmed the prevalence of corruption in the municipality. The appointment of a new executive mayor and the secondment of officials from national institutions positively impacted NMBM services efficiencies. Disciplinary measures were taken, and several implicated staff resigned. The new executive mayor recruited a professional team of managers. He investigated the causes of the municipality's previous failures, moving towards creating a positive municipal environment that has resulted in positive governance (NMBM, 2016). To add to the challenges of the period, South Africa has a tradition of robust and defiant trade unions. Not helpful to the governance situation were the numerous illegal/unprocedural trade union strikes. However, persistent communication with unions by municipality management resulted in a significant reduction in unprocedural strikes.

13.5.4 Urban Development

Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality urban development is defined in its planned spatial structure – the Municipality Spatial Development Framework (NMBM, 2017a). The municipality's development principles, contained in the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act, 2013 (SPLUMA), is made up of the following characteristics; spatial justice, spatial sustainability, efficiency, spatial resilience and good administration. In executing SPLUMA, NMBM applies urban planning and urban design concepts of urban corridors/activity spines as "structuring elements that reinforce a hierarchy of nodes" that have recognised development potential. These define different spatial developments of dissimilar intensities. Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality planners have favoured mixed-use activities within proposed development corridors. The municipality's prime transport node activity facilities are its two ports, i.e., the older Gqeberha near the city centre and Port of Ngqura, a deep-water port in the Coega Special Economic Zone (SEZ) located 30 km north of the city centre.

More diversified mobility modes are also favoured to minimise travelling costs and the costs of transport infrastructure. Previously disadvantaged communities' access to employment opportunities is one of the aims of the planned mixed-mobility infrastructure offerings. Transportation infrastructure aims to enable and enhance a more efficient city structure. In Gqeberha, the second oldest town after Cape Town, parts of its urban fabric are ripe for urban renewal. The broader objectives of the urban renewal programme include the general renewal of the nodal areas and initiatives to address the economic, social and security needs of the community in an integrated and sustainable manner

Mandela Bay Development Agency (MBDA), a municipal-owned entity of NMBM, is an important soft infrastructure enabler to support its development. The MBDA implements programs and projects intending to kindle economic growth. Other entities include the Nelson Mandela Bay Business Chamber. This type of urban development includes urban renewal, exploring the potential of the arts, culture, heritage, and creative industries, promoting NMBM as the place to host international, regional and local events, exploit its beach frontage, and erect sports recreation infrastructure. The municipality supports the rural parts of NMBM's economic development in tourism and agriculture.

13.5.5 Infrastructure and Urban Services

Before NMBM introduced its new turnaround strategy, which has been discussed above from a South African perspective, the city was affected by stoppages, which adversely impacted its infrastructure and urban services. There were significant delays with city-wide projects such as the integrated public transport system and the proposed Metropolitan Police. Service delivery, a measure of a success, had been underperforming. Tendering for infrastructure, most likely related to poor governance, was reported as extremely sluggish. This state of affairs caused critical roads maintenance to come to a halt.

Following the turnaround in 2015, urban services and facilities that were provided included the following (amongst others):

- 3,000 houses were built.
- 24 km gravel roads and storm water drains were built.
- Electrical connections were extended to 2,215 houses.
- The Nooitgedacht water supply was completed.
- Fishwater Flats Waste Treatment plant was completed; new vehicles for waste collection were procured.
- The rehabilitation of landfill sites has taken place.
- The Kragga Kamma Waste Drop-off Centre was renovated and is functional.
- High-mast lights have been equipped with energy-efficient light emitting diode (LED) fittings.

The public works programs created an estimated 7,000 short-term job opportunities. The municipality's consultants advised NMBM to restrict illegal electrical connections and work on overdue accounts. These challenges are common in almost all South African municipalities and have their roots in the anti-apartheid protests, where non-payment for municipal services was encouraged (NMBM, 2016).

13.5.6 Logistics

Logistics is the organisation and implementation of complex operations, such as the flow of goods between the point of origin and point of consumption to meet market or consumers' requirements. Gqeberha is a logistics point, with two ports for ocean-going merchandise; Gqeberha International Airport for international air travel and Uitenhage aerodrome for domestic air travel; and national, regional, and local roads such as the N2, R 102, R 75 and R 334. Several infrastructure projects to improve the city's logistics structure were put in place from 2015 onwards in the municipality, including a revised traffic-management system. Plans prepared in 2015 also included a plan for universal Wi-Fi availability, the redevelopment of the former central business district, Baakens Valley, and King's Beach. The most significant plan was the redevelopment of the Gqeberha Harbour.

Nelson Mandela Bay Logistics Park provides infrastructure and services to the automobile manufacturing industry. It assists manufacturers with reducing vehicle manufacturing costs and improves and enhances supplier competitiveness. It is a government project with the participation of the private sector and institutions. It claims the advantages of globally competitive prices and services, purpose-built facilities, and ICT-enabled and shared logistic services (COEGA Development Corporation, 2022). A Uitenhage Aerodrome project aims to develop it as an incubator hub for light engineering, logistics, and aviation activities. This regional airport is envisioned to play the same role that similar aerodromes/airports on the periphery of the Gauteng Province conurbation play for selective logistic needs.

13.5.7 Human Capital

In terms of human capital, the situation at Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is similar to that of other South African municipalities. 'Human capital in this context is characterised by Du Plessis (2016) as follows:

- Person-Job Fit – explained as the fit between a person's abilities and the job's demands and the fit between a person's desires and motivations and the attributes and rewards of the job;
- Person-Organisation Fit – described as the fit between an individual's values, attitudes and personality and the organisation's values, norms and culture (Du Plessis, 2016:33-34).

Koma (2010:112), states, that the performance of numerous municipalities across the country has thus far clearly demonstrated a huge deficiencies as far as the fulfilment of both their constitutional and legislative obligations are concerned.' Du Plessis, (2016:35) further highlights "tensions in the political-administrative interface' as one of the key challenges to local government performing its tasks effectively and efficiently

In this regard, the National Development Plan (2011:366) also suggests a challenge for government by suggesting that there has been an erosion of accountability in local, national and provincial governments that needs to be addressed if a capable state is to be established and sustained. At this stage, local government in South Africa might be falling short. Du Plessis (2016) also notes that smaller municipalities have reportedly experienced problems when appointing new staff members because incorrect procedures were followed".

13.5.8 Economic Development

The Profile and Analysis District Development (NMBM, 2020a) report provides a good insight into the 'structure and performance of Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality. The average annual growth in GDP for the municipality since 2008 has been about 1.49%, with 1.26% for the province and 1.5% for South Africa. The city had an estimated GDP of R 128 billion in 2018 (up from R 60.9 billion in 2008), contributing to approximately 34% of the Eastern Cape Province GDP.

TABLE 13.8 | Gross value added (GVA) by broad economic sector – Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, 2016 (R billions, Current Prices)

Industry Sector	Nelson Mandela Bay	Eastern Cape	National Total	Nelson Mandela as % Province	Nelson Mandela as % National
Agriculture	0.4	6.7	106.1	5.40	0.34
Mining	0.1	0.4	350.9	15.70	0.02
Manufacturing	23.2	43.6	572.9	53.20	4.05
Electricity	0.9	9	166	10.10	0.55
Construction	3.7	13.3	170.3	27.70	2.16
Trade	18.9	67.9	652.7	27.80	2.89
Transport	13.1	30.3	426.7	43.10	3.06
Finance	23.7	61.4	854.4	38.60	2.78
Community services	27.4	102.7	1,041.30	26.70	2.63
Total industries	111.3	335.3	4,341.30	33.20	2.56

Source: NMBM (2020a) Nelson Mandela Bay Metro.

Table 13.8 gives a breakdown of GDP by sector of the city's economy. Community services, finances, and manufacturing are the main driving sectors of the economy. The manufacturing contribution has been falling, especially with the decline of the automobile assembly and parts industries. There are significant structural problems with the economy, which may take many years to recover and diversify. The enabling environment supporting manufacturing requires significant reengineering to attract more technology and intensive capital investment in more niche-based manufacturing. Should this occur, jobs in the manufacturing sector would not rise significantly, as has occurred in Asia.

Tertiary sector jobs will develop mainly in the construction, health, education, and environmental and domestic services sectors; however, substantial investment is needed in technical and para-professional services to create the skills to fill these jobs.

A key focus of economic development in NMBM is tourism; however, with COVID-19, this may take several years to recover, if at all. The performance of tourism from 2006 to 2016 has been a steady decline in business, leisure, and visiting friends and relatives. In 2016 domestic tourists made up 87% and international tourists 13% of tourists. Business and conference tourism face increasing difficulties as these sectors move to more online arrangements. Leisure tourism needs to diversity to compete with other destinations in order to grow tourism numbers post COVID-19.

The Nelson Mandela Bay Growth and Development Long-Term Plan 2017-2032 recommended developing industry clusters. These include automotive, ocean economy, agriculture, green economy, manufacturing, construction, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), services, transport, tourism and education. Sector strategy workshops identified key issues for short, medium and long-term strategies (NMBM, 2017b). Industry cluster development is an internationally recognised means of stimulating economic development; but a critical factor in their success is creating enabling environments that reduce government red tape and foster collaboration and resource sharing to cover the cost of common user infrastructure and services.

Substantial improvements are necessary for the efficiency and effectiveness of the NMBM administration to strengthen the governance systems and strategic infrastructure of the enabling environment to support industry cluster development. These efforts entail:

- developing the capability and capacity of both the political and administrative components of the institution,
- developing a financially robust municipality that is customer-centric and proactively delivers ahead of expectations and demand,

- improving municipal internal skills, efficiency and customer focus,
- creating a community of partners within both the private and public sectors,
- adopting a zero-tolerance for crime,
- cleaning the city by embarking on a series of clean-up operations.

Growth and development plans are essential to strengthen the governance and enabling environment to support the development of the clusters. Implementation of such plans requires a commitment by NMBM to fund economic development officers with experience in industry cluster facilitation and development. Networks like The Competitiveness Institute (The Competitiveness Institute, 2022) can provide knowledge products, education and technical support for industry cluster development.

13.5.9 Municipal Finance

Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality's financial position, even before COVID-19, faced significant financial challenges. Audit reports have indicated that issues such as leadership instability, poor management, and ineffective control systems have resulted in poor financial management. Over 72% of the municipality's revenue is locally generated; the balance comes from transfers, mainly from National and Provincial government. Data on financial performance (see Table 139) shows that revenue has grown at only 3.39% in nominal terms, with declines in transfers and other revenues. Given that the average inflation rate in South Africa during this period exceeded 5%, the municipality has experienced a significant natural decline in its revenue base.

TABLE 13.9 | Financial revenue base of NMBM 2014/15 to 2018/19

Financial Performance All values Rand '000	2018/19	2017/18	2016/17	2015/16	2014/15	Annual Change (%)
Property rates	2,117,762	2,007,605	1,639,399	1,502,463	1,332,135	12.29
Services charges	5,158,344	5,182,065	4,882,016	4,649,224	4,059,466	6.17
Investment revenue	146,946	155,484	121,035	113,354	83,294	15.25
Transfers - operational	1,366,322	1,578,577	954,122	1,148,940	1,486,060	-2.08
Other own revenue	510,460	618,384	1,322,117	1,314,995	1,176,696	-18.84
Total revenue (excluding capital transfers and contributions)	9,299,834	9,542,115	8,918,689	8,728,976	8,137,651	3.39

Source: NMBM Budget Paper (2020).

Analysis of the municipal budget shows a current debtor collection rate for revenue performance at 92%. There is continued overspending on the operating budget (11% in 2017/19), mainly in contracted services related to governance and administration. There was nearly 18% under-spending on the capital budget, despite the cash balance rising to more than R 3 billion. Spending on repairs and maintenance allocations in the budget has continued to fall, resulting in neglected maintenance of assets and infrastructure. Fruitless and wasteful expenditure has remained high.

Overall, a significant improvement in local government financial management is needed to restore NMBM's financial performance and deliver more capital works programs. These actions are crucial to support COVID-19 recovery efforts, as capital works programs generate high economic gqd employment multiplier effects. There is also a need to restore outlays on maintaining infrastructure and other assets, including developing smarter systems and reengineering many of these to improve efficiency and longevity.

13.5.10 The Environment

In 2011, the first State of the Environment Report (SOER) for NMBM was published (NMBM, 2011). It comprehensively describes the state of the environment using indicators grouped into the following nine reporting themes:

- change in land that includes land-use, zoning, property sizes, open space per person, formal versus informal settlements and the extent of mining,
- climate change and air quality that is inclusive of trends in temperature, trends in precipitation, extreme events and air quality,
- biodiversity that includes ecosystem status: biodiversity pattern,
- the extent of formally conserved areas, ecosystem protection, metropolitan open space system, invasive alien trees,
- rivers, estuaries and the coast that includes conservation status, faecal bacteria at bathing beaches, river water quality, river degradation,
- bulk services: energy, waste and water reports energy, solid waste, liquid waste and water,
- poverty: an examination of the occurrence of poverty, quality of life and population growth,
- health, including access to primary health care facilities,
- environmental governance that includes recognising the IDP framework's environment, the fulfilment of the environmental management function, compliance with environmental legislation, and recommended responses.

Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality SOER has identified 58 vegetation types, 33 of which were threatened unless efforts were made to ensure their protection (NMBM, 2015, pp. 7-8). In 2014, the first Bioregional Plan for NMBM was prepared (NMBM, 2014).The plan's purpose was to provide a map of biodiversity priorities and accompanying guidelines to inform land-use planning, environmental assessment and authorisations, and natural resource management by a range of sectors whose policies and decisions impact biodiversity. The plan spatially depicts terrestrial and aquatic features critical for conserving biodiversity and maintaining ecosystem functioning. The Bioregional Plan essentially profiles priority biodiversity and effective management regimes. It was developed to minimise potential conflict between biodiversity and other land-use forms to the greatest extent possible. The plan's objectives are to:

- form the primary biodiversity informant for land-use and resource use decision-making,
- identify a network of critical biodiversity areas that achieve national biodiversity thresholds on the least amount of land possible,
- act as the spatial framework and policy for sustainable development and assist the municipality in complying with environmental and planning legislation requirements that promote biodiversity protection and management.

The Bioregional Plan is holistic, intended for use by all sector agencies involved in land-use planning, decision-making, and multi-sectoral planning. The users of the Bioregional Plan include mandatory users, including environmental impact assessments, agricultural land-use decisions and development control decisions through land-use legislation (e.g., rezoning, planning approvals etc.); as well as users involved in proactive, forward-planning, such as IDPs, SDFs and zoning schemes; and proactive conservation, such as biodiversity stewardship initiatives and the expansion of protected areas. The Bioregional Plans are commendable, but they still do not address planning situations where the arguments for biodiversity receive a hostile reception, such as informal settlement squatters illegally occupying prime land of high biodiversity significance.

13.5.11 Development Opportunities for Supporting Post-Covid Recovery in NMBM

While NMBM and other secondary cities face many development challenges, many opportunities exist to change the mind-set and policy settings to create more sustainable development and new jobs, as well as improve the city's well-being and province. These opportunities apply to other secondary cities too.

13.5.11.1 Support for Stockvels

For residents living in secondary cities and smaller regional urban centres, access to finance is difficult compared to the larger cities. The larger cities of South Africa are substantially wealthier than secondary cities with a broader range of personal credit facilities. Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality should permit alternative self-help housing, enlarge the logistics footprint, explore incorporating the informal-sector economy to open up opportunities to low-income populations to create micro-enterprises and build homes, and support Stockvels. Stockvels are clubs of twelve or more people who serve as rotating credit unions or saving schemes in South Africa, where members contribute fixed sums of money to a central fund weekly, fortnightly, or monthly. Stokvels or local credit unions are supported widely in South Asia to create community credit and avoid the need of the poor to rely on private money lenders that charge exorbitant interest rates. There are estimated to be about 820,000 stokvels in South Africa, with a membership of 11.4 million, handling over R 44 billion per annum[3] (Rawal, 2020)

13.5.11.2 Self Help Housing

The South African government has built a record number of housing units for the poor through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) established in 1994. By 2014, according to Statistics South Africa, the government had built 3.9 million RDP houses out of 16.9 million subsidised housing units. However, studies indicate that RDP housing faces significant criticism that it is not meeting the criteria set for construction and occupation. Given that the RDP has not met the housing deficit, opportunities exist for NMBM to engage in partnerships with the provincial and national institutions to introduce affordable housing schemes to work with the private sector to develop alternative housing options.

13.5.11.3 Logistics

Public transport in regional towns and cities is expensive in South Africa, with households spending upwards of 10% of household income on travel. Innovative and simple ways to reduce transport costs in cities are needed to increase the disposable incomes of the poor. Motorcycle taxis are illegal in South Africa and Zimbabwe but are accept as a legal means of mobility in many other African, as well as Asian countries. In some cases, unemployed men/youths get the motorcycle taxi industry going and provide services to millions in Africa's rural areas and cities.

There is an opportunity to establish a motorcycle taxi industry in NMBM, engaging thousands of unemployed young people in work while offering 24-hour mobility to residents. Motorcycle taxis can also improve women's public safety at night, as drivers must use mobile apps to record passengers, routes and destinations. There is added value in supporting the logistics industry in delivering online purchases of goods to destinations not accessible by car. The motorcycle industry has unleashed innovativeness that adapts to local conditions such as overhauling engines, and repairs, fabrication of spare parts, undertake modifications to add new features like strengthened people and good carriers and offer marketing opportunities market women's food stalls at motorbike taxi pick up points. Africa's motorcycle industry offers direct and indirect self-employment. Although absolute numbers of people impacted is uncertain, but it is possibly in the tens of millions of people. Secondary cities in South Africa should learn from their African counterparts, and NMBM and other local governments could experiment with a pilot program.

13.5.11.4 Incorporate the Informal Sector in the Economy

South Africa's economic structure is highly formalised, compared to other African countries. However, the informal economy also plays a significant role and contributes to many citizens' livelihoods (Bruton et al, 2012). South Africa has struggled to accommodate this informal sector, but there is increasing recognition in African countries of the benefits from synergising the informal with the formal sector. This synergy is recognised by the International Labour Organization (2013), which provides the regulatory environment relating to the informal economy at the international and national levels and the requirement for policy frameworks that integrate the two economies.

The opportunities for opening up the economy to the informal sector in NMBM are significant. However, this requires a program of engagement with the informal sector supported by the municipality to develop interest groups using social media, with the informal workforce involved in creative industries, trades, domestic services, and construction. Once interest is created in these chat communities, this can lead to the development of knowledge networks for sharing ideas and business contacts. Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality and training institutes can then support the development of a network of small informal micro and individual enterprises that are interested in developing their informal business into the formal system by access to training, mentoring and business development programs.

13.5.11.5 Policies for the Development of the NMBM Economy

Three key policies are needed to develop the economy of NMBM. Firstly, local economic development as a policy should be expanded to embrace trans-municipality jurisdictions to create a new regional and local economic development policy, similar to those being experimented with in the Cape Province. The expanded policy would enable municipalities that share similar outlooks to development and resources to build synergetic relationships and leverage that as the basis of the successful network of systems of linked economies.

Secondly, there needs to be a change in the expectation that the local government will provide almost all municipal services. In many areas, such as housing and construction, the private and informal sectors may produce more appropriate and better value alternatives. This is especially the case in rural areas.

Thirdly, many entrepreneurs and innovators in cities and rural areas do not have appropriate mentors, facilities, or financial support to move their ideas to the next level. The number of research and innovation hubs growing at some of the country's tertiary institutions indicates a significant talent pool with cutting-edge ideas that need support to develop those ideas into actual products, benefiting the economy.

13.6 Enhancing the Development of Secondary Cities in South Africa

As part of the research, inputs and advice was obtained from senior people involved in South Africa's municipalities through a questionnaire about their challenges in developing secondary cities and towns in order to identify how to advance the development of secondary cities in South Africa. The overwhelming response was that there was no specific institution explicitly dedicated to addressing the issues and needs of these cities, and that this was a significant gap in national urban policy. However, institutions such as the South Africa Local Government Association (SALGA), South Africa Cities Network (SACN), Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Municipality Infrastructure Support Agent (MISA) and research units at tertiary planning institutions from time to time co-opt the secondary city theme (often implicitly), undertake seminars and workshops, and have produced research reports and other publications. Other ad hoc bodies and institutions that identify with secondary cities and the SA Cities Network enhance cities' networking capacity. The SA Cities Network organization has recently increased its focus on secondary cities and their competitiveness.

The respondents to the questionnaire identified South African cities' need to adopt more endogenous employment and economic growth and development policies and strategies. There is the recognition that South African cities have lost their competitive advantage and have been weakened by poor institutional governance and the loss of skills through migration. A new economic development model is needed for South Africa, focusing on cities' collaborative advantage. This calls for cities and regions to become more networked in city partnerships for trade development between clusters of cities and regional towns to create greater economic sovereignty and provide a collective response to external risk hazards and events.

Municipalities' LED strategies must create the engines for endogenous economic and community-related investments through IDPs. Secondary cities can no longer go it alone in seeking to compete based on a model of competitive advantage, adopting a winner-take-all-approach against other cities to secure LED opportunities. They must first address the concept that self-interest and parochialism is a no-win game. City LEDs must look to greater alignment of policies, programs, infrastructure and resource sharing with neighbouring municipalities. The major challenge is the lack of structures that enable cross-municipality economic growth linkages.

Key actions that were identified as needed by secondary cities in South Africa to support their development include:

- A national urban policy is needed that recognises the strategic role of secondary cities in the national system of cities as value-adding hubs, logistics and supply in the development of the national economy.

- The application of collaborative governance and clusters of clusters will foster local economic development and value-adding: These exist; however, they do not focus on secondary cities but are generic to local government and normally specific to a district. The view is that these are enabled through municipal systems structures, traditional leadership and that non-municipality institution such as the Cities Network and SALGA facilitate collaborative governance and cluster networking.

- Fostering the development of regional networks or corridor systems and clusters of cities, with the intent of developing subnational regional markets.

- Building communities of interest in secondary cities: Several international organisations and NGOs, such as the global network of cities, focus on resilience and climate change. Secondary cities can develop these for local economic development, social support, and environmental interest to improve secondary cities and neighbourhoods' well-being.

- Information and knowledge sharing hubs exist, but at the national and metropolitan level. Examples are the eDurban portal, the Department of Agriculture, Rural Development and Land Reform's spatial planning and information systems. Secondary cities can learn from Durban to develop local areas information and knowledge sharing networks and hubs.

- National, provincial and local chambers of commerce operate through South Africa. However, they are specific to government-defined territorial jurisdictions. There are opportunities for secondary city-focused institutions with cross border territorial jurisdictions.

- The development of smart/green/circular economies explicitly tailored to secondary cities could help foster regional innovation, specialisation and green business development initiatives.

The call for action by the government is needed to focus on secondary cities to support the growth of the national economy and equitable economic growth and development. Policy documents exist at the international, national, provincial and local level, which have an impact at the local level. However, there are no policies directed to secondary cities. The National Treasury's Neighbourhood Partnership Development Grant (NDPG) programme supports all cites at the municipal level, but their funding tends to be for metropolitan municipalities' projects. Some smaller cities (secondary cities) have benefitted in developing their respective economies and economic development. This program concentrates on CBDs and 'underdeveloped' areas in secondary cities without specifically being targeted to secondary cities.

13.7 The New Agenda for Secondary Cities in South Africa

Secondary cities are not a feature of national urban and economic development policy in South Africa. They are an essential part of countries' spatial economic landscape and play a crucial role in local and national development. The national and provincial governments should give them greater attention when formulating national economic and urban development policies and infrastructure building programs. As South Africa seeks to work its way out of a dual economic and health crisis, secondary cities risk being left behind in the post-COVID-19 recovery efforts.

This chapter has identified some critical areas of concern related to urban, economic and social development governance, finance, infrastructure, connectivity, human capital development, land management and environmental issues of secondary cities in South Africa. Many of its secondary cities are falling behind the development of the country's three major cities. The case study has provided an insight into the problems and challenges of urban management and governance; local economic development and challenges of structural adjustment; provision of basic infrastructure and services; and the problems of local health, social and employment problems. The challenges facing NMBM are witnessed in secondary cities throughout the country, but the situation is much worse in some cases.

South Africa is a country rich in natural and endowed resources. It has infrastructure, wealth and governance systems that are the envy of many African countries. However, it has lost its competitive advantage as many of its institutions, infrastructure, and support services networks fail to keep up with the demand of a young and increasingly urbanised population.

South Africa needs a new development agenda for its cities to ensure more equitable, inclusive and sustainable urban development. That agenda needs to define a clear role for secondary cities. Left unchecked, the current trends and patterns of urban development and policies will increase pressure on Gauteng and Cape Town metropolises and result in greater distortions to the economic geography and structure of the economy, income and human settlement patterns. At all costs, this should and can be avoided with better urban policy.

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ENDNOTES

(1)   IDP in South African Planning means `Integrated Development Planning' and not `Internally Displaced Persons', as is the case in the other chapters of this book.

(2)   Dylan Knott, technical manager for the rail consultancy and rolling stock supplier African Railway Systems, quoted in "Rail infrastructure in state of neglect," by Jessica Oosthuizen, Creamer Media's Engineering News, Aug. 3, 2018. https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/rail-infrastructure-in-state-of-neglect-2018-08-03

(3)   Du Preez (2019) notes that many of the 820,000 stokvels operating in South Africa do not use a bank account to keep the savings they collect on behalf of an estimated 11-million South Africans. Research shows only 41% of stokvels make use of bank accounts.

ALE BADARA SY, PETER BIKAM,
JEAN MARIE ILY

14

TOUBA-MBACKÉ: SENEGAL

> **The Republic of Senegal is the westernmost country on the African mainland. Over 80% of the population lives in the western half of the country, and its capital, Dakar, has historically served as the gateway to West Africa (CILSS, 2016). Senegal has an area of 19,612 km2 and surrounds the Gambia. The nation's longest border is with Mauritania to the north; to the east, it borders Mali, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau.**

The estimated population of Senegal in 2021 is around 17.3 million, of which approximately 47.2% live in urban areas. The current urbanisation rate is about 3.3%. Senegal has 17 cities with a population of over 100,000; the capital, Dakar, had the largest population, at around 2.65 million in 2018. The country's GDP in 2020 was US$66.438 billion, and the GDP per capita was US$1,675.

This chapter presents a case study of urbanisation and secondary city development in Senegal. The secondary city selected for this study is Touba-Mbacké because of its importance as an inland religious and cultural centre. Touba is a holy city emanating from Mouridism, and it is part of the Diourbel region and Mbacké district. It is the second most populated city after Dakar. It is located 200 km west of Dakar (Figure 14.1) (ANAT, 2016).

The Holy City of Touba is located close to the secular city of Mbacké. Both cities constitute a spatial continuum, and this bipole has been often called 'Greater Touba'. Touba-Mbacké is experiencing relatively high levels of migration and urbanisation pressure.

FIGURE 14.1 | Senegal National Plan for Planning and Territorial Development showing location of Touba-Mbacké

Source: ANAT20

14.1 Urbanisation and Secondary Cities Development in Senegal

14.1.1 Urbanisation in Senegal: A quick Historical Perspective

The advent of colonial rule was a catalyst to rapid urbanisation in Senegal and western Africa in general (World Bank, 2015). There were traditional cities in Senegal and other western African countries prior to the arrival of colonial rule—some of which still exist, such as Timbuktu—after the rise of empires like those of Mali, Ghana and Songhai, but intertribal wars, colonisation, and slavery were detrimental to the expansion of traditional cities.

The modern form of urbanisation in Senegal began in 1840 when the French declared Senegal a permanent French possession, abolished all forms of slavery, and granted full citizenship to those born in four Senegalese cities: Dakar, Rufisque, Thiès, and Saint-Louis. This enabled the people of Senegal to elect and send a deputy to the National Assembly in Paris.

At the time of its independence in 1960, Senegal was one of the most urbanised countries in sub-Saharan Africa, ahead of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. This was due, particularly, to the close link between agricultural development and urbanisation, which had led to the emergence of a relatively structured and balanced urban framework (World Bank, 2015). Secondary cities had been heavily involved in trade along the Senegal River and cultivated groundnuts (peanuts) in the Arachidier Basin (also known as the Groundnut or Peanut Basin).

But during the post-independence period, the increasing primate role of Dakar as the leading city and the seat of national government has led to urban macrocephaly[1]. Figure 14.2 shows the evolution of cities and urban populations in Senegal between 1904 and 2005. The lack of coherent spatial planning, lack of funds and weak capacities of the local administrations, together with significant rural-urban migration, also adversely affected the ability of Senegal's secondary cities to provide proper planning services and utilities. This resulted in requests for funds from international institutions in the 1990s for urban development projects (Gellar, 1995).

