

# Branded and Renewed? Policies, Politics and Processes of Urban Development in the Reform Era

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Hidden behind city branding exercises through large projects are acts of land capture and slum demolitions by a predatory local state and crony capitalism. In the policy arena, meanwhile, the urban, and particularly the metropolitan story has been one of deliberate confusion, and fragmentation of policy and implementation. The promise of rapid city transformation has not been met through the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, which does something for infrastructure and something for housing but all in an uncoordinated project-by-project manner. Neither the infrastructure agenda nor shelter security for all is advanced. The urban reality instead has been one of gradual improvement, with or without these policy and branding initiatives.

The new millennium has brought a new approach and structural changes in the way urban development has been pursued in India. This article presents different facets of these changes in policies, politics and processes. It limits itself to observations from the metropolitan cities, as these have largely been the arena of action – large investments, land-grabs, scams, and people’s resistance movements against eviction. While economic reforms at the national level were introduced in the early 1990s, urban changes (some would call them urban reforms), begun gradually in the decade of 2000 accelerated with the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM).

Partisan politics has pre-fixed the urban renewal mission with a JN. However, the changes in the urban sector observed today are not related to ruling party ideology but are a demand of the changing times and changing power structures, especially the new rich, overwhelmingly concentrated in the metropolitan cities in India, who are exercising great control over ideology, media and politics.

The ongoing transformations in urban India represent a consensus in the urban visions of all political dispensations. The United Progressive Alliance’s first government (UPA-I) promised to implement what its predecessor had visualised. The dominant vision of the urban is as “engines of economic growth”,<sup>1</sup> a slogan which is in the JNNURM’s preamble, overlooking the fact that cities are also habitats for the migrant poor. While the vision is limited, urban policymakers and managers have to also confront some real-world dynamics of people’s aspirations and demands on urban policy. As a result, we observe different processes unfolding on parallel tracks and highly fragmented urban change.

This paper identifies five parallel strands in these urban processes – elitist visions of cities, irreconcilable agendas of infrastructure development and poverty alleviation creating a situation of deliberate policy confusion, brutal displacements in the decade of 2000-10 and in the last few years, rehabilitation of those displaced, a predatory state and gradual transformation of the cities, regardless of the above processes. There is also a sixth parallel strand – the people’s own resistance to marginalisation and displacement to which local state actors in turn react and respond.

What do we make of these urban dynamics and layers of urban processes? Is there an underlying meta-narrative? Do these grandiose visions and missions legitimise predatory capture of urban land and resources? Can the realities of Indian electoral politics and people’s own aspirations balance out these predatory trends in urban areas? Does the local state balance out both extremes through the game of exclusion and inclusion? These are the questions

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explored in this paper through the dynamics observed in available data, urban investments and newspaper reports.

In what follows, first, we briefly explore the tendency to dream big in urban development, dreams that have however not fully materialised. We then discuss the urban development policy and its implementation as embodied in the JNNURM and show how both the thrust for rapid economic growth through infrastructure projects and for including the poor exist simultaneously, resulting in a situation of deliberate policy confusion. This is followed by an exploration of the land grabs and the predatory nature of state as epitomised in land dynamics. The concluding section argues that the agenda of incremental change should not be abandoned.

### Exclusive Visions and Exclusive Clubs

“Rajkot will get a skytrain”. “Ahmedabad will get a metro”. The promises of urban transformation have found a regular place in daily newspapers, many in the business of selling the news and selling products. Cities are branded – *Apnu Amdavad, Amchi Mumbai* – for sale, i e, for inviting investors. Big projects are a kind of fashion statements for cities, sold to the upwardly mobile, aspiring to bring the Seine promenade to Ahmedabad or a Shanghai skyline to Mumbai.

Such visions, which incidentally are widespread, translate into a reality of modern or state-of-the-art urban infrastructure and luxury or high-end real estate development. These visions promote big money and big players in the urban space, opening up cities for monopolistic control. Articulated in documents such as *Bombay First – McKinsey’s Vision Mumbai* (2003), these visions are then adopted as Mumbai development policy in putative reports of the Chief Minister’s Task Force (Government of Maharashtra 2004).

The vision of exclusive clubs also gets emphasised by certain policy decisions at the state level. There is a strong perception in the more developed states that the benefits of their economic growth are being enjoyed by those from less developed states. Urban Maharashtra has seen political movements on this issue. In March 2010, Gujarat announced Regulations for the Rehabilitation and Redevelopment of the Slums to provide public housing to “eligible” slum dweller or project-affected persons, if the slum dweller is “not a foreign national and is the occupant of hutment for a period of minimum 10 years and has a domicile of Gujarat for 25 years or his descendant” (p 4).<sup>2</sup> The key point here is a domicile of 25 years. Urban residency is otherwise determined by cut-off dates. Slum dwellers providing residency proof any time before the cut-off date are eligible for urban services. Delhi’s cut-off date is 1998, Mumbai’s is 1995 (although litigation is pending in the state high court to extend the cut-off to 2000) and Ahmedabad is 1976! Metropolitan cities are, therefore, emerging as exclusive clubs closing the doors to new migrants.

But, these visions and the related attempts to exclude migrants have not become reality. Even the dream of urban transformation, reforms and infrastructure investment through the JNNURM has not been met, according to the High Powered Expert Committee (HPEC) for Estimating the Investment Requirements for Urban Infrastructure Services, and hence there is a need for New Improved JNNURM (NIJNNURM) (HPEC 2011: 33). The HPEC Report further also argues that “[e]nsuring high quality public services for

all in the cities and towns of India is an end in itself, but it will also facilitate the full realisation of India’s economic potential” (p xxi).