FIGURE 14.2 | Map showing the evolution of the number of cities and urban population of Senegal

Source: Urban évolution maps 1904 - 2002, Guy Mainet - La conquête urbaine au Sénégal in Urbanisation et développement – Espaces Tropicaux n°4 Talence – CEGET CNRS et Ousmane Thiam – 2009

14.1.2 Secondary Cities Outlook in Senegal: Economic Functions, Urban Hierarchy, Demographic Trends

The World Bank report on Senegal (2017) indicates that 10 secondary cities are primarily reception centres for rural-urban migration. Each of those cities is unique in configuration, but they have commonalities in their growth patterns and development, mainly because of their proximity to the poor rural population that surrounds them. Poor urban planning, governance and management have resulted in inadequate institutional capacity; the growth of slums and informal settlements; inadequate infrastructure to supply critical water, electricity, waste management and sanitation systems; environmental damage; and lack of economic and employment opportunities.

The 2035 National Land-Use Planning and Territorial Development Plan (PNADT 2035) provides a functional hierarchy of human settlements based on three criteria: administrative status, demographic weight and geographical

position. Its hierarchy of human settlements is divided into six categories: the international metropolis of Dakar, the balancing metropolises, regional metropolises, secondary cities, and two levels of relay centres (Figure 14.3). (See also at the end of this chapter a more detailed analysis of Senegal's policies, strategies, and programs for secondary cities development.)

The urban network in the interior of the country, i.e., excluding Dakar, has three levels of settlement:

1. The balancing metropolises are made up of 10 agglomerations in the country's interior, which will have a population higher or equal to 300,000 inhabitants by 2035 or have a strategic geographical position to rebalance the urban framework. They are Thiès, Kaolack, Ziguinchor, Saint-Louis, Tambacounda, Kolda, Kédougou, Matam, Touba-Mbacké and Mbour.

2. The regional metropolises are cities with the status of regional capitals or that will have a population of between 100,000 and 300,000 inhabitants by 2035. They are the cities of Diourbel, Louga, Kaffrine, Fatick, Sédhiou, Tivaouane and Richard-Toll.

3. The secondary cities are all the departmental capitals, except the capitals of metropolises, whose population could reach at least 25,000 inhabitants, but not more than 100,000 by 2035. Secondary cities are the smallest urban entities in the hierarchy. They are Velingara, Bambey, Bignona, Koungheul, Dagana, Kébémer, Guinguinéo, Bakel, Kanel, Linguère, Gossas, Goudomp, Koumpentoum, Podor, Malem-Hodar, Birkelane, Goudiry, Foundiougne, Salémata, Oussouye, Ranérou, , Nioro , Bounkiling, Joal-Fadiouth, Dahra, M'boro, Diaobé-Kabendou, Pout, Cayar, Mekhe, Rosso-Senegal, Khombole, Thiadiaye, Sokone, Karang Poste Office, Kahone, Sinthiou Bamanbe-Banadji, Gandiaye, Passy, Madina Wandifa, Medina Gounass, Darou Mousty, Kafountine, Ndioum and Ndoffane. Table 13.5. shows the economic roles of Senegal's largest cities.

Except for Dakar and Touba-Mbacké, most Senegalese cities are small and are predominately trading and agriculture centres.

FIGURE 14.3 | Map showing the functional hierarchy of human settlements in Senegal

Source: (PNADT 2035) National Agency for Regional Planning (ANAT), 2020.

TABLE 14.1 | The economic roles of Senegal's largest cities

No	City	Economic role
1	Touba-Mbacké	Old Islamic town with historic monuments; and religious town with significant annual Islamic festival (Magal)
2	Thiès	Transport, production of rice, peanuts, fruits, and cassava
3	Mbour	Tourism, fishing industry, peanut processing
4	Saint-Louis	Colonial city important as a tourist destination; communal centre for sugar production and export of fish, vegetables and rice; and a growing religious function
5	Kaolack	Peanut trading and processing centre and a major Islamic centre
6	Matam	Income from international migration, pastoral activities
7	Ziguinchor	It is a major port (passengers and merchandise ships from Dakar) and airport, as the 'entry door' of South Senegal. Also, administrative functions, tourism, and the only university in south Senegal
8	Kolda	Rice cultivation, trading of agricultural, livestock, and forestry products
9	Kédougou	Mining city
10	Tambacounda	Cotton transportation hub

Source: Authors observations and World Bank Country Report on Senegal (2017).

Table 14.2 shows major secondary cities ranked according to population size. This is followed by a summary description of the 10 most significant cities in Senegal, excluding the capital Dakar.

TABLE 14.2 | Major secondary cities in Senegal ranked according to population size

Cities	Population in 2013	Population in 2025 trend	Population in 2035 trend	2025-2035 trend rate (%)	Share of pop. national urban in 2035 - trend (%)	Rate wished 2025-2035 2025-2035	Population projected in 2035 according to the desired rate	Share of pop. National urban in 2035 - Desired (%)	The gap between trend and desired
Dakar	3,026,316	4,199,856	5,256,850	2.27	36.5	0.85%	4,570,813	31.7	- 686,037
Balancing metropolises									
Touba-Mbacké	830,569	1,208,920	1,670,775	3.29	11.6	4.6	1,895,459	13.1	224,684
Thiès	317,763	437,788	552,200	2.35	3.8	2.3	552,200	3.8	0
Kaolack	256,078	369,910	495,074	2.96	3.4	4.6	579,980	4.0	84,906
Mbour	274,695	378,454	479,951	2.40	3.3	2.4	479,951	3.3	0
Saint-Louis	209,752	286,614	363,952	2.42	2.5	4.6	449,381	3.1	85,429
Ziguinchor	205,294	300,766	412,176	3.20	2.9	4.6	471,569	3.3	59,393
Tambacounda	107,293	164,533	237,323	3.73	1.6	4.6	257,970	1.8	20,647
Kolda	81,099	117,970	162,148	3.23	1.1	4.6	184,965	1.3	22,817
Matam	32,872	51,465	73,224	3.59	0.5	4.6	80,692	0.6	7,468
Kédougou	30,051	44,780	63,416	3.54	0.4	4.6	70,210	0.5	6,794
Population of balancing metropolises	2,345,466	3,361,200	4,510,239	2.98	31.3		5,022,377	34.8	512,138
Total population of other cities	1,486,345	2,879,574	4,653,150	0.05	32.3		4,827,050	33.47	173,900
National urban population	6,858,127	10,440,630	14,420,239	0.03	64.0		14,420,239	100	

Source: National Planning and Territorial Development Plan, (PNADT 2035) National Agency for Regional Planning (ANAT), 2018.

Touba-Mbacké is an Islamic holy city founded in 1887 by a Sufi Master, Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacké (1857–1927), to serve as the spiritual city of the Mouride people. After Dakar, it is the second-largest city, with rapid growth: its population was 399,900 inhabitants in 2002 and 929,764 in 2013 (Senegal Population Census, 2013). It has an area of more than 166 km² and a population density of around 5,250 people per km². The Magal religious pilgrimage is celebrated each year in Touba-Mbacké by thousands of Muslims in Senegal and the diaspora. During that period, the city's population can double. The following part/the second part of this chapter consists of an in-depth/detailed presentation of this city. (See the next part of this chapter for a detailed analysis.)

Thiès is the third-largest city in Senegal and a transport hub for a productive agricultural hinterland producing rice, peanuts, cassava, millet and fruits, and for phosphate mines. It is the leading livestock trading and meat centre in Senegal. The city is best known for its tapestry-making industry. Its territory covers around 49 km² with a population density of 7,300 people per km². From 1976 to 2013, the average rate of urbanisation was 38.7% (Ministère de l`Economie et des Finances, 2007).

Mbour lies on a 'petite côte' (small coast) about 80 km south of Dakar. The city's major industries are tourism, fishing, and peanut processing. The region's population density is 452 people per km². It is becoming an urban agglomeration with the touristic city of Saly (and progressively also agglomerating with the touristic towns of Somone, Ngaparou, Popenguine, and Toubab Dialaw), and it will become part of the Dakar Megapolis if growth trends continue.

Kaolack is a trade, agriculture, and religious pole at the centre of the country, located in the Saloum River Valley. The rate of urbanisation from 1996 to 2013 was 35.5%.

Saint-Louis was 'founded' as a city by French traders in 1659, but there were already indigenous villages on the site. The colonial city is located on an island on an estuary at the mouth of the Senegal River. The island is only protected from the sea by a strip of sand called 'Langue de Barbarie', which is currently dramatically threatened by erosion, rising sea level, and overcrowding problems. From the eighteenth century, Saint-Louis extended to the continent; the continental part of it, called 'Sor', and the city suburbs currently represent much of its area. It remains an important cultural and natural tourism destination. However, it is a commercial centre for fishing, rice, vegetables, sugar processing and transportation to other cities. It is also an important religious centre, with this last function increasing more and more over the last years (with the annual pilgrimage of 'two rakkas').

Ziguinchor, on the southern coast of the Senegalese territory, plays the role of a large port and ferry terminal. After the country's independence in 1960, the city's economic growth slowed due to the war of independence in neighbouring Guinea Bissau. As the capital of Casamance, it experienced three decades of conflict with the Dakar Authority. However, the average rate of urbanisation in Ziguinchor from 1976 to 2013 was 39.1%.

Tambacounda is located about 400 km southeast of Dakar. The town is known for its varied agricultural potential and its cotton industry. Crops grown in the hinterland include millet, sorghum, cotton, maise, peanuts and rice. The urbanisation rate from 1976 to 2013 was 17.6%.

Kolda's territory covers an area of 9 km² with an occupancy rate of 93%. The city is facing difficulties related to its spatial expansion. Despite its relatively large size, urbanisation has spilled over the city boundary. Most of the Kolda districts lack many essential services such as proper stormwater management, sanitation, or solid waste management. Therefore, Kolda is one of the pilot cities of the Senegal Green Secondary Cities Development Programme implemented by the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) with the government of Senegal and the local authority.

The Matam-Ourossogui bipole is in north-eastern Senegal on the border with Mali. The two cities are 7 km apart. The creation of this bipole (in French 'bipôle') is linked to the constraints of spatial expansion of the city of Matam, the capital of the department and the region, located on the banks of the Senegal River. Ourossogui has the advantage of being located on the national road, which provides significant economic and space potential: the city developed on a road junction (from the national road to Matam). Although Matam is the capital of the region, urban evolution is very slow and without adequate services. By contrast, Ourossogui took advantage of the enclave situation of Matam to house some regional infrastructure. Given its crossroads position, it tends to supplant the city of Matam and plays a strategic role in its region. The city has become a hub in the local economy and polarises the municipalities of Waounde, Semmé, Thilogne, Kanel, and Matam.

Kédougou is the regional capital of the mining region of the same name. It is located at the eastern end of Senegal, bordering Guinea and Mali, about 705 km from Dakar. The population density is very low, but there has been a 5% population growth due to mining in the region in the last decade. As a result, there has been an increase in the density of the population and growing need for more land for housing and infrastructure. The spatial development of the city is linear, given the nature of the site. The neighbourhoods are spread along a 1,500-metre-wide, east-west-facing strip of land, with constraints related to the presence of the Gambia River arm and the Dinguessou River. Kédougou is home to administrative and infrastructure facilities in line with its status as the region's capital. As for Kolda, it has been, until recently, one of the most deprived cities of Senegal in terms of public services, utilities and infrastructures.

TABLE 14.3 | Africapolis data for secondary city urban agglomerations in Senegal

Agglomeration Name	Population 2000	Population 2010	Population 2015	Density (pp km²) 2015	Built up km²	Growth Rate (%)
Dakar	1,962,888	2,608,899	3,067,637	15,052	204	3.02
Touba-Mbacké	331,428	684,776	872,732	5,244	166	6.67
Thiès	221,542	290,865	358,806	7,317	49	3.27
Mbour	136,013	233,369	317,009	4,658	68	5.80
Kaolack	166,382	221,595	259,582	7,494	35	3.01
Saint-Louis	134,203	186,030	222,043	10,965	20	3.41
Ziguinchor	150,106	188,148	214,936	8,328	26	2.42
Diourbel	90,245	119,269	139,984	6,650	21	2.97
Tambacounda	62,508	92,757	112,332	4,732	24	3.99
Louga	68,915	93,147	109,250	5,714	19	3.12
Kolda	49,743	71,130	84,908	3,608	24	3.63
Tivaouane	35,815	57,353	75,232	5,516	14	5.07

Source: Africapolis Database (2018).

Table 14.3 shows Africapolis Data for secondary city urban agglomerations in Senegal. The built-up urban areas, density, and growth rates are a more accurate representation of dynamics of secondary cities and the capital Dakar than are the Senegalese official data of the previous table, which only consider administrative limits of each city.

14.1.3 Policies on Senegal's Urbanisation and Secondary City Development and Land management

In the administrative-territorial reform of 1972, 37 urban municipalities were created, and mayors elected. However, when additional municipalities were created in 1996, responsibility for the role of the municipalities changed. Municipalities, particularly secondary cities, obtained more responsibility for urban development, infrastructure development and services.

Since the 2013 Law of Decentralization (also "Act III of the decentralisation"), secondary cities in Senegal have wide-ranging formal responsibilities in applying the town planning laws that legislate land acquisition and conditions for developments. The mayor is the administrative head that gives the political direction in terms of major urban development projects. However, the central government and its agencies remain the key player whenexternal donors channel funds for urban development.

The 2013 Law of decentralisation for Senegal has provisions that provide for:

- Administrative divisions: 14 administrative regions, which are no longer autonomous local governments. They are managed by a governor who represents the central government and is responsible for ensuring the application of laws and regulations. At the 'departement' (county) level, a prefect also represents the state, and at the 'arrondissement' (district) level, this is the 'sous-préfet' (subprefect) who guarantees the rule of law.
- Act III led to a new division for local governments on the decentralisation side, with 46 departements (local governments with elected assemblies) and 557 communes, with municipal councils that elect a mayor. "Communautés rurales" (rural communities) no longer exist, as they all became 'communes' with the same status and competencies as urban 'communes'.
- The 'city' status has been maintained for the five former 'cities' of Dakar, Pikine, Guédiawaye, Rufisque and Thiès.

The law provided the following principles:

- Municipalities can intervene over the land belonging to the state for infrastructure development, facility upgrading and the provision of services to the residents.
- The mayor's headland distribution committees oversee the distribution of plots and provide stakeholders with permits to construct and demolish houses under the administrative control of the state administration.
- The municipality oversees preparing the urban documentation (master plan) in line with the state legislations.

14.2 Problems and Issues Affecting Senegal's Economy and Secondary City Development

Senegalese secondary cities continue to grow without planning and managing their urban development or promoting employment and sustainable economic growth. Urbanisation mainly occurs in a concentric or linear form of growth along the highways leading in and out of Senegal's cities. It is also occurring as clusters of polycentric development, which have emerged as villages and towns on the periphery of rapidly growing urban centres, have expanded.

This emerging pattern of development creates significant problems for secondary cities as increasing numbers of people commute daily into these cities for work, education, and other business, then leave the city to return to their village at the end of the day. The additional day-visitor populations, e.g., in the case of Touba-Mbacké, place increasing demand for and pressure on urban infrastructure and services, which many of the day visitors do not pay for.

The uncontrolled urban sprawl also increases the unit cost of networks and infrastructures, making the investment and exploitation costs unaffordable for public authorities.

14.2.1 Human Capital Development (HDI) Social Issues, Environmental Risks, and Human Development Challenges

One of the significant characteristics of secondary cities in Senegal is the low-level income of the residents. Sané (2003) has indicated that most of the population in the cities migrated from the rural areas to avoid poverty, but they arrive in the cities with no skills.

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human capital development: long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Between 1990 and 2018, Senegal's HDI value increased by 36.5%, from 0.377 to 0.514.

Table 14.4 shows Senegal's progress in each of the HDI indicators during the period 1990 and 2018. Life expectancy at birth increased by 10.5 years; mean years of schooling increased by 0.9 years and expected years of schooling increased by 4.5 years. Senegal's HDI value increased from 0.377 to 0.514, an increase of 36.5% (UN Data).

Secondary cities in Senegal offer relatively inferior professional services compared to the primate city of Dakar because of the concentration of skills. Insufficiently trained professionals in secondary cities minimise human capital inputs in such cities. However, Touba-Mbacké has been innovative in tapping the diaspora network to export education and tourism promotion and developing expatriate associations to gain access to knowledge, market information, and new technologies to advantage business development (Ross, 2011).

Population pressures on extensive agriculture and peanut production resulting in reduced soil fertility are another key cause of migration to the cities. Due to poverty and rural population exodus to urban areas, the migration processes have increasingly involved low-income workers employed in domestic and/or temporary jobs, such as gardening, security, and domestic workers. They are poorly paid and cannot afford modern township amenities.

TABLE 14.4 | Senegal's HDI trends based on consistent time series data and new goalposts

	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (211 PPP$)	HDI value
1990	57.2	4.5	2.2	2,262	0.377
1995	57.4	4.8	2.1	2,177	0.378
2000	57.8	5.4	1.9	2,381	0.390
2005	60.6	6.7	2.4	2,660	0.434
2010	64.3	8.0	2.4	2,749	0.468
2015	66.7	9.1	2.9	2,933	0.504
2016	67.1	9.0	2.9	3,018	0.506
2017	67.4	9.0	3.0	3,139	0.510
2018	67.7	9.0	3.1	3,256	0.514
2019	67.9	8.6	3.2	3,309	0.512

Source: United Nations Development Program (2020).

Senegal has historically been free of ethnic, racial and religious strife. Some noticeable exceptions to this peaceful state of affairs were the Anti-Moor rioting in 1989 due to a conflict between Senegal and Mauritania (and massive expulsions of "Senegalese" nationals – or considered so – by Mauritanian government); and the separatist rebellion in Casamance.

14.2.2 The Need for Better Land Tenure Management and Improved Governance

The uninterrupted democratic transition from one presidency to the next since the independence has been positive for Senegal. At the same time, this long-term stability has led to a similar spinoff in financial and investment sectors that have had negative components.

TABLE 14.5 | Percentage access to land and housing type in secondary cities tenant

Secondary city	Landlord	Co-landlord	Tenant	Co-tenant	Rent to buy	Housed by employer	Housed by parent /friend	Others
Ziquinchor	37.9	3.9	46	6.9	0.1	1.5	2.8	1.0
Touba-Mbacké	65.1							
Thiès	74.5	5.9	12.3	2.0	0.1	1.6	2.4	1.2
Mbour	62.0		15.0					
Kaolack	81.1	5.4	8.9	1.2	0.0	0.6	2.1	0.7
Saint-Louis	80.4	5.09.3	1.2	01.2	0.0	0.7	1.9	0.9
Rufisque	61.0	r						
Diourbel	88.6	4.2	3.6	0.5	0.0	0.4	1.8	0.9
Louga	88.5	4.7	3.2	0.6	0.0	0.5	1.6	0.9
Tambacounda	75.3	4.7	11.8	1.8	0.0	0.7	1.9	0.8

Source: Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie (2013), ministère de L`Économie et de la Planification 2013.

But on the other hand, the negative factors in the structure and processes of land tenure, environmental issues management, bureaucracy, and lack of efficiency and accountability from the administration are not good for competitiveness nor economic efficiency. Table 14.5 shows household access to land and housing in Senegal's secondary cities in 2013. A 2013 study on land tenure issues in Senegal noted the following challenges (Kaag et al., 2013).

- Land grabbing and allocation to entrepreneurs, officials, and politicians.
- Pressure on land and land speculation.
- Government bodies do not account for the citizens concerning land issues.

United Nations Habitat (2018) report (UN-Habitat, 2018) on Senegal's performance at the end of 2016 indicated that the Program for Governance and Peace (PGP) achieved its third objective: Increased Citizen Participation in the Electoral Process. Under the second objective: Strengthened Fiscal Decentralization & Local Governance, the PGP worked closely with the newly created ministry for the promotion of good governance to develop and implement a National Good Governance Strategy, the key results of which include the passage of a new law requiring a declaration of assets by officials within the public sector spending authority. This work was undertaken in conjunction with the Ministry of Decentralization to map the fiscal transfer process to identify bottlenecks and leakages; and with 13 local government partners to improve local governance and financial management, increase local revenue generation, and improve service delivery by integrating governance interventions into sectors such as health and education.

14.2.3 Infrastructure and Urban Connectivity

In most secondary cities in Senegal, like in many western African cities, the public sector is complemented by the private sector, sometimes regulated but not financed by the municipalities (Robinson, 2006). This parallel model has significant impacts on access and costs, particularly to the more impoverished population.

Although inroads have been made to provide a wide range of infrastructure, the quality of construction and operation of those amenities is generally insufficient. The quality-of-service delivery and accountability could be improved.

Poor road maintenance and safety, for example, have not been wholly addressed yet. However, a loan from the Chinese government has enabled the building of a new highway between Touba and Dakar in a Build-Operate' connecting the two principal cities of the country (Dakar and Greater Touba), and an subsidy from the United States allowed the connection of the centre of the country to the southern regions of Casamance.

Connectivity between Senegal's secondary cities is reduced by the poor network and lack of high-speed internet. This has adversely impacted upon the growth of the national and regional economies.

Significant progress has been made to the provision of potable water, but poorer residents are disadvantaged due to access and costs.

14.2.4 Senegal Macroeconomic and Finance Perspectives

Between 2014 and 2018, Senegal's economic development growth was among the highest in Africa. However, in 2019 the GDP was 5.3%, compared with 6.3% in 2017. On the demand side, investment and exports were the strongest economic drivers, standing at 12.5% and 7.2%, respectively (World Bank, 2020b).

In 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic slowed the country's economic growth rate to about 1.3%, with services such as tourism, and the transport sector, together with exports, being the most affected. Economic recovery is likely to be gradual and driven by a healthy return of private consumption and investment (Jawoo et al., 2021). Significant private investment is central to increasing Senegal's productive capacity and to supporting export growth. Services remain the main contributor to GDP, with the primary sector (agriculture) being the most dynamic growth driver, particularly in secondary cities located near rural areas.

Senegal's oil and gas developments have been delayed because of the pandemic and are unlikely to contribute to the economy before 2025. But according to some recent perspectives and depending on the global oil and gas prices future evolution, the exploitation of those deep offshore resources could be barely profitable. Nevertheless, Senegal has been investing a lot and getting into debt in the last few years, counting on those future incomes.

Infrastructure projects make up 34.4% of African Development Bank (AfDB) investment in Senegal, compared to 21.3% in the social sector and 18.7% for rural projects.

A report (Imam & Kolerus, 2013) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), *Senegal: Financial Depth and Macrostability*, indicated the dominance of Senegal's financial system by the banking sector, which is composed of 19 commercial banks concentrated in the three largest cities, including Touba-Mbacké. The report indicated that banks made up about 90% of the financial system in Senegal. The five largest banks account for 66% of assets and collect 79% of deposits. Many microfinance institutions (MFIs) and 234 establishments supply limited financial services to lower-income households. Although they cover both urban and rural regions, about half of the sector's activity is heavily concentrated in Dakar.

Twenty-five insurance companies account for most of the remainder of the domestic financial system. The regional securities and equity market is a marginal source of funding, apart from the government. The government has minority stakes in banking transactions, ranging from 10% to 25% of the equity in several banks. One bank provides Islamic banking services that respond mainly to Touba-Mbacké and other Islamic financial needs. It was noted that only about 7% of the population holds a bank account. Bank deposits amount to about 40% of GDP. However, Senegal's interbank market is underdeveloped, with only a limited amount of liquidity traded among banks. For example, there is no explicit deposit insurance scheme. Employment creation strategies by the state and its partners have so far not yielded the results hoped for in terms of the numbers and quality of jobs created for the youth, in a country with a youthful population, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic period. Figure 14.4 shows the evolution of the bank and non-bank sectors in Senegal.

The African Development Bank report of 2020 to 2021(African Development Bank Group, 2020) shows that Senegal performed very well between 2017 and 2019. However, the COVID-19 pandemic could significantly alter the country's financial outlook. The bank estimated that Senegal could lose as much as 6.7 percentage points of GDP growth because of the slowdown in tourism (estimated at -60%) and transportation (-9%), and face a 3% drop in overall investment due to reductions in public investment, foreign direct investment (FDI) and overseas remittances from the diaspora.

FIGURE 14.4 | Senegal: Evolution of the bank and nonbank Sectors

Credit to the economy has grown steadily ...

**Senegal. Domestic credit provided
by banking sector (% of GDP)**

... particulary to the service sector.

Source: WDI.

Source: Central Bank of West African States.

Compared with earlier forecasts, the deficit was expected to double in 2020 due to lower revenues (208 billion CFA francs) due to the slowdown in economic activity and higher expenditures (8%) not included in the budget. The majority of the 481 billion CFA francs funding gap is expected to be met from external funding sources. The bank found that public debt could increase from 64% of GDP in 2019 to 67% in 2020. The current account deficit is expected to remain relatively stable due to reducing imports by 7.9%. Inflation is not expected to increase significantly due to an easing of monetary policy and border closures. Economic growth will depend on developments in the global economy, but it was expected to restart in 2021, reaching 5.1% under the baseline scenario and 2.6% in the worst-case scenario.

A redefinition of investment will stimulate private sector recovery because of government initiatives and new mechanisms in investments or cash loans to support businesses affected by the pandemic and introduce a series of fiscal measures to support the formal sector. Table 14.6 shows the African Development Bank's estimates and projections with and without the COVID-19 pandemic from 2018 to 2021.

TABLE 14.6 | Growth projections with or without Covid-19 from 2018-2021

Growth terms			Without COVID-19		With COVID-19 baseline scenario		Without COVID-19 baseline scenario	
	2018	2019 (e)	2020 (p)	2021 (p)	2020 (p)	2021 (p)	2020 (p)	2021 (p)
Real GDP	6.4	5.2	6.8	7.0	2.8	5.1	0.1	2.6
Inflation (%)	0.5	1.1	1.5	1.5	2..0	1.8	2.2	2.1
Budget balance (+/-) (%GDP)	-3.7	-3.8	-3.0	-3.0	-6.3	-5.1	-7.1	-5.7
Current account balance (+/-) (% GDP)	-9.5	-9.6	-10.7	-10.5	-11.0	-10.4	-11.6	-10.4

Source: African Development Bank Report (2020) e = estimation p = projection.

14.2.5 Investment

Most of the FDI in Senegal flows to Dakar and other coastal towns rather than to secondary cities. Since 2014, FDI flows into Senegal have been linked to the Emerging Senegal Plan to develop infrastructure, electricity, agriculture, drinking water, and health, which the government is actively encouraging. From 2018 to 2019, the United Nations UNCTAD FDI in Senegal rose from US$848 million to a record high of US$983 million (+16%). At the end of 2019, the total stock of FDI stood at almost US$6.4 billion(UNCTAD, 2020) (Table 14.7). Overall, imports from EU countries have been declining in recent years, increasing imports from Asian countries. Despite this, the Senegalese economy remains highly dependent on European growth (Lloyds Bank, 2019).

TABLE 14.7 | Foreign direct investment in Senegal, 2017-2019

Foreign Direct Investment	2017	2018	2019
FDI Inward Flow (million US$)	588	848	983
DDI Stock (million US$)	4,916	5,515	6,398
Number of Greenfield Investments (million US$)	753	318	2,131

Source: UNCTAD (2020).

The largest investor in Senegal is France. Other important investors include China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, followed by Morocco, Indonesia, and the United States. In recent years, Senegal has improved its tax collection system by implementing an electronic filing and payment system and merging several taxes. In 2020 the World Bank ranked Senegal 123rd of 190 countries for the ease of doing business (World Bank, 2020a).

The Diamniadio International Industrial Platform – Special Economic Zone (SPZ) - is expected to stimulate investment. It is a tangible outcome of the government's Emerging Senegal Plan, an ambitious set of initiatives "aiming at getting Senegal onto the road to development by 2035" (UNIDA, 2018).

The lack of barriers to full ownership of businesses by foreign investors in most sectors and limited discrimination against businesses conducted or owned by foreigners creates an attractive investment environment for foreign investors. The country has relatively competitive production costs, a skilled workforce, strategic geographical location, good international and regional political relations, and a competitive economy. Negative investment factors include economic vulnerability, low activity diversity, underdeveloped infrastructure, inefficient regulation, bureaucracy, high factor costs and lack of security.

14.2.6 The Impact of COVID-19 on Economic Activities in Secondary Cities

The COVID-19 pandemic has had an immeasurable impact on socio-economic activity in Senegal, both socially and economically, with women being the most affected. Seventy-five percent of Senegalese women in secondary cities work mainly in the informal sector. The pandemic lockdown measures have led to a partial and sometimes complete drop in the economic livelihoods of women in Senegal because they do not benefit from any risk insurance.

A study of the Senegal informal economy, conducted by the International Labour Office in 2020, revealed that 85.7% of women in this sector have a turnover of less than (US$171) per month, and 77.9% of women employed in informal enterprises earn less than (US$63) per month. As a result of the COVID-19 lockdown, women working as waitresses, restaurateurs, hairdressers, make-up artists, domestic workers and other occupations have been deprived of income. A key obstacle to investment during the COVID-19 pandemic in Dakar and Senegal's secondary cities has been insufficient government aid, which stood at 66.1%, and insufficient funds by the private sector, which was estimated at 62.2% in 2020.

Although the Government of Senegal has taken decisive measures to contain the pandemic and mitigate its socio-economic impact, financing is severely constrained due to little or no investment drive. The government has implemented a comprehensive reaction plan, the "Economic and Social Resilience Program," which includes health, sanitary, and containment measures. The aim is to protect the livelihood of the most vulnerable populations. Growth is expected to recover once the crisis recedes gradually, and a vaccine is provided to the population. This can be driven by a robust return of private consumption and rapidly growing investment in secondary cities. The July 2020 report by the World Bank on Senegal's COVID-19 response boost, identified several shortfalls during the pandemic:

- Investment promotion was 44.9% of the total investment.
- Legislative control difficulties for COVID-19 were estimated at the cost of 35.5%.
- Difficulties in obtaining raw investment funds were estimated at 30.1% of the total.
- Costs of transportation rose by 25.5%.
- Inability to access funds rose by 23.4%.
- Lack of technology to adapt to working at home was estimated at the cost of 14.7%.
- Other difficulty costs were estimated at 10.9%.
- No difficulties during the COVID-19 pandemic in Senegal was only 1.5% (Jawoo et al., 2021).

Little economic data is available on cities. The primary economic activities which occur in them are: (i) religious pilgrimages; (ii) agriculture (crop, livestock, and fishery); (iii) industrial processing; (iv) tourism; and (v) commerce.

14.3 Current Policy Initiatives to Support Secondary Cities

The government of Senegal recognises the need for a more comprehensive approach to urban and regional development and secondary cities. However, the approach to urbanisation planning, development, and management is not well integrated and is poorly coordinated. There is a need for more systems, multi-sectoral, devolved, and integrated approaches to urban and regional planning and development.

In recent years the Senegalese government and its partners are currently initiating various policies, strategies, and initiatives for secondary cities. The "Plan Sénégal Emergent" (Senegal Emergent Plan – PSE), the current government's main political and strategic roadmap since 2014, gives special attention to territorial rebalancing and enhancing the socio-economic potential of cities in the interior of the country.

To address the territorial imbalances and strengthen the national urban network of cities to mitigate current trends towards concentration of development along the coast and the western part of the country, the "Plan National d'Aménagement et de Développement du Territoire (National Planning and Development Plan – PNDAT) designed by the Agence Nationale de l'Aménagement du Territoiree (ANAT - National Agency for Regional Planning) envisages the creation of 20 strategic secondary cities to encourage the development of peripheral regions and enhance the potential for cross-border areas. Those cities include a regional capital (Kédougou), four department heads (Kanel, Ranérou, Kidira, Koungheul) and seven urban centres (Keur Momar Sarr, Darah, Diamniadio, Dioabe, Ourossogui, Kidira and Cap Skiring), major urban corridors (Potou, Mboro, Ndioum, Rosso, etc.) and areas with high economic potential (Touba, Ourossogui, Sabadola). The funds available for implementing PNDAT are limited and restrictive in what they can be used for.

The PNADT aims to change the balance of coastal concentration of urbanisation concentrated around Dakar to the inland or dispersed metropolises. The substantial reinforcement of development in these cities in infrastructure, buildings and equipment and improved metropolitan governance is intended to increase their attractiveness as places to live and invest. With the development of these metropolises, the intended goal is to enhance connectivity and strengthen the development of neighbouring municipalities. The revised PNADT calls for the:

- The proper definition of functional metropolitan areas.
- The establishment of a more adapted mode of territorial governance.

- The realisation of a territorial coherence scheme (SCOT) at the level of each metropolitan area, which will allow the municipalities to have a unique spatial planning system and urban planning documents.
- The development of an urban pole to facilitate the residential and professional integration of newcomers.
- A special economic zone (SEZ) to promote virtuous interactions between spatial planning and economic planning.

Figure 14.5 shows each metropolitan area's possible spatial configuration (Propositions D'amenagement et de Developpement Territorial) by 2035. The limits of development are not fixed and depend on the fabric of functional links—home-work relations, for example—that the metropolis-centre weaves with its immediate hinterland. The focus of the concept of the metropolitan area lies in the fact that it makes it possible to overcome administrative boundaries and to have a holistic reading of the facts of urbanisation at the local level.

FIGURE 14.5 | Proposals for development and territorial development

Source: ANAT (2020).

Senegal needs national and local governments to develop a city partnership program to fund the implementation of PNDAT—a basket of funds for investment in a range of hard and soft infrastructure projects and programs, similar but more diversified than the secondary cities program developed by the World Bank for Ghana (World Bank, 2018). The National Urban Renewal Program in India and Smart Cities City Deals program (Australian Government, 2020) in Australia provide a foundation that could be adapted for Senegal for ongoing reform and cooperative action in supporting city development. These programs give cities a much more decisive role in determining how funds should be allocated and spent on infrastructure projects. They represent a new framework for cities policy at the federal level—and it is a framework that guides action across various portfolios to deliver better outcomes for our cities, the people who live in them and countries.

Since 2014, the government has been implementing the City Modernization Programme (PROMOVILLES) to build more than 300 km of roads in various cities in Senegal, including their outbuildings (remediation, public lighting and landscaping).

In addition, a major planning, development and equipment program for 29 urban centres called "Pôles urbains" (New cities) have been initiated in all 14 regions of the country. Six of these urban hubs are being planned in Greater Dakar (Diamniadio, Lake Rose, Daga Kholpa, Yenn, Bambilor, and Deni Birame Ndao). The other 23 clusters will be created at the secondary city level, at a rate of 300 ha per selected site. But, despite its urban dynamism and its enormous urbanisation potential, the Touba-Mbacké agglomeration has not been chosen for this program.

The Senegalese Municipalities and Cities Support Programme (PACASEN), funded by the World Bank and African Development Bank, will also introduce structural reforms to improve local authorities' financial and human resources governance, including Senegalese secondary cities, with a budget of US$280 million.

Several initiatives have also emerged with donor funding to improve and develop sustainable sanitation, stormwater management, and solid waste management services in secondary cities.

The PROMOGED (Project for the Promotion of Integrated Management and Solid Waste Economy in Senegal) follows the Sustainable Urban Solid Waste Management Project (PGDSU) to strengthen the governance of the waste sector and, to improve infrastructure and solid waste management services in the Dakar metropolitan area and more than 100 secondary cities located in the Thiès poles (Thiès, Mbour and Tivaouane), the north pole (Saint-Louis and Matam) and Casamance (Ziguinchor, Kolda and Sédhiou). The project will benefit 138 municipalities, with a total population of 6,823,025 people or 758,114 households, improve their living environment (43% of Senegal's population) and provide at least 3,000 decent jobs for womenand young people. Touba is not being included.

The Office National de l'Assainissement (Sanitation National Office of Senegal - ONAS) has implemented structural programs for building sanitation infrastructures and improving services delivery performance and quality. During the last decade, the Five Centres program funded by the European Union in the secondary cities of Richard-Toll, Mbour, Mbacké, Tivaouane and Diourbel, aimed to improve the level of service on the whole sanitation chain (domestic and public spaces, access segment, sewers, treatment plant for wastewater and faecal sludge, etc.). Currently, the "Ten Cities Project" funded by the West African Bank for Development (WADB, or BOAD in French) is targeting the secondary cities of Matam, Kaolack, Louga, Tivaouane, Tambacounda, Saint-Louis, and Touba, plus the suburban cities of Rufisque and Pikine in the Greater Dakar area. The ONAS also focuses on improving water and sanitation services delivery in five towns in the centre of Senegal through the World Bank-funded program "PEAMIR."

The Global Green Growth Institute supports the Senegalese government to implement the Green Secondary Cities Development Program in 25 municipalities to address the challenges of growth and poverty. The Green Secondary Cities Development Programme aims to provide these localities with strategic planning tools focused on green growth to strengthen territorial resilience, develop climate governance capacities, and mobilise resources to finance bankable projects. For the first phase of the program's implementation, Kolda, Tivaouane, and the new city of Diamniadio were the pilot cities. As presented in the previous part of this chapter, the second stage involves Touba city (but not Mbacké). The GGGI approach is based on five 'pillars' that form the basis of the Green Secondary Cities Development Framework Guidelines, on which the most important progress can be made to achieve its objective. These pillars are:

- Energy and energy efficiency.
- Urban mobility.
- Land use.
- Water and sanitation.
- Solid waste management and recycling.

The 'green cities' model also relies on innovative business models and public–private partnership (PPP) schemes for services delivery. For the last 15 to 20 years, Senegal has been implementing a national urban slum upgrading and legalisation policy to respond to rapid and uncontrolled urban growth spreading to Dakar and more so in secondary cities.

14.4 Touba-Mbacké: A Hybrid City

Touba-Mbacké is a bipole city in central Senegal, located 190 km east of Dakar, but with very different identities, management, and governance methods, although it shares a common history linked to Mouridism. Touba was founded by Mame Maram Mbacké, the great-grandfather of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba (1853–1927), who founded the Holy City of Touba in 1887. Mourides consider the holy city as an earthly manifestation of 'Touba' or the celestial tree of paradise: it is the spiritual interpretation of the city that gave rise to the growth of this religious centre. The Great Mosque of Touba, which is juxtaposed with the old Mouride cemetery, symbolises metropolitan centrality and urban life rhythms around religious tourism activities.

Touba has grown to become the most famous Sufi Islamic scholarship and tourism activity centre in Senegal. The Islamic context has influenced the physical characteristics and socio-economic substance of the city. Built by rural people, the steep growth of the city of Touba is linked to three factors:

- The construction from 1931 of the Great Mosque with Serigne Mouhamadou Moustapha Mbacké who was the first Khalife of Touba.
- The first subdivision of Touba which resulted in the doubling of the population between 1958 and 1960.
- The establishment of Ocass Market in 1956 and its development from 1958.

PHOTO 14.1
The Great Mosque of Touba, Senegal

© Wikimedia Commons.

Although the city developed during the colonial period, it is one of the few towns in Senegal which does not have infrastructure developed under colonial rule. It has been growing rapidly, fostered by the launch in 1985 by the third Khalife of the Mourides, Serigne Abdoul Ahad Mbacké, which helped accelerate the city's urbanisation.

Mbacké, the secular elder sister city of Touba, has become a suburb, due to the growing influence of the holy city.

The Touba Great Magal is an annual religious event celebrated in Touba each year after 18 lunar months (18 Safar) by thousands of Muslims of the Mouride Brotherhood in memory of the departure into exile in Gabon. The Magal attracts pilgrims and tourists from the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mauritania, Europe and the United States, where the Mouride Brotherhood is strong. Pilgrims perform certain rites, and major companies relocate their operations to ensure good visibility among Muslim consumers and tourists.

During the Magal event, the state mobilises essential services like telephone, electricity and water companies to ensure a smooth pilgrimage in Touba-Mbacké.

14.4.1 Touba-Mbacké, a Sprawling City

The Greater Touba or Touba-Mbacké agglomeration, is facing unprecedented urban sprawl. In 1928, Touba occupied 400 ha; today, it occupies 30,000 ha. Several municipalities and villages have been attached to the city, either administratively or because of urban expansion. Due to urbanisation, the city is now connected to Mbacké, the capital of an administrative department in the Diourbel region. The two territories are heavily intertwined and spreading.

According to Dr Cheikh Guèye, a researcher and specialist of Touba (Guèye, 2002), the religious city grew by 15% per year for 30 years between 1958 and 1988. Figure 14.6 shows the extent of urban agglomeration from 1974 to 2009 (Ross, 2006). It was mainly made up of a rural population, primarily from the Arachidier Basin, and was the first city in the interior. This rural town has engulfed Mbacké, which developed on the margins of the religious city, and together they form the second agglomeration of the country. Many of the people living in these areas come from the rural areas of the Louga and Diourbel regions; others have come from the suburbs of Dakar.

Unfortunately, the urban sprawl has not yet been followed by ithe mplementation of urban services, especially in the peri-urban localities (also called 'Santhianes' locally). The facilities and infrastructure of Touba are unable to meet the needs of its outlying neighbourhoods.

FIGURE 14.6 | Map of the Touba-Mbacké agglomeration

Source: Ross (2006).

The Khalife-General lives on Touba-Mbacké's central square, and his father (former Khalif) supervised the construction of the mosque, which was completed in 1963. The mosque is centred on Touba-Mbacké's main market, the Ocass, one of Senegal's most important markets.

While Touba-Mbacké's thoroughfares converge on the Great Mosque, its public transit network (consisting of minibuses, buggies and donkey carts) converges on Ocass Market. This is the city's central business district (CBD), and it houses its oldest banking establishment. It is also the first part of the city to have undergone higher density "second-generation" urbanisation, where single-family compounds were replaced by multistory, multipurpose buildings that generate revenue for the city.

TABLE 14.8 | Profile of Touba-Mbacké

Indicator	Details	Unit Measure
Urban Area	What is the estimated urban area in the city?	1,833 km²
Demographics	What was the estimated population in 2013?	929,764 (2013)
	What was the population in 2013 or the last census	929,764
	Is the city's share of the national population growing?	5.87%
	Estimated density of population	510 pp km²
	Has population density in the city increased or decreased?	Increased 7.1%
Economic Strength	What is the city's estimated GDP?	Unknown
	Estimate of how fast is the economy-growing pa?	Unknown
	What is the fastest-growing sector of the economy?	Islamic tourism
	What does it export?	Islamic (Mouridism) Culture and artefacts
Income Levels	What is the estimated average income per month?	Unknown
	How much higher are incomes in the capital city compared to the city?	74,197/pa US$
Employment	How big is informal sector employment?	85% of total
	What is the unemployment rate?	Less than 15%
	Is there a reliance on remittances to supplement household income?	From pilgrims and diaspora
	Estimate % of households living below the poverty line. Gini Coefficient data?	Unknown
Poverty Rate	What is the gini coefficient?	Unknown
	What is the budget of the municipality?	Unknown
Public Finances	What are the primary sources of funds and expenditure?	Tourism
	How much money does the municipality spend/capita?	Unknown
	What % of the city population has access to potable water?	68%
Infrastructure	What % of the city population has good sanitation?	Unknown
	What % of the city population has waste management collection?	58%
	What is the length of urban roads?	Unknown
	What is the distance and travel time to the nearest largest city?	184km/2hr41min distance/time
	How many intercity buses are there a day?	270 trips/day
	Does the municipality have a GIS with an inventory of infrastructure?	Unknown
	What % of the city's residents live in slums?	Unknown
Housing and Land	What % of households rent?	39.9%
	What is the cost of land on the fringe?	Unknown

Various Sources

14.4.2 A Specific Model of Urban Governance

Touba is the capital of the Mourides, so all decisions concerning the management and development of the city are the exclusive responsibility of the Khalife General of the Mourides (Sow et al., 2020).

The municipal councillors are appointed within the great families of the sons of the revered Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba, the founder of the Mouridism and the holy city, and the Touba-Mosquée Ward is administered directly by a mayor whom the Khalife-General of the Mourids appoints.

Touba enjoys an officially recognised status of exterritoriality: the use of tobacco and alcohol, gambling, football, cinema, and folkloric events are prohibited within the limits of special status. This is not the case for Mbacké, which existed as a city (in the administrative sense) long before Touba, but has now become an enclave within the religious city.

The central government still controls aspects like security—and permission to set up official/national police stations was only given in the 1980s.

Nevertheless, the commitment of the different/various stakeholders to the city's urban development is a major asset. In Touba, state and religious authorities are working together to develop the city. The brotherhood is organised in various socio-professional and cultural associations known as 'dahiras'. The dahiras raise funds for the brotherhood`s projects and leaders. Mourides community stand out due to their dynamism and entrepreneurship. The Mourides constitute the most influential brotherhood in Senegal, particularly in Touba-Mbacké, i.e., politically, and economically. They own numerous rice, millets and peanut farms. and their followers sometimes work for free. The civic engagement noted with associations and dahiras, as well as its diaspora, is a strong asset for the future development of Touba, as they carry out development projects. Religious authorities in Touba finance large projects in all sectors.

A major project currently being carried out, for example, is the University of Touba, set up and financed mainly by the Khalife-General as well as other Mouride religious guides.

Touba-Mbacké is not one of the regional headquarters in Senegal. It falls under the Diourbel region because of its unique role as Senegal's largest traditional Islamic centre. Because of the city`s sacred nature, it was made an autonomous administrative zone run by the Mouride Brotherhood. The governance of Touba-Mbacké is based on a system of wards. Touba became a commune in the administrative sense in 2014, with a mayor as its head; before that it was a 'rural community' but not an urban commune.

The low level of French education of local elected officials is not a major constraint, as most of the counsellors are literate in Arabic. Women are also represented in the local council.

14.4.3 A Dynamic Economy and financial Environment

The economic importance of Touba-Mbacké within Senegal is significant. It has a well-structured CBD with banks and financial transaction facilities and strong commercial activity, particularly around the largest mosque in Senegal, with various goods and services on display for tourists and worshippers, including prayer mats, household goods, religious ceramics, clothes, artefacts and carpets.

During the Magal festival, water, electricity, ablution facilities and accommodation for tourists also increase significantly. The city's gross domestic product is not available, but it is estimated that commercial activities in the town can double during the Magal period, as the population swells up to 2 million.

14.4.4 An Original Urban Structure, Land Status, and Management

Touba-Mbacké is designed on a radial and regular grid layout pattern of streets, with three major boulevards converging on the Great Mosque of Touba in the centre of the city (Figure 14.7). The Mbacké-Touba boulevard forms the main promenade road for the twin city. Touba also has a major inner-city ring road. The environment of Touba-Mbacké varies from a high-density, built-up CBD to residential wards with lesser shopping areas to the rural areas outside of the city. On the latter, the Islamic clerics in Touba-Mbacké are the owners of numerous millet and peanut farms in the surrounding area; they control the peanut market, and their followers work for free because they are believed to gain spiritually.

Source: Direction des Travaux géographiques et cartographiques.

A large part of the municipal territory is the property of the religious family of Serigne Touba. Indeed, Touba is a land title. The city of Touba has the specificity of being built on a single private land title in the name of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba. The title was put into effect under the colonial was affected by the colonial power under the Khalifat of Serigne Mouhamadou Moustapha Mbacké in September 1928, under number 528, for an area of 400 ha. The land title on which the city is built has been extended, increasing to about 30,000 ha or about 12 km around the mosque. The city offers the image of a unique plot (Ka, 2011).

The city is made up of several 'villages' founded by Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba's sons. Darou Miname belongs to the family of Serigne Bassirou, Darou Khoudoss to that of Serigne Mouhamadou Moustapha Mbacké, first Kalife of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, Gouye Mbind to that of Serigne Bara, Ndindy to the family of Serigne Fallou the second Kalife of the Mourides. The religious leaders granted most plots free of charge to their disciples for housing needs or other activities.

As an important regional city, Touba is directly linked by road to other close Senegalese regional centres like Diourbel, Saint-Louis, Kaolack, Louga, Linguere, and Thiès, and it also has an airport outside of the town. During the Magal festival, due to the population increase, movement within the city is almost 100% pedestrian. The city has one hospital, two health centres, and about 20 health posts.

14.4.5 A Rapid Growth Leading to Environmental and Health Challenges

With its enormous demographic weight and the development of religious tourism, the quantity of daily waste produced by the city is significant. We also note the importance of plastic waste due to the use of water bags and the development of commercial activities. Along with the frequency of religious events, the city produces a high volume of organic waste. However, the city does not yet have an effective management system, although some improvements were made by the Solid Waste Management Unit (Government Agency for Solid Waste Management – UCG).

There is also the proliferation of garbage dumps, especially in outlying areas. The city of Touba alone produced 586.24 tonnes of waste per day in 2020, i.e., an average daily production of 0.71 kg per inhabitant. This waste is composed of fine elements (64%), organic waste (11%), plastic waste (5%), and fuel (7%) (UCGC, 2017). Waste management is not done under the best conditions. Only 14% of households have regulatory bins. The pre-collection is carried out by private contractors, (GGGI, 2020).

Touba is the only city in Senegal where the distribution of water is free. But the tap water in this locality is very salty, pushing the population to buy water from wells, with all that this entails as a hygiene problem. This salinity of the water also has negative impacts on the city's environment. The quality of the water does not facilitate the development of plant cover in public spaces. During the Magal, there is a critical lack of water, leading part of the population to buy water tanks to cover their needs during these events. And during the rainy season, most of the streets are flooded.

Recent investments to improve the management and treatment of wastewater have been made to the city's sewer network, through extension to areas relying on on-site sanitation. There is now a faecal sludge treatment plant, which was built in Mbacké by the Office National de l'Assainissement (ONAS) and managed by a national private firm, Delvic SI.

To support population growth, The Government has launched in 2007 a program for the modernisation of Touba-Mbacké over the next five years that will disburse "about FCFA100 billion ($235 million) for the extension of road and electricity networks, as well as the sanitation system" in Touba-Mbacké.

14.5 Touba's Trends and Challenges for the Future

The Greater Touba has strong commercial activities, and the city's growth will continue to be driven by commercial education, knowledge, and religious activities. Remittances and the flow of funds for developing religious and cultural facilities have been crucial to the development of Touba-Mbacké, as has the Brotherhood of Mourides. Studies have been undertaken to investigate how the city's cultural capital can develop tourism and education opportunities.

The city of Touba will continue to expand, particularly to the north, due to increased rural-urban migration and growing demand for land and housing. This rapid urbanisation in this corridor will impact mobility significantly, increase travel time to work, and strain an already congested and inefficient transportation network.

The city could use the international expertise and goodwill of its institutions, especially leaders of Mouridism, to enhance its competitiveness, governance, and potential to play a more significant role in the nation's development. There are opportunities to exploit the city's unique circumstances, using its international significance to attract capital and investment in new enterprises that help develop and diversify the local economy.

In this context, GGGI is working with the municipality of Touba to develop and implement a Development Strategy of Touba as a Green Secondary City. Developed and implemented by GGGI with the Senegalese government and local authorities, the Touba 2035 Green City Development Strategy provides a planning and implementation framework to strengthen urban resilience for coping with the effects of climate change, as well as to consolidate its economic competitiveness and reinforce its strategic position within its region. The strategy can help deliver more sustainable development outcomes, preserving the environment and natural resources through an integrated and inclusive urban management approach based on green growth.

The Touba Green City Action Plan relies on the implementation of three major programs, broken down into a portfolio of 20 priority projects to drive the city's ecological transition towards green growth over five years (2020–2024). The process involves a multi-sector consultation approach of a series of technical activities with the municipality's participation, local actors, religious leaders, and technical services. This plan includes several major development projects that will enable Touba to improve its religious and economic functions and maintain its position as Senegal's second-largest city. The Touba vision is aimed at ensuring the transition to a low-carbon green city. The strategic guidelines defined based on the Green Secondary Cities Development Guidelines make this vision operational and focus on the city's priorities—on aspects related to the revegetation of the city, the strengthening of urban services, and the establishment of a liquid-solid waste collection and management system. In total, 20 priority projects have been identified to drive the city's transition to green growth. Creating an integrated waste recovery centre is an economic development objective for the city because it should also create green jobs and thus have social and economic benefits.

There are also opportunities to introduce public-private partnerships to improve the delivery and maintenance of the public utilities listed above.

14.6 Summary of Main Challenges for Senegalese Secondary Cities

The level of urbanisation in Senegal is expected to reach 30% by 2030. While Dakar will continue to grow rapidly, absorbing many rural-urban migrants in the future, secondary cities are expected to experience a more significant share of urban population growth. The challenges of managing uncontrolled and unbalanced growth of urbanisation in Senegal are that the Dakar capital region has a high level of polarisation, including the bulk of activities, infrastructure, businesses, universities, and informal sector jobs. Secondary cities and regions are losing out on investment, development and employment opportunities. With high levels of youth unemployment in many of these cities and loss of development opportunities, this situation adds to a restlessness and concerns about equity and justice, with significant economic, social and political consequences for the country.

Secondary, or intermediate cities as known in Senegal, are crucial to support the development of a national system of cities and regional economies. Economic development of secondary cities has not been a significant focus of urban policy; until recently. Poor urban governance is one of the most significant factors undermining cities' competitiveness in many developing economies and in Senegal. Unless more significant opportunities and efforts are made to support the development of secondary cities, the country will be unable to maximise its development potential. This entails an action agenda that focuses on decentralised investment in public services and goods to support secondary cities. If no action plan is put in place, the gap between Dakar and Senegal's secondary cities will continue to widen. Senegal can develop its inland secondary cities, but it needs a comprehensive set of policies and plans to do so.

Key to this is the promotion of competitiveness, including an emphasis on an urbanisation strategy that integrates all cities, irrespective of whether they are secondary or tertiary. This requires the decentralisation and devolution of administrative and financial responsibilities, leadership; accessibility of local government services; and inclusive decision-making to secondary cities. Access to good statistical and survey data for Touba-Mbacké is limited. Many basic indicators of the city's development proved difficult to locate or were not produced. This makes it difficult for the city to develop economic, social, and land-use policies without access to information. Good geospatial data is available from Africapolis, but this lacks depth in terms of the socio-demographics and economics of the city. There is a need to significantly improve data and management information services for the city and its regional economy.

Secondary urban centres face serious environmental, economic and social problems that need to be brought to the forefront and given more significant resources in order to implement and localise national, regional, and urban and regional development policies and programs. A massive backlog of infrastructure projects exists for most of Senegal's secondary cities. Yet funding for strategic infrastructures such as roads, sanitation, pipe-borne water supply, information and communications technology (ICT), and electricity is needed to support transport, logistics, telecommunications and municipal services that significantly affect secondary cities' competitiveness.

A means of collecting additional taxes and revenues to pay for the urban services is crucial if the demands for adequate infrastructure are to be met. This necessitates putting land-use planning back at the heart of national priorities. Under this condition and adding relevant policies and investments, secondary cities could become green growth poles capable of absorbing rural exodus and providing the services and jobs needed by the increasing population.

The government has initiated a series of programs and actions to create a competitive regional economy, creating wealth and jobs supported by secondary cities and capable of driving a balanced development of the territories, and all of this justifies the government's option to retain secondary cities as a model for green cities (see above).

There are many actions Senegal could take to support the development of its secondary cities. These need to be enunciated clearly and prioritised. The authors suggest three priority areas below, where Senegal should engage in broader discussion and debate, and where calling for policy action could support the sustainable development of Senegalese secondary cities.

14.6.1 Policies Improvements to Support the Development of Secondary Cities in Senegal

Senegal is a country facing significant challenges in managing urbanisation. Climate, historical and cultural factors have shaped the geography of its cities and urban systems. Its proximity to Europe offers significant development opportunities, but its network of cities and urban populations needs to become better educated, developed, and competitive to realise these: this especially applies to the nation's secondary cities. These need support to realise their full development potential.

14.6.2 Climate Adaptation and Relevant Sanitation, Solid Waste Management, And Stormwater Management: A Necessary Paradigm Shift

Climate change is affecting many Senegal cities. For example, Saint-Louis, home to nearly 300,000 people, is seeing houses destroyed, streets flooded, and crops killed by encroaching saltwater Yeung, 2019). Senegal is acting on climate change through action plans and emergency management strategies, but funding to develop infrastructure for adaptation is limited (Zamudio & Terton, 2016).

Uncontrolled construction, urban sprawl, and low-density suburban areas expand unitary costs of networks, avoiding economies of scale and making it even more challenging to finance sanitation and drainage infrastructure and implement solid waste collection and treatment systems. Climate change perspectives will most likely aggravate the consequences of urban environment management failure.

Sanitation and stormwater management has relied on 'classical', costly, big network solutions, adapted from western practices. These are not applicable for non-consolidated urban contexts, which have generally failed in Senegal. They result in a massive waste of public funds (mainly by debt, reinforcing the country's dependence on its donors and threatening the capacity to develop its endogenic incomes and invest in other sectors).

But in the last 10 years, thanks to the liveliness of its private firms and the sense of innovation of some of its researchers, and with the noticeable support of its international partners such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, French Agency for Development (AFD), World Bank, or USAID ,amongst others, Senegal, and in

particular Dakar, has been a laboratory for innovation in terms of decentralised sanitation solutions relying on on-site solutions and faecal sludge solutions, as well as supporting and regulating the (primarily informal) private service providers.

Circular economy approaches have been experimented with for both sewerage and faecal sludge or solid organic and plastic waste. New integrated and 'nature-based' solutions are being tested for improving the city's resilience to flooding. If all the lessons from those experiences and approaches are viable, these could be adopted, and upscaling could represent a significant opportunity for supporting the development of secondary cities in Senegal.

14.6.3 Developing National Secondary Cities Movement Partnerships: A Collaborative Governance to Develop Regional Economic Clusters and Corridors of Smaller Cities

Increasingly, cities in Senegal are being exposed to greater competition and must enhance their economic performance by integrating their services better into value-adding industries and supply chains. The factors that drive competitiveness should be aligned to developed economic infrastructure that can facilitate trade and investment growth in secondary cities and between cities in a regional network. Strategies are needed to address such deficiencies by fostering integration to ensure more equitable, efficient and environmentally sustainable urban development across the country. Such strategies should include harnessing the resources of countries and cities in the region to boost weak areas.