### Paradigm of Deliberate Confusion

The policy paradigm for the urban development has been one of deliberate confusion. The right, wanting high investments and urban transformation find the ongoing changes very slow; those on the left argue that these changes come at the cost of the urban poor. The policies attempt to cater to both sides, excluding and destabilising urban ecologies through projects such as river-fronts, flyovers and road-widening and including through say urban rehabilitation programmes, the Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) housing under the JNNURM and now the proposed Rajiv Awaas Yojana (RAY). The balance keeps fluctuating; varying from state to state depending on the political economy of the state. These conflicting policy signals could be called a paradigm of deliberate confusion, allowing policy to swing in the direction from where the pressure is coming.

Urban policies are on two parallel tracks, an agenda implemented by the Ministry of Urban Development (MOUD) of building state of the art cities, and another pursued by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (MOHUPA) for addressing the manifestations of poverty such as slums, lack of services, weak employment opportunities for the urban poor, etc. Both, however, rarely meet. Single-minded pursuit of an infrastructure agenda causes unacknowledged displacements and poverty. Similarly the fact that addressing the needs of the urban poor can lead to improvement in overall living conditions is also not acknowledged. There are mixed messages and policy directions. Policy can be pulled in either direction, with the infrastructure agenda being pushed through lobby groups and a poverty agenda pushed through street demonstrations and sometimes through the exigencies of electoral politics. The JNNURM is an embodiment of these confusions, conflict and fragmentation of the urban paradigm and policy space.

### Urban Renewal Mission

The objectives, design and reforms of the JNNURM have been discussed elsewhere. This essay attempts to establish the fragmented nature of the entire mission’s implementation. When the JNNURM was designed, there was strong apprehension that it would lead to exclusion of the poor and capture of urban space by urban elite (Mahadevia 2006). Reviewing processes in Mumbai, Banerjee-Guha (2009) argued that the JNNURM had become an official carrier of the neo-liberal agenda. To some extent that has been true, as Kundu and Samanta (2011: 62-63) show:

[O]nly 58% of the urban population has been covered under JNNURM, the coverage being high in the developed states and metropolitan cities. ... [there is] greater bias on improving the efficiency in the functioning of the overall city economy and meeting the infrastructural deficiencies at the macro-level rather than addressing the issues of distributional inadequacy and improving the access of the poor to these.

The JNNURM project proposals were to be preceded by preparation of City Development Plans (CDP), ideally to identify the city’s development priorities through stakeholder participation. The stakeholders were selectively called, participatory processes,

if at all undertaken were shoddily done. The CDP preparation was arbitrary and undemocratically completed by experts, many of whom had no prior knowledge of the city or cities (Citizens' Groups 2009) and certainly no stake.<sup>3</sup> The poor, if at all they found a reference in these documents, were not viewed as participants, stakeholders or subjects of change, but instead as beneficiaries or objects of change and thereby at the mercy of the official stakeholders, experts and the urban local body (ULB) officials.

The original fears were partially allayed with the expansion of the list of cities to be included and the introduction of investment programmes for non-mission cities and towns, namely, the Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT), which is equivalent to the Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) component of the mission cities and the Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme (IHSDP), equivalent to the BSUP of the mission cities. The earlier apprehension that only infrastructure projects would be taken up also got addressed with the introduction of a norm of 40% JNNURM fund allocation to the BSUP component.

There has been progress in urban investment in small and medium towns (SMT) subsequently. In all, proposals have been sent for 640 towns (of some 5,000) under the UIDSSMT by August-end 2010 (Table 1) for 763 projects.<sup>4</sup> On average, 1.2 project proposals have been sent per SMT, unlike in the UIG component wherein mission cities have sent more than one proposal per city. On the whole, UIDSSMT funding applications are only 21% of the total UIG applications from the states. The interest of the states is indeed in improving the infrastructure situation in the mission cities and not in the SMTs.

But, not all states have this dismal interest in UIDSSMT. Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan have sent in UIDSSMT proposals equalling about 50%

and more of the UIG funding requests. An old study on municipal finances found that if the municipal corporations were excluded, per capita grants were the highest to small towns of population size up to 50,000 in Andhra Pradesh (Mahadevia and Mukherjee 2003). Punjab also had lower inequality among different size classes of towns in terms of per capita income and expenditure. Gujarat was the most unequal in terms of per capita income, per capita expenditure, per capita grant and per capita debt, with the SMTs at great disadvantage compared to the metros (Mahadevia and Mukherjee 2003). This trend is further corroborated by the UIDSSMT proposals sent from Gujarat. The total funds applied for under the UIDSSMT from the state are just 8.2% of the funds applied for under the UIG! The UIDSSMT to UIG proportion in the projects funds approved is 8% in another state: West Bengal.

The picture changes when we look at actual realisation of proposals, assessed through analysis of Additional Central Assistance (ACA) released. The success rate of project applications has been higher in the UIDSSMT as compared to UIG. Of the total project funds approved, the actual ACA released stands at 19.3% on average in the UIG for the major states in India (Tables 1-4) whereas it stands at 54.3% for the UIDSSMT. Under the UIDSSMT, the central government contributes 80% of the project costs and releases the ACA in two instalments, whereas under the UIG, the central share is only 35% of the project cost, released in four instalments. Hence, at the onset, there is an equalisation process at the central level to assist the SMTs even if the states are not too keen to submit proposals. Thus, the proportion of ACA released for the UIDSSMT to that for UIG projects is 58% at the all-India level for the major states listed in Table 1. For some states, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala and Punjab, this proportion is more than 100%. But, the bias in favour of large cities is quite high in Gujarat, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and West Bengal (Table 1).

**Table 1: State Sectoral Shares: UIDSSMT versus UIG**

States	Water Supply	Sewerage	Storm Water	WaterBody Management	Solid Waste Management	Heritage	Road	Total Approved	Number of Towns	UIDSSMT to UIG (%) (Total Approved)	UIDSSMT to UIG (%) (Total ACA Released)
Andhra Pradesh	73.0	14.2	7.7	0.0	0.1	0.0	4.9	100.0	69	54.1	174.63
Assam	9.0	0.0	91.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	28	65.8	69.99
Bihar	37.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8	0.0	58.4	100.0	11	36.7	108.27
Chhattisgarh	24.3	75.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	3	82.8	36.98
Gujarat	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	52	8.2	21.85
Haryana	0.0	66.4	0.0	0.0	33.6	0.0	0.0	100.0	7	233	56.97
Himachal	0.0	0.0	26.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	63.4	100.0	3	13.2	37.16
Jammu and Kashmir	46.9	0.0	23.6	0.1	6.4	4.2	18.8	100.0	13	75.0	155.78
Jharkhand	83.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.4	0.0	0.0	100.0	4	12.7	33.18
Karnataka	61.3	11.4	10.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.6	100.0	30	20.8	63.71
Kerala	79.8	11.6	0.0	0.0	8.5	0.0	0.0	100.0	22	42.9	105.00
Madhya Pradesh	77.1	20.8	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	1.9	100.0	33	33.6	73.82
Maharashtra	76.8	18.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.9	100.0	86	23.9	51.91
Orissa	56.9	2.7	0.0	9.9	0.0	7.7	22.8	100.0	12	27.4	57.01
Punjab	15.0	85.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	14	54.6	122.24
Rajasthan	25.0	65.2	3.3	1.1	0.0	1.0	4.4	100.0	35	49.6	74.98
Tamil Nadu	53.6	34.5	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0	11.1	100.0	115	14.9	58.95
Uttarakhand	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	1	15.4	19.40
Uttar Pradesh	41.6	24.7	1.9	0.0	14.5	0.0	17.5	100.0	46	21.7	51.42
West Bengal	82.1	3.2	12.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	100.0	25	8.0	33.61
All India	61.2	22.5	5.8	0.2	2.5	0.3	7.4	100.0	640	21.0	57.64

(1) No parking projects sent for approval under the UIDSSMT.

(2) Situation as on 31 August 2010.

Source: Calculated from MoUD UIDSSMT website data and JNNURM website data.

Interestingly and rightly, about 84% of the projects funds applied for in the UDSSMR have been for water supply and sewerage, the former having a share of 61% and the latter 23% (Table 1). The lack of city-level infrastructure networks for water supply and sanitation are indeed the bottlenecks in improving basic services at the household level. There are a few states that deviate from this general behaviour: Assam (91% of the approved project funds are for storm water drainage) and Himachal Pradesh (63% for roads). In Uttar Pradesh, water supply, sewerage, solid waste management and roads are all important sectors, but, water supply constitute only 42% of the project funds approved.

The sectoral composition changes in the UIG projects, with transport emerging as an important sector after water supply and sewerage. The latter two sectors have a share of 57.4% in project funds approved (Table 2). In transport, roads and flyovers have a 13.3% and mass transit an 8.6% share. The HPEC (2011: xxv) states that JNNURM has rightly emphasised water supply and sanitation programmes under the UIG component, but that there has been inadequate emphasis on the transport sector. Hence it proposes that 44.12% of the total investments in infrastructure to be in roads, and another 11.47% in transport, taking the total of the transport sector to about 56%. But investments in road infrastructure without taking into account the needs for pedestrians and cyclists could make roads the exclusive domains of those with private motorised vehicles, particularly four wheelers. Our cities are very poor in laying the infrastructure for pedestrians, cyclists and users of non-motorised transport.

In Tables 2 and 3, the figures marked in italics are the ones where the state's share in a particular sector is higher than that sector's share at all India level. For example, in Table 2, water

supply's share in total approved funds for the projects is 33.6% at the national level, but, in Andhra Pradesh, this sector's share in the funds approved is 47.3%.

Metropolitan cities, aspiring to be "world-class" are laying emphasis on road infrastructure, which would benefit those with private vehicles more than the general population, whereas other cities are still grappling with provision of basic infrastructure such as water supply and sanitation. For instance, in Delhi, the roads and flyovers sector has a 56% share in approved projects reflecting its importance in the state's priorities. Interestingly, in sectoral share of funds approved, all states except Gujarat and Karnataka have significant shares of water supply and sewerage projects. In Karnataka, storm water drainage and then roads, flyovers and transport are important. In Gujarat, only mass transit (namely the bus rapid transport system or BRTS) is the most important sector. Surprisingly, in Maharashtra, which has the largest and the eighth largest metropolises, water supply followed by sewerage are most important sectors. We find a similar pattern when we look at the data on ACA released (Table 3, p 60).