The dynamics of local economies, including secondary cities in Senegal, could be enhanced through various social, cultural, and institutional-business integration. The concept of secondary city partnerships entails enhancing regional linkages and regional cooperation to reduce the widening disparities between cities to develop city networks. National and subnational policies that support secondary city partnerships can be achieved through integrated physical, logistical, and economic linguistic investment in secondary cities; and improved sub-regional transport and communication systems between the cities. For example, organised networks, diaspora linkages, trusts, corporate leadership, innovation, creativity and risk management can be promoted in entrepreneurship and seeking trade and investment with other secondary cities in Senegal and beyond.

This would require a deliberate attempt at fostering regional cooperation between metropolitan and secondary cities to identify opportunities for trade and collaboration in order to create new jobs and business opportunities that can tap into national, international and secondary cities markets. Partnerships are needed to address regional infrastructure deficiencies and promote information sharing. Partnerships can also promote economic trade corridors that link and increase connectivity and trade between cities and integrate secondary cities into regional supply chains.

The creation of economic development corridors and regional clusters of cities has the potential to create mechanisms that secondary cities can use to unlock their potential to attract investment and capital; develop their human capital base, investment in infrastructure, knowledge, trade, and grow their way out of poverty. These can be achieved through the following means:

- Enable secondary cities to be smarter cities by importing and adapting green technologies, better logistics systems, and e-governance between secondary cities.
- Develop systems for enhanced mobility, including ICT-enabled transport infrastructure, and integrated multi-modal transport The relaunch of the railways through the creation of new lines and upgrading of existing ones, as proposed in the "Plan Sénégal Emergent" strategy, would, of course, contribute to the opening and economic development of secondary cities in Senegal, and with neighbouring countries. One first example of such an intercity railway is already being achieved between Dakar and Diamniadio.
- Promote high-value cluster development by developing innovation/incubation hubs and centres and training programs integrating primate cities such as Dakar.
- Strengthening urban development authorities by promoting integrated development planning and fostering the regeneration of secondary cities' inner areas.
- Promoting an urbanisation strategy and system of integrated cities between Senegal and the secondary cities of neighbouring countries.

Senegal surrounds the Gambia, and the two countries already share language, social and cultural commonalities. Enhancing linkages by aligning logistics, trade, economic and administrative systems to improve the free flow of people, goods, and services between cities is essential in fostering the development of economic corridors and competitive regions between the two countries, in the context of Senegambia trade relations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African free trade agreements.

Improved inter-regional trade between Senegal and the Gambia's cities could be promoted by rehabilitating roads and developing ICT networks. The improvement of the political relationship between the two government has created a new dynamic, and a bridge on the Gambia River, inaugurated recently, is promoting interchanges between the two countries and is connecting the southern region of Casamance (and the secondary cities of Kolda, Sédhiou and Ziguinchor) to the rest of Senegalese territory.

A bridge is also being built on the Senegal River, connecting Rosso-Mauritania and Rosso-Senegal's twin cities, thus allowing trade and exchanges between Senegal and neighbouring sub-Saharan African countries in the northern part of the continent (Maghreb countries). This is a significant symbolic achievement, considering that Mauritania and Senegal were at the edge of a war 20 years ago. Adopting a 'synaps' approach promoting sub-regional integration and promoting exchanges between secondary cities from Senegal and its neighbouring countries, Mali, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, should be encouraged by the States' governments with the support of their technical and financial partners.

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ENDNOTES

(1) Macrocephaly, in geography terms relates to the excessive concentration of population and development in a single centre to the detriment of other areas.

SECTION III.

New Urban-Age Agenda for Secondary Cities

15

LEARNING OUTCOMES

BRIAN H ROBERTS,
GODFREY O. OANYUMBA

Few in-depth studies have been conducted of African secondary cities compared to metropolitan regions. Most studies on secondary cities have been undertaken by international development assistance or national agencies. These tend to have a sector-specific focus with minimal detailed information to support proposed development projects and activities. The same applies to master plans, many of which are outdated. The primary message coming out of the findings of the book is more research and significantly better data are needed to meet the planning, urban management and sustainable development needs of African secondary cities.

PHOTO 15.1
Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) Southern Africa YALI Regional Learning Center

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This chapter attempts to synthesize the principal findings of the book. It highlights the major policy gaps as well as failures in policies, management and development practices. It recommends ways the development of secondary cities, including their role in supporting national and regional socio-economic development, can be supported. Historical and other factors have significantly influenced the development of secondary cities in Africa and have led to many of its current development problems. Changing development and governance paradigms that are a legacy of the past will be difficult. The research indicates a significant need for a change of approach to urban governance and management, the strengthening of enabling environments, and addressing risks and impacts associated with climate and economic change, pandemics, migration, regional disparities, and environmental degradation. Hopefully, these findings will inform the discussion and debate on the need for a new urban agenda to support the development of secondary cities in African countries.

The case studies have formed an important part of this research. They reveal the diversity of approaches adopted by the eight countries studied to support the development of secondary cities. Countries like Ghana, Kenya and Uganda are giving strong support to the development of secondary cities linked to policies on decentralisation. Other countries like Nigeria are less engaged in developing secondary cities and continue to favour a more centralised national development approach. This research has found many commonalities of development issues and challenges facing African secondary cities. Post-independence, many countries have failed to review their governance and administration systems for relevance to the African context. In many cases, they have allowed systems that were put in place by colonial powers to be eroded and corrupted. This is particularly the case in many aspects of urban planning and management systems.

This research has revealed a range of factors contributing to the lack of sustainable development of African secondary cities. The main findings are summarised below under the headings of policy and governance, physical and spatial development, economic development, socio-demographic features, the environment, connectivity, and international development assistance.

15.1 Features of Secondary Development

Since the end of the colonial era, African countries have experienced an unprecedented period of rapid urbanisation and development. Africa's urbanisation rate is 1.1%, although this is predicted to fall slightly over the next three decades. Africa is 43% urbanised and is likely to reach 50% by 2030. Some countries, like Egypt, are heavily urbanised, whereas countries like Burundi have low levels of urbanisation. This rapid urbanisation is placing enormous pressure on African countries. A clear finding of the research undertaken for this book is that African countries must make more vigorous efforts to manage urbanisation: the consequences of not doing so on future generations of African urban dwellers, especially in secondary cities, will otherwise be significant.

This research has shown that secondary cities face similar development and management problems to those of large metropolitan and primate cities, but at different types and scales – and these problems vary between regions and within countries. The economic and spatial geography, roles and functions, levels of development and socio-economic structure of secondary cities differ from those of metropolitan areas and smaller regional cities – as secondary cities are significant catalysts for development and exchange within national and cross-border economies.

Secondary cities are a subsidiary type of city that forms part of a national/regional system of cities and urban settlements. Without secondary cities, national economies in countries with large populations would not function efficiently, and economic performance would be significantly reduced. While in the context of Africa, secondary cities tend to be defined by a population range between 100,000 and 1 million, they can be larger in countries like Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya or smaller in Botswana and Mali. Secondary cities are usually defined more by their function than their size – but not always.

Secondary cities play an essential role in the command-and-control systems of government, policy, supply chains, logistics, economics, infrastructure development and human services delivery. Unlike primary cities, they are not the centre of economic activity and government in the country. Many secondary cities fill a role as high-order intermediaries, hubs or loci in transportation and logistics networks, connecting large metropolitan areas with smaller regional networks of towns and cities. They are vital to facilitating the efficient and effective two-way flow of trade, people, investment, information, infrastructure and human services between metropolitan regions, smaller regional towns, cities and rural areas. They also play an important role in facilitating trade between cross-border towns and cities.

Historically, advanced economies would not have developed without well-functioning and connected national systems of cities and regional economies. Generally, these had good logistics, infrastructure, governance, and local services delivery systems. Secondary cities play a crucial role in national spatial, economic and social development in all countries, especially in rapidly urbanising countries. Overall, however, African secondary cities are not functioning, performing or operating well within national systems of cities – they are not value-adding to processes and supply chains.

A key problem throughout most of Africa is the focus of national governments on supporting the development of primary cities, resulting in policy neglect and an unsustainable system of cities development. This situation, accompanied by other factors beyond the control of the national and local government, has left the capacity and development potential of secondary cities severely weakened and is hindering national and regional development.

15.2 Policies and Governance

15.2.1 Secondary Cities Not a High Priority Area of Policy Focus

For more than 50 years, there has been intermittent interest by governments, international development agencies and researchers in developing secondary cities in Africa. Many of the issues facing cities, including inequitable development, poor governance, unmanaged urban development, low levels of investment, and environmental neglect – have been extensively documented. Despite this and despite considerable assistance funds being injected into African economies, minimal progress has been made. Despite the growing interest in secondary cities and the wider recognition of their contribution to national economies, they have not until recently featured widely in national and international urbanisation and economic development policy discussions. To date, less than 20 African countries have national urbanisation policies, strategies, or plans, and only 14 were found to mention secondary or intermediaries in their urban policy statements.

15.2.2 The Legacy of Colonialism Development Policies

Colonial development policies and governance practices have undoubtably had a profound and ongoing impact on secondary city development across much of Africa – as all but two African countries (Ethiopia and Liberia) experienced significant periods of colonial rule. Most of today's secondary cities were established as regional administrative centres of provincial and local governments. Their primary purpose was to provide localised administrative and service centres to support the colonial focus on opening vast areas of Africa to agriculture – for cash cropping and pastoral farming – and for mineral extraction to support European industrialisation. This had significant impacts on traditional culture and governance, the effects of which continue today.

During colonial times local governments in secondary African cities were, generally, better funded, administered, and managed than today, as they were recognised as important to maintaining efficient national and international trade and supply chains. In most cases after independence, the focus shifted to a more centralised approach, with the role of secondary cities being primarily to support national and regional economies' trading and governance requirements. Today most secondary city economies in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, are not heavily engaged in export supply chains, apart from natural resources and a limited range of agricultural products, and transport.

In many countries, the transition to self-rule resulted in a significant loss of professional and managerial personnel, with both colonial and highly educated nationals leaving or migrating. This loss of human and corporate capital, along with reduced access to core funding for infrastructure and community services investment, severely depleted the capacity of secondary and small local governments across the continent to recruit competent staff and secure development and operational funds. Reductions in central government funding to local governments after independence, severely weakened local authorities and their capacity to deliver services, resulting in the progressive centralisation of political power, financial control, decision-making, and delivery of municipal services by central government agencies.

Colonial government policies and approaches to urban planning, development and governance significantly impacted how secondary cities were developed and managed post-independence. Many of those policies and approaches have remained in common practice, despite many former colonial countries reforming their planning systems, laws and practices over time. This continuation of a Western systems approach to planning and development, albeit outdated, is not unexpected, given that much of the policy advice provided to African governments over many decades has come from advisers from Western backgrounds, and that a significant proportion of senior national public-sector managers, policymakers and academics also were educated in developed countries. There is yet to emerge an endogenous hybrid system of governance that merges colonial, customary, and modern-world policies and practices appropriate to the needs of African cities.

15.2.3 Decentralisation and Devolution

Few of the African countries studied had adopted national decentralisation and evolution policies focused on the planning and development of secondary cities, although some attempts have been made. Angola has a secondary city policy, starting with its new-town satellite cities located around Luanda, the capital. Kenya had a national growth centre strategy in the 1970s; however, this proved ineffective and is now defunct. In 2010, Kenya adopted a new Constitution[1] that introduced a decentralisation program with new country structures and autonomous regional secondary cities. However, 6 of the 10 leading secondary cities lie within 65 km of Kenya's capital, Nairobi. Rwanda, Uganda, Tunisia and Senegal have all embarked upon programs aimed at decentralisation.

Nigeria has made the most frequent experiments with devolving power. However, except for the founding of the new federal capital Abuja, deep federal centralism has and will continue to make it difficult to decentralise power to the extent desirable that would stimulate far-reaching growth in the country's many secondary cities. The Nigerian National Development Plan 2021 to 2025 (Government of Nigeria, 2021). states explicitly that specific cities within each region will be developed into regional growth centres. This policy aims to speed up the growth of secondary urban centres within respective regions or states. The mechanism for achieving this is not explained in the document.

South Africa, post-1994, has had far-reaching policy transformations to redress in its spatial economy. Ethiopia is currently supporting policies that specifically address secondary cities. Senegal has developed policies to develop 10 secondary cities as growth centres to rebalance the distribution of the nation's urban population.

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Decentralisation of government should result in significant support for the development of secondary cities. However, research shows the process is slow, with a strong reluctance of central government to develop the powers and financial management and resources required to support it. Few countries have advocated a more equitable distribution of natural resources to secondary cities. Central governments tend not to trust the local government to deliver urban services. Only in the large metropolitan regions has there been a willingness to develop more service delivery responsibilities. The COVID-19 pandemic has thwarted most attempts at decentralisation, as local governments do not have the capacity, resources, training, nor leadership to manage the crisis. Many responsibilities have been re-centralised and may not easily be wrested back by local governments.

15.2.4 Policies and Initiatives to Support Secondary City Development:

Initiatives and policies are necessary to support the development of secondary cities. Cities Alliance has supported the preparation of city development strategies that seek to identify elements of competitiveness and development potential for secondary cities in several African countries.

In Angola, the notion of competitiveness and economic efficiency of secondary cities is unlikely to be realised unless there is a rethink on the national urban policy and decentralisation, given the high level of urban primacy. The central government devolved power to Huambo and other cities and allocated national resources for their

reconstruction. Progress, however, has been slow because of the weakness of local government administration and management. In Ghana, the local government is severely constrained by the lack of capacity to develop and implement policy, uncertainty in flows of grant money, and little responsibility for local economic development. An unwillingness to enforce planning and building controls has resulted in deforestation and the construction of housing in wetland and flood-prone areas, with severe environmental impacts.

In Kenya, Mombasa's policy gaps include pro-poor policies, sound local government financial systems, decisions based on a firm foundation of data and information, and a transformational framework aligned with the 2010 Constitution. The recommendation from the study of Touba-Mbacké in Senegal is simply to have in place data and information for decision-making. In Nigeria, Ibadan's initiatives and policies are weak and poorly articulated. They revolve around the provision of housing. Devoid of national policy interventions and reforms to strengthen the decentralisation process, little change is expected to improve the management and competitiveness of Ibadan. Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth), in South Africa, like other secondary cities, must target multi-sectorial investments that suit its condition.

15.2.5 Local Government Reforms

The legacy of colonial rule and government systems continues to shape the administrative, planning, development, and economic development policies and management functions of secondary cities in Africa, despite the decline in local government authority over time. There is growing pressure for greater decentralisation and devolution but attempts at local government reform have been slow. They have not significantly altered the urban governance structure and local government systems in many African countries. Countries like Ghana, Kenya, Morocco (Houdret & Harnisch, 2017) and Tunisia, however, have embarked upon local government reforms to urban planning, finance, administration and management systems.

Transformation and reforms have proved difficult, with many restrictions on funding arrangements and entrenched employment and organisation systems that have changed little since the colonial era. This is partly because local governments and regional offices of central government agencies based in the secondary cities create significant local employment. Attempts at institutional and labour efficiency reforms have been difficult where job losses are threatened. This issue was specifically relevant to Cape Coast and Gqeberha in South Africa.

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They have not significantly altered the urban governance structure and local government systems in many African countries.

Changes have occurred in some countries due to political reform: for example, Nigeria's civilian and military experimentation with federalism; Ethiopia's swing from feudal to Marxist-Leninist inclinations; South Africa's apartheid; and Angola's new federalism after the civil war. Other determinants of the transformation identified in the case studies arise from opportunities presented by constitutional changes that affected all eight of the secondary cities studied. As an area of policy focus, secondary cities were identified through the research as a non-policy priority for African countries, except for Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, and South Africa, which has started a conversation on the concept.

15.2.6 Public Consultation and Engagement

Many case studies raised the need for improved public consultation and engagement. The level of public consultation is improving in countries like Kenya and Uganda, but it is often led by the community, non-government advocacy or specific interest groups. Public consultation in secondary cities is limited in scope and scale, especially for inclusive urban planning and budgeting: many local government's view consultation and participation in urban governance processes as a threat to their authority. Wider community consultation and participation in local urban governance in secondary cities will serve as a check on the abuse of power, introducing accountability and engaging communities in decision-making, planning and implementation processes. Community participation needs to go a further step: to engaging with the community and special interest groups so that they are not only involved in planning and policy-making processes, but also in co-executing programs of activities and being chartered to deliver local infrastructure and services, undertake maintenance, and educate communities on becoming more responsible for taking care of the environment and the needs of the poor and marginalised groups.

15.2.7 Urban Governance

Urban governance was found to be a challenge in all of the case study secondary cities. The biggest issue is the growing re-centralisation of power at the expense of local autonomy, identified in Angola, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Senegal and, to a lesser extent, in South Africa. The centralisation of power significantly impacts local government governance because of their dependence on the political will and controls at the centre of government. The consequence is weak local governments that struggle to sustain themselves financially and deliver what may be considered even minimal services to their populations, let alone aim to improve the sustainability and robust development of the area within their responsibility.

The most significant challenges to urban governance in secondary cities are the poor qualifications, knowledge, and experience of city management staff. Most lack professional staff and technical skills. Few secondary cities have qualified planners, engineers, or financial or environmental experts to undertake local governments' mandatory functions and responsibilities in managing urbanisation. Technologies, bylaws, management practices, and processes need to be modernised and financial accounting practices improved. Faculties are poor, with a lack of furnishing, equipment and motor vehicles making it extremely difficult to conduct many processes of local government efficiently. Few secondary cities have adopted e-governance, which is essential to modernise and improve the efficiency and productivity of government to deliver urban services. Many of the governance systems are not open, leaving space for corruption and other malpractices.

15.2.8 Land Administration and Management

Land administration and management is one of the most challenging issues in secondary cities. Illegal occupation, theft, disputed ownerships, and dual land registries (state and customary) complicate ownership rights and land-use, which deny people and businesses the opportunity to generate wealth through tenure security. In Angola, the situation is more challenging, with many areas surrounding secondary cities being land-mined during a disastrous 41-year period of civil war. A well-performing land management and administration system will ensure the efficient operation of land markets, property taxes, security of tenure, change of use, economic returns, and wealth generation. A well-functioning system requires customary land leases to be registered to guarantee property rights and for the securitisation of loans against land and property for investment.

Land ownership and lease records are poor, leading to significant property tax shortfalls in secondary cities, and widespread disputes related to customary land. Over the past three decades, most countries in Africa have experimented with ways to solve the challenges related to ownership and development of land, especially land conversion. Land problems are multi-faceted and multi-layered, and the development and use of land is a significant disincentive to its improvement in secondary cities and rural areas.

15.2.9 Municipal Financial Management

All secondary city case studies identified municipal financial management as being poor. Even Gqeberha (South Africa), which had good municipal financial management practices, faced significant challenges. Poor revenue generation instruments, financial mismanagement, wasteful expenditure, insolvency, and corruption are common problems. During the colonial era, municipal financial management practices were good, partly because access to and flow of funds for capital works investment and maintenance were reliable, and property and other taxes were collected. Since independence, in most cases, local government effectiveness has been weakened by centralist policies, limited access to well-trained staff and insufficient funds to meet budget outlays, including wages.

Municipal financial management practices identified by the research as needing improvement include:

- Modernisation of municipal financial practices, including accrual accounting, budgeting, and transparency.
- Taxation mapping and property valuation.
- Debt management.
- Tax collection.

15.3 Physical and Spatial Development

In all case studies, the need for better planning and management of secondary city urban development is a strong message. The periphery of most secondary cities has grown significantly in recent years without adequate planning and control on urban development. The case studies indicate a reluctance by local governments to enforce planning rules, plans, standards and regulations. The consequences are that spatial development patterns for African primate and secondary cities have been laissez-faire and low density. Many secondary cities' urban-area growth rate, especially in eastern, western and parts of central Africa, is expanding at twice the population growth rate. Uncontrolled sprawl in peripheral low-density urban settlements has left many newly urbanised areas lacking basic infrastructure and human services.

Secondary city local governments must manage peripheral and informal/slum area settlements and uphold the rule of law and planning for development. The trend in the spatial development of secondary cities will not change, and they will become sprawling metropolises. The consequences of sprawling, uncontrolled development are already compounding severe economic, social and environmental problems. The difficulties, and cost of addressing them, will increase with time. Although this message has been stated many times over decades, there is little evidence in the research to suggest that secondary city local governments are willing to change. This unwillingness of the local government to change their approach and uphold the rule of law related to the management and sustainable development of secondary cities is the single biggest obstacle to their sustainable development.

In Ghana, for example (Photo 15.2), despite having a plan for the development of the city of Tamale, development on the periphery has not been well managed. This has resulted in many parts of the city lacking good urban services and housing. With growing civil unrest in the Sahel, secondary cities like Tamale are likely to experience an influx of refugees, which will only compound the problems associated with poor urban planning and management for secondary cities with an increasing migrant population across the continent.

PHOTO 15.2
Unplanned urban expansion on the periphery of secondary cities: Tamale, Ghana

© Google Earth (2021)

Except for Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya, Congo and South Africa, which have populations of over 1 million, the populations of most African secondary cities are between 100,000 and 300,000 (Table 15.1). The growth in the number of secondary African cities has been significant. In 1990 it is estimated there were 243 secondary cities with populations between 100,000 and 1 million. By 2020 there were 882 cities with that population, and by 2050, if growth rates continue, this number could reach 1,800 to 2,000. The consequence of this trend is that by 2030, more than 30,000 km² of the most fertile land is likely to be converted for urban use.

TABLE 15.1 | Type and numbers of urban agglomerations in Africa (2015)

AFRICA	1990	2000	2010	2015	2020	2030	2035
10 million or more		1	2	3	3	5	5
5 to 10 million	1	2	2	3	6	13	19
1 to 5 million	24	37	42	51	59	81	93
500,000 to 1 million	29	35	56	60	75	111	128
300,000 to 500,000	43	48	65	90	92	117	121
100,000 to 300,000*	171	255	351	485	715		
50,000 to 100,000*	290	454	636	782	815		
Total	558	832	1,154	1,474	1,765		
Eastern Africa							
10 million or more	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
5 to 10 million	0	0	0	1	1	4	5

Source: Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics (2020). Estimates derived from Africapolis Data (2015).

15.3.1 The Dominance of Primate Cities

African countries have one of the highest levels of urban primacy of all global regions. In 41 out of 51 African countries, more than 15% of the urban population lives in the largest primate cities. In 27 countries, more than 30% live in primate cities, while in 2 cities – Togo and Djibouti – more than half the urban population lives in those counties' largest cities. This results in a disproportionately high concentration of population, human capital, wealth and economic investment in one place. Many of these primate cities are experiencing increasing land disputes, infrastructure, environmental and social issues. More than 30% of national GDP output occurs in primate cities. Measures of GDP, levels of investment, infrastructure, wages, access to services, and other development indicators per capita show that primate cities are 1.5 to 3 times better off than secondary cities. This imbalance poses significant risks, given that a major disaster or civil unrest in a primate city would have severe impacts on national economies. In addition, many primate cities are in hazardous coastal zones and face potential climate change threats.

15.3.2 Secondary City Agglomerations

Africapolis (spatial data and research) shows two emerging phenomena of secondary city agglomeration in African regions. One is a poly-centric agglomeration of a primate city surrounded by rapidly expanding secondary cities, due primarily to significant spill-over of the population, such as has occurred in Casablanca (Morocco), Lagos (Nigeria) and Johannesburg (South Africa). The second is where an existing secondary city has expanded rapidly, due to the rapid urban growth of surrounding towns and smaller cities that have become spatially and economically integrated with that secondary city. While the latter has resulted in very large population agglomerations, these function as one secondary city, such as Ibadan in Nigeria and Kisumu in Kenya. This phenomenon is becoming more widespread in western and eastern Africa.

The agglomeration phenomenon creates significant challenges for the clustered secondary cities surrounding primate cities such as Lagos, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and Tunis (Tunisia). While the agglomerations developing around existing secondary cities often lead to an emergence of regional markets, creating trade, employment, and service opportunities, they face significant public transport, urban services, and environmental problems. The primary cities in Africa may well have an international outlook, and secondary cities can capitalise on this advantage by complementing the hosting of productive activities in smaller clusters, which can capitalise on lower costs associated with smaller size or proximity to inputs such as agriculture or natural resources.

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While the latter has resulted in very large population agglomerations, these function as one secondary city, such as Ibadan in Nigeria and Kisumu in Kenya.

In addition, the phenomenon encourages increased rural-urban migration. There are no effective regional government mechanisms for funding or coordination of infrastructure development and service delivery. Service delivery, therefore, becomes piecemeal, as local governments compete for an ever-decreasing pool of funds, primarily from federal sources, to provide basic urban services. Similarly, there are no effective mechanisms for integrating regional development planning, investment, or service delivery in cities like Ibadan (Nigeria), Kisumu (Kenya) or Touba-Mbacké (Senegal).

In most cases, critical elements of hard and soft infrastructure needed to support agglomeration economies' development and sustainable growth are not available or are inadequate. Urban utility corridors are seldom reserved or protected from illegal development, which adds significantly to land acquisition and construction costs later, when services are needed.

The case studies show that as secondary cities become part of primate cities or expand to form new urban agglomerations, a new metropolitan management structure is required to ensure effective and orderly coordination of planning, infrastructure, and service delivery of the newly integrated agglomeration.

15.3.3 Emerging International Trade Corridor Secondary Cities

Another trend emerging in western and eastern Africa is the development of international trade corridor secondary and cross-border cities. Over 50 cross-border secondary cities are expanding rapidly. The corridor cities comprise a series of smaller towns and cities whose economies are linked by trade along the highway that connects them. A wide range of goods and services are traded between such cities and between countries. This expansion will lead to a series of narrow, linear secondary cities. A key problem emerging from this form of development is that the cities within the corridors compete for limited trade, infrastructure, and other development funds from the central government rather than collaborate – and the disbursement of development funds is often disjointed, erratic and politically based.

As a result, infrastructure providers responsible for ensuring that the network of cities along these corridors are well connected and function better end up facing traffic bottlenecks and conflict between local- and through-traffic flows. Better corridor development planning, especially land-use, roads and traffic management, could reduce many of those problems.

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> *The corridor cities comprise a series of smaller towns and cities whose economies are linked by trade along the highway that connects them.*

The research found little evidence of attempts to support collaborative efforts on secondary city corridor development. Mechanisms are needed to improve both the planning of economic development corridors and the development of secondary corridor cities. These mechanisms are particularly critical for corridors crossing international boundaries. New forms of partnerships will be required to manage secondary cities along trade development corridors in African countries. This includes ratifying international agreements between countries involving free-trade regulations, code sharing of infrastructure, policing and free movement of people.

15.3.4 Coastal, Inland and Landlocked Secondary Cities

Coastal secondary cities, especially port cities like Gabès (Tunisia), Mombasa (Kenya), Warri (Nigeria) and Sekondi-Takoradi (Ghana), enjoy relative advantages over landlocked secondary cities due to the substantial infrastructure and support services investment needed to function. In addition, port cities lead to other spinoff industries, which help diversify the local economic base. Inland secondary cities, such as Dire-Dawa in Ethiopia, are less fortunate, as their economic base often revolves mainly around agriculture and transport logistics. Natural resource-based secondary city economies such as Obuasi (population 114,795 in 2020), a gold mining centre in Ghana, and Tete, a coal-mining centre in Mozambique, often fare better, as they receive significant benefits from the investment in mining activities.

The challenge for inland and landlocked secondary cities is to diversify their economic base, become more competitive and engage in trade and development to and with neighbouring towns and cities. Dire-Dawa is an example of this. It is expected to benefit economically from developing the new railway between Addis Ababa and Djibouti, which will pass through Dire-Dawa, offering trade and other opportunities. Inland cities need support from central government and international agencies to develop greater self-sufficiency and adopt a more endogenous economic growth model, allowing import substitution and more digitally developed economic activities to grow. Opportunities for growth in these cities are limited. Many, such as the Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya, are refugee-based economies, with limited prospects for diversification or development, as much of the population is transient.

15.3.5 Urban Sprawl and Density

Many secondary cities are large, with the population dispersed over a wide peri-urban area. However, northern African cities tend to be more contained and densely settled. Densities are often high in the inner city, with informal slum areas, poor housing, and unsanitary conditions. The consequence of unmanaged urban development is the extremely high cost of providing extended or infill urban services. The average density of African secondary cities is around 4,000 persons per km^2, but this varies between regions. As noted in Chapter 5 (on demographic trends), however, average density presents a misleading picture of the concentration of population in secondary cities. Africa's largest secondary cities mostly have a densely populated and settled inner-city core, which progressively reduces in the concentric gradient as the city spreads out into peri-urban areas. Many secondary cities take on a starfish pattern of development, which progressively fills in. Unfortunately, the lack of planning and development controls leave many infill areas without adequate access to services and transport.