The BSUP projects are largely for new housing construction. From the detailed project reports (DPRS) list available from the MOHUPA website,<sup>5</sup> only a few approved DPRS were for slum upgradation and other MOHUPA priorities such as markets for street vendors. Hence, the whole idea of reaching out to the poor under the BSUP gets diluted in the very approach to housing taken by the state governments. In fact, studies have now shown that the urban poor tend to stay in informal housing and improve it incrementally (Mahadevia 2011). Theoretically, it has been argued that the best policy is to extend them tenure security and microcredit to facilitate housing improvements.<sup>6</sup> India has repeatedly

**Table 2: Sectoral Share in Amount Approved by States, UIG**

State	Water Supply	Sewerage	Storm Water	WaterBody Management	Solid Waste Management	Heritage	Parking	Road and Flyover	Mass Transit	Other Transport	Urban Renewal	Total Approved	% Share of State in Approvals	Difference between State's Urban Population Share and Approval Share
Andhra Pradesh	47.3	20.6	12.1	-	1.3	-	-	3.8	13.3	-	1.7	100.0	7.6	-0.90
Assam	88.9	-	-	-	11.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	0.5	0.51
Bihar	79.7	13.5	-	-	6.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1.2	2.62
Chhattisgarh	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	0.5	1.10
Gujarat	16.6	22.9	16.0	0.5	4.0	1.4	-	9.2	29.3	-	-	100.0	8.9	-2.62
Haryana	70.1	14.7	4.4	-	10.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1.2	1.16
Himachal	47.2	35.7	-	-	10.5	-	-	6.6	-	-	-	100.0	0.3	-0.08
Jammu and Kashmir	50.7	49.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	0.9	-0.16
Jharkhand	85.9	-	-	-	14.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1.3	1.01
Karnataka	10.1	16.6	40.9	-	0.9	1.2	-	17.8	-	12.5	-	100.0	5.5	0.48
Kerala	28.9	41.6	5.0	-	11.3	-	-	11.0	-	-	2.2	100.0	1.7	0.87
Madhya Pradesh	37.0	20.1	15.7	-	1.9	2.1	2.5	4.7	14.8	-	1.2	100.0	3.8	2.66
Maharashtra	39.3	19.4	12.7	0.5	3.2	0.4	-	8.6	15.8	0.2	-	100.0	18.9	-4.65
Orissa	20.6	61.4	17.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	100.0	1.4	0.42
Punjab	31.0	38.4	-	-	10.0	-	-	20.6	-	-	-	100.0	1.2	1.49
Rajasthan	28.9	24.2	-	0.4	1.1	-	-	-	39.0	-	6.4	100.0	2.1	3.59
Tamil Nadu	31.8	26.2	32.6	-	7.9	0.1	-	1.4	-	-	-	100.0	9.9	-1.98
Uttarakhand	30.8	34.2	-	9.9	12.6	-	-	12.4	-	-	-	100.0	0.7	0.10
Uttar Pradesh	40.8	43.5	11.2	-	4.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	9.0	5.26
West Bengal	62.2	12.4	-	0.8	4.4	-	-	15.3	5.3	-	0.4	100.0	8.0	-1.85
Delhi	-	24.5	5.1	-	-	-	9.9	55.8	-	1.3	3.3	100.0	12.7	-7.69
All-India	33.6	23.8	13.2	0.2	3.7	0.4	1.4	13.3	8.6	0.9	0.8	100.0	100.0	1.33

(1) Situation as on 19 August 2010.

(2) The share of the states included in the table to total UIG approvals is 97.0% whereas their share in the total population is 98.3%. Source: Calculated from the data available on the JNNURM website.

overlooked this wisdom and gone ahead with promoting new house construction, which has been either highly unaffordable or unsuitable for the urban poor. In essence, this approach to housing has supported construction lobbies more than shelter security for the urban poor.

On the whole, the BSUP component was expected to have 40% and UIG 60% of the share of JNNURM funds. This means that the BSUP funding should be about 66.6% of the UIG funding. In reality, for approved projects, BSUP is 45% of the UIG and with regard to ACA released, BSUP is 52% of the UIG (Table 4, p 61). In BSUP, the national government contributes 80% of the approved cost of the dwelling unit. Over time, however, the real costs far exceeded approved costs in many BSUP projects; the states were expected to fill this gap. Thus, Mahadevia (2010) has shown that in Patna, as a result, the BSUP projects did not take off. In Ahmedabad, the city government is meeting this gap. What has happened and what is happening with the BSUP projects would require an entire paper. But, since the central share in the BSUP is so high, the ACA released is large in comparison to that for the UIG.

BSUP projects have different approaches in different cities. Ahmedabad and Surat have constructed new units largely on the city periphery.<sup>7</sup> In Hyderabad too, the location is on the periphery (Mahadevia and Gogoi 2010). In Bangalore and Pune, the units are constructed on the site of the slum. In Madhya Pradesh also, on-site redevelopment has been undertaken. In situ redevelopment of slums means that the city is willing to give prime lands to the poor communities. Putting BSUP housing on the periphery means that the cities are pushing out the poor from prime lands. In cities such as Ahmedabad, Hyderabad and Surat too, BSUP units are being used for resettling those affected by infrastructure and

city beautification projects allowing urban rehabilitation for the first time. At the national level therefore, the picture is once again mixed.

The situation will change only if cities are able to absorb the funds. The city is able to absorb or utilise the funds sanctioned only if it can go ahead and implement the project. Since the city gets partial funding, it has to, on its own or with state government support, supply the balance. The state government as well as the city government must have matching finances. Thus, only cities and states with better financial capability are able to absorb the sanctioned ACA. Second, the city must have capability to implement the projects, which means that it must have adequate and trained staff. Third, the city must be able to put out tenders and it is essential that there are contractors to bid for tenders. Mahadevia (2010) showed that in Bihar, there were no private sector firms who could bid for projects and hence the state had to put out tenders several times for BSUP projects. The city government then should be able to meet their obligations to the contractors. Many cities are unable to do so.

The inbuilt mechanism in JNNURM for release of the next tranche of funds is achievement of mandatory reforms. If the state and the city are unable to implement the reforms, the ACA is not released. As explained at length in Mahadevia (2010), fulfilment of reforms conditions often requires structural changes in the ULB and the state, which are difficult and hence not met. Lastly, the cities must have capability to develop DPRs. In all, many governance and financial failures at the city level can impede acquisition and absorption of funds for development projects. Thus, although the JNNURM has brought additional money, progress at the city level is slower than expected, leading

**Table 3: Sectoral Share in ACA Released by States, UIG**

State	Water Supply	Sewerage	Storm Water	Water Body Management	Solid Waste Management	Heritage	Parking	Road and Flyover	Mass Transit	Other Transport	Urban Renewal	Total Approved	% Share of State in ACA Released	Difference between State's Urban Population Share and ACA Released Share
Andhra Pradesh	48.3	19.0	11.6	-	0.7	-	-	3.3	15.3	-	1.8	100.0	8.4	-1.67
Assam	88.9	-	-	-	11.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1.2	-0.16
Bihar	74.4	19.5	-	-	6.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	0.8	2.97
Chhattisgarh	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1.5	0.07
Gujarat	19.0	20.2	24.1	0.3	3.4	0.5	-	11.3	21.3	-	-	100.0	10.8	-4.52
Haryana	52.3	33.0	6.5	-	8.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1.0	1.34
Himachal	47.6	28.6	-	-	10.5	-	-	13.3	-	-	-	100.0	0.3	-0.08
Jammu and Kashmir	49.9	50.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1.0	-0.27
Jharkhand	85.7	-	-	-	14.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1.0	1.26
Karnataka	16.6	7.6	34.6	-	1.0	1.3	-	17.7	-	21.3	-	100.0	5.3	0.64
Kerala	36.3	31.7	5.6	-	16.3	-	-	8.3	-	-	1.7	100.0	1.4	1.15
Madhya Pradesh	41.7	20.0	10.1	-	3.4	2.0	1.5	7.9	11.4	-	2.1	100.0	4.0	2.42
Maharashtra	37.8	15.9	12.3	0.3	2.3	1.3	-	7.6	22.1	0.3	-	100.0	22.2	-7.97
Orissa	21.0	62.6	15.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	100.0	1.3	0.43
Punjab	19.2	23.7	-	-	6.2	-	-	50.9	-	-	-	100.0	1.2	1.46
Rajasthan	48.6	24.9	-	0.3	1.3	-	-	-	20.8	-	4.1	100.0	3.2	2.44
Tamil Nadu	31.5	28.3	28.4	-	9.5	0.1	-	2.3	-	-	-	100.0	8.0	-0.10
Uttarakhand	57.3	20.8	-	6.2	8.0	-	-	7.8	-	-	-	100.0	1.1	-0.31
Uttar Pradesh	48.8	36.3	10.8	-	4.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	9.6	4.63
West Bengal	57.6	15.3	9.0	-	5.2	-	-	12.7	-	-	0.3	100.0	5.7	0.46
Delhi	-	24.9	-	-	-	-	10.1	56.9	3.4	1.3	3.4	100.0	5.5	-0.52
All-India	38.0	21.3	13.5	0.2	3.6	0.5	0.7	9.9	10.4	1.3	0.6	100.0	100.0	3.76

(1) Situation as on 19 August 2010.

(2) The share of the states included in the table to total UIG approvals is 94.6% whereas their share in the total population is 98.3%.

Source: Calculated from the JNNURM website data.

**Table 4: BSUP Details**

States	Cities from Which DPRs Received	Number of DPRs Received	Central Share to Project Cost (%)	BSUP to UIG (Approved) (%)	BSUP to UIG (ACA Released)	Difference between State's Urban Population Share and Approval Share
1 Andhra Pradesh	3	43	49.75	66.17	85.34	-4.5
2 Assam	1	8	90.00	34.30	34.31	0.6
3 Bihar	2	18	44.05	99.74	79.31	1.2
4 Chhattisgarh	1	6	78.92	152.32	92.92	-0.1
5 Gujarat	4	20	48.10	32.10	48.61	-0.1
6 Haryana	1	5	48.54	9.12	26.46	2.1
7 Himachal	1	2	76.09	15.67	15.02	0.1
8 Jammu and Kashmir	2	5	82.79	30.55	28.53	0.1
9 Jharkhand	3	11	67.87	48.68	52.13	0.9
10 Karnataka	2	25	54.60	22.76	26.07	3.2
11 Kerala	2	7	67.96	34.44	67.66	1.3
12 Madhya Pradesh	4	37	48.86	31.04	30.96	3.8
13 Maharashtra	5	66	47.44	60.22	53.51	-11.2
14 Orissa	2	6	72.61	9.19	8.50	1.5
15 Punjab	2	3	49.91	9.98	17.99	2.4
16 Rajasthan	2	4	56.10	37.32	22.55	3.9
17 Tamil Nadu	3	65	44.76	39.32	52.08	-0.8
18 Uttarakhand	3	13	75.94	21.49	13.83	0.4
19 Uttar Pradesh	7	70	48.85	43.50	46.61	5.5
20 West Bengal	2	93	48.81	68.51	100.71	-6.1
21 Delhi	1	19	42.37	23.91	35.11	-1.8
Above total	53	526	49.51	44.25	51.79	2.5
All-India	63	549	50.54	44.80	52.26	-

to HPEC's critique of JNNURM. "Mission has more generally exposed the lack of capacity at local government level to prepare and implement projects in urban infrastructure" (2011: 33).