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> *The consequence of unmanaged urban development is the extremely high cost of providing extended or infill urban services.*

15.3.6 Need for Infrastructure

Without exception, all of the case study cities have old or obsolete infrastructure, large un-serviced urban areas and insufficient capacity to accommodate the projected high population growth rates. All secondary cities face challenges in investing in new infrastructure (with one or two exceptions) and expanding and maintaining existing infrastructure. Estimates for infrastructure that would positively impact GDP run into billions of dollars annually that neither the cities nor the countries can afford.

15.3.7 Neglect of the Build Environment

Many secondary cities have well-kept urban residential and parkland areas, public spaces, and monuments. Cities like Gabès, Cape Coast, Mombasa, and Touba-Mbacké have important cultural and religious buildings, archaeological sites and old city housing areas with significant character and history. Some secondary cities, such as Stone Town in Zanzibar, have World Heritage status. However, the quality of the built environment of most African secondary cities is poor and neglected. Civic pride is often low. Local governments lack funds to maintain public assets, spaces, and waterways, which become used as community waste dumps and for toileting. Dumping of medical waste also is a significant problem identified in several case studies.

The neglect of the built environment is a product of many factors, including weak local government enforcement of rules and regulations and poor community attitudes towards the use and cleanliness of public and private open spaces and facilities. The consequences of this are: significant threats to public health and well-being; public safety concerns (with no night-time streetlighting); compact and high-density substandard informal building; overflowing solid and sanitary waste; polluted streams and river systems; failure to control air pollution; lack of access to potable water; and the prevalence of controllable human diseases. It also affects the function and aesthetics of many secondary cities and their attractiveness as places to live, do business and visit.

15.4 Economic development

As the name suggests, secondary cities play a secondary role to primate cities in terms of the diversity of investment and their contribution to the national economy. Without exception, secondary cities exploit their strategic regional roles as service and resource-processing centres in agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and mining – but little else. The case studies show that secondary cities have similar economic characteristics. Significant port cities like Mombasa, Gqeberha (South Africa) and Port Harcourt (Nigeria) play a key role in their national and international economies. Cities such as Touba-Mbacké and Cape Coast have developed a competitive advantage in cultural tourism and education. Others have built a competitive advantage in global manufacturing, such as Gqeberha, and Mombasa in logistics. Yet other smaller secondary cities, such as Dire-Dawa, struggle to have a regional impact.

15.4.1 Lack of Economic Data

The lack of reliable and up-to-date data is a significant impediment to the provision of adequate support for the physical, economic, and social planning of development and infrastructure in secondary cities. Cape Coast, Mombasa and Gqeberha were the only secondary cities for which detailed data could be obtained on economic activities and competitiveness. Few African countries, apart from South Africa and Morocco (Haddad et al., 2017), have developed subnational input-output tables at the provincial or city level. This lack of information makes the benefits of allocating national resources and the budgeting of public funds to cities and regions difficult to determine. Data on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, off-budget capital grants and remittances to regions and secondary cities is unavailable, making it extremely difficult to estimate investment capital needs in secondary cities.

As found in the Ibadan City Masterplan studies (Oyo State Government, 2019), a high percentage of private capital flows go to localised consumption of consumer goods and services (appliances, food and medicines). There are also high levels of capital flow leakage of profits and transfers with extremely low margins on sales. This is because extremely low levels of capital are retained in secondary cities and regions for investment. There is a high reliance on remittance capital to fund private consumption and construction projects, including housing and trading facilities.

15.4.2 Economic Development Policies and Planning

Local governments generally have no role in local economic development (LED). For most secondary cities in Africa, LED policy and planning is the responsibility of the central government. In some countries such as South Africa, it is the responsibility of the provincial government. Few cities have economic development plans, although some did prepare city development strategies many years ago with the support of the Cities Alliance.

There is a significant disconnect between economic development, land use and infrastructure planning. There is still a strong reliance on master planning to guide development and an absence of integrated planning. Although some countries such as South Africa, Rwanda, Kenya and Morocco have begun to recognise the importance of integrated planning to support the more sustainable development of cities, few secondary cities have the knowledge or capacity to engage in this approach to planning and development. Most countries do not have integrated development planning legislation. Many of the case studies demonstrated the need for more integrated and greater responsibility for local economic development. Significant education and assistance are needed to enhance the capacity of secondary cities in local economic development.

15.4.3 Green Economies

African secondary cities, in the main, lag in the introduction of green economy initiatives. Adopting economic policies to develop green economies is essential to improve the sustainability of development in these cities. Some African countries are developing policies to support a transition to a greener economy, but efforts tend to focus on primate cities such as Cape Town in South Africa and Kampala in Uganda. Few secondary cities have policy agendas to encourage biomass, clean energy production, water and solid waste recycling, and materials re-use. Rwanda has developed an action plan for economic development to transition its capital and secondary cities towards green economies. The focus on green economic development in secondary cities offers a pathway to more sustainable development and new employment opportunities. However, this requires governments to develop green growth funds for cities with development assistance programs.

15.4.4 Scale and Critical Mass of Markets

Secondary cities, especially those that do not have a manufacturing, resource, or transport base, have difficulty creating scale and a critical mass of business and associated activities to diversify the local economic base, including market development opportunities. Scale and critical mass are thresholds in the pathway to economic diversification. Catalyst industries, such as a food processing plant, and significant infrastructure and human capital investment, often are needed to trigger secondary city growth. Universities and technical colleges are also significant triggers. Significant investment is required in mining, regional irrigation for agriculture, and transport, such as the railway linking Addis Ababa and Djibouti, which will trigger growth in Dire-Dawa.

Low-income levels leave little household disposable income for discretionary expenditure. Issues such as the lack of access to credit (see below) and settlement of debts at the end of each month slow the daily circulation of money through the local economy. High levels of unsecuritised indebtedness and low levels of business skills make it difficult to diversify economic opportunities. Subsequently, the size of markets for products and services can become very narrow.

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> *Scale and critical mass are thresholds in the pathway to economic diversification.*

Unlike metropolitan regions where there are multiple subnational market demands for goods and services and more scope to create employment and business opportunities, secondary cities find it challenging to create the scale and mass to grow new markets. Historically, city-state economies in many western African countries did this through specialisation and value-adding to industry supply chains along camel and river routes, such as the bronze industry in Benin and the leather industry in Touba-Mbacké. Policies and incentives to encourage industry specialisation and collaboration between cities and businesses to co-create new value-adding and niche industries are essential to creating the thresholds of scale and critical mass required to create expanded subnational regional markets engaged in city-to-city trade. This calls for government support to foster administrative and economic decentralisation and free up cross-border trade between cities within Africa. It calls for a new economic policy agenda on decentralisation.

15.4.5 Lack of Capital Investment

There are considerable variations in national/secondary city investments. Whilst petroleum and resource-rich countries can generate the revenues for investment in Angola, Botswana, Ghana and Nigeria, most African nations struggle to attract foreign direct investment – especially to secondary cities. Many rely heavily on bilateral and multilateral assistance and remittances to support their development and well-being. Most countries are still applying an export-growth development model to create an environment attractive to foreign investment in order to develop export markets. Only Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and South Africa secondary cities have relatively strong export manufacturing sectors. Some countries have turned to mobilise domestic investment through reform, such as Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal. However, impacts are primarily at the metropolitan city level, with little flow-on to secondary cities and subnational regions.

Despite the broad range of challenges, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa, Nigeria and Angola are leading places to invest. However, the sophistication of the regulatory levels of business and business infrastructure differ substantially. Gqeberha in South Africa is a global anchor for motor vehicle assembly but has suffered setbacks due to the closure of General Motors. In Nigeria, the closest Ibadan comes to a global institution is the University of Ibadan. Cape Coast in Ghana also has a good university, but it lacks partnerships with the city government and research and development capacity to support knowledge services to the local economy.

Huambo in Angola currently is not sufficiently competitive to attract secondary city investment on its own accord. Extensive post-civil war restoration must take place before it can reach its pre-independence output levels. Mombasa's Kilindini Harbour is inefficient, but currently is the leading seaport in Kenya and the principal port for several eastern and central African countries. Gabès, Tunisia, is a significant industrial city and phosphate export centre, but environmental and pollution problems impede its ability to attract business.

New geopolitical changes in Southern Sudan and the significant oil and coal deposits in eastern and northern Kenya will provide competition for Mombasa, as the new Port of Lamu opens to its north. New mineral discoveries may drive the development of secondary cities in the eastern heartland of Kenya. In Senegal, Touba-Mbacké is unique as a notable Islamic pilgrimage centre. All indicators show that the eight case studies are economically inefficient, heavily reliant on central government grants and unsustainable in their present situation.

15.4.6 Weakness in the Development of the E-Economy

Capital investment, especially in smart hard and soft infrastructure, is a high priority for secondary cities and regional development. The development of internet services to support business, services, procurement, and governance is a high priority for African secondary cities. Without these services, regional Africa is in danger of falling further behind the rest of the world in economic and social development. Kenya, Rwanda, Tunisia, and South Africa are developing support for e-based economies to support secondary city development. The development of e-based systems to replace manual systems will improve the speed of transactions and efficiencies, including better governance and financial controls, including tax collection.

15.4.7 Weak Access to Micro Credit

Microcredit facilities to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) business investment and development are limited, especially in smaller secondary cities. Bank deposits are centralised and directed to the creation of capital in large cities. Little of the deposits made at local branches of national banks return to secondary cities to create loans for fixed capital investment. Most formal sources of capital are used as credit for procuring stock or materials for trading or construction. Secondary cities have high informal-sector employment, and most businesses are not incorporated entities, which adversely affects tax revenue. Profit margins are meagre, resulting in little profit to create working capital or investment. Cities like Gqeberha have much higher corporate business enterprise levels, profits, and retained earnings, but this is not the case for most African secondary cities.

Local, small-scale, corporate-cooperative banking arrangements operate in most secondary cities, providing a valuable service and offering limited facilities and levels of credit. Phone banking is growing in secondary cities in Rwanda, Nigeria, Ghana, and northern Africa. Still, poor internet services in sub-Saharan regional areas and low incomes do not provide much room for credit expansion.

The research shows significant weaknesses in developing local capital markets and microcredit facilities and services. Microcredit and expanded loan capital are needed to support housing, industrial, commercial, and social services facilities, plants, and equipment. These investments are significant drivers of economic development. They have high employment and value-adding multiplier effects. The development of microcredit facilities, especially for low-income and poor households, and post-COVID-19 recovery efforts, are essential to boost economic activity and jobs in the micro and SME sectors. Innovative ways of improving access to credit by banks, finance and phone banking telecommunications companies are needed to expand credit facilities to the pool.

15.4.8 Cost of Doing Business

Many case studies show that the cost of doing business is a significant factor in creating more dynamic and competitive secondary city businesses and governments. The case studies show that the economies of most secondary cities in Africa are not nationally or globally competitive, economically efficient, nor well-managed. World Bank (2020) reports on the cost of doing business confirm Africa's poor performance: Rwanda, Morocco, and Kenya rank the highest, with Rwanda scoring only 38 in the global ranking. Sub-Saharan Africa remains one of the weakest performing regions for the ease of doing business, with an average ranking score of 51.8. Cities, especially metropolitan regions, and large primate cities, contribute most to national GDP. Poor infrastructure, including information and communications technology (ICT), and poor governance in these secondary cities add to the cost of doing business, increase the cost of living and operational costs, and result in a loss of competitiveness by local businesses.

The situation is worse in most African secondary cities, except for gateway port cities. The case studies report factors such as poor levels and maintenance of infrastructure, inefficiencies in service delivery by local governments, poor communications, poor access to skilled labour, and weak business enabling environments, all of which add significantly to the high transaction costs of government, institutional and private sector business. Transaction costs rise substantially the more distant secondary cities are from metropolitan regions and port cities. While food, land and rents are lower than in the metropolitan areas and offer a competitive advantage to a business, these advantages are more than offset by the lack of good logistics, high level service providers, skilled labour – especially management   access to a reliable supply of production inputs and high transportation costs.

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> *Cities, especially metropolitan regions, and large primate cities, contribute most to national GDP. Poor infrastructure...*

15.4.9 Reducing Transaction Costs of Business and Government

One means of reducing the transaction costs of doing business and government involves collaborative partnerships (Kindseth, 2021) to construct and operate common-user infrastructure and shared services. Investment in common-user facilities and infrastructure is needed to reduce business and government transaction costs. Common-user-space warehousing could significantly reduce storage and stock-holding costs for businesses. The construction of these facilities could be encouraged by central government-backed bank guarantees to encourage

cooperative type investment. Other cost co-sharing arrangements can be introduced to reduce costs for transport, local area energy, water treatment, and waste recycling. These investments would create green economy jobs and reduce the environmental damage done to waterways systems and soils. Secondary cities must partner with the central government to develop eco-friendly investments in technologies and facilities that help create sustainable development opportunities.

15.5 Socio-Demographic Features

15.5.1 Population Growth

There is much debate about the size of Africa's urban population and the number of people living in secondary cities. The United Nations estimates the current urban population at 600 million or 43% of Africa's total population. Of this, 15% or more live in secondary cities. Africapolis, supported by the OECD, puts the figure at 50%. Africapolis estimates that the population of urban areas in 2015 was 567 million, compared to UNDESA's estimate of 491.53 million. Africapolis' estimates are made from capturing the population of urban areas based on spatial imagery. UN estimates are derived from administrative boundaries. In many cases, urban areas of urban administration districts extend well beyond city boundaries. The differences are explained by the two organisations using different definitions of 'urban'.

African secondary cities are expanding at a rate of 3%, compared to 2.6% for many large metropolitan regions. Rates of growth vary significantly between regions. Northern African secondary cities, with populations between 0.5 and 1 million, are growing fastest at 4.6%; southern African cities are growing at 2.5%, the slowest rate, due to higher national levels of urbanisation. Many regional secondary cities are the first step for rural-urban migrants. A significant proportion of these cities eventually develop into primate cities.

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> *Africapolis estimates that the population of urban areas in 2015 was 567 million, compared to UNDESA's estimate of 491.53 million.*

The demography of secondary cities varies between metropolitan regions. The age cohorts of secondary cities show they have younger populations, due to higher growth and migration rates and slightly higher male populations. There is a slight hollowing out of the population cohort between 15 and 45 years of age in many secondary cities, with the movement of skilled people and students to larger cities in search of higher salaries, education and career opportunities.

The growing physical and socio-economic development gap between primary and secondary cities has a polarising effect, creating socio-spatial inequalities and multiple deprivations. In line with the demographics of secondary towns and cities, children and youth are most affected by these inequalities and deprivations (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020).

15.5.2 Migrant Populations

The make-up of migrants in urban areas varies within African countries and regions. Three types of migrants make up the demographic structure of urban populations: refugees, economic migrants, and seasonal migrants. Depending on countries, this mix may include a large cohort of international or ethnic groups. Secondary cities close to international borders in Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and the southern Sahel often have many international migrants. In southern

and northern Africa, small urban areas currently absorb about 75% of rural-urban migration, and their growth rates can be higher than in metropolitan centres. Analysis of rural-urban migration in eight southern African countries indicated that this type of migration accounts for about half of the urban population. An estimated 25% to 30% of the population growth in secondary cities is attributable to migration. More definitive studies are needed to identify the demographic structure of migrant populations in secondary cities. Many of these are second-phase migrants from smaller urban areas or transient migrants to large metropolitan regions as seasonal workers.

Migrants bring significant economic net benefits to secondary cities. While migrants experience many prejudices and discrimination, they add significantly to productivity and employment growth, as discussed in Chapter 4. They also add to the diversity and, through the diaspora, develop business connections that enhance trade and investment. Migrants tend to have better education and bring skills used to create local businesses and enterprises. Many will take up jobs that resident-born populations will not do, and many of these are essential for providing basic sanitation services. There is evidence that migration to secondary cities is rising, especially in the southern Sahel and northern countries and in South Africa. Often, these secondary city locations are part of a staged migration to large cities, once migrants have gained basic language and technical skills.

15.5.3 Lack of Decent Employment Opportunities

Secondary cities tend to have high levels of informal sector employment. The narrowness of the economic base and a high proportion of the population engaged in consumption-driven economic activities severely limits the diversity of jobs, income and business skills, and local government revenues. Trading, transport, and domestic services are high employment sectors. Few secondary cities have high employment levels in the advanced services sectors, such as finance, health, and education services. Cape Coast is an exception; it has higher employment levels in the education sector due to its university and the high number of private boarding schools. Without higher levels of demand for advanced services, it is difficult to broaden the economic base of local economies to provide access to decent higher-paid jobs. Dire-Dawa has focused on reducing urban unemployment and slum/informal settlement areas, increasing access to land and essential services, and strengthening urban-rural and urban-urban linkages. It is a good case study of a secondary city addressing the need for employment creation.

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> *Cape Coast is an exception; it has higher employment levels in the education sector due to its university and the high number of private boarding schools.*

15.5.4 High levels of youth unemployment

The secondary cities studied have high levels of youth unemployment and the accompanying stresses. While youth unemployment is high in African cities, secondary cities face very high incidences of social disorder linked to a lack of employment opportunities. Gangs, criminal activity, drug-related activities, and violence against women are significant social issues in several case study cities. Many males are poorly educated, with low self-esteem, are unemployed or under-employed and easily led to criminal and gang activity, often associated with cross-border illicit trade. Youth unemployment is high among new and transient rural-urban migrants, who tend to be less educated than locally born residents and often do not speak the local dialect or have the same tribal association. The focus of assistance to a secondary city is to reduce urban unemployment and slum/informal settlement areas, increase access to land and basic services, and strengthen urban-rural and urban-urban linkages.

15.5.5 Low levels of education

The skill base in most secondary cities is narrow, making it hard for businesses to recruit well-educated local staff. Secondary city populations tend to have fewer years of schooling, lower levels of higher education, fewer schools per 10,000 population, lower levels of literacy and numeracy, and lower-level facilities and equipment. In secondary city primary and secondary schools, expenditure per capita is often significantly less than in larger cities, but much higher than in rural areas. Many schools do not have computers and internet services, reducing access to e-learning and improved knowledge opportunities to equip students for working in the twenty-first century. Attracting high-quality staff is challenging, with high teacher turnover rates and poor teacher training standards. These factors affect the development of regional secondary city skill bases, both in quality and quantity. Low education levels reflect nationwide problems across Africa – of low expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP. Rwanda has recognised this problem and is seeking to introduce e-learning into secondary cities. E-learning and learning of English have been introduced to good effect in the refugee city of Kakuma in north-western Kenya.

15.5.6 Housing

Africa has some of the worst housing conditions globally, with 60% of the total urban population of sub-Saharan Africa living in slums and informal settlements (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020, p. 11). Housing deprivation is associated with low income and high unemployment. Several reports show that housing conditions in secondary cities are lower than in primary cities. The household size in the inner-city core slum areas is often very large. Factors contributing to this situation include land tenure disputes, the inability of urban authorities to plan and layout plots for housing, lack of capital to build affordable housing, poor construction skills and poor quality of building materials. Ibadan Is an example of a secondary city with significant housing problems.

The lack of decent housing profoundly impacts the quality of life and well-being, affecting people's physical and psychological health – especially children and the elderly. The need for better quality, layout, and housing design, with basic services in all African cities, has been documented extensively. Still, given the low income and education levels, solutions to these problems have not been forthcoming. Secondary cities are positioned better than larger cities to solve housing problems, as access to land is less constrained and land cost is cheaper in secondary cities. However, a paradigm shift is needed to enable local governments to engage in housing partnerships with landowners to ensure that land is developed for housing through an orderly process, even if services are provided later. The housing finance problem in secondary cities is still acute, given the low income of much of the population.

15.5.7 Low-level Investment in Social Infrastructure

Capital investment is needed to develop and improve social services facilities such as health, education, welfare, emergency services, and police. This is crucial to support the development of healthy, safe, and knowledgeable inhabitants of secondary cities. Secondary cities have extremely low ratios of schools, hospital beds and emergency services facilities compared to primate cities. As shown in the Mombasa case study (see Chapter 12, Kenya), low youth education levels can severely impact unemployment and crime. Indicators of the level of basic social infrastructure for health and education for some of the case studies show that social infrastructure levels, quantity, and quality are significantly lower than in metropolitan regions. Poor social infrastructure significantly affects the quality of life, public health, and productivity in secondary cities. Private social services are developing in many cities like Ibadan and Mombasa. Still, these only provide for the needs of high-income groups, leaving most low-income people lacking many essential human services.

15.6 State of the Environment

The state of the environment in many secondary cities is poor. Environmental reporting on the state of cities or regional reports scarcely mentions the environmental problems facing the development and management of secondary cities. Little data is collected on air and water quality, land conversions and vegetation loss. Secondary city governments cannot enforce environmental regulations, as they lack the staff, resources and equipment needed. Little has been done to address waterways pollution and water resource usage rights; this requires total catchment management, which current government systems are not equipped to do.

15.6.1 Catchment Management

The loss of vegetation in peri-urban areas surrounding secondary cities in the arid regions of Africa is high - especially where trees are cut for firewood or making charcoal. Loss of vegetation has become more severe due to climate change, land clearing and overgrazing of water catchment areas. This has led to growing flood problems, not only in immediate catchments but downstream. Local governments are not in the position administratively or have the resources to police the loss of vegetation through illegal land clearing, a factor noted in the Cape Coast study, Ghana (see Chapter 7).

The Climate Change Pact adopted at the Glasgow 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) calls for an end to deforestation by 2030; however, this will require concerted efforts to reduce the loss of vegetation in regions where secondary cities have an impact on this. Greater resources must be given to secondary cities and regional local governments to improve catchment management. New innovative approaches will need to be introduced to encourage greater community self-organising and management arrangements to restore water catchment health and reduce runoff and soil erosion. Schemes such as the National Landcare Program in Australia[2] offer solutions for improved catchment management of African secondary cities. However, this will also call for collaboration between local governments that make up large water and vegetation catchments on preparing management plans and sharing the cost, information, and resources for their management.

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> *New innovative approaches will need to be introduced to encourage greater community self-organising and management arrangements to restore water catchment health and reduce runoff and soil erosion.*

15.6.2 Waste Management

Smaller secondary cities in Africa tend not to have well-organised waste management systems and services. Waste rubbish is disposed of extensively by burning and dumping. Few secondary cities have well-developed waste management facilities or incineration. Poor waste management, especially medical waste, is having a significant impact on public health. Toxic industrial wastes (especially abattoirs), for example, in Cape Coast, is mainly discharged untreated. As a result, waterways, groundwater tables, and soils in many low-lying areas of secondary cities are becoming heavily contaminated. A review of international development assistance projects

shows that African primate, and a few larger secondary cities, have received project aid to address soil or water table pollution. For many low-lying small secondary cities, groundwater pollution is a significant problem. Many of the poorer communities in these cities rely on wells as their main source of potable water.

Waste management and groundwater pollution are emerging as long-term severe public health issues for secondary cities. In the lower reaches of river systems, the problem is compounded by the cumulative effects of solid and liquid waste dumping on land near and in waterways. Collaborative solutions are required to address these issues, some of which will involve international efforts to ensure waste does not contaminate soils and waterways. While secondary and intermediary sized cities with populations between 100,000 and 1 million comprise 30% of Africa's urban population, they significantly contribute to national pollution. A more holistic approach to waste management, including using shared regional waste services and recycling, is required to avoid further degradation of land and water environments.

15.6.3 Air pollution

Compared to secondary cities in other regions of the world, Africa has low air pollution levels. Nevertheless, deaths from smoke pollution caused by household cooking and burning of rubbish are high. In sub-Saharan Africa, four out of five inhabitants use solid biomass for cooking, leading to high death rates – especially amongst children and women. This may not decrease any time soon, until alternative fuel or energy sources and equipment are made cheap enough for even the poorest household to purchase.

National programs are required to reduce unsustainable domestic use of biomass for cooking and energy for petrol-driven engines – especially motorcycles and mopeds. This transition will take many years to achieve. It will require a targeted-change program, starting in the extensive primary and secondary cities where population levels and energy use are highest.

15.6.4 Management of Climate Change

African secondary cities contribute minimally to climate change, but they are increasingly affected by it. More frequent flooding, droughts, and rising temperatures reduce the habitability of many secondary cities in the Sahel region. Coastal secondary cities like Cape Coast are severely affected by coastal erosion and significantly impacted by rising sea levels. Secondary cities are poorly equipped to deal with climate change, especially in applying adaptation measures to address flood mitigation and coastal erosion. This involves expensive infrastructure, for which local and central governments do not have funds to pay. Most secondary cities will have to develop local solutions to climate change impacts through low-cost technology, self-organising communities, or community-based emergency and disaster management plans for dealing with threats as they arise.

Addressing issues of climate change in African cities will require extensive investment in programs for adaptation. In preparing development plans, secondary cities must identify climate change risks and public sector investment plans to mitigate these. Comprehensive secondary and intermediate city-level climate change audits will be necessary for all African countries to know what priority investments are needed to adapt to climate change. International development agencies can play a crucial role in developing national capacity to conduct audits and assess climate change adaption needs for cities.

15.6.5 Green Finance

Most African countries cannot fund measures needed to address environmental management, regeneration, and climate change adaption. The COP26 conference revealed that substantial funds and resources would need to be raised from developed economies to address climate change and meet other sustainable development goals (SDG) targets. The need for green finance funds, which would give access to funds to redress climate change and environmental management problems, is crucial if African cities are to meet the SDG targets and improve the quality of life for Africa's urban and rural populations. National governments also need to develop green finance funds using nationwide pension savings.

15.7 Connectivity

There is enormous diversity and contrast in the pattern and level of development of sub-Saharan African cities. Unlike other world regions, urbanisation in sub-Saharan countries is dominated by large metropolitan cities, most of which are the national capitals or former national capitals. Secondary city development is occurring around some of the major cities of Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola. Most secondary cities are part of the system of cities developed under colonial rule.

While all sub-Saharan African cities are experiencing severe growth-management problems, secondary city problems are the most severe. These cities have poor urban governance and management systems. Many lack basic infrastructure, good education, community, and health services and have unreliable urban and regional logistics systems. Professionally managed sub-Saharan Africa and secondary cities have dynamic local economies; they are mostly consumption-driven with a large informal employment sector. Their peri-urban areas tend to be highly dispersed, with inhabitants engaged in semi-subsistence activities. In these cities, the population and labour force tend to be transitionary, with migrants frequently returning to rural areas or moving into metropolitan cities when employment is not available.

Local economies are dominated by the transport, government, and trading services sectors. The industrialisation of African secondary cities has been slow to develop, partly because of poor infrastructure, logistics and government systems. The inefficiency of systems outside of the principal metropolitan regions adds to business and government transaction costs. Secondary cities struggle to attract investment and build and retain human capital. Many are becoming heavily reliant on domestic and foreign remittances to supplement household incomes and support local economic activities. Urban financial management, revenue, and land management administration systems are weak. Land and housing markets are distorted, uncertain, lack transparency, and are influenced heavily by expatriate investment. Property and land-tax evasion is widespread.

Most sub-Saharan African secondary cities are not competitive. There is no policy framework for fostering competition for trade and investment between cities. National governments have shown no strong commitment to implement administrative and physical decentralisation policy reforms to encourage greater local autonomy, responsibility, and effort to promote local economic development by secondary city governments. While the development of some secondary cities has been driven strongly by natural resource development, productivity improvements in the agriculture and services sector are low, undermining the ability of secondary cities to compete. Most sub-Saharan African secondary cities do not have the capacity to develop competitive export-orientated economies and industries, so they will need to focus more on encouraging endogenous growth and stimulating national trade and markets. These are strategic directions needed in national urbanisation and regional economic development policies that stress the important role those secondary cities play in the social and economic development of systems of cities and countries.

15.8 International Development Assistance

Sub-Saharan Africa countries have received significant international assistance for urban development, especially after attaining independence. More recently, assistance agencies have varied from the United Nations to pan-European, American, and private institutions and the Chinese. Some researchers argue that international assistance has left African countries worse off than they were 50 years ago. Key problems are seen to be not the amount of aid or assistance African countries have received, but the inequality of opportunities given to the development of African economies compared to other regions of the world, such as Asia, together with the 'one size fits all' approach adopted by many assistance agencies. Solutions need to be developed that recognise and address the different needs of different African countries.

15.9 Key Takeaway Lessons

African secondary cities are falling well behind metropolitan regions in the development race. While some are dynamic centres of commerce and trade, most secondary cities are struggling to develop more advanced economies that will enable them to become self–sufficient and prosperous. There is a need to start a conversation at the higher national political and technical levels across the African continent on the merits of secondary city development. Substantial investment is necessary for human capital development to support the development of cities and jobs, as sub-Saharan Africa transitions to a post-agriculture economy. There is an urgent need to build local governance capacity and support land and infrastructure development, markets, and logistics systems. This should begin with the rehabilitation of existing urban systems – to provide the bare minimum level of urban services to support the operation and maintenance of primary and secondary cities.