Lastly, the question remains as to whether the funds infused are adequate to meet existing service and housing gaps. In housing, the National Urban Housing and Habitat Policy, 2007 has estimated a housing shortage of 24.7 million dwelling units at the end of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, or 2007.<sup>8</sup> Up till September 2010, 1.5 million housing units were sanctioned under the BSUP and IHSDP together and 0.35 million completed, indicating that there is a long way to go, and the goal may not be ever reached at this rate through this approach. Further, for ensuring shelter security for all, cities will have to give up some lands, though the proportion is not very large (Mahadevia 2009). The JNNURM or NIJNNURM is not ever likely to improve housing conditions of the urban poor if it follows the approach JNNURM has taken.

Will the UIG and UIDSSMT funds be adequate to meet urban infrastructure deficits? McKinsey Global Institute's (MGI) (2010) report on India's urbanisation estimates requirement of \$1.2 trillion over a period of 20 years or Rs 2,700 billion per year to stop the slide and meet the global standards. HPEC (2011) has put the total fund requirement at Rs 39.19 trillion over the 20-year period or about Rs 1,959 billion per year to meet infrastructure deficits. The JNNURM projects approved in five years since the start of the mission have been about Rs 0.6 trillion over four or so years,<sup>9</sup> that is Rs 150 billion per year.

The ground is being set for private sector participation in the NIJNNURM. These figures also are for generating huge business opportunities for the private corporate sector globally and for pushing the Indian government to open up basic services for the private sector, a project being tested in a few cities such as Delhi, Bangalore, etc. The JNNURM reform of 100% cost recovery on

water supply operations and maintenance has been a test for cities' ability to recover these costs. The success here has not been as per expectations; cities have not been able to change their revenue base drastically (Mahadevia 2010).

JNNURM implementation shows that world class status has not been achieved through it. On the contrary, all cities, including those aspiring to be world class such as Mumbai, are still struggling to put in basic infrastructure such as for water supply and sewerage.

Realising the slow achievements of the BSUP, the new housing programme RAY has been announced. It requires that slum communities should partner in the shelter programme and that the cities should pass legislation to formalise land tenure or give property rights to the slum dwellers. The new programme

anticipates in situ upgradation or redevelopment of slums according to the demand of the residents. The tricky part in the new programme is the grant of property titles to the slum dwellers a la De Soto. Would this lead to land capture and displacements? Mahadevia (2011) argues that it is very much likely to be the case. But, if the slum redevelopment is through community participation, the benefits could also reach the urban poor. As is the trend, we see both the possibilities in RAY. A real RAY of hope is that the National Alliance of People's Movement (NAPM) has asked the state government of Maharashtra to implement RAY in the slums of Mumbai, particularly where slums dwellers are demanding implementation.<sup>10</sup>

To sum up then, in spite of JNNURM, Indian cities are expected to change slowly. Then why do we have such tall claims and loud declarations about rapid urban change? In this author's assessment, in the name of economic growth and transition to world-class cities, individual interests can enter the play.

### Cities for Sale

Land scams and land grabs by powerful interests – politicians, bureaucrats, and some large corporates – have at best taken advantage of and at worst promoted the rhetoric and branding of world-class cities. The biggest of these scam in the name of urban development has been that around the Commonwealth Games (CWG).<sup>11</sup> Cities and the politician-bureaucrat nexus have also been in the lead in land scams in Maharashtra.<sup>12</sup> The Adarsh scam in Mumbai, for instance, benefited politicians, their relatives, bureaucrats, army personnel, in all a handful of people. The Bangalore land scam benefited a handful of politicians, their friends and relatives and bureaucrats (Khan 2010).

Even in the absence of scams, urban lands have become speculative entities for the amassing of wealth or what is called primitive

accumulation. States have passed township policies after the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA) was repealed so private firms could assemble land parcels. Gujarat and Karnataka have been active in this regard, the former having immunity from accountability in the name of economic growth and the latter in the name of information technology (IT) development. In 2002, the president of the Bellandur panchayat on Bangalore's southern periphery accused India's best known IT company Infosys of grabbing 118 acres of the most productive land in his village (Benjamin 2008).