The development of local secondary city economies can be transformed to support endogenous economic growth and the development needs identified. Developing local business networks, collaboration to reduce common-user costs of providing infrastructure and services, fostering industry clusters, specialisation, and cooperation will be essential to leverage resources and create economies of scope and scale. Building a network of collaborative-competitive cities will be crucial to achieving this. There is a need to showcase global, continental, and local urbanisation best practices and make knowledge about these accessible to stakeholders.

There is need for parallel conversations with African peoples of the mind shift required to achieve accelerated and sustainable economic growth and gains associated with local, national, and global opportunities. Government must review their taxing systems to ensure fairness and equitability in a user-pays system that is managed effectively, and that all due taxes are collected. Such conversations must recognise the need to evolve sustainable, home-grown solutions to the challenges and opportunities presented by urbanisation. This includes developing local capital markets to realise the potential to capitalise land and public assets to provide pool funding to supplement private sector and public-private partnership (PPP) investments. A focus on the reform of urban land administration and management systems is necessary to underpin the development of and confidence in urban land and property markets.

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> *There is a need to showcase global, continental, and local urbanisation best practices and make knowledge about these accessible to stakeholders.*

The immediate and long-term efforts at planning, management, and development of secondary cities will become severely hampered without national statistical offices and data improvements. Reliable data is essential for modern cities to plan physical, economic, and social development and infrastructure and monitor environmental impacts and performance. The establishment of African and international research 'centres of excellence' would enable cross-continental, regional, national and local urbanisation issues to be openly addressed and data to be made available to any stakeholder interested in the planning management and development of a region's cities.

Official development assistance (ODA) supporting urban projects in Africa has been allocated disproportionally towards the needs of primate cities. It has not been well-coordinated, as agencies focus on single-sector investments and technical assistance, and it seldom involves integrated packages of aid to secondary cities. Secondary cities are disadvantaged by both FDI and international development assistance in realising their development potential. There is an urgent need for ODA agencies and national governments to ascertain why the design, delivery, and performance of so many internationally assisted projects do not deliver on development outcomes. The ODA with institutional, NGO and private sector resources is poor. A more spatially integrated, collaborative, and targeted approach to development aid, planning, financing, operations and maintenance is required for secondary cities to make a more significant contribution to urban and regional development and reduce the growing inequities

occurring between them and metropolitan regions.

The development of African secondary cities is being shaped by a new and powerful set of economic, climate and social changes; violence; disease; and geopolitical forces. Many of these are beyond the management and control of national and local governments. These forces will continue to change the dynamics of African countries, and especially secondary cities. Many of the problems associated with climate change, education, public health, international migration, corruption, and criminal activities will require cooperative efforts at national, regional, and local levels of government to resolve. Devolution or decentralisation will also be critical to developing more effective local responses to some of the problems in secondary cities.

Challenges and change are always difficult to manage; however, they can also create opportunities. Many African secondary cities have good opportunities, provided they are well managed and supported through good policy, management, and development initiatives. How to realise these opportunities is the focus of the final chapter.

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16

NEW URBAN-AGE AGENDA FOR AFRICA

BRIAN H ROBERTS

> The population of African cities is expected to grow by more than 900 million by 2050. Many of these people will live in secondary cities. Secondary cities are a sub-system of the national systems of cities — between primate cities/metropolitan areas and regional towns — and they play an important role in national development. Most are administrative capitals, major industry, or satellite cities of metropolitan regions with populations ranging between 100,000 and 1 million people. However, in countries like Nigeria, some secondary cities will grow very large in the future, with populations exceeding 2 million people.

Most African secondary cities are active, bustling centres of business, logistics, and trade. Many are poor compared to primate cities and the large metropolitan regions, such as Lagos, Kinshasa, and Cairo, which dominate the pattern of national economic and urban settlement. Due to their high household sizes, African secondary cities tend to have low rise housing and be dispersed, but still relatively dense. Some have a rich cultural, musical, architectural, and archaeological heritage and are unique — such as Luxor in Egypt, Stone Town in Zanzibar, and Saint-Louis in Senegal. Like Mombasa in Kenya and Tétouan in Morocco, others are transforming rapidly, becoming more entrepreneurial, competitive, and well-connected.

The purpose of this book has been to explore and understand the causation factors that have constrained the development of African secondary cities. The authors have identified the many challenges, gaps, and shortfalls in urban policy, planning, development, and maintenance approaches and the lack of focus on secondary cities. The importance of secondary cities to national development is only now becoming recognised. Valuable lessons have been gained from the chapter and case studies about the need for improved urban policy, governance, management, human capital capacity, institutional, economic, and regenerative development.

Despite their many problems, all secondary cities have some potential for development. Secondary cities do not have the agglomeration advantages of large metropolitan regions, but most have the population and market size to create the level of scale to become competitive. The key to realising this potential is how to improve city governments' capacity to manage urban environments and urbanisation, and leverage infrastructure, capital, human resources, and technology to enable the cities to be more competitive and operate at a broader scale, beyond local regions and across borders. Many development opportunities for secondary cities have been described in earlier chapters. The first step to unlocking development opportunities is to address the inequities that are currently inherent in that system.

A new approach, therefore, is needed to support the development of national systems of cities that recognise the importance of secondary cities to national development. Secondary cities are critical in facilitating connectivity between large metropolitan regions — with over 65% of Africa's population living in smaller urban and rural areas. Greater balance in the development of the national systems of cities is essential.

The continued growth of large primate city metropolitan regions in Africa is not sustainable. As nations develop, unless secondary cities function more efficiently, improvements to people's livelihoods are likely to be limited to populations living in the very large cities. If the pattern of urbanisation, migration and wealth continue to remain concentrated, there will potentially be severe consequences for national economies, the environment, and populations across the continent. This concentration also poses a significant risk to the economic security of nations if a major shock event hits the primate cities.

This chapter outlines ways secondary cities can maximize future development opportunities, achieve greater equality and sustainability, and enhance their national economy. The focus is on opportunities to adopt a better and more systems approach to the management and development of African secondary cities. This section focuses on spatial economic development models, spatial planning of land-use and infrastructure, the development and management of governance, social, environmental systems, and connectivity. This is followed by a short section on international official development assistance organisations' roles and priority areas for support for secondary cities.

16.1 A New Urban-Age Agenda for Secondary Cities

The world's urban future resides in the development of cities, especially its secondary cities (Bearak & Moriarty, 2021). In 2016 the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-Habitat, launched the New Urban Agenda, which most countries signed. To date, slow progress has been made thus far with its implementation (Galal, 2018). However, the document's focus was on large metropolitan regions, with minimal recognition of the critical role secondary/intermediate cities can play in the national systems of cities.

As already discussed, central governments across Africa generally have failed to ensure that secondary cities play a more productive role in national development in economic, population and spatial planning policy. In most cases, secondary city per-capita development indicators fall significantly below those of metropolitan regions. The time has come for governments to recognise the vital role of secondary cities in the development of African countries. They must be given a greater focus in national urban, population and economic development agendas and policy and be provided with the resources and capacity to play a more significant role in national development.

Capacitating secondary cities to support the development of a more robust and more dynamic national system of cities and development requires a different way of thinking about policy development and implementation — using a system rather than a sectoral approach — to managing national and local resources.

All cities function through a complex mix of interrelated urban systems and networks. These systems depend on wide-ranging inputs of energy, resources, products, goods and services, people, and decision-making processes to deliver essential economic, social, environmental, personal goods and services. At the secondary city level, the forward and backward linkages within these systems are complex. Historically, national, and local government governance in supporting the production and delivery of a wide range of goods and services has been sector-based with poor integration between systems and poorly managed.

Urban economic development policy for secondary cities development operates vertically and horizontally at multiple levels across the state — from country to individual parcels of land in the case of planning systems. The systems that relate to land may involve legal, economic, social (i.e., health and safety), and logistics supply-chain elements for countries and cities to have well-functioning property markets. How well the elements, states and relationships are linked, and the efficiency of transactions and flows affect whether a business thrives.

16.2 Preparing for a New Age of African Networked Cities

Few African countries have begun the transition to supporting the development of urban systems at the secondary city level. To improve the management and development of secondary cities, better urban governance, infrastructure, land development, investment, service delivery and logistics systems are necessary. A more dynamic, responsive and sustainable approach by secondary cities is needed to attract jobs, better housing and investment. This requires a more systemic understanding by policymakers of the ways systems of cities and urban systems operate at the secondary city level.

African countries need to develop national development and urban strategies that define the role, functions, and types of systems for different sub-sets of cities within national systems of cities (e.g., metropolitan, secondary, and smaller-sized cities). The management of cities these days is shaped less by population size and more by their function within national and increasingly regional trading systems.

Cities no longer function as hierarchical systems of hubs, spokes, nodes and connectors. Technology, particularly the internet, is transforming urban systems from hierarchies to networks. The Internet of things has revolutionized knowledge, production and purchasing. In African cities' management, planning, development and governance, especially the intermediary role of secondary cities, holistic urban systems management are needed to replace many of the older hierarchical and controlling planning and decision-making systems. This applies to all levels of government.

The transformation of urban systems from hierarchies to networks provides greater choice and competition and completely bypasses traditional order. The integration of urban services between local governments leads to wider choices and better quality of services.

16.2.1 Framework for a Systems Approach to Secondary City Development

A change of practice towards a more systems-driven approach is needed to ensure more sustainable development outcomes for African secondary cities. This will be difficult and will require a shift in thinking by policymakers and leaders of government. Most governments and international development agencies have adopted sector approaches to preparing urban development projects for capital works or capacity-building programs. Often, only one agency or department benefits. The flow-on of benefits, information and learning to other agencies involved and responsible for ongoing operation and maintenance seldom occurs.

A 2010 report noted that the World Bank performance failure rate of urban sector projects in Africa was over 25% (Bahl et al., 2013), with project design flaws being a significant issue (Nahashon, 2010). Few governments like to engage in multi-sector projects because they are complicated to design, involve a lot of research and coordination and are challenging to implement. However, the benefits of multi-sector development projects often outperform many single-sector projects (Roberts & Cohen, 2002).

Existing organisation systems, processes, and governance arrangements will not solve many management and development problems affecting secondary cities. A change of governance model is required. Management problems related to climate change, economic development and urban services require greater cooperation, shared funding and inputs arrangements between agencies and departments at multiple levels. These coordination problems can be solved through better coordination and collaborative governance arrangements using a systems approach to problem-solving and the planning, design, implementation and operations of projects and programs.

Lifecycle planning operations for infrastructure and services are essential and should be introduced to all local city governments. Local governments maintain most of the public-built assets, even though the central government might pay for them. This should lead to better-integrated management and ensure inputs/outputs for the planning, development, operation and maintenance of roads, health, education, and other services. 'Whole of government` approaches to planning and budgeting, timing and transfers of responsibilities need to be introduced and procedures defined clearly. This must become a primary focus of change management in secondary city governments and an essential guide of central government funding and official development assistance (ODA).

Examples of well-developed projects that adopted integrated approaches to whole of government planning and operations include Ghana's Strategic Plan for the Greater Accra Metropolitan Development Area, one of the few attempts made (Ministry of Local Government, Ghana, 1992). This was a first attempt at a 'whole of region' integrated plan, but the failure to establish a planning commission (see discussion later) for the region to oversee the coordination of budgets and project implementation led to a very fragmented approach to its implementation. Box 16-1 describes a successfully implemented integrated program for two regions in Sri Lanka.

An urban system consists of a range of sub-systems comprised of many different elements. The performance and operation of secondary cities depend upon the positive interaction of the different elements. If one or more fails or is missing, the impact on the city can be significant. For example, failure in a network of traffic light systems can cause significant traffic congestion and extended travel and delivery times, with resulting additional costs.

BOX 16.1 | The Northeast Local Services Improvement Project (NELSIP)

The Northeast Local Services Improvement Project (NELSIP) 2010-2017 in Sri Lanka (World Bank, 2018) was a multi-sector project involving social, urban, rural and resilience components to support 101 local governments in the war-ravaged north and eastern parts of the country to regenerate the economy of many cities, towns and districts. The goal was to rebuild local government capacity to manage local government finances before embarking on programs to design, develop, contract and implement the construction of a broad range of public buildings and infrastructure projects, revenue and organization reform, operations, and maintenance and one-stop-shop approval services. More than 1,160 projects (mainly infrastructure) valued at over US$86 million were completed, leading to the improvement of over 1,500 km of road and 63 km of drainage, and the construction of 126 market buildings, 41 local government and commercial offices buildings, 58 children's playgrounds, 12 new libraries and nursery facilities, healthcare, crematorium, and other community service facilities. Compared to previous sector projects focused on water and sanitation, the economic rate of return on this project was significant.

16.2.2 Framework for Managing Secondary Cities

A systems approach framework to manage and support development opportunities for secondary cities in Africa is outlined in Table 16.1). This approach can also be applied to analyse national urban systems. It is presented here to conceptualise the various elements of managing the development and operation of secondary cities.

Table 16.1 shows six urban systems (top row across) and six functional (first column) groups of activities, which provide a framework for the management of activities to support the operations and development of secondary cities. (These systems and functions can be changed or adapted if desired.) Many connections, flows, and combinations of activities occur across these various networks of urban systems and functions at different levels on a day-to-day and annual operations basis for the management of secondary cities. The table shows a sample of initiatives that secondary cities and adjacent region governments could take to build capacity and support opportunities for development and regeneration.

Well-developed urban systems will enable the facilitation of multiple connections and mobilize resources, skills and technologies in many different places, spaces and times to enable things to be done quickly. Critical to the introduction and development of a systems management approach to secondary cities is the need for careful analysis of the constraints preventing these systems from functioning efficiently. These constraints may be political, skills and knowledge, information, financial, technological or a combination of these. The critical issue for secondary city local governments is to know the most significant constraints to the efficient operation of urban systems and remedy them as a matter of priority.

16.2.2.1 Key Urban Systems

Six broad urban systems support the operation and development of secondary cities. These are outlined below and discussed in more detail later:

Governance systems can be the product of how individuals and institutions (both public and private) plan, organize and manage a city's public affairs and allocate resources and responsibilities. It includes formal institutions and informal arrangements, the social capital of citizens, and the legal, regulatory, operational and management arrangements necessary to organize and manage the city.

Economic and Finance systems comprise money, land, property markets, employment, investments, valuations and local government financial management.

Built Environment systems comprise the physical, operational infrastructure, utilities, structures, buildings and other tangible assets used by societies for various everyday purposes. They also include hardware, machinery and technologies used to produce different goods and services needed by communities.

Social systems are the structures and mechanisms used in the social structure of society to provide a wide range of personal and social needs. They include the management structures used to produce and provide essential health, education, culture, welfare, emergency, security, law and order services and improve general well-being. Social systems also include knowledge (both formal and tacit), information, communications, media and personal services contributing to social and cultural capital development.

Environmental systems are resources, products and services produced by nature and used in the development and operation of cities. They account for the exchange of materials and influence between cities and their surrounding landscapes. Their focus is on the nature and quality of the physical environment, including urban microclimate, hydrology, vegetation, landforms, coastlines, water, air quality and soils.

Connectivity (flow) systems are the hard and soft infrastructure of networks and technologies associated with all systems that enable the flow of goods, materials, people, livestock, water, energy, waste, data, knowledge and information between geographic locations and between people across space and time. Without the connectivity of these elements, cities could not function.

TABLE 16.1 | Functional elements urban subsystem supporting the development of secondary cities

Systems/ functions	Governance	Economics and Finance	Built Environment	Social	Environmental	Connectivity
Organization and Structure	Collaborative governance Teams-based management	Economic development policies One-stop business centre	The integrated development approval system Public participation	Employment and poverty alleviation Single social services centre	Integrated environmental management	Online information Data exchange E-governance Focus groups
Policy and Strategy	Integrated public policy management Community-based budgeting	Urban financial management Investment Incentives	Integrated strategic planning Public investment plans	Public health and wellbeing	Climate change adaptation Emergency management plans	Support for self-organizing network partnerships Suggestion boxes
Resource Management:	Legal systems and regulation Financial management	Value-added business Co-financing	Building regulation enforcement	Lifelong education and learning Community colleges	Pollution and congestion Forest and land rehabilitation	Public transport apps Share-use ride and logistics apps
Planning and Development	Corporate planning and management	Productivity and competitiveness targets Economic risk management assessment	Housing and shelter strategies Public-private partnership infrastructure delivery	Community services	Environmental health and safety	Communications and information
Capacity Building	Accountability and transparency Human resources management	Research and development Technology and innovation	Development control Citizen science groups	Peace and security Community crime watch Community policing	Cleaner production and industrial ecology Recycling	Communities of interest Diaspora networks Supply chains and dynamics
Resilience and Regeneration	Participatory and inclusive governance Social media networks for disaster recovery	Industry diversification grants City-city trade partnerships	Asset maintenance Heritage conservation Local area energy networks	Human resource development Migrant integration programs	Green economies and design Risk and hazard management	Community support networks Local area support services Community wardens

Source: Author.

16.2.2.2 Functional Groups of Activities Supporting the Management of Urban Systems

The functional activities needed to support the development and operation of urban systems in secondary cities can be grouped or clustered. The efficiency in which these function is affected by governance arrangements, available resources and the capacity of urban systems to support secondary city sustainable development and operations. The various activities and interactions associated with functional elements span many levels of governments, businesses and communities. A convenient way to group these functional activities for organizing the management and development of secondary cities is under the following headings:

Organization and Structure: This group of activities focuses on improving government and governance systems' efficiency and effectiveness by enhancing cooperation and collaboration. The scope of activities could include community and collaborative policy development and services delivery, teams' management, development and operations of regional planning and development commissions, and arrangements for disaster management and recovery.

Policy and Strategy: The focus of activities in this area may involve broad stakeholder support for activities designed to develop local, national, and regional urban policy to support the development of secondary cities. It could include supporting policies to assist with administrative and fiscal decentralization, national policies for logistics improvement, local economic development, city poverty alleviation and climate change adaptation.

Resource Management: Governments are responsible for the management, development and allocation of resources, which include natural, human, environmental, built and financial resources. Managing the allocation and spatial distribution of these resources can significantly affect the operations and development opportunities for systems of cities.

> "
> *The various activities and interactions associated with functional elements span many levels of governments, businesses and communities.*

Planning Development: These include programmatic activities (more than one activity or project) to support the preparation of local city development plans, infrastructure plans, area improvement programs, and management plans for peri-urban areas. The country program strategy could define programmatic activities agreed with the government, conducted at a national and city level. Programmatic activities could include a national program of competitive funding for integrated support packages to help secondary cities manage peri-urban areas, inner-city revitalization, urban renewal areas, or areas impacted by external issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Facilities for bundling projects to include technical assistance, capacity building and finance might be considered part of an integrated assistance package to secondary cities. Such arrangements have been used in Australia (Government of Australia, 2018), the United Kingdom, and India to support capacity building for secondary cities.

Capacity Building: This includes wide-ranging support for activities to improve the urban management, financial capacity and competencies of institutions, chambers of commerce, professional organizations, tradespeople, unions and communities in enhancing knowledge and expertise to develop and manage secondary cities more efficiently and effectively. Capacity building involves the development of infrastructure and network systems to strengthen the enabling environment of businesses, institutions, and public agencies to adopt and increase the use of e-governance, information management, geographic information system (GIS) capacity, and support for operations and maintenance.

Resilience and Regeneration: These could involve activities and projects targeted at specific areas or groups of people living in poverty or suffering from the impacts of disease, disaster or climate change. It may be possible to support programmatic prototype projects for the poor, involving standard housing or infrastructure for multiple

sites in secondary cities. A single, countrywide project could be developed to demonstrate low-cost solutions or approaches to shelter, improve household energy, or display localized construction techniques. For some secondary cities, activities might involve the restoration of buildings and cultural heritage.

Governments could also partner with business and civil society groups to mobilize multi-lateral support and resources for program activities at different scale levels. Multi-lateral activities may also involve developing toolkits and databases, where cities have access to reliable information and best practice models of urban management and the development of secondary cities.

The following sections describe measures that can assist in formulating national development and urban policy and strategies to support the development of secondary cities. These are grouped under the six urban systems described above and shown in Table 16.1 They need to be considered in the context of national urban systems.

16.3 Governance systems

Governance reform relating to the management of urban systems is essential if national systems of cities are to respond to the many changes that will impact their development. Decisions-making by secondary city governments must be done carefully, as each decision will impact the national system of cities and affect the economic development opportunities for other cities and regions that depend on them.

The following are some agenda items related to urban governance systems that will help create new opportunities for the development of secondary cities.

16.3.1 Decentralization of Secondary City Governance

The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated a trend whereby many local government functions have been re-centralized – on this occasion to manage the impacts of the pandemic. As soon as possible, an orderly decentralization and devolution of functions back to local government, where day-to-day services are most effectively delivered, must be affected. Secondary city local governments must have clear statutory mandates, greater autonomy, realistic budgets, freedom of choice and control of the agenda for setting the vision and delivering on local development outcomes. Even in single-party states like China (HKTDC, 2021) and Vietnam, regional secondary cities are being given greater responsibility by the central government to shape local development policies and strategies to support national development outcomes, especially endogenous growth.

Central governments in Africa must show greater willingness to decentralize, devolve and empower local government, institutions, business and civil society organizations to fulfil their (mainly) mandatory roles and responsibilities: they must be resourced and capacitated to do so. The lack of empowerment hinders development and engagement in effective partnerships between government, business, institutions and civil society to deliver infrastructure, land, housing, and urban and social services more efficiently than government. This development potential should be unlocked.

A significant body of research shows that the more decentralized countries – those with diverse and more spatially equitable distribution of wealth, production, population and economic activity, coupled with high physical and business connectivity levels – tend to perform best and grow fastest. African countries show significantly greater disparities between large and smaller cities for wealth, production, income, and employment indicators than do advanced economies, like Australia, the United States, and Germany, which have a more equitable spatial distribution of population, wealth and economic activities. The spatial mix and number of secondary cities also provide an opportunity to maintain economic capacity if the primate city/s were hit by disaster or their functional capacity was severely disrupted for an extended period.

The disastrous flooding in Bangkok in 2011 illustrates the significant disruption such an event can have on a national economy (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2013). The World Bank estimated that the cost of the flooding event to the Thai economy, in economic and other losses, was US$46.5 billion (12% of GDP). The impact on the

country and its cities was severe. Thailand was fortunate to recover over the next two years, due to its industrial base, resilience capacity and reserves. Most African countries do not have resources or the capacity to recover as Thailand did, however, if their economic engines (their primary cities) were disrupted severely. The risks associated with high-level primacy are sufficiently high to warrant a change of spatial policy on urbanisation and economic development for most African countries.

16.3.2 Regional Planning Commissions

Planning for urban and peri-urban development of secondary cities is not holistic, spatial, or well-coordinated. Local government agencies and departments prepare development plans, but they seldom involve cross-agency consultation during the annual planning and budget preparation cycle. Horizontal cross-agency planning rarely occurs at the central government level. The lack of this coordination and collaboration weakens horizontal sectoral and spatial budgeting planning and operations, leading to shortfalls in cross-agency budget allocations meant to ensure efficient infrastructure and services delivery lifecycle operations, especially at the local government level. Unnecessary duplication of effort and under- or over-allocation, poor coordination, and use of resources by the three levels of government — especially at the local level — means many essential infrastructure and services deliveries are not performing optimally.

Better integrated horizontal spatial packaging and clustering of budget outlays for the provision, maintenance and recurrent expenditure on assets and systems would reduce costs and help deliver public services more efficiently to support national development (see next section). It would also help the private sector align its investments better to support regional and local development and job creation.

Some African countries, like Ghana, have introduced national planning and regional commissions. The commissions' role is to improve the spatial, horizontal, and vertical inter-agency and government coordination, lifecycle budgeting and funding of public investment in capital work projects and service delivery programmes supporting national development. In addition to national planning commissions, there is a need for regional planning commissions, like in Ethiopia, to ensure better planning, coordination of development projects and programmes between the public and private sectors at the regional level. Regional commissions should be given similar powers and responsibilities as, and report to, the national planning commission.

Regional planning commissions would deliver significant benefits for secondary cities in states or provinces in which they are located (e.g., see HKTDC, 2021). Many secondary cities are state/provincial/district capitals. They would create opportunities to share geospatial data, plans and budgets related to long- and short-term planning, delivery and ongoing operations, and maintenance of local/national/international funded government projects and built assets to support the development of regions and nations. Regional planning commissions could identify cost-sharing arrangements to deliver lower cost, more efficient, effective, and sustainable services, and use public and private sector resources to optimise development efforts.

Planning commissions are models that have been used very effectively elsewhere to ensure governments get value for money from public investments. These investments continue to operate efficiently throughout their lifecycle. Linking multi-agency recurrent expenditure for maintenance of public assets during their lifecycle could quickly become line-items in national and local government budgets. Regional planning commissions would take time and need capacity building to develop. They are a crucial governance instrument needed to decentralise decision-making, responsibility and more coordinated delivery of projects and programs at a regional and secondary city level.

16.3.3 Collaborative Governance for City Development and Management

Worldwide, local governments tend to be very reluctant to share and collaborate on the provision and delivery of infrastructure and urban services. This reluctance is due to concerns about equitability or the benefits of co-investment or co-delivery of services and self-interests. This reluctance to cooperate is particularly challenging for smaller local governments that lack critical resources and find it difficult to operate at scale to meet mandated

obligations to deliver infrastructure and services. Small local governments often are reluctant to support amalgamations or cooperate in fear that they will be swallowed up or dominated by larger local governments. Many have few resources to make a meaningful contribution to improving overall development efforts involving cooperation and collaboration between local governments.

Many countries and cities are engaging in collaborative governance arrangements as an alternative to amalgamation, addressing concerns and supporting planned infrastructure and services delivery and strengthening enabling environments for business and investment. Collaborative governance involves regional networks of local governments working together, pooling, and sharing resources on a wide range of planning, infrastructure, urban and regional services delivery to reduce transaction costs. Central governments can provide incentives to encourage collaborative governance by providing top-up funding and resources to local governments that have signed binding agreements to collaborate and share personnel and resources to deliver local infrastructure and public services more efficiently.

Collaborative governance arrangements between local governments result in collaborative advantage and enhanced competitiveness by enabling a network of local governments to build a critical mass of resources and hard and soft infrastructure needed to support the development of the local economy. Such arrangements create opportunities for secondary cities to develop essential infrastructure to support their development and hinterland regions.

Collaborative governance can provide significant cost savings and improved levels and quality of services at the secondary city and regional levels, particularly in the co-delivery of education, health, emergency services, water supply and waste management services. Co-investment, where a few local governments operate as a network to create a critical mass of resources, infrastructure and services, can result in a sharing of risk and reduced costs that make them more competitive and attractive to investors to establish new industries and services, as well as increased employment opportunities to regional populations.

> ## "
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> *Collaborative governance involves regional networks of local governments working together, pooling, and sharing resources on a wide range of planning, infrastructure, urban and regional services delivery to reduce transaction costs.*

Annex A outlines a collaborative framework advantage for secondary cities, which could apply across African countries. Examples of how collaborative governance involving co-sharing of local government resources could be applied include: co-funding guarantees for infrastructure, asset management, pooling the cost and use of plants and equipment, joint urban and regional planning, and legal and financial management services. Collaborative governance does not involve political restructuring or changing governance arrangements. Its purpose is to ensure more efficient, cost-effective, and value-adding infrastructure and service delivery at the local level.

Collaborative governance operates best by doing simple things, such as ensuring that local governments can pool (or share) the use of resources such as equipment and/or staff. Road-making equipment, for example, can be pooled to facilitate improved road maintenance within several local government districts, instead of each local government purchasing equipment separately and having it idle for significant periods, either because of a lack of funds to purchase fuel, maintenance or because some equipment is not needed all the time. As a result, improvements to road maintenance will see increased benefits in transport logistics and trade. In addition to sharing equipment, matters such as legal, engineering, building control and municipal financial expertise can be provided on an agreed shared basis to more than one local government in the network, ensuring that more local governments have access to higher-level expertise.

An excellent model to start the networking of secondary cities is under development in Rwanda (see Box 16.2). Rwanda is embarking on an ambitious task of developing a network of six green secondary cities. Two key priorities are integrated development planning and management and the development of secondary cities as growth poles, with a focus on green urbanisation and innovation (Box 16.2). In May 2016, the Government of Rwanda, in partnership with the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), launched the National Roadmap for Green Secondary Cities Development in Rwanda (GGGI, 2016). The National Roadmap will support Rwanda's Green Growth and Climate Resilient Strategy and serve as an implementation tool for the country's Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS2). A key element of the green cities' agenda is connectivity around five priority areas of economic transformation for rapid growth.

BOX 16.2 | Rwanda Broadband Secondary Cities Network

Rwanda has taken the lead in Africa in economic development through a model of green city development. The initiative supported by the World Bank and other ODA aims to develop a network of six secondary cities and towns to provide a basis for information and knowledge sharing and services delivery, including education and health services. It is also being used to support green industry development using the broadband network.