The land grabs have also occurred through the many new townships and special economic zones (SEZ) that have come up around many metropolitan cities. Examples include Cyberabad, a 53 square kilometre city outside the existing twin cities of Hyderabad-Secunderabad (Ramachandriah and Prasad 2008), the Rajiv Gandhi Infotech Park at Hingewadi in 2,342 hectares, where farmers protested (Mahadevia and Parashar 2008), two large SEZs in Navi Mumbai area, land acquisition has been put off for one of which due to resistance from the farmers, and various townships proposed on the Yamuna Expressway, which faced violent farmer protests, alleging that the lands were acquired and also given away to the private developers at rates much lower than the market price.<sup>13</sup>

Do we expect the poor to find housing in these new developments? Land and real estate prices have increased so dramatically in the last few years that it has become almost impossible for even the middle classes to access formal housing in the metropolitan cities. This has led the central government to redefine "affordable housing" in the 2011-12 budget,<sup>14</sup> as housing with a price tag of Rs 25 lakh. Last financial year, the definition was applicable to housing with a price of Rs 20 lakh. A 1% interest subsidy for loans for such housing has been announced and the maximum available loan limit has been increased from Rs 10 lakh to Rs 15 lakh, which means that the households have to pay Rs 10 lakh upfront. Would these be poor households? A loan of Rs 15 lakh can be affordable and available to only those whose monthly family income is at the least Rs 50,000. Are these the poor for whom the interest subsidy is being given? The current speculative land and property markets have created a situation wherein even the professional middle class is priced out of the market in the metropolitan cities and the government is forced to subsidise them. This interest subsidy in a way benefits real estate speculators; property price increases are largely due to speculation.

As a result of these vast interests in urban and urbanising lands, what the post-2000 period has brought to the metropolitan cities is large-scale demolitions, some such as Mumbai's 2004-05 (Mahadevia and Narayanan 2008) and Delhi's for the construction of the CWG facilities (Batra and Mehra 2008), begun even before the launch of JNNURM, and implementation of JNNURM infrastructure projects (Citizen's Groups 2009; Our Inclusive Ahmedabad 2010).

The CWG was an excuse to demolish slums on the Yamuna Pushta and dump them at a site more than 35 km outside the city on land without facilities (Batra and Mehra 2008). An estimated 75,000 households have been evicted and the lands have been used for not just CWG facilities, but also building a temple

(Akshardham) and luxury apartments. Dupont (2008: 83) reports that 217 slum sites were demolished during 1990 to 2007 and 64,619 households relocated. The figures vary, but the enormity of the displacements is striking. Dupont (2008: 84) also shows that 50% of demolished sites were not developed at all and remained vacant during their survey in 2007, 21% were converted into parks and green spaces and only 15% built up. Evidently, slum demolitions were to fulfil the priority of "clean-green-beautiful" vision of the city at the expense of the right to housing of the poor" (Dupont 2008: 85). Bhan (2011: 127) gives a figure of 45,000 homes demolished between 2004 and 2007 in Delhi.

Mumbai's 2004-05 slum evictions have been well documented and discussed under the theme of "Shanghaing Mumbai" (Mahadevia and Narayanan 2008, Bhide 2008). As per Our Inclusive Ahmedabad's public hearing held in December 2009, about 28,000 slum dwelling units were demolished in the city in 2006-08 and another 2,000 households were served notice for eviction on account of various urban infrastructure projects (Our Inclusive Ahmedabad 2010). The Sabarmati Riverfront project is expected to evict about 14,000 households directly as well as indirectly (Our Inclusive Ahmedabad 2010). About 1,000 houses were demolished in the period from 4-6 May 2011 in violation of the Gujarat High Court order of no demolition without alternative housing (Express News Service 2011). The project-affected households, including those living on the riverbank, are being rehabilitated under the BSUP schemes, many in the main city but many also on the periphery, where they have been dumped on sites without basic services, causing slide into poverty (Our Inclusive Ahmedabad 2010).<sup>15</sup>

### Slip between the Cup and the Lip

The urban story or to be correct, the metropolitan story so far has been one of big visions and elite capture in many cases, bordering on scam, through a predatory local state in cahoots with crony capitalists. Simultaneously, there has been deliberate policy confusion, fragmentation of urban policy and implementation, all leading to apparent chaos and gradual transformation of the cities, out of sync with the vision documents and expectations of city visionaries and experts. The JNNURM, for example, is doing something for infrastructure, something for housing, all in a project-by-project uncoordinated manner fortunately not heeding the proposals in hasty, ad hoc and undemocratically prepared CDPs. The promises of rapid city transformation have not been met. The way urban processes are unfolding, we can certainly say that neither the infrastructure agenda nor shelter security for all is advancing at a rapid rate.

Similarly fears about the total expunging of the existing poor have not yet materialised, though over the last few decades, the process has been set into motion. The pushing out of the poor to the periphery in Delhi and Mumbai has been very evident. But large tracts of lands in the central parts of cities continue to be occupied by the slums. JNNURM housing has been used for rehabilitating project-affected populations in some cities such as Ahmedabad, Surat and Hyderabad. In mega cities such as Mumbai and Delhi, there is less evidence of resettlement.

**Table 5: Household-Level Service Achievement** (%; 2002-09)

Development Indicator	2002	2008-09
Households in pucca houses	87.7	91.7
Slum households in pucca houses	48.0	57.0
Households in bottom 20% consumption class living in pucca housing	-	76.4
Households in bottom 20-40% consumption class living in pucca housing	-	85.7
Households having access to tap water	73.6	74.3
Slum households having access to tap water	78.0	78.0
Households having access to bathroom	68.5	78.5
Households in bottom 20% having access to bathroom	-	52.8
Households in bottom 20-40% having access to bathroom	-	68.1
Households having access to latrines	22.1	88.7
Households in bottom 20% consumption class having access to latrines	-	66.7
Households in bottom 20-40% consumption class having access to latrines	-	80.2
Slum households having access to latrine	-	85.3
Households having access to latrine for exclusive household use	53.5	58.1
Households in bottom 20% consumption class having access to latrine for exclusive household use	-	34.3
Households in bottom 20-40% consumption class having access to latrine for exclusive household use	-	46.8
Slum households having access to latrine for exclusive household use	-	10.2
Households connected to drainage	70.7	84.0
Households connected to underground or covered drainage	51.2	58.5
Slum households connected to underground or covered drainage	27.0	37.5

Source: National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) (2003, 2004, 2010a, 2010b).