DEVELOP RWANDA SECONDARY CITIES AS A MODEL GREEN CITIES WITH GREEN ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

OBJECTIVE:
Support the Government of Rwanda to implement **EDPRS 2 (2013-2018)** in light of "Green Growth" paradigm, particulary in the area of urbanization and local green economy.

MUHANGA
RUSIZI
RUBAVU
NYAGATARE
MUSANZE
HUYE

Source: Jeong (2014).

The creation of formal regional partnerships between cities and towns under networks or collaborative partnership arrangements offers cities opportunities to identify trade, information and other types of exchange that are mutually beneficial to signatories. Such partnerships can provide opportunities for a network of secondary city local governments to collaborate on climate change, regional transportation, communications and other infrastructure, and the construction of regional community and social services. Sister-city partnerships exist between many African secondary cities; however, they seldom generate many economic and/or social benefits.

16.3.4 Inclusiveness and Participatory Governance

Inclusiveness policy is becoming more widespread in local governments in Africa AND is essential to good-governance practice decision-making. It ensures relevant agencies and organizations, business, and community interests are recognized. Inclusiveness helps build trust in government and supports policy development and implementation, ensuring specific or special interests (e.g., people with disabilities, women and children) are included in decision-making and governance arrangements. Decisions are binding on participating parties and accepted more widely. Inclusiveness incorporates practices of community engagement, communities of practice (Hoosen, 2009), participatory planning and budgeting. It also includes community governance arrangements to maintain neighbourhood infrastructure and buildings, security and street beautification.

However, inclusiveness in secondary cities needs to go beyond consultation — to co-design and implementation of projects and programs of activities with business, institutions and local communities of interest. Many participatory governance processes are highly structured and do not provide opportunities for local innovation, creativity and experience to be incorporated into the local capacity-building process in order to deliver infrastructure and services. Secondary cities need to introduce more self-organised governance processes to deliver on a range of local infrastructure and services. Self-organising arrangements involve local community groups self-organizing to engage in tree planting, waterways management, community parks maintenance, and the building of community facilities they manage. This devolution of responsibility for local and broader regional urban areas to groups and organisations is important, as they are often better equipped to handle these. Such groups can usually call upon virtual expertise in the diaspora to provide valuable inputs into self-organising services delivery and management.

16.4 Economic and Finance Systems

The model of comparative and competitive advantage has driven the economic development of cities and countries for many centuries. However, as the world runs out of easily accessible non-renewable resources and climate change threatens life on the planet, that model is no longer sustainable. A new model of city development is emerging, based on a sharing economy, conservation of resources, green and inclusive growth, inclusion, equitable and sustainable development. This is a model based on collaborative advantage and cooperation where cities, governments, businesses, institutions, and organizations work in somewhat self-organizing systems but under clear guidelines, and using creative ways, to engage in planning, trade, commercialization, logistics, services delivery, and security level access and protocols. These arrangements and policies will vary between countries, cities, and geographic regions.

BOX 16.3 | In brief: Comparative, Competitive and Collaborative Advantages

Comparative advantage is **an economy's ability to produce a particular good or service at a lower opportunity cost than its trading partners**. The theory of comparative advantage introduces opportunity cost as a factor for analysis in choosing between different options for production. — *This may relate to cheap taxes, land and subsidized infrastructure.*

Competitive advantage refers to **factors that allow a company to produce goods or services better or more cheaply than its rivals**. These factors allow the productive entity to generate more sales or superior margins compared to its market rivals. — *This can mean applications of skills, technology, logistics, marketing, and innovations.*

Collaborative advantage is **the ability to form effective and rewarding partnerships with other organisations, for mutual benefit**. Being a good partner is a key corporate asset, or capability, for any business today. And today, this also may go further into collaboration between businesses, government and civil society. — *The focus here is on sharing common use infrastructure and services, joint ventures, alliance, etc., to reduce common transaction cost to business and government.*

Source: Adapted Investopedia, Econlib (2022).

Secondary cities can play a more influential role in the economic development of nations and regions, but changes are needed to national urbanisation and economic and spatial development policies. Four key elements of spatial economic change are outlined below to help secondary cities to realise their development potential. These changes must occur within national spatial economic development policies for countries in the African region.

16.4.1 Urban Economics

16.4.1.1 A Balanced Exogenous and Endogenous Growth Model

Focus on export-orientated development has been a success factor in improving economic growth and development and moving millions of people out of poverty. Globalization and neoliberalist ideology have underpinned the growth model for national development for many decades. However, that model is being challenged in the developed and developing world, particularly due to the lingering effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) and the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, many countries have realized their vulnerability and loss of economic sovereignty due to their heavy reliance on a limited number of countries for trade, especially for the provision of manufactured goods and services.

A global shift led by China is fostering much stronger self-reliance, with support for endogenous growth and strengthening subnational, regional and city development capacity. Countries such as Japan, Korea, and Germany, with declining rates of population growth and ageing populations, are moving towards more capital- and technology-intensive production of manufactured goods and services, which can be delivered efficiently at economies of scale and locally to offset the competitive advantages of low labour costs that were once provided by manufacturing offshore in developing countries. These changes will have significant implications on global manufacturing in the future, as developed countries change the mix of endogenous and exogenous growth policies and move to reshored manufacturing.

African countries aspire to become more industrialised. Many have sought to do this by establishing economic enterprise industry zones to encourage foreign direct investment. However, these have been located predominantly in primate cities, have lacked a well-developed supply chain and logistics infrastructure, and have attracted limited investment in many cases. As noted, the competitive advantage of cheap labour costs, discounting of environmental and social costs associated with unsafe working conditions, and the shift towards more service-driven economies are challenging that dominant growth model for many African countries.

Growing levels of inequality, reliance on consumption-driven domestic growth, and a lack of competitiveness in locally-based manufacturing have significantly constrained development prospects for many African countries. The dependence on an exogenous growth-driven economic development model has underpinned national economic development for many decades. However, this will not create sufficient jobs to meet the demands for employment or significantly change most countries' wealth and consumption patterns. For African countries to develop a more sustainable model of development, national and local governments need to focus on fostering more opportunities for endogenous growth, especially in the services sector, where most jobs will be created in the future.

A balanced national spatial model of economic development that is both endogenous and exogenous is required for African countries. A focus on exporting industries is still important. However, they must recognize there are many opportunities for decentralized endogenous growth and embrace the important role of secondary cities in fostering increased national production, consumption and wealth creation. This calls for a significant policy shift but is crucial to achieving more equitable, inclusive and sustainable development in African economies and national systems of cities.

16.4.1.2 Creation of Green Economies

The transition to less fossil-fuel energy use is essential, focusing on a more circular economy for African cities. The creation of green economies presents numerous opportunities for African secondary cities. Many have the scale and population size to start the transition process. The complete transition to greener secondary city economies will take time, given much of the infrastructure required to support their development will require substantial investment in new infrastructure, technology, and human development and other resources. The focus of green economic development should begin with regenerating existing assets and retrofitting them to stretch their operational life to make them more efficient, with cheap and straightforward technologies.

Promising efforts are being made at a small scale to introduce sustainable technologies into African secondary cities to support recycling, biofuel production and green energy. However, the challenge is scaling up and adapting these technologies and raising the capital necessary to do so. In the interim, the key to scaling up is innovation, leveraging

local innovation, entrepreneurship, and know-how, and building virtual knowledge networks within the national and international expert community and the diaspora. The first crucial step to enable secondary cities to transform their infrastructure and systems to promote the growth of a more circular, greener economy is regeneration.

Ways in which secondary cities can create opportunities to develop greener, more sustainable economies include:

- Develop local area energy networks, including solar, wind, geothermal and biomass local generation sources. This has the potential to create more sustainable jobs and reduce energy costs.
- Introduce applications of industrial ecology by the recycling and reuse of water and wastes, especially plastic products for re-purposing as building materials, street furnishings and consumer products.
- Adopt cleaner production techniques for local industries with small grants for adapting machinery and equipment to use less energy, water, and raw materials.
- Restore, retrofit, re-engineer or replace energy or hydraulically inadequate infrastructure to reduce water, heat, and energy loss.
- Develop local businesses and technical skills to aid the conversion of petrochemical to electrical engines.
- Support regional forestry projects to support timber production, localise production of local furniture, building construction and other wood products.
- Support more diversified regional production of food to reduce the need for imported food.
- Pool equipment, machinery, vehicles, and facilities to achieve savings in energy use and labour efficiency.

16.4.1.3 New National Spatial Model of Economic Development

African countries face a difficult choice in managing spatial economic development. Should they continue with the highly centralized model of directing urban and regional economic development policy, allowing primate cities to be the primary drivers of national economic development? Or should there be a significant shift towards a more decentralized integrated national system of cities and regional development, where cities are encouraged to collaborate in competition with the country's largest cities?

Historically, African governments have adopted a more centralized approach to support the economic development of secondary cities to help overcome economies of scale and high transaction cost issues. However, this approach has led to ever-widening disparities, concentrations of wealth and power in the hands of a few, and inequalities in public services. It limits the range of job creation and investment opportunities outside metropolitan regions. However, large urban areas in Africa are experiencing rising externality costs from pollution and congestion. Concentrating so much of national production, political power, and wealth in one or two very large cities also leaves nations highly vulnerable and exposed to risk in the event of a disaster, such as severe flooding or pandemics. More equitable distribution of population, cities and wealth would help mitigate long-term economic shocks, should a major disaster strike a nation's primate city.

This research indicates the need for a decentralised and integrated system of cities and regional development as a new national spatial model of secondary cities economic development in African countries. Three spatial strategies can be applied to support this model, as shown in Figure 16.1. These are:

- A. Economic development corridors.
- B. Regional cluster of cities and towns.
- C. Metropolitan regional clusters.

FIGURE 16.1 | Three broad spatial strategies for enhancing secondary cities development

Source: Author.

Each of the above involves building networks and clusters and enhancing connectivity for secondary cities surrounding metropolitan regions, economic development corridors, and sub-national regions. The principles behind the development of all three strategies are similar. In most countries, a combination of each can be applied, depending on economic geography and population density.

These principles underpinning each of the three strategies involve building a framework to foster the development of:

- Networks of trading-city partnerships
- Frameworks for enhancing connectivity
- A focus on linking value-chains and industry clusters
- Strengthened rural-urban linkages
- The mix of exogenous and endogenous growth
- Growth of competitive sub-national corridors and regional markets.

Figure 16.1 shows the concept for developing the three approaches for collaborative networks of secondary cities. The scale and development of these networks will vary within countries, depending on the nature and size of secondary and associated smaller cities and the willingness of cities to collaborate. Some will become regular, hierarchical, or free-scale networks of cities. The intent is to develop something like "an Internet of cities, "connected in different ways to maximize choice in accessing goods and services and markets to export local goods and services. Just as the "Internet of things" is changing radically and shaping the global economy emerging, an "Internet of cities" comprising networks of secondary cities and regional economies engaged in trade and other exchanges offers new opportunities to create and develop jobs, industries, prosperity, and greater self-sufficiency that will lead to more sustainable and equitable economic development outcomes for African countries.

There can be some overlap between the three spatial networks of secondary cities, especially between the corridor and regional networks. The economic structures and connectivity arrangements for each spatial framework will be different. Regional networks of secondary cities are likely to develop where a denser network of secondary cities is distant from a large metropolitan region. For example, the Kisumu and Ibadan urban agglomerations could be organized into regional network clusters of collaborating trading towns and cities. Johannesburg, Casablanca,

Alexandria, Addis Ababa, and Lagos could be developed as integrated secondary city clusters with their core primate city economies. An economic development corridor could be developed along the West African coast from Cape Coast to Sekondi-Takoradi or become part of a larger international economic trade development corridor from Abidjan to Lagos.

16.4.2 Urban Finance

16.4.2.1 Local Government Finance Corporations

Secondary cities need greater access to capital to fund infrastructure and essential urban and regional services. Most African secondary cities do not have access to funds in money markets, with borrowing permitted only through national government treasuries. There is a need for competition in local government capital markets. A way to achieve this is by the establishment of local government association funding agencies or corporations. A good model for this is the New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency (New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency, 2022), which has separate legislation (Parliamentary Counsel Office, New Zealand, 2011). Similar funding structures could operate in parallel and provide competition to current lending practices. This funding mechanism should lead to efficiencies in current and future local-government financing arrangements and expand opportunities for domestic pension funds, insurance, and short-term local-government investment in sinking funds.

Local government funding agencies or corporations operate under an arrangement where they collectively raise funds for securing large loans, bills, or bonds, which are then packaged or bundled as a portfolio of loans to local governments for infrastructure and other capital works. Participating local governments guarantee repayments. The model is akin to lending through 'solidarity groups', in this case, local governments. It aligns with the principles of the Grameen Bank (Alam & Getubig, 2010) and Guidelines for Local Governments on Policies for Social and Solidarity Economy (Jenkins et al., 2021). Establishing a local government funding agency could begin with metropolitan and secondary city local governments, which could be expanded into smaller local governments once operating. As a basis for leveraging funds, local government funding corporation should be given an allocation of national value-added (VAT) or goods and services (GST) taxes.

General requirements for establishing local government funding agencies in African countries to expand access to funds for capital works and other development programs would include the following:

- National governments would introduce enabling legislation or laws to establish local government funding agencies. All participating city local governments would be required to
  - Agree to operate as a solidarity lending agency and its conditions of operation
  - Undergo financial audits and be given a credit rating
  - Agree to annual auditing of the agency
  - Agree to a code of conduct for financial management
  - Prepare annual balance, income, and cash flow set of public accounts
  - Establish sinking funds for replacement or rehabilitation of public infrastructure and assets.
- National governments would issue bonds to provide seed capital for local government funding agencies and enable pension funds, insurance, and other investors to buy notes, bills, or lines of credit to agencies.

16.4.2.2 Leveraging Municipal Funds

African secondary city local governments have traditionally competed against each other for access to a limited pool of national funds to support their development and operations. This approach often results in economic and political opportunism and inequities. Secondary cities aligned politically with the national government ideology are more likely to secure funds than those not. The outcome is a disjointed and inequitable flow of funds and resources to secondary and smaller city local governments. Given the limited public funds available to secondary cities, it is essential that local governments that leverage their funds and resources be rewarded with matching funds, especially where funds are made available from international development assistance sources.

Secondary cities must be given incentives to gain access to additional funds that demonstrate improved efforts to increase local revenue and use these to value-add to use and extend existing assets to support productivity and service delivery.

There are opportunities to significantly leverage local government debt capital and grant funding to support the development of secondary cities. Central governments give access to top-up funds to value add for projects and programs where local governments agree to collaborate with surrounding local governments or other secondary cities. Collaborative funding arrangements can significantly improve the multiplier effects of public investment funding in regional transport, water, sanitation, and energy costs. It also helps to reduce operating and maintenance costs. Examples of projects where collaborative funding can benefit secondary cities include developing local area energy networks, sanitation and waste management, water storage and networking, public transport and information, and pooling resources and assets for public sector service delivery.

16.4.2.3 Municipal Financial Management

The key to securing access to finance and leveraging private-sector resources will be improving municipal fiscal health and obtaining creditworthiness. This is defined, in general, by the criteria laid out by credit rating agencies, and it signals to capital markets not only cities' readiness to receive financing, but, importantly, their ability to manage the funds according to internationally recognised standards. Many cities across Africa, particularly secondary cities, are still far from creditworthy and therefore need to undertake reforms to improve their municipal fiscal health as a prerequisite to tapping into financial resources.

Secondary cities will need to maintain positive balances and deliver sufficient public services to achieve creditworthiness within their total recurrent revenue. At the same time, they also need to have enough budget needs to meet their growing developmental needs, primarily related to infrastructure investment. To do this, secondary cities should consider the following reform initiatives to improve the financial management:

- Reforming and developing an institutional framework that allows secondary cities to:
  - Receive transparent, stable, and predictable inter-governmental fiscal transfers.
  - Raise sufficient own-source revenues and ensure prudent management, including high collection rates.
  - Flexibly adjust their rates and charges to reflect the needs of local contexts.
  - Provide for and strengthen the capital investment planning process.

- Enhancing prudent financial management to ensure:
  - Transparent and accurate accounting systems, with the consideration of moving from cash-based to an accrual-based system.
  - Stable operating and capital budgets and maintaining positive balances.
  - Sufficient cash flows and reserves.
  - A clear overview and prudent management of assets and liabilities.
  - Strong liquidity and debt management.
  - Reduction of off-balance sheet liabilities.

It will be too early, expensive, and therefore unnecessary to undertake a full credit rating for most secondary cities. Rather, internal processes, perhaps with support of national government agencies with more capacity, can undertake an initial municipal fiscal-health assessment to determine strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges and develop an action plan to improve these accordingly.

16.4.2.4 Increased Revenue Capture

Revenue collection from income tax, local government taxes and charges for services and rents across Africa generally is weak. Chapter 6 outlines opportunities for secondary cities to enhance local revenue collection, including improvements to tax maps, rapid appraisal valuation, simplification of tax collection, a fair share of value-added/consumption taxes and the introduction of value capture. There is extensive documentation on improving local revenue collection in African cities; however, investment and technologies, training, and initial data collection are expensive. The role of international assistance in enhancing local revenue collection is crucial. Secondary cities should collectively secure funds for mass training programs, technology, and other capacity building to improve revenue capture, especially from the escalation of land values.

Geographic information systems for land-use, building, property, and infrastructure mapping is becoming more widely used in secondary cities. However, the cost of procuring equipment, training and maintenance is high unless data can be linked to enhancing revenue streams from property and other taxes to pay for ongoing operations. Investment in GIS and management information systems (MIS) and making access to these available from public platforms is an important investment for secondary cities to manage data and information and improve the efficiency of urban services operations.

16.4.2.5 Lifecycle Asset and Risk Management Plans

Local governments must keep an inventory and maintain assets in good repair to support high-quality urban services and economic development. Local government legislation should require asset management plans for all urban areas as a requirement of local government financial and asset management (NSW Government, Australia, 2022). Few secondary cities in Africa can develop these plans; they require central government and international development assistance. Asset management plans are essential for establishing credit rating and defining targets for sinking funds to replace or repair assets in the future.

The practice of using asset management plans (which incorporate current depreciated value) is crucial to long-term capital works and fiscal development planning. In New Zealand, for example, infrastructure plans are prepared for 30 years and contain long-term maintenance, operations, and contingency costs. The value of assets and depreciation are included in corporate balance sheets. Smaller cities and regional councils with limited resources and expertise should consider collaborating to prepare and update asset management, and capital works plans.

16.5 Built Environment Systems

Most countries have adopted a sector-by-sector management approach to urbanisation and urban development. This approach often results in piecemeal and sporadic improvements to infrastructure and services. The result is a patchwork of urban infrastructure and service delivery projects that only slightly improve the overall functionality of urban systems and secondary city development. A more systems (holistic and integrated) approach to the planning, management and development of secondary cities is needed at multiple tiers of governance. Currently, there are very few examples of holistic and integrated urban improvement programs in Africa.

The following actions could significantly improve secondary city and regional coordinated planning and development and create development opportunities.

16.5.1 National Development Planning

Most African countries have national development plans. A few have national urban plans. National development plans tend to focus on key sector capital works investment projects and institutional and policy reform programs, which are proposed for the medium and long-term, usually 5–10 years. Few of these plans achieve targeted outcomes. Many include a wish list of projects funded by international development assistance grants and loans.

National development plans need to be more integrated, spatial, and cluster-investment focused. Little value-adding can occur in regional economies if critical supply-chain components of value chains are not adequately integrated into the design of large capital investment projects.

Future national development plans should be designed using more bottom-up approaches, where comprehensive packages of hard and soft infrastructure needed to support strategic industries are built into national activity programs. Secondary cities can play a major role in identifying the regional industries and critical infrastructure needed to support economic growth and development and bundle these into a series of investment activities that need to be funded by public agencies through grants and loans or international development assistance. The use of more systems and clustered approaches to national development planning, along with national and regional investment packages to support urban and regional development can provide a framework for raising capital from public and private sources.

At the secondary city level, preparation of public investment programs (PIP) would significantly enhance investment attractiveness, particularly if there are opportunities for a range of funding agencies to invest in components of significant development projects, such as local area energy networks, transport, warehousing and logistics facilities and construction materials industries. Other co-investment activities that secondary cities could support through PIPs include PPPs for public health delivery, education, markets, and emergency services management. All these activities require multisector input and investment to be built, managed and maintained efficiently.

16.5.2 Integrated Strategic Planning

The need for better planning of secondary cities has been well documented. Some cities have sector master plans for land use, transportation, and infrastructure. There is little evidence of attempts by African cities to prepare integrated sector plans. One of the few attempts was the Strategic Plan for the Greater Accra Metropolitan Development Area in 1992 noted earlier. However, with issues like climate change, bushfires, congestion, economic development, environmental management, housing affordability and homelessness, better integration of sector plans and financing arrangements is needed.

At the national, regional and city level, integrated planning integrates physical, economic, social and environmental sector plan objectives and outcomes. It aims to reduce the complexity and siloed nature of sector planning and decision-making processes to create a more efficient and holistic planning system. Integrated planning is the next step in planning reform in Africa. Some countries, like Kenya, have moved away from master planning to strategic land-use planning. The next step is to commence multi-sector integrated strategic planning, which can be undertaken by state and regional planning commissions (discussed above).

16.5.3 Linking Strategic Planning to Financial Planning and Budgeting

Integrated strategic planning, on its own, is not enough to ensure sustainable development outcomes. It needs to be linked to integrated financial planning of capital works and recurrent expenditure considerations, mainly associated with large public and private sector projects (including PPP projects). Box 164 Auckland Unitary Planprovides a good practice case study of strategic planning linked to financial planning and budgeting. Secondary cities also need to conduct risk assessments of plans and planning policy documents and check development proposals against climate change risk. This will become a conditional element of infrastructure and land-use plans in the future.

BOX 16.4 | Auckland Unitary Plan

The Auckland Unitary Plan, New Zealand, is world-class good practice demonstrating integrated strategic development, finance and budget planning.. This is an advanced economy plan, but many of the principles could be adapted and applied at the secondary cities level in Africa. The Auckland Unitary Plan linking land-use and economic planning strategies to 10-year financial planning budgeting could improve integrated planning throughout local government. New Zealand councils' 10-year long-term plan must be reviewed every 3 years; the 30+ year infrastructure strategy considers the lifecycle cost of public assets. One feature of this system is that the long-term plan is subject to external audit by New Zealand's Office of the Auditor General. African countries could adopt a similar process to ensure that strategic land-use and development plans deliver expected outcomes.

Source: Auckland Council (2021); New Zealand Office of the Auditor General (2022)The lack of integration and alignment between physical land-use, economic, and capital works plans results in a planning system that lacks a cross-checking of impacts and dependencies between sectors plans and decision-making processes. This also applies to national and local government financial plans and budgets, risk assessments and climate change planning.

16.5.4 Infrastructure Development Plans

Infrastructure is crucial to underpin economic and social development and enhance community well-being and quality of life. It encompasses hard, soft, and smart infrastructure. Infrastructure financing, provision, and management will be crucial elements of development strategies and plans for secondary cities and their hinterland regions. Infrastructure projects undertaken should be explicitly linked to the infrastructure priority requirements identified in those plans. Unfortunately, public and PPP major infrastructure projects in secondary cities is characterized by high cost and time overruns. There is a need to reform and improve tendering processes to address inefficiencies/deficiencies in procurement, sub-contracting, industrial relations and the overall management and oversight of project delivery. There is a massive backlog of current long-term infrastructure projects and proposals that need to be reviewed and revised to consider regulatory changes to environmental mitigation and other concerns. Smart integrated infrastructure systems, finance, and the prioritisation of outstanding infrastructure projects will be required.

Smart infrastructure elements should be considered in all aspects of Infrastructure planning for secondary cities. These include:

- Preparation of lifecycle asset management plans, incorporating programmes, priorities, and funding arrangements to maintain, sustain and dispose of public utilities, infrastructure, and assets to optimise their capacity and use to support state and regional development.
- The development of local area energy, water, wastewater, and transport networks.
- Investment in hard and soft infrastructure to strengthen connectivity and efficiency of intra and inter-regional and city networks and systems.
- New modalities and instruments for funding Infrastructure.
- Introducing intelligent transport and logistics systems to support seamless intermodal transfers.
- Water infrastructure, including drought resistance.
- Development of metadata infrastructure.
- Value-added engineering and management processes.

16.5.5 Conservation and Restoration Plans and Programs to Access Green Finance

Restoration and rehabilitation of buildings, infrastructure, plant, machinery, equipment, and degraded land are critical for secondary cities in restoring assets to a safe, efficient and sustainable operational level. Investing in restoring inner-city and historical areas of secondary cities is crucial to restoring capital values of land and attracting investment in the business, commercial and tourism sectors. Secondary cities such as Zanzibar's Stone Town in Tanzania demonstrate the importance of investing in conservation and building restoration, giving the city UNESCO World Heritage Site status.

The restoration of damaged forest lands, wetlands, and foreshores within and surrounding the boundaries of secondary cities is essential to reducing localised impacts of climate change and environmental damage. The emergence of green international financing to support climate change mitigation will flow through into African cities, providing opportunities for secondary cities located in river catchments to access conservation funding to rehabilitate and restore degraded landscapes and river systems. Secondary cities should prepare for these opportunities by developing climate change investment plans outlining specific capital works, management, and operation arrangements to maintain the quality of restored conservation areas. Some secondary cities will be in the position to benefit from carbon and environmental credits by investing in conservation and climate mitigation programs to restore damaged habitats.

▎**16.6** Social Systems

16.6.1 Human Resource Management

16.6.1.1 Skills Development

Most secondary cities lack access to a work force with the basic skills needed to improve the development and delivery of basic urban services and support more productive economic activities. Secondary cities are an important interim step for rural-urban migrants to gain new skills before migrating to larger cities or internationally in search of higher income and better quality of life. The development of para-professional, technical, medical, administrative, and trade skills is crucial to the sustainable development of secondary cities. The key to developing these skills is the establishment of local community colleges, where curriculum design meets the current and future education demands of the economy. Concurrent with this is the need for better networking between education institutions to develop lifelong learning capabilities and link universities and other research institutions to local research and development needs.

The introduction of collaborative partnership arrangements between high schools, technical colleges and universities to provide online learning and education to classrooms in the home is critical for enhancing education skills and knowledge in secondary cities. The model provided in Rwanda could be applied in other countries of Africa. The lack and poor quality of teachers and support capability in secondary cities hinder their development. Countries like Australia offer significant expertise in remote learning that could be applied at low cost to support the development of secondary cities and regions throughout Africa to enable all students to gain more equitable access to high-quality education.

A key focus for secondary cities and regions is the need to enhance literacy and learning skills. Most secondary cities, particularly those located inland, have low literacy and numeracy rates. This severely disadvantages young people and their access to higher education, knowledge and learning. Enhancing basic literacy, numeracy and computing skills are vital to developing more knowledge skill jobs in secondary cities. Secondary city local governments have a crucial role in working with education institutions to build capacity from preschool to high school learning capabilities in national, local and international language skills through community education partnership programs. These should be fostered and encouraged in all secondary cities across Africa.

16.6.1.2 Support for Learning and Knowledge Communities

Developing learning, knowledge and creative skills is one of the most critical investments secondary cities can make. The future economy will become more information and knowledge-driven. Building the hard and soft infrastructure and networks to support this is important. Secondary cities that lack knowledgeable and skilled, educated human capital will struggle to remain competitive, create jobs or be innovative. Therefore, a key focus of secondary city governance must be on creating learning communities where inhabitants can improve their knowledge and awareness and acquire new skills, expertise, and information that applies to local government, business and personal development. Support for developing learning and knowledge communities is crucial to the future economic and social development strategies for secondary cities.

16.6.2 Management of Urbanisation

Migration is a significant factor in the development of secondary cities. Little is yet known about the spatial patterns and internal flows of migrants in the respective jurisdictions, their characteristics, their contribution to local economies and their needs, and especially their housing. Migration to secondary cities is likely to increase, especially in countries like Ethiopia and Nigeria. Most people migrate in search of improved economic opportunities. Migration has net positive benefits for most secondary cities. Migrants often bring new skills, ideas, and capital. They also add to the cultural diversity of the cities. However, many migrants live in ethnic enclaves, which can become prone to illegal activities.

Few African countries have national population policies or plans. Those that do tend not to be very specific about managing migration growth from a spatial perspective. Secondary cities can support high levels of migration, provided land, accommodation, employment and basic community services are available in advance of migrants arriving. Most migrants reside in ethnic enclaves, but few spatial planning documents adequately address the needs of migrant populations. A more managed approach to national urban migration is required by linking national population policy to national urbanisation and economic development policies. These three policy realms should also be integrated at the secondary city level to ensure that local governments can more effectively manage population growth because of migration.