The urban reality has been gradual improvements in the cities, with or without the JNNURM. The improvements have been through both people's own investments in housing and basic infrastructure at the local level and also ULB or state government investments in trunk as well as settlement-level infrastructure. Improvement in coverage of water supply through taps has occurred to the extent of the ULBs initiative. Individual households have themselves constructed latrines and bathrooms; coverage has improved significantly in the last decade. In the slums and for the bottom 40% of the population, access to individual latrines still remains to be achieved (Table 5). At the city level, availability

of covered or underground drainage in the slums is severely lagging. Improvement in this infrastructure has not been as rapid as for other basic infrastructure.

Do these snapshots of the urban development processes reveal any meta-picture? We observe gradual improvement in urban basic services availability at aggregate level. Disaggregated data shows that improvements for the bottom half of the urban poor are slower than for the remaining population (Table 5). There are two reasons for this. In the metropolitan cities, improvements for bottom half largely living in slums is slow because of lack of tenure security in the non-notified slums. Second, the poor are concentrated in the non-metropolitan cities, which do not even have capacity to extend basic services, leave aside address questions of poverty.

The JNNURM is a mixed bag, showing results in some places and failing in others. In this game, vested interests have been pushed in. The Citizens' Groups (2009) report shows that there have been arbitrary changes in land use to accommodate prime or fashionable projects, while informal housing and economic activity running against planning restrictions have not been permitted. The city as a whole may or may not have benefited through some JNNURM projects.

When the city is branded, through fashion statements such as riverfront projects, etc, hiding behind these dreams are acts of land capture (some bordering on scams) and slum demolitions. Individuals benefit from such projects and not the public exchequer as envisaged by mainstream policymakers. These visions also divert ULB attention from their regular job and supporting the incremental efforts of the poor, which include successful incremental housing efforts such as the Slum Networking Programme (SNP) in Ahmedabad. These incremental efforts by the poor, however, do not bring in big players such as the consultants, contractors, builders, and with them, the rent seekers. The RAY for shelter security can be effective if we learn from our experience and go slow. Let us not glamorise cities and urban development, let us slog it out, considering people as participants in the process and not as beneficiaries. Any big bang approach is a sure route to elite capture and displacement of the poor.

#### NOTES

- 1 "Overview: Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission", accessed on 17 July 2011, <http://jnnurm.nic.in/nurmudweb/toolkit/Overview.pdf>
- 2 Foreign national typically means a Bangladeshi or Bengali Muslim. "Regulations for the Rehabilitation and Redevelopment of the Slums 2010", accessed 22 June 2010: <http://www.udd.gujarat.gov.in/udd/smPolicy.pdf>.
- 3 The joke going around that time was that CDPs have been prepared in such a hasty and impersonal manner that they all looked the same and only some very specific details such as population changed with each city CDP. The review of CDPs has also shown that the data were incorrect or outdated, or not referenced, raising questions on the authenticity of the data sources and hence the strategies proposed.
- 4 Data retrieved from the MoUD UIDSSMT page, accessed on 15 February 2011: <http://www.urbanindia.nic.in/programme/ud/uidssmtbody.htm#uidssmt>
- 5 Accessed 15 February 2011: [https://jnnurmmis.nic.in/jnnurm\\_hupa/jnnurm/DPR\\_BSUP-status.pdf](https://jnnurmmis.nic.in/jnnurm_hupa/jnnurm/DPR_BSUP-status.pdf)

6 For discussion, see Mahadevia (2011).

7 From the personal visit of this author.

8 "Housing and Urban Policy in India", accessed on 15 February 2011: <http://mhupa.gov.in/policies/index2.htm>

9 Considering that the proposals would have come after a year of the announcement of the mission, as in the first year, the cities would have spent preparing CDPs.

10 Citizen News Service (2011), "Medha Patkar Continues Her Hunger Strike on 3rd Consecutive Day", accessed on 22 May: <http://www.citizen-news.org/2011/05/medha-patkar-continues-her-hunger.html>

11 The CWG scam is still unfolding and more skeletons could tumble out of the closet. Details up to a point can be found in Majumdar and Mehta (2010).

12 The figures in Khetan (2011) are mind-boggling: the present chief minister scrapped real estate projects worth Rs 12,500 crore; 102 acres of land was given away to a builder at just Rs 4,058; two former chief ministers together sanctioned townships worth Rs 55,000 crore invoking slum redevelopment legislation.

13 It has been argued that the government acquired land from the farmers at prices as low as Rs 450-850 for a sq m but sold those later to private developers at Rs 4,500-5,500 per sq m. These developers are now selling the same land at Rs 15,000-17,000 per sq yard (Sharma and Rai 2011).

14 "Low-cost Housing Loans of Rs 15 Lakh to Get 1% Interest Sop", *Indian Express*, 28 February 2011, accessed on 28 February 2011: <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/lowcost-housing-loans-of-rs-15-lakh-to-get-1-interest-sop/755815/>

15 This author is a member of Gujarat High Court appointed Rehabilitation Monitoring Committee, where she observes the vacillation between inclusion and exclusion in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's (AMC) approach.

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