16.6.3 Migrant Support Programs

Secondary cities are a significant recipient of migrants in Sahel regions of Africa; some cities in Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya have large refugee populations. Some of the refugees in these cities have remained dislocated from their homeland for more than 30 years. Many of their children were born in the camps. These children are often considered non-citizens (i.e., not recognised by the host country as a citizen), but have gained languages and adopted customs that enable them to fit more easily into community life and employment. The research and the case study of Kakuma in Kenya (see Box 5-1, Chapter 5) shows there is significant potential to support the development of migrant skills and the capability to contribute to the development of local economies. However, this requires local governments to understand better the value migrant populations can add to the economic, social, knowledge and cultural mix of secondary cities — especially in border regions.

Opportunities exist for secondary city governments and communities, through partnerships, to engage in policies and programs to support greater harmonization and to progressively support multi-culturalism in secondary cities, recognising the importance of diversity and difference. Community partnerships can help stabilize racial conflict, bring peace and understanding to secondary cities near conflict zones.

16.6.4 Immigrant and Diaspora Networks

More than 30% of the population living in secondary cities are migrants. In addition, there is a large diaspora population living in and outside Africa who remit large sums of money back to their local communities. Formal remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa were recorded as $48 billion in 2019 (Ratha, 2021), with the figure for

informal flows also high. While making more effective use of remittance funds is important, these same networks can access social capital knowledge, experience and technology that is not available in secondary cities. Emigrants are a significant untapped resource that secondary cities need to leverage to fill skills, knowledge, and information gaps created by low human capital development and migration levels. Secondary cities need to encourage the development of more formalised immigration and diaspora networks focusing on communities of interest linked to finance trade and investment; planning and policy development; technology and innovation, asset management, education, and social services delivery.

16.7 Environmental Systems Management

16.7.1 Localized Responses to Climate Change

African secondary cities are not a significant contributor to climate change but will continue to be very much affected by its impacts. Lack of reliable rainfall, deforestation, changing seasonal weather patterns and warming present significant threats. Secondary cities will have to manage these impacts with little help from the central government. Only the actions of more advanced economies will mitigate the potentially damaging effects of climate change on African countries and cities.

The focus of secondary city government responses to climate change will need to be on localised adaption measures. With limited resources, local governments can collaborate and share knowledge, lessons and ideas with other cities and communities to mitigate climate change challenges. The approach can be self-organising and collaborative (e.g., local groups organizing initiatives with little help or direction from local government). Few secondary cities in Africa have the resources, capacity, or expertise to fund or oversee major projects for climate change adaptation.

Secondary cities can create opportunities to work collaboratively to manage many damaging effects of climate change. Some of these opportunities were discussed in Section 16.4.1.2, Creation of Green Economies. Others include:

- Support community stream and river catchment management to plant trees, building structures and retention basins to slow the velocity of stream flows during heavy rain to reduce the effects of flooding.
- Develop biogas from organic waste to substitute for kerosene and other fossilised fuels used in cooking to reduce CO_2 emission and improve local air quality.
- Introduce community schemes to plant trees in streets and public spaces to create shade, reduce ambient air temperature and absorb carbon.
- Use local materials and traditions to improve house design to improve and insulation of houses.
- Educate and utilise local communities in reducing pollution of waterways.

16.7.2 Localization of the SDGs

A more collaborative approach to river and artesian basin catchment management will also be needed to ensure available resources. For example, water quality along the Niger River will require collaborative action to ensure upstream cities reduce water contamination to reduce downstream water quality and flooding.

16.7.3 Water Conservation

Access to adequate clean, potable water is a growing problem for secondary cities. African river systems are becoming increasingly polluted, and groundwater reservoirs are depleted. Transpiration rates for dams are very high — many cities of the Sahel region risk running out of water. Secondary cities on the coasts and large river systems will find it increasingly expensive to treat or desalinate water. A high priority for secondary cities should be

water conservation measures to use water more wisely, recycle where possible and reduce pollution. As researchers from the World Resources Institute note, "The loss of natural soils, streams, wetlands and forests impact water replenishment and drainage, making it difficult — if not impossible — for city-regions to cope with water security and other risks like flooding and landslides"(van den Berg et al., 2021).

Climate change, increased migration and poor planning of urban areas will adversely impact an already challenging situation. Researchers from the World Resources Institute have developed simple and relatively inexpensive measures that secondary cities could apply to improve water conservation and reduce transpiration (van den Berg et al. 2021), as shown in Figure 16.2.

FIGURE 16.2 | Nature-based solutions for climate adaptation and water conservation in cities across Africa

Increasing tree cover and green spaces to battle heat island effect

Community gardens help increase water retention while encouraging community-building and local conservation

Greening rooftops reduce summer heat, provide winter insulation, and reduce stormwater runoff

Increasing permeable surfaces and wetlands to increase natural infiltration of rainwater and reduce stormwater runoff

Implementing ecosystem-based protection, such as mangroves, for coastline regeneration and disaster risk reduction

Source: van den Berg et al. (2021).

16.8 Connectivity Systems

The future development of secondary cities can be advantaged by strengthening their intermediary roles and functions, enhancing linkages and connectivity between national systems of cities, and enhancing connectivity between secondary cities by building networks of mutual and virtual cooperation. Collaboration is the key to this. It involves setting up the infrastructure for building networks and integrated systems for sharing ideas, information, resources, assets and knowledge through shared systems of interconnected infrastructure. It also includes linking city-to-city economies, adaptive networks of supply chains, and strengthening and improving hub and logistics functions of secondary cities and communications.

Building and maintaining networks that facilitate exchanges of trade, goods and services, investment, visitor travel, knowledge, and education within and between cities and regions is not exclusively the concern of transport, logistics and communications infrastructure services. These services are vital to developing national economies and cities. They must be supported by other soft infrastructure and networks to enhance capacity, capability and connectivity between national systems of cities across Africa. These include building infrastructure for collaborative arrangements for information sharing, integrated regional planning, pooling of capital and regional risk and disaster management — especially along river systems and hinterlands between local government.

The following initiatives need to be carefully considered and public policies prepared by secondary cities to support their development.

16.8.1 Enhancing Connectivity within National Urban Systems

Enhancing connectivity within urban systems is one of the most critical elements of improving the performance and development of secondary cities. Connectivity is concerned with the type and level of connectedness and the capacity of the interconnected people, platforms, systems and applications to facilitate exchange between government, business, communities and individuals. The Internet of things and social media have also given rise to a new dimension of connectivity.

There are, however, significant impediments to connectivity in African countries. First, personal travel and national supply-chain connectivity are inhibited by poor transportation infrastructure. Second, poor local infrastructure and access to reliable supplies and technologies reduce the productivity of product supply chains and value-adding processes. Third, low levels of education constrain connectivity to knowledge, data and information, and computer literacy and inhibit creativity. Finally, connectivity to government services is constrained by the scarcity of reliable information and by poverty and political allegiances.

The following measures can significantly improve connectivity to support the development of secondary cities.

16.8.2 Regional Internet Services

Rwanda has recognised the importance and value of rolling out broadband internet to secondary cities. The internet is the most important platform for connectivity that can help support the development of secondary cities. Roads and infrastructure are important to the production and flow of resources, goods, and commodities; however, future African urban economies will become increasingly reliant on services, especially the internet. The roll-out of broadband and 5G+ networks of regional communications are crucial to improving the competitiveness and performance of African secondary city economies. It should be a high-priority investment across all African countries.

Internet services must also be accompanied by local area energy networks, using alternative energy sources such as solar or wind power, which Africa has in abundance. These networks also have broader applications for secondary cities and regions in facilitating technology such as 3D printing, which can be used in areas of medicine (building prosthetic legs and arms) and for machinery replacement spare parts, building fittings and fixtures, children's play equipment and toys, and arts and crafts. The advantage is that this technology can use recycled materials to make many useful products at low costs and quickly.

BOX 16.5 | Medical uses for 3D printing technology in Africa

3D printing technology is steadily affecting medical practice in Africa. The most notable intervention is in printing prosthetic limbs and sockets such as the one that a three-year-old Ugandan, Rosaline, received. Rosaline's prosthetic and socket cost US$250 – a fraction of the normal US$5,000 price tag. The process is faster, the prosthetic can be printed in a day, and amputees report a more comfortable fit.

Source: University of Toronto (2017)

16.8.3 Regional transportation

While regional road, rail, and airline transport networks within and between African countries have improved significantly in recent decades, the majority remain poor. The priority has been to enhance the connectivity of regional city-to-city linkages.

However, feeder roads are also of strategic importance, particularly for improving the quantity and quality of food transportation and reducing the damage and loss resulting from inferior regional road networks. Of critical importance for connectivity are efficient logistics handling facilities. It is vital for secondary cities to improve logistics facilities and services, especially documentation and tracking, as they play a significant role in national supply chains. Logistics facilities impact the efficiency of the flow of goods and services and the performance of national and rural economies.

16.8.4 Connecting Communities of Interest

Civic leadership is crucial to secondary city development. It requires trust, inclusiveness, respect, transparency and accountability between all community sectors and a wide range of decision-makers responsible for the planning, developing, and managing of secondary cities. This can be achieved by introducing community charters as best-practice local government engagement, like that adopted in Scotland (Community Chartering Network, 2018) and provided in a guide produced by Christian Aid (Christian Aid, 2018). In addition, the development of communities of interest linked to trade and investment, together with professional knowledge sharing, and the diaspora offer ways to develop clusters or pools of knowledge as vital resources to support local economic development. They can also lead to substantial development of secondary city human capital.

16.9 A Role for ODA in supporting the development of Secondary Cities

Official development assistance will be essential to support the development of secondary cities. It can provide the catalyst for investment in secondary cities to create a critical mass of infrastructure, human capital, and institutional governance capacity building, improving core services delivery capacity, mobilising, and leveraging resources to develop the local and regional economies. Careful use of ODA funds can help mobilise other government, private and institutional investment, and resources (including the diaspora) to foster resilience, enhance development, and improve the performance and competitiveness of secondary cities. The following is a framework for ODA organisations to target programs and activities that would benefit the development and management of secondary cities.

16.9.1 Defining the Scope and Scale of African Secondary Cities Development Programs

For ODA to effectively support the development of secondary cities, two important matters should be considered when formulating development assistant packages: (i) What is the scope and scale of activities to be considered, and (ii) at what level should these be targeted?

Table 16.2 Framework for scope and scale of ODA activities for African secondary cities development program shows different levels and types of activities in which international ODA agencies, governments, businesses, and communities could engage to support a new urban-age agenda for developing secondary cities in Africa. The first column indicates the level of engagement, i.e., the scale — regional, country, city, local and multi-lateral. The scope of activities is listed (across the top row) under policy and strategy, programs, projects, capacity building, and knowledge management.

TABLE 16.2 | Framework for scope and scale of ODA activities for African secondary cities development program

Scope (horizontal) and scale (vertical) of Activities	Policy and Strategy	Programs Delivery	Projects Delivery	Capacity Building	Knowledge Management
African Regional Level	African regional strategies to promote secondary city corridor economic development	Regional partnership programs with ODA		Regional forums Regional training	Knowledge networks City partnerships
Country Level	Country program strategies for secondary cities Secondary city urban policies Urban green economic development Urban management partnership program	Targeted / programmatic plans and strategies for secondary cities Catalytic programs such as city deals and co-investment in infrastructure	National demonstration projects Shelter housing Energy efficiency Waste recycling reuse	Urban management education and CPD program National urban research centres	National urban forums National knowledge hub
City Level*	Integrated multisector city development and regional development strategies	Future urban development areas. Slum mapping Poverty alleviation Management of peri-urban Urban finance	Programmatic projects Single themed projects Local economic development office Revenue collection Value capture	Institutional capacity Professional Development Local economic development	Urban research institute Population projections Investment prospectus
Local Area Level			Thematic projects	Community partnership building	Community education and awareness
Multi-lateral		Partnership for secondary cities development initiative		Tool kits Funding Best practices guide	Database of best practices

Source: Author

16.9.2 Levels of ODA Support

Five levels of ODA support could be targeted to support the management and development of secondary cities. These are:

Africa regional level: African regions need to be better connected, with support targeted to meet secondary city needs in balancing an intermediary role in national and international trade and development. Urban development and support programs can be developed at a continental and regional level with organizations like the African Economic Community, Economic Commission for Africa, African Development Bank and the World Bank. The organizations listed in Table 16.3 could have a key role in facilitating workshops and programs to support planning to improve interregional connectivity at the regional level. The building blocks to enhancing the economic development corridor and cross-border secondary cities, such as those emerging in western and eastern Africa, involve institutions working to develop cross-border and corridor agreements to free up trade, the movement of people and knowledge exchanges between cities and countries.

TABLE 16.3 | Key regional agencies and organisations which could engage in secondary city development

Key Regional Organizations	Subgroups
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)	
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	
East African Community (EAC)	
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/ CEEAC)	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	
Southern African Development Community (SADC)	Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)	

Source: Various websites.

Country level: Some countries have developed national urban strategies and programs to support local development, slum upgrading, urban poverty alleviation, and initiatives to support the development of secondary cities. At the country level, ODA support for secondary cities planning and programs, like those in Ghana and Rwanda, are noted as developing a national framework for connecting systems of secondary cities. Developing country-level strategies to support urban sector activities, target support for enhancing connectivity between metropolitan regions, secondary and other intermediate cities, and regional development could help significantly improve supply-chain value-adding and logistics efficiencies in support of national development.

The areas area where national programs for secondary cities would benefit significantly from ODA include:

- National Urban Strategies: The Habitat III declaration and SDGs call for stronger national urban strategies. However, these must be part of national development plans and strategies. They need to be integrated with national economic, population, social and environmental plans, and strategies.

- Institutional capacity building: Capacity-building activities could include on-the-job training and skill-building activities for local housing and infrastructure construction, improved local government management, and continuing professional education and leadership.

- Networking and knowledge management: This might include supporting multi-level networking and knowledge-building of community associations, information systems development at the state and city-wide levels, community education and awareness programs through social media and local radio.

- A multi-layered and geographic programmed activity is needed involving ODA (and others) support to secondary cities at the country level. Types of activities that could be considered include:

  - Facilitating urban policy dialogue or mainstreaming national plans, local government budgeting processes and regulatory reforms.

  - Policies that help cities anticipate and plan for urban growth. This can be achieved by creating incentives for local authorities to become more accountable.

  - Increasing revenues for improved infrastructure and service delivery.

  - Defining property rights.

  - Requiring the efficient and transparent management of public land resources.

Cities level: At the city level, ODA support for capacity-building activities for on-the-job training and skill-building activities for local housing and infrastructure construction, improved management of local government, continuing professional education and leadership. Such packages must include provision for enhancing rural-urban linkages, connectivity between regional cities, knowledge sharing and integrating strategic and water catchment management planning where possible packages of assistance should be in the form of regional cluster integrated-development projects with bundled packages of capital funding and technical assistance.

At the secondary cities and urban periphery level, a local government could target improvements in strategic areas of:

- Urban governance.
- Land administration and management.
- Green economic growth.
- Climate change adaptation.
- Quality job growth.
- City inclusion strategies.

Local area level: ODA can be of significant benefit in local area improvements for infrastructure, including local area energy, sanitation, and water networks, housing, conservation, and community development. The latter may involve programs for supporting migrants and refugees to adjust and assimilate into the communities of secondary cities. Local area improvements could also embrace capital works involving community partnerships to build structures for climate change adaptation, the development of community parks and facilities, and monitoring and evaluation of infrastructure to improve maintenance.

Central governments and international development assistance agencies and organizations play a leading role in facilitating local and public policy dialogue. They help to strengthen the capacity of both central and local governments to provide intra- and inter-governmental coordination and urban resource management arrangements. They can also assist donor coordination by providing a framework to align activities involving research and development, learning, news, information dissemination, monitoring and evaluation. Local area programs could include grants for housing repair and improvements.

Multilateral: ODA agencies can leverage funds to value-add to projects and programs by collaborating in activities that are mutually beneficial and feasible to multi-package assistance at a regional, country, and city level. This can be facilitated at the country ODA and donor forum level, in partnership with national and governments.

16.10 Concluding Remarks

Africa's future development and prosperity and the well-being of its people lie in its national system of cities. Despite the fact that the continent is currently a little more than 45% urbanised, most Africans will be born, migrate, and live-in cities by the middle of this century. However, without redress, it is in the large cities where most of the investment, wealth and jobs will occur. National governments need to prioritise supporting the development of secondary and smaller intermediate cities and regional towns, if the imbalance and disparities in the growth and development of national systems of cities are to change.

Secondary cities are home to between 12.5% and 15% of Africa's population, or 27% to 30% of its total urban population, depending on how 'urban' is defined. Many secondary cities are growing rapidly — especially those with populations between 500,000 and 1 million. Those cities support a significantly greater proportion of the population and perform vital intermediary functions for between 40% and 65% of the population living in regional and rural areas, depending on countries. They play a crucial role as logistics hubs and in supporting national and international supply chains to move materials, goods, services and travellers. However, because many are not functioning well, the capacity of secondary cities to help grow and diversify national economic growth, trade and development is constrained.

A new urban age is dawning in Africa, but few countries or cities across the continent can as yet manage its impacts. Africa needs well-developed and functioning systems of cities that will support their national economies and create new jobs. However, its systems need to become more spatially developed and better connected and managed in order to achieve this. The trend of increasing primacy of African cities is a risk. It leads to inequitable spatial distribution of wealth, political power, skills and resources concentrated in a few cities.

The direct consequences of this are likely to be increased levels of migration to large metropolitan regions and some secondary cities; a geographic widening of the gap in terms of income, wealth and access to human services; growing regional poverty; and weaker local and regional economic development and governance. Africa needs a more balanced system of cities, focusing on the sustainable development of secondary cities.

The research presented in this book has added valuable knowledge about the role, functions and development of secondary cities in Africa. It has revealed much about the poor state of urban environments, governance and management of secondary cities in Africa. But it also shows good examples of secondary cities that are doing well. Some have adopted measures such as improved local waste management services, engagement in biomass and clean energy production, recycling and reusing waste, and developing low-cost housing and localized credit facilities to support development. These initiatives are encouraging — but scaling up remains a problem.

A change in the direction of national spatial economic development policy is needed. This change calls for a greater focus on improving connectivity, adopting systems and integrated approaches to national and subnational urban spatial, economic, and social development policy; and improved urban governance, policy, planning, and management. Collaboration, connectivity, and regeneration are three crucial factors in supporting the sustainable development of secondary cities. Local governments have significant opportunities to overcome severe resource shortages, fix infrastructure, and improve poor services delivery through greater collaboration. However, this calls for new and improved urban governance arrangements in secondary cities to engage in collaborative governance to pool and share resources in order to provide and maintain infrastructure, community, and social service delivery.

There is need for a new spirit of optimism on the future development of African secondary cities. African secondary cities face many challenges, but they also present many opportunities. Solutions exist to solve the problems of rapid urbanisation, urban management, and governance in African secondary cities. However, knowledge of these solutions needs to be more widespread, with more cooperative and collaborative efforts for the management of these cities. Secondary cities can take much from best practices examples from other countries that will support their development by introducing collaborative governance models to share resources; exchange information, knowledge, and ideas; and integrate planning, governance, and development approaches that build in more self-reliant, self-organizing communities and local areas network systems. The many initiatives and opportunities identified in this book offer approaches through which African secondary cities can build a secure and prosperous future. These are the takeaway messages from this book.

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A1

FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY CITES PARTNERSHIPS

The Dynamics of Systems of Secondary Cities in Africa
ANNEX A: FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY CITES PARTNERSHIPS

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> A new model for business and economic development has emerged since the GFC. This model is based on the sharing economy and collaborative advantage. It is replacing the older competitive and comparative advantage models in regional economic and business development. In the drive for firms to become more competitive, opportunities to reduce business cost margins are limited, except through innovation, investment in new technology, and low labour costs of production. Its focus is to reduce the transaction costs of commonly used infrastructure and services, create a critical mass of firms or enterprises to overcome scale and competition from large competitors, and share product, market, and takeover risks. As a result, businesses and governments are attracted to collaboration arrangements and other partnerships to reduce externality costs and gain better access to knowledge, public infrastructure, and resources. The growth of industry clusters and networks has been identified as a way firms in secondary cities can create collaborative advantage and secure a greater share of national investment in new industries and jobs.

For African secondary cities to grow and develop sustainably, their local economic development policies must guide investing in the right strategic infrastructure and enabling environments that will enable them to become better connected to supply chains, markets and support services. They must have a development framework or plan and governance arrangements to guide the process. This is a valuable lesson gained from the network partnerships for economic development described in some of the cases in the book, *Connecting Systems of Secondary Cities (Roberts, 2019, p. 106).*

Figure A outlines a framework that can be used to guide the process to build the strategic infrastructure to enhance connectivity for secondary cities. Elements of this framework are drawn from the initiative in New Zealand (Allen & Eaqub, 2012) and the UK Core Cities initiative in Manchester (Core Cities, 2010, p. 20). There are six basic steps in the framework and three analytical processes.

Step 1: Agreement to Collaborate: This initial step involves three or more secondary cities agreeing to collaborate as a network to support local economic development and trade between them. For this to happen, there must be agreement on specific types of activities that the cities can mutually support to generate competitive advantage and mutual benefit from developing partnership arrangements. The partnership might involve specific industries, clusters, or the provision of public goods and services. This initial process takes time. Considerable effort is necessary to win the confidence of businesses and public agencies in order to collaborate. In secondary cities, interests are often parochial, territorial and myopic — especially if power, position or market share is perceived to be threatened.

It will take time for local government to understand the advantages of the new collaboration and cooperation model applied to business and local economic development. Unless secondary cities' local governments want to partner, can see the benefits of collaboration and are willing to work towards co-investment arrangements that are transparent for delivering public goods and services, they should not rush into agreements to develop collaborative industry structures and systems for local economic development. However, it is a sustainable governance model that is being used in many developed countries to reduce costs, waste and broaden services to multiple cities by combining resources and purchasing power. Experience in building industry cluster partnerships between competing firms in different cities or geographic locations shows that it takes many years to educate, win trust and gain confidence among stakeholders within local communities so that collaborative approaches will benefit local economic development.

Step 2: City Connectedness and Cluster Analysis: Before African secondary cities can begin to develop infrastructure networks to enhance connectivity and foster trade between cities, there must be a thorough audit of the state, capacity and performance of the local economy and the network infrastructure that supports its operations and developments. Secondary cities engaged in development need to prepare city development strategies. These have a crucial role in identifying the potential of co-investing in infrastructure to support industry and cluster network partnerships that add value to local business and public services. The analysis conducted to prepare city development strategies should identify structure, trends, risk, and prospects and the current strength of connectivity in city networks and connectivity between cities.

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This involves the preparation of connectivity indexes for the following:

- Local area indexes (industry cluster analysis).
- City-wide networks (urban systems analysis).
- Rural-urban networks (rural-urban linkages).
- Systems of city networks (external linkages).

FIGURE A1 | Framework for Development of Secondary Cites Partnerships

1 **AGREEMENT TO COLLABORATE**

Secondary Cities Joint partnership meeting and MOU collaboration agreement to set up Secondary Cities Development Partnerships Program (SCDPP)

ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY CITY LOCAL ECONOMY INTENDING TO COLLABORATE
- Struture
- Prospects
- Trends
- Risks

2 **CITY CONNECTEDNESS AND CLUSTER ANALYSIS**

Secondary Cities share plans and information with partnerships participants to identify area of collaboration

SECONDARY CITY CONNECTIVITY NETWORK INDEX ANALYSIS
- Local Area Indexes (Industry cluster analysis)
- City-wide network (Urban system analysis)
- Rural Urban networks (Rural urban linkages)
- Systems of city networks (External linkages)

3 **FEASIBILITY STUDIES OF COLLABORATUIN OPPORTUNITIES**

Potential Local and External Industry clusters, business, institution and government partnershios opportunities indentidies and feasibility studies conducted

ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY CITY VALUE ADDING SUPPLY CHAIN LINKAGES
- Local industry clusters value-adding options
- Local endogenous value-adding options
- Rural/Urban linkage value-adding options
- City networks (external) linkages value-adding options

4 **HARD AND SOFT INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK INVESMENT DEVELOPMENT PLAN**
- Local Area Networks
- Secondary City Regional Network Partnership
- Clustered Secondary City Network Partnership
- Corridor Network Partnership
- Global Industry Network Partnership

NEEDS AND GAP ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK LINKAGES
- Local industry clusters value-adding options
- Local endogenous value-adding options
- Rural Urban linkage value-adding options
- City networks (external) linkages value-adding options

5 **SECONDARY CITIES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM**

City to City and Industry to Industry Cluster Partnership

CITIES INVESTING IN PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK FOR PRIORITISED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP
- Local industry clusters value-adding options
- Local endogenous value-adding options
- Rural Urban linkage value-adding options
- City networks (external) linkages value-adding options

The information gathered to prepare secondary city economic development strategies (CEDS) is then shared by the partners so that opportunities to start linking development activities between industry clusters and public service providers can be identified. These opportunities provide the platform for further discussion and research on development potential, network infrastructure, and capital goods and services investment needs. Much of the discussion will focus on the strategic infrastructure needed to enable business activities and markets in the respective cities to develop and what essential investment is needed in public goods and services to develop the infrastructure networks to enable the free flow of exchanges.

If cross-border secondary cities and national governments are involved, the process becomes more complex. However, this should not dissuade secondary cities with similar cultural, religious, legal and language systems from agreeing to engage in secondary city-regional partnerships or economic development corridor partnerships. There are good prospects for this to occur in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

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Step 3: Feasibility Studies of Inter-City Local and External Industry Cluster Partnerships: The sharing of information on respective secondary city local economies will enable businesses, governments and institutions to identify opportunities to collaborate, innovate or share information. This is the concept behind smart cities, where information is shared so that individuals, entrepreneurs and industry groups can identify and assess the feasibility of developing and launching new or adapted products into local and external markets. Experts and research can facilitate these connections. This process may involve cities working collaboratively with firms, industry groups and clusters to develop their private sector partnerships, e.g., food processing, tourism and agricultural machinery.

The importance of intra-city and urban-rural linkage partnership should not be overlooked. Local area networks and production outputs can be significantly enhanced to expand their contribution to a broader industry-secondary city partnership at the regional, corridor, metropolitan, and global levels. This is one of the principles behind developing the European Cluster Collaboration partnership initiative (European Commission, 2014). A valuable example of facilitating opportunities for connecting and collaborating is Joint Venture Silicon Valley, which brings together leaders from business, government, academia, labour and the broader community through initiatives aimed at addressing issues related to climate change, education, transportation, economic development, disaster preparedness, health care, food security and more.[1]

Feasibility studies need to be undertaken of industry and public services for which there is agreement on the potential for collaboration and development. Priorities should be determined on what partnerships should be developed. Ideally, an industry or an associate public services partnership, if not both, should be developed, preferably one that is not too complicated—for example, sharing knowledge through joint funding of library facilities to offer e-textbooks to secondary schools. This sharing of knowledge and information would help create confidence in building city-to-city government and business partnerships. The first partnerships will always be a learning experience; therefore, an action-learning (learning by doing) management approach should be adopted as a good practice technique used to promote the development of industry cluster partnerships (OECD, 2004).

Step 4: Hard and Soft Infrastructure Network Investment Development Plans: A crucial step in creating partnerships for building networks within systems of secondary cities is to identify types, arrangements and priorities for their establishment. Studies and research are needed to investigate the nature, scale, and reach of networks needed for systems of secondary cities, as well as the technology for building the hard and soft infrastructure to support many different types of networks and network partnerships, such as the following:

- Local area networks.
- Secondary city regional network partnerships.
- Clustered secondary city network partnerships.
- Corridor network partnerships.
- Global industry network partnerships.

Connectivity measures, such as internet speed, use of mobile phones, availability of public buses and number of passenger trips, etc., produce useful sets of indicators showing the relative strengths, weaknesses, risks, and gaps in soft and hard infrastructure network elements that support industry supply chains and other types of exchange between cities. Assessing collaborative government arrangements can also help identify what public investments are needed to strengthen and develop enabling environments and common-user infrastructure and services. In some cases, collaboration can help to reduce transaction and operational costs of services, such as e-services and compliance and enforcement of regulations, where costs are shared between cities.

Step 5: Secondary City Partnerships Programme: There is no single model that best suits city-to-city collaboration and network development. Some form of agreement or memorandum providing an understanding of collaborative governance arrangements, cooperation areas, and resource sharing to develop and deliver public goods and services and to develop strategic infrastructure networks is essential. It should include raising capital and allocating resources in city budgets involved in a secondary-cities partnership programme. In some cases, the partnership can be strengthened by state/province/district and national governments being party to industry partnerships. Such an arrangement can help provide a guarantee for capital and other resources to develop strategic infrastructure for supporting intercity partnership arrangements. Some capital investment requires co-partnering on finance and risk-sharing. Other investments will be the responsibility of individual government

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ENDNOTES

(1) See, Joint Venture Silicon Valley, https://jointventure.org/

